Are They All Middle Powers? Or, are there None!

With a degree of valuable planning by my colleague Colin Bradford  at the China-West Dialogue, or CWD, we convened our first virtual session of the current year. And we were very pleased that some thirty folk joined us from across the digital world  – from Japan through Asia and Europe to Canada and the United States and on to Brazil. We hoped this session would be an opportunity to examine and critique “Asia’s Future at a crossroads: A Japanese strategy for peace and sustainable prosperity.” This very valuable Report was the outcome of years of work by the ‘Asia Future’ Research Group (Research Group)  co-convened by Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus of Keio University and Mike Mochizuki of the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University.

The Research Group began meeting in 2018.  In 2022 the Japanese government adopted a new “National Security Strategy” for the first time in a decade. And it was the evolved new Japanese foreign policy and security strategy that the Research Group critically reviewed.

The Research Group early on ‘revealed its hand’. As they declared:

What underlies the discussion and recommendations in this report is our serious concern that the new paradigm will leave Asia entangled and divided in the future.

And as a result the Research Group urged :

Japan’s long-held emphasis on a multifaceted and multilayered approach to Asia policy continues to be a constructive way to address the new regional and international challenges that have emerged.

What a continuation of this Japanese foreign policy approach demanded, according to the Report, was:

… Japan should maintain and promote security cooperation with the United States; but at the same time, it should also exercise leadership to help mitigate the competition between the U.S. and China in Asia through constructive diplomacy, thereby reducing the danger of great power war in the region.

The Research Group urged that Japanese policy not be reshaped by the rise in US-China rivalry and the growing geopolitical tensions in the international system generally and in the Indo-Pacific specifically. Alas, that may prove to be quite difficult.

Back to the Report, however. I am not doing justice to the fullness of the Report in this Post and those of you interested in international dynamics and relations in the Indo-Pacific, especially, I do encourage you to take some time with the Report. It will be worth it.

But I wanted to shift my attention in this Post to some of the debate that emerged during our CWD gathering and discussion of the Report. What was interesting in that discussion – and recognizing that the group was not made up of Japanese researchers – many reacted to the Report’s identification of Japan as a ‘Middle Power’ – clearly an IR crowd. This debate over the identification and impact of middle powers in international relations was further aided by the provision from our colleague Amitav Acharya of a new article by Robertson and Carr on middle powers. It is apparent that there has been a long running discussion – and I do mean long running – by IR colleagues – you’ll not be surprised to hear, over what is a middle power and the impact of these powers have on shaping global relations.

Now middle power labels have long been carried by a number of states most notably, Canada and Australia. These are the so-called traditional middle powers. The middle power definition was applied early to states that possessed structurally – that is the requisite ‘material power’ and what could then be described as being in the middle. These powers possessed less than the major, or great powers, such as the United States, and now China,  but more than those lesser powers. Unfortunately, an examination of the material powers status fails to bear this out as pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

For a start there is nothing ‘middle’ about the ranking of the middle powers. Canada and Australia, the classic middle powers, generally appear between 8th and 15th in various global lists of economic size or military capacity. This could not be classified as the ‘middle’ in a world of 143 states in 1960 and makes less sense in 2023 with 195 states.

Well, if the material power rankings don’t do it, and I think that is right, then for many the determination revolved about middle power behavior instead. As pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

The three core assumptions of middle power theory of states as international in focus, multilateral in method, and good citizens in conduct had clear analytical utility during periods of the 20th century, exemplified by a prominent practitioner–scholarly nexus during this period.

However, their analysis of some six contenders by the two authors, chosen by the two on “principles of consensus, hard cases, and breadth, our contemporary cases are, in alphabetical order, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey.” I’ll leave aside the obvious questions as whether all deserve in fact the middle power label, these states show, as analyzed by the authors, that the behavioral concepts are increasingly unable to capture the practices and actions of these states. As Robertson and Carr describe:

To be effective, middle-sized states must respond to, and evolve with the nature of the system they operate in. Conceptually therefore, the middle power concept ‘is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system’. … middle power theory no longer helps us distinguish or interpret these states. Changes in the international environment suggest this finding will endure. … As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’.

