Rising BRICSAM

'Breaking' Knowledge, Information and Commentary on Rising BRICSAM and Global Governance Summitry

Rising BRICSAM

The Impact of the UN Summit of the Future (SOTF)

The Global Summit Project (GSP), as I’ve written in the past, has targeted as one of its main research interests, the national and international actions to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  It is therefore not a big surprise that I was attracted to my good colleague, Stewart Patrick’s webinar initiative examining the Summit of the Future (SOTF) in the context of global governance. The SOTF, as much of the immediate UN efforts is concerned, in part, with achieving the SDGs. Stewart is the director of the Carnegie Endowment’s (CEIP)  Global Order and Institutions Program. Bravely he brought together for a CEIP webinar conversation – “Is This the Moment to Renew Global Governance? Prospects for the UN Summit of the Future” – Guy Ryder, UN Under-Secretary-General for Policy, Jake Sherman, Minister Counselor, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Minh-Thu Pham, Nonresident Scholar, CEIP. Stewart acted as moderator for this session.

This webinar is well worth listening to. We have folks who have real insights into UN reform and into achieving the SDGs. We will see, I suspect, over the coming months a growing number of presentations and events concerned with SOTF. The SOTF is the second UN summit and like the first will be held at the UNGA opening week in September. And also like the first, Heads of State and Government will be in attendance for this second of the ‘Two Summits’.

The first – the SDG Summit called member leaders to attend at the UN to review the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This first Summit, encouraged by the UN Secretary General,

… carried out a comprehensive review of the state of the SDGs, responded to the impact of multiple and interlocking crises facing the world, and provided high-level political guidance on transformative and accelerated actions leading up to the 2030 deadline for achieving the SDGs.

The SDG Summit was chaired by the President of the General Assembly. The evidence to date reveals, unfortunately, that this most important of  global efforts is way off track and notwithstanding the urging from all to accelerate the effort to achieve the SDGs, it will be a very difficult uphill battle to achieve the goals.

The second of the Two Summits is the Summit of the Future. According to the UN and the Secretary General:

The Summit of the Future is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

The Summit of the Future has already produced a draft – the zero draft – of the final Summit document – the “Pact for the Future”. An extensive document, the Pact for the Future covers five areas:

  • Sustainable development  and financing for development
  • International peace and security
  • Science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation
  • Youth and future generations
  • Transforming global governance

Indeed it is an extensive document and well worth spending some time on. But a review reveals somewhat oddly that the document covers not just UN areas of focus but extends beyond them. This includes, for instance, reforms to international financial architecture, institutions not part of the UN system including the World Bank, the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). The Document does not back away from calling for reform of these institutions as well as those in the UN system – most notably reforming the Security Council:

To enhance our cooperation, we need a multilateral system that is fit for the future, ready to address the political, economic, environmental and technological changes in the world, and with the agility to adapt to an uncertain future. We know that multilateral institutions – especially the Security Council and the international financial architecture – have struggled to address the scale of the challenges they face and live up to the world’s expectations of them. Too often, international commitments that are made, remain unfulfilled. …

 

We reaffirm our declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations [that was 2020], and we commit to accelerating our pursuit of the 12 commitments contained therein, including through the measures outlined in this Pact. We further re-affirm the importance of the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its centre. We recognize that the multilateral system must keep pace with a changing world. To that end, we commit to concrete steps to reinvigorate this system, fill critical gaps in global governance, and accelerate efforts to keep our past promises and agreements. Through this Pact for the Future, we commit to build a multilateral system that delivers for everyone, everywhere. We commit to concrete action in five broad areas, as follows.

The discussion with Stewart in this webinar over the Summit of the Future is animated by very knowledgeable folk from the UN and near it. But a review of the Document reveals, it seems to me, and not so obviously discussed in the webinar, that the SOTF zero draft focuses on the ‘What’.  What needs to be reformed, what needs to be added to the UN and the multilateral system? But what is missing is the ‘How’. It is not the first examination – with strong detail, to discuss the reform and updating of the UN system and indeed beyond that to the international financial architecture. But like earlier documents before it and with serious discussions about this Document what is missing is the ‘How’. How do you in the context of heightened geopolitical tensions, and particular national interests, implement reforms? How do you accommodate the often reasonable demands of the Global South? In the world of 4-Cs – cooperation, collaboration, coordination and commitment – there is little evidence acknowledging ‘commitment’, as opposed to need for cooperation, because in fact it is scarce. In the end national governments are the key to achieving the SDGs and meeting necessary reforms of policies and institutions; and as best I can see and understand this critical element is hard to find.

I can understand the Secretary General urging the organization and the members forward but are we closer to reform of the Security Council after years of discussion? I am afraid we are not there yet and the Pact for the Future cannot hide it.

Image Credit: Summit of the Future & The Role of Geneva – Geneva Environment Network
This Post appeared originally at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Free subscriptions are always welcome.

Are They All Middle Powers? Or, are there None!

With a degree of valuable planning by my colleague Colin Bradford  at the China-West Dialogue, or CWD, we convened our first virtual session of the current year. And we were very pleased that some thirty folk joined us from across the digital world  – from Japan through Asia and Europe to Canada and the United States and on to Brazil. We hoped this session would be an opportunity to examine and critique “Asia’s Future at a crossroads: A Japanese strategy for peace and sustainable prosperity.” This very valuable Report was the outcome of years of work by the ‘Asia Future’ Research Group (Research Group)  co-convened by Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus of Keio University and Mike Mochizuki of the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University.

The Research Group began meeting in 2018.  In 2022 the Japanese government adopted a new “National Security Strategy” for the first time in a decade. And it was the evolved new Japanese foreign policy and security strategy that the Research Group critically reviewed.

The Research Group early on ‘revealed its hand’. As they declared:

What underlies the discussion and recommendations in this report is our serious concern that the new paradigm will leave Asia entangled and divided in the future.

And as a result the Research Group urged :

Japan’s long-held emphasis on a multifaceted and multilayered approach to Asia policy continues to be a constructive way to address the new regional and international challenges that have emerged.

What a continuation of this Japanese foreign policy approach demanded, according to the Report, was:

… Japan should maintain and promote security cooperation with the United States; but at the same time, it should also exercise leadership to help mitigate the competition between the U.S. and China in Asia through constructive diplomacy, thereby reducing the danger of great power war in the region.

The Research Group urged that Japanese policy not be reshaped by the rise in US-China rivalry and the growing geopolitical tensions in the international system generally and in the Indo-Pacific specifically. Alas, that may prove to be quite difficult.

Back to the Report, however. I am not doing justice to the fullness of the Report in this Post and those of you interested in international dynamics and relations in the Indo-Pacific, especially, I do encourage you to take some time with the Report. It will be worth it.

But I wanted to shift my attention in this Post to some of the debate that emerged during our CWD gathering and discussion of the Report. What was interesting in that discussion – and recognizing that the group was not made up of Japanese researchers – many reacted to the Report’s identification of Japan as a ‘Middle Power’ – clearly an IR crowd. This debate over the identification and impact of middle powers in international relations was further aided by the provision from our colleague Amitav Acharya of a new article by Robertson and Carr on middle powers. It is apparent that there has been a long running discussion – and I do mean long running – by IR colleagues – you’ll not be surprised to hear, over what is a middle power and the impact of these powers have on shaping global relations.

Now middle power labels have long been carried by a number of states most notably, Canada and Australia. These are the so-called traditional middle powers. The middle power definition was applied early to states that possessed structurally – that is the requisite ‘material power’ and what could then be described as being in the middle. These powers possessed less than the major, or great powers, such as the United States, and now China,  but more than those lesser powers. Unfortunately, an examination of the material powers status fails to bear this out as pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

For a start there is nothing ‘middle’ about the ranking of the middle powers. Canada and Australia, the classic middle powers, generally appear between 8th and 15th in various global lists of economic size or military capacity. This could not be classified as the ‘middle’ in a world of 143 states in 1960 and makes less sense in 2023 with 195 states.

Well, if the material power rankings don’t do it, and I think that is right, then for many the determination revolved about middle power behavior instead. As pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

The three core assumptions of middle power theory of states as international in focus, multilateral in method, and good citizens in conduct had clear analytical utility during periods of the 20th century, exemplified by a prominent practitioner–scholarly nexus during this period.

However, their analysis of some six contenders by the two authors, chosen by the two on “principles of consensus, hard cases, and breadth, our contemporary cases are, in alphabetical order, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey.” I’ll leave aside the obvious questions as whether all deserve in fact the middle power label, these states show, as analyzed by the authors, that the behavioral concepts are increasingly unable to capture the practices and actions of these states. As Robertson and Carr describe:

To be effective, middle-sized states must respond to, and evolve with the nature of the system they operate in. Conceptually therefore, the middle power concept ‘is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system’. … middle power theory no longer helps us distinguish or interpret these states. Changes in the international environment suggest this finding will endure. … As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’.