Assuming we can accurately describe in an international order those that are possibly middle powers then, the relations between and among state actors become critical in revealing middle powers. As a result in an order with US-China tensions and a growing willingness on the part of a growing number of states to act aggressively – read that Russia and Ukraine and Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah and indeed Iran as well then:

As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’. … As we enter a period that is marked by increased competition, a remembrance of the possibilities of middle power cooperation that produced initiatives such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Ottawa Treaty deserves to be made.

What then is revealed by all this? Well lots. But let me suggest at least one conclusion. And it is not about Japan or middle powers but the difficulty of drawing conclusions and outcomes in international behavior. A little like astronomy: ‘all are working on all’. Examining at a point in time and then drawing conclusions from that moment the character and behavior of the global order and then looking forward may be all but futile. Or, at least, it is very difficult and must be approached with great caution. Caution is indeed the watchword.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

This Post appeared originally at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Comments and free subscription is welcomed.

 

 

Indonesia’s G20 Win: behind-the-scenes gatherings and unity in a time when global governance needs it most – and now to India

Dominating our smartphone screens, televisions, and front pages were photos of Justin Trudeau, Xi Jinping, Joe Biden, and Giorgia Meloni in traditional Indonesian attire, participating in a ceremonial mangrove tree planting event and gathering late night to discuss the missiles that killed two Poles, contemplating potential next steps using NATO’s Article 4. These leaders are – whether they want to be or not – celebrities. They are simultaneously praised and critiqued depending on who is watching them. Yet, what is not seen by mainstream audiences, perhaps even those more politically astute, is the intricate machine of behind-the-scenes work taking place throughout 257 meetings between December 2021 and December 2022 under Indonesia’s presidency of the G20 Summit.

In 2011, the Director of the Global Summitry Project, Alan Alexandroff, wrote about the notion of the G20 not being solely about its leaders, but rather surrounding the Leaders’ Summit an array of complementary “personal representatives, ministers, other officials, IFIs, IOs, [and] global regulators that make the G[20] system work – or not”. Whether the G20 is successful (a subjective term, in any case), is a different conversation.

Alexandroff’s Iceberg Theory of Global Governance positions the G20 Leaders’ Summit at its tip, but the vast bulk of the iceberg is situated below the surface, and often goes unnoticed by the majority of observers and experts.

This underwater all-encompassing mass is formed by numerous assemblies: from Ministerial meetings regarding health, environment and climate, women’s empowerment, trade investment and industry, the energy transition, development, labor, research and innovation, and tourism; to Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governor meetings, Finance-Health Deputies meetings, joint Sherpa and Finance Deputies meetings, individual Sherpa meetings, Foreign Ministers meetings, G20 Digital Ministers meetings, and Education Ministers meetings; and lastly, engagement group gatherings (including the U20, B20 on climate/energy, integrity, compliance, and business leaders; the T20, with numerous recommendations from think tanks around the world, the Y20, with priority areas on digital transformation and youth empowerment, and the L20 Employment Summit).

It would be hard to contest that the G20 indeed has been a platform that has developed and advanced key collaborative actions toward policies and priorities, from the Leader Declaration identifying the Pandemic Fund, the Financial Intermediary Funds for Pandemic Prevention, which employs the World Bank and World Health Organization.

The incoming G20 Troika – Indonesia, India and Brazil – will mark a unique shift in global governance deliberations. It will be led by three Global South countries with emerging large market economies hosting the year-long activities. The hosting will pass from India in 2023, Brazil in 2024, and South Africa in 2025.

We anticipate this three-year spread of Global South presidencies will tackle issues that have been brushed to the side or missed in other G20 Summits. This is certainly a significant step in the effort to construct a multilateral network to seek mutually beneficial responses to growing challenges impacting all countries.

The Financial Times released an article following Indonesia’s Leaders’ Summit, deeming its outcomes “remarkable”. Russia, represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, seemed isolated on the world stage as China put forth a more neutral stance in its support towards Moscow. Xi commented that his administration “resolutely opposes attempt[s] to politicize food and energy issues or use them as tools and weapons”.

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Scepticism Again Abounded Prior to the Opening of a G20 Leaders’ Summit – But Then …

Alan Beattie, veteran G20 watcher from the Financial Times, has regaled us once again with reasons to dismiss G20 summits before they begin.  On November 14th,  a day before the Indonesian G20 summit begins in Bali, we are treated to the conclusion