Assuming we can accurately describe in an international order those that are possibly middle powers then, the relations between and among state actors become critical in revealing middle powers. As a result in an order with US-China tensions and a growing willingness on the part of a growing number of states to act aggressively – read that Russia and Ukraine and Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah and indeed Iran as well then:

As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’. … As we enter a period that is marked by increased competition, a remembrance of the possibilities of middle power cooperation that produced initiatives such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Ottawa Treaty deserves to be made.

What then is revealed by all this? Well lots. But let me suggest at least one conclusion. And it is not about Japan or middle powers but the difficulty of drawing conclusions and outcomes in international behavior. A little like astronomy: ‘all are working on all’. Examining at a point in time and then drawing conclusions from that moment the character and behavior of the global order and then looking forward may be all but futile. Or, at least, it is very difficult and must be approached with great caution. Caution is indeed the watchword.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

This Post appeared originally at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Comments and free subscription is welcomed.

 

 

The SDGs are faltering! What can be done?

Returning to the SDGs

We have pointed out in the past – either through LinkedIn or in Substack posts that the Global Summitry Project (GSP) has targeted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The issue is now front and center as we enter the UN General Assembly’s return next week.  The 2023 SDG Summit will take place on September 18th and 19th. It will mark the beginning of, at least according to the UN Secretary General, Antonio Gueterres, “a new phase of accelerated progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals with high-level political guidance on transformative and accelerated actions leading up to 2030”. At least that is his hope.

Early on the GSP identified this initiative as a means to assess the health of current multilateralism. First, a quick review of the SDGs:

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The SDGs were passed unanimously at the UN General Assembly in 2015. Agenda 2030, as it was called at the UN, identified 17 goals, 169 targets and at least 241 indicators.

These goals, targets and indicators, unlike the earlier Millennium Development Goals Initiative  – the MDGs – were designed to apply not just to developing countries but to all countries, whether developing or developed. Agenda 2030 was not then just a classic development effort. This effort was, and is, a global project for all states. Achieving the SDGs is about securing global development and achieving global sustainability for all – developing, emerging market and developed economies, Global North, Global South – all. Here are the goals:

Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere

Goal 2: Zero Hunger

Goal 3: Good Health and Well-Being: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

Goal 4: Quality Education

Goal 5: Gender Equality: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

Goal 6: Clean Water and Sanitation: Ensure access to water and sanitation for all

Goal 7: Affordable and Clean Energy: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy

Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth: Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all

Goal 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure: Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

Goal 10: Reduced Inequalities: Reduce inequality within and among countries

Goal 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

Goal 12: Responsible Consumption and Production: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

Goal 13: Climate Action: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

Goal 14: Life Below Water: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources

Goal 15: Life on Land: Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss

Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies

Goal 17: Partnerships for the Goals: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.
The ‘Two Summits’

Now we are on the case of the SDGs at the GSP. As a result we are following what are often referred to as the “Two Summits”. The first is the SDG Summit: The UN Secretary-General calls the SDG Summit [HLPF Summit, September 2023] the “centerpiece moment of 2023.” It takes place at the midpoint – completion of the first 7.5 years toward the final goal – for fully implementing the development agenda, the SDGs, adopted by countries in 2015 in 2030.

In 2024, in addition, a second Summit will take place. The UN will convene the Summit of the Future (SOTF). The theme of this Summit – ‘Multilateral Solutions for a Better Tomorrow.’ In September 2021, the Secretary-General issued a report, ‘Our Common Agenda’ urging a speed up of the implementation of the SDGSs and advancing the commitments contained in the UN75 Declaration. In some cases, the proposals addressed gaps that emerged since 2015, requiring new intergovernmental agreements. The report, therefore, called for the convening of a Summit of the Future to forge a new global consensus on readying for a future that is rife with risks but also opportunities. The General Assembly agreed to hold the SOTF Summit on September 22nd and September 23rd 2024. A ‘Pact for the Future’ is expected to be put before the UNGA and approved.  The Summit’s aim is to reinforce the UN and global governance structures to better address old and new challenges and to formulate a ‘Pact for the Future’ that would help advance the SDGs by 2030.

Overall, the SOTF, it is hoped, will revitalize multilateralism and lead, possibly, to needed multilateral institutional reform and provide a convincing narrative spelling out how the SOTF can:

●  foster enablers of SDG acceleration such as digitalization and access to finance;

●  tackle obstacles to SDG implementation, for example, through the New Agenda for Peace, by promoting effective crisis response through the Emergency Platform, by addressing fake news, and by supporting global public goods financing;

●  reinforce international standards conducive for the SDGs, including Beyond GDP, ‘longtermism’ and rights for future generations, and of course those on human rights and gender; and

●  develop a more networked, inclusive, and effective UN for SDG acceleration through the Emergency Platform, Youth Office, and a biennial summit with IFIs and the G20, among others.

The Multilateral Disconnect

So, where are we? At the midpoint it is evident the implementation of the SDGs is in deep, very deep trouble. As former UN Deputy Secretary General and currently the President of the Open Society Foundations, Mark Malloch Brown has recently written in FP:

Confirmation of that gloomy picture will come at the summit on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on Sept.18-19 . This was meant to be a midway progress review: the implementation period for the 17 interlinked objectives, which include ending extreme poverty and hunger, began in 2016 and is due to end in 2030. The world is far from the right track. Out of 140 metrics by which the SDGs are measured, half are not on the desired trajectory and about one-third have stalled or gone into reverse. … Time and trust are running out, both on the SDGs and the wider restoration and renewal of the multilateral system.
There will be serious efforts at the UN meetings to urge all to focus on the SDGs and accelerate efforts to achieve these goals. But there is a huge problem – a serious disconnect. And it spells continuing problems for collective global governance efforts. There is an unfortunate glaring disconnect here. The urging is  occurring at the multilateral level but the implementation is at the national level. And efforts at the national level are either underwhelming or, sadly, non-existent. Multilateralism continues to largely occur at the national level and as I have pointed out before, key member states, read that the United States – are disengaged from any national effort. US executive and congressional budgeting processes and finance and development policy implementation are simply void of any SDG policy efforts. And the US is not the only member state in this situation. The rhetoric may be there at the international level but today it does not link to national policy action. Now, in the face of the absence of national policy, numerous local and regional actors and non-state actors, corporations and civil society organizations (CSOs) have stepped in. But their efforts, I am afraid, cannot substitute for national efforts. Without that the strong urging will continue at the international level but without serious progress.

What can be done? We will return to this here.

This Post was first uploaded to my Substack at Alan’s Newsletter:

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-sdgs-are-faltering-what-can-be

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BRICS Confusion is Rather Evident

Well, though still in the weekend, I must admit this Post is a bit late, though still available, I hope, for an enjoyable weekend read.

So, I was not planning to target the BRICS South Africa gathering a second time in this Alan’s Newsletter Post, at least not quite this soon. However,  the decisions taken, or not taken in some cases at this most recent BRICS Summit in Johannesburg South Africa was too ‘juicy’ to ignore.  As pointed out by Rajiv Bhatia of India’s Gateway House now, more than ever the diplomatic balancing act for the new and enlarged BRICS presents an even more dramatic challenge for this Leaders’ Summit:

As BRICS heads into its 18th year, [the South Africa Leaders’ Summit is the 15th] its success and way forward will depend on the members’ ability to tackle the principal challenge of retaining its internal solidarity while balancing expansion and its impact and influence in the world.

And that central point – retaining its internal solidarity while balancing expansion – is hard to foresee. There is confusion over who was chosen to add and indeed whether they have agreed to join, and what conditions; there is confusion over the choices themselves; and there is confusion over what the enlargement is likely to mean for this Leaders’ Summit.

It is evident that the enlargement has added heft to an already significant leaders’ group. As Bhatia points out:

As a grouping of five nations, BRICS represents 27% of the world’s land area, 42% of the population, 16% of international trade, 27% of global GDP in nominal terms, and 32.5% in PPP terms.

Now the group, according to, Bhaso Ndzendze in The Conversation , is:

The enlarged grouping will account for 46.5% of the world population. Using IMF GDP data, we can deduce that it will account for about 30% of global GDP.

On a PPP basis apparently, it will represent 37 percent of global GDP according to James Kynge in the FT.

So, six countries were identified as joining the BRICS come January 2024: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran. JIm O’Neill, formerly of Goldman Sachs,  who has been tagged for creating the BRICS acronym suggested this about the enlargement:

… I have questioned the organization’s purpose, beyond serving as a symbolic gesture. Now that the BRICS has announced that it will add six more countries – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – I pose the question again. The decision, after all, does not appear to have been decided on any clear objective, much less economic, criteria. Why, for example, was Indonesia not asked? Why Argentina and not Mexico, or Ethiopia and not Nigeria?

All good questions. Now the list, I would suggest, seems to reveal that China and Russia prevailed in the choices agreed to. Why, I suspect that is, is the BRICS enlargement includes Iran. As the NYTimes pointed out in its article on BRICS expansion:

The inclusion of Tehran — which has antagonistic relations with China’s chief rival, the United States — suggests that Chinese and Russian pressure had succeeded over the qualms of members like India, Brazil and South Africa, which maintain friendly ties with the West.

It is not unreasonable to suggest that adding Iran can only heighten the geopolitical tensions between the BRICS and others – most notably the G7, and most particularly the US with its many Iran sanctions.

Nevertheless, the hosts and commentators as quoted in the NYTimes again, tried to put the best face on it:

… South Africa, sought to put a hopeful spin on the enlargement decision in any case.

Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s representative in the BRICS negotiations, told reporters that the group needs to change with the times. “This is what BRICS is saying, let’s be more inclusive. BRICS is not anti-West,” he said.

And then of course there is the boosterism from the South Africa President, Cyril Ramaphosa as well (FP):

BRICS has embarked on a new chapter in its effort to build a world that is fair, a world that is just, a world that is also inclusive and prosperous,

As for Indonesia, an obvious choice for the BRICS to draw closer to ASEAN and Southeast Asia more  broadly. Why was it not part of the enlargement group? It would seem that Indonesia has not yet decided whether it wants membership. It has not submitted, apparently, a letter of intent. Also, it appears, notwithstanding the announcement that the UAE, in fact, has not decided whether to accept the BRICS invitation, though I suppose in the end it will.

And then there is – Argentina.  Argentina remains mired in a dreadful economic crisis. If in the end new members will be asked to contribute capital to the most important BRICS creation, in my opinion, the New Development Bank (NDB), Argentina is far more likely to ask for support than to be able to contribute support. In the end, I suspect it was Brazil and its current president, Lula that pressed for membership to be extended to Argentina.

As just noted, the most notable significant BRICS achievement, in my opinion, has been the creation of the NDB. There  was some indication that the expanded members would all be required to contribute to the NDB.  And that still may occur.  Still, it is disappointing that not more was mentioned of the NDB by the current announcements.

There was, also, a fair bit of reporting, and loud statements prior to the conclusion of the Summit, that suggested the BRICS might well take steps to create some form of common currency, or steps at de-dollarization by the BRICS. But as was pointed out by Henry Poenisch in OMFIF:

declaration released at the gathering in Johannesburg on 24 August made no mention of a common currency and instead focused on bilateral clearing – the second-best option. It stressed the importance of ‘encouraging the use of local currencies in international trade and financial transactions between Brics as well as between their trading partners.’

Yet, it seems to me the enhanced use of local currencies, except possibly the Chinese renminbi, is a rather questionable proposition. Using some of the local currencies available, and then holding the surplus for future use doesn’t seem a rather appealing course of action.

Finally, what most commentators failed to point to in their descriptions of the enlargement of the BRICS is that two of the six new members – Argentina and Saudi Arabia – are already members of the G20, as of course are all of the original BRICS. Rather than contemplating the consequence of the enlarged BRICS for global policy progress, it strikes me targeting the efforts, and today’s evident hardships in advancing global governance in the face of rising geopolitics by focusing attention on the G20 might well be a more fruitful avenue of inquiry if one was examining global summitry and the efforts to advance global governance. Looking again, at Jim O’Neill he turns, not reasonably, in this direction:

What the world really needs is a resurrected G20, which already includes all the same key players, plus others. It remains the best forum for addressing truly global issues such as economic growth, international trade, climate change, pandemic prevention, and so on. Though it now faces significant challenges, it still can reclaim the spirit of 2008-10, when it coordinated the international response to the global financial crisis. At some point, the US and China will have to overcome their differences and allow the G20 to return to its central position.

This was originally posted at my Substack ‘Alan’s Newsletter’ You can view there and you are free to subscribe as well.
https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/brics-confusion-is-rather-evident?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Image Credit: France 24

Not Simply the Pace of Summitry: In then end, it is all about the 4Cs

I posted recently here at Alan’s Newsletter on the upcoming BRICS Summit – Puzzling over a BRICS Enlargement. And BRICS, as I described in the Post, is a ‘big deal’ in the pantheon of Leaders’ Summits. I also noted the possible ‘reignition’ of the Trilateral Summit – China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (Korea). But this is not the current extent of summit activity. There is, in fact, another Trilateral Summit that is about to gather – what I am referring to as a ‘Second Trilateral Summit’. This is the gathering at Camp David of the leaders of Japan, Korea and the United States. And since that gathering is tomorrow, Friday, I thought I’d get this Post out in anticipation of the Camp David Trilateral Summit of the three leaders.

‘Global summitry’ – the extent, importance and consequence of these leaders’ gatherings and the global governance progress achieved at these gatherings is, not surprisingly, at the heart of the Global Summitry Project (GSP). It is here in the e-journal Global Summitry, in our work with colleagues in the China-West Dialogue (CWD), and the strengthening of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and our work with students and researchers through the GSP including the articles, podcasts and videos.

Well let’s turn back, for just a moment to the upcoming  Summit. What, you say, a second trilateral summit? Well, yes, actually. The JapanTimes sets out possible goals for such a Trilateral Leaders’ gathering – the Second Trilateral Summit :

In a major step toward making trilateral cooperation a more permanent fixture, U.S.President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean leader Yoon Suk-yeol will agree to hold three-way summits at least once a year, while also conducting more frequent joint military drills around the Korean Peninsula and bolstering intelligence-sharing, including real-time warning data on North Korean missile launches.

The three leaders are also expected to signal deeper cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, supply chain resilience and fighting economic coercion.

The one-day meeting — the three leaders’ first stand alone summit not held on the sidelines of a separate event — will take place against the backdrop of North Korea’s ever-improving nuclear and missile programs as well as China’s growing military assertiveness. Both issues will be high on the agenda.

But first and foremost, the summit is expected to focus on laying the foundation for a more durable trilateral relationship that can withstand political change, namely the growing partnership between two of the most powerful democracies in Asia.

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The New and Rather Difficult Course of Global Order Relations

‘The Decline of US Hegemony and its Consequences for the Global Order’ – A Roundtable at the International Studies Association

ISA 2023: Exhibit, Advertise, and SponsorSo, the International Studies Association (ISA) just concluded in Montreal  after a visibly energetic in-person gathering following several years of virtual meetings only.

I was fortunate enough to chair the roundtable. All sorts of good folk attended including panelists: Arthur Stein, UCLA, Lou Pauly, University of Toronto, Yves Tiberghien, University of British Columbia, and Kyle Lascurettes, Lewis and Clark College. Unfortunately, our colleagues, Janice Stein could not join but I was fortunate enough to receive her speaking note and I have tried to reflect some of her thinking with the notes from other colleagues.

What didn’t surprise me, of course, during the session was the recognition from all that we have a fraught period of transition in the international system. There is the obvious Russian aggression against Ukraine and the challenge by Russia to some of the basic tenets of the current order – most notably territorial integrity and national sovereignty. There is also the obvious growing leading power tensions between the US and China and the growing threat of confrontation and conflict especially over Taiwan that currently stock the relationship. There was the obvious attention to US determination to sustain dominance even in the face of a dramatic power transition with the emergence of China and more broadly the Global South – India and other Indo-Pacific nations including Indonesia, etc. and other Southeast Asian states and then, of course, the return of Lula to Brazil.

But raw geopolitics did not dominate the discourse of the Roundtable. Equally significant in our discussions was the acknowledgement of the continuance of the intergovernmental institutions and collective actions of states to advance global order and achieve collective action within the framework of the current and evolving Order. While some decried the faltering of the global institutions, nevertheless, there was general acceptance that regional and other informal order-based institutions continued advance policies in various ways. AS one of my colleagues Kyle Lascurettes noted: “There is a truly global rules-based order that stands a good chance of outliving American hegemonic decline. But the so called “liberal” or “Western” rules-based order is and will be in trouble.” Indeed, the liberal order or the Liberal International Order (LIO) disappeared, I’d argue with the Global Financial Crisis” in 2008 but the Global Order does indeed remain. And, as Yves Tiberghien focusing on the dramatic power transition suggested: “today is a time of disruption and transition – a special phase. Major shocks, change, crises, innovation will take place over the next 1-2 decades … Also shift in awareness. Western dominated order was an anomaly of last 200 years, with a rise phase for 300 years before that. Return of multiple voices all over the world. Return to a diverse, polymorphic, poly polarity.” As Jagannath Panda recently wrote in an EAF blog on March 20, 2023:  “Obituaries of the US-led liberal international order may be exaggerated, but the shift towards multipolarity is in motion.”

And what then do we have as the Global Order, and how will it advance. Arthur Stein recalled the fragile nature of the Order, which he described for me in his opening chapter of my 2008 edited volume – Can the World be Governed? The global order, he wrote then, and repeated at our Roundtable was:  ‘a weakly confederal world’. As he said at the time (2008, 52) : ”In fact, one could argue not only that multilateralism is an existential reality but that weak confederalism is the nature of modern reality.”

So the LIO has faded,  and what remains is the global RBIO (rules-based international order). Weaker and less collaborative – indeed as Arthur pointed out, the low hanging fruit of cooperation has passed and it is and will be increasingly difficult to reach collaborative solutions . But as Yves points out that there is continuing support for aspects of the Order including with China where Yves notes the significant China support for COP15 the Conference on  Biodiversity where the multilateral conference came together to agree on a new set of goals to guide global action through 2030 and to halt and reverse nature loss and the recently concluded agreement on the text for the critical High Seas Treaty. The challenge for the leading powers is to maintain a forward collaborative thrust, and as Lou Pauly warned, it is critical for the US to accept: “The challenge is to overcome perennial tendencies toward either insularity or spasmodic over-extension, toward temporizing on necessary decisions, toward shifting the costs of adjustment to the relatively poor internally, and toward exporting the rest of those costs to other countries.” It will not be easy; and Arthur reminded us that American domestic politics has been a problem since 1919 and continues today with the failure to approve through the US Senate, international agreements and the often strained effort to use executive power.

As Janice Stein alludes to in her notes: “Plurilateral and minilateral institutions – from AUKUS to IPEF to Trade and Technology Councils will be the principal sites of innovation. I have called this process “taking it offsite.” New institutions are being stood up, led by the willing, who set rules and invite others to join if they wish. One could argue that we are entering a period of start-up innovation in the creation of new, smaller, more flexible, and more focused institutions.

Although Janice may be a touch pessimistic over multilateral collaborative action, the Global Order has its worked cut out for it to avoid great power conflict and achieve critical global governance policies in climate, global finance, global health and much more.

 

Image Credit: ISA

Focusing on the China-West Dialogue Project (CWD); Advancing Global Governance; and Improving US-China Relations

Now, turning back to the Global Summitry Project (GSP) and the Vision20 – collective efforts of Yves Tiberghien, Professor of Political Science and Konwakai Chair in Japanese Research at the University of British Columbia (UBC), Colin Bradford, nonresident Senior Fellow from Brookings  and myself, the Director of the Global Summitry Project. We have initiated various research initiatives.

A critical major effort over some three years has been the China-West Dialogue Process (CWD). The CWD has been Co-Chaired with Colin Bradford, the lead Co-Chair of the CWD and myself. This initiative has held some twenty plus virtual gatherings and many participants are set to gather in person for the first time in years at the Global Solutions Summit in Berlin May 15-16th <https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/programs/china-west-dialogue/?utm_source=MASTER_Verteiler&utm_campaign=33fe63ffef-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_11_11_10_44_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4f4e08bb85-33fe63ffef-447373003> to focus on US-China relations and assess how the G20 can advance critical, and dramatically needed global governance issues – global debt management, climate change policy, global food security and health security.

What is required, however, and is currently missing, is that the two leading powers turn their minds to such critical global governance policy efforts – both bilateral and multilateral.  From the beginning the CWD has targeted first Trump policy and now Biden foreign policy. Trump Administration officials made it clear that ‘engagement with China’ born in the Nixon Administration was at an end. Both Administrations called for competition though not for conflict. The outcome so far, especially for bilateral relations has been dismal.

As my Co-Chair Colin Bradford wrote on March 7th: “The strategic competition between the US and China is real and must be accepted and managed. But the confrontational narratives of this binary relationship are dominating and weakening global leadership and governance and present a threat to the global order.”   As the Editorial of the NYTimes, today, March 12th, urges: “Americans’ interests are best served by emphasizing competition with China while minimizing confrontation. Glib invocations of the Cold War are misguided. It doesn’t take more than a glance to appreciate that this relationship is very different. Rather than try to trip the competition, America should focus on figuring out how to run faster, …” <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/opinion/china-us-relationship.html?referringSource=articleShare>. Competition is not the problem for the Biden Administration; but collaborative policy making certainly appears to be. And current policy has made it more difficult. All one needs to do is to examine the interaction of the Biden Administration and the Chinese Government and Party on “balloon gate”. As Paul Herr of the Chicago Council identifies in his post at EAF: <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/12/ballooning-mistrust-in-the-us-china-relationship/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter2023-03-12> “Washington and Beijing’s response to the appearance of a Chinese surveillance balloon over the United States in February 2023 illustrates several aspects of the current US–China relationship that will make it very difficult to reverse the downward spiral in bilateral ties. The episode displayed mutual distrust, latent hostility, a failure to communicate and the adverse impact of internal politics on how the two sides deal with each other.”

As the CWD has identified at the GSI CWD Website – <https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/programs/china-west-dialogue/> “The CWD’s fundamental goal is to help reshape the narratives and behaviours of US-China relations from friction to function by engaging other middle and major powers and emerging powers in a reframed China-West relations in G20 processes and other public forums. The aim of the Project is to identify new political dynamics that yield more productive relations in the international system.” At the CWD has identified, and noted by Colin Bradford on March 7th: “The CWD has concluded that the G20 is the most important platform for profiling and actualizing these alternative political dynamics in the year-long official G20 processes, which could enable convergence on systemic threats and ease geopolitical tensions.”

It is a challenging  goal in the face of current difficult US-China relations – but crucial for settling global order relations that have become ‘so rocky’ and unsettled in the last several years.

March 12, 2023

 

Scepticism Again Abounded Prior to the Opening of a G20 Leaders’ Summit – But Then …

Alan Beattie, veteran G20 watcher from the Financial Times, has regaled us once again with reasons to dismiss G20 summits before they begin.  On November 14th,  a day before the Indonesian G20 summit begins in Bali, we are treated to the conclusion by him that the G20 is a “gabfest” and  that “it is what it always has been, which is largely pointless”! 

To prove his point,  Alan Beattie links us to his March 13, 2009, article , published a month before the London G20 summit, which was arguably the most important economic summit ever. Entitled “the gap of twenty”, he wrote back then rather definitively that “there should be little doubt…that the divisions seen on display have already dissipated the G20’s ability to spread confidence”.

The Indonesian G20 Summit has in fact demonstrated that without the G20 there would be no global leadership platform which could bring together a finite number of major actors in global affairs from an eclectic array of regions and regime types to address the war in Ukraine, US-China relations, and global systemic challenges. 

What Alan Beattie gets wrong in both 2009 and now more recently just prior to the Bali Summit is to fail to see that “domestic  constituencies “do indeed drive the “domestic calculus”.  The dynamics of global summitry are intended to push the frontiers of public discourses in order to mainstream ambition as good governance rather than to be an exercise in fancy pants diplomacy.  The term “gabfest” trivializes the efforts by global leaders and their officials, advisers and experts to provide societies with the vocabulary for understanding global risks and with vision for global solutions.   

What has gone on all year before the Leaders’ Bali gathering is the tedious developments of policy proposals that will work and the quest for pushing  feasibility frontiers to the maximum that domestic  and financial constraints will bear.   

The  G20 process is essential for global survival and for guiding global systems toward sustainability instead of disaster. The Indonesian Summit has underlined this critical point.

Image Credit: SMA Negeri 1 Singaraja

By Guest Blogger Colin Bradford who is lead-co-chair of the China-West Dialogue (CWD), co-chair of the Vision20, global fellow of the Berlin Global Solutions Initiative (GSI), and non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution.

 

Competing and Collaborating – Dealing with Today’s Geopolitics and Global Governance

It is an eventful several weeks. Most dramatically the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party has launched – indeed it is approaching its conclusion. There is little doubt that Xi Jinping will claim a third term ending the effort by earlier leaders to limit leadership to two terms. His statements will likely be our best guide to Chinese foreign policy for the immediate future. But more on that in a future blog post.

And then there’s the Biden Administration’s release of the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS explains the security priorities of the administration to both Congress and the American public and is a legislatively mandated document.This strategic document was about to be released in February of this year but was delayed as the Russia-Ukraine war loomed. With its release just a few days ago, we get some big picture framing for Biden Administration security and foreign policy. Indeed, the advance press call held by Jake Sullivan, the United States National Security Advisor to President Joe Biden, on the day of the document’s release provides an interesting summary and insight of current US policy. Jake sets it out:

The fundamental premise of the strategy is that we have entered a decisive decade with respect to two fundamental strategic challenges. The first is the competition between the major powers to shape the future of the international order. And the second is that while this competition is underway, we need to deal with a set of transnational challenges that are affecting people everywhere, including here in the United States — from climate change to food insecurity, to communicable diseases, to terrorism, to the energy transition, to inflation.

 

And this strategy makes clear that these shared challenges are not marginal issues, they are not secondary to geopolitics, but they operate on a plane alongside the competition — the geopolitical competition with major powers.

 

Now, of course, there are tensions between trying to rally cooperation to solve these shared challenges and trying to position ourselves effectively to prevail in strategic competition. But there are also ways in which these are reinforcing. And we believe fundamentally that the core elements of what the United States must do in the years ahead is — are the same for both sets of challenges.

 

Specifically, we need to invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence, especially our strength here at home, both for the purpose of effective competition and for the purpose of being set up to rally the world to solve shared challenges.

 

Second, we need to build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence, both to shape the global strategic environment and to address these transnational threats that require cooperation to succeed. And finally, we need to set the rules of the road for the 21st century in critical areas — from emerging technologies in cyberspace, to trade, economics, investment, and more — both so that the international order continues to reflect our values and our interests and so that the international order is better designed to be able to take on the challenges ahead.

 

So this decisive decade is critical both for defining the terms of competition, particularly with the PRC, and for getting ahead of massive challenges that if we lose the time in this decade, we will not be able to keep pace with most notably the climate crisis, but other challenges as well.

 

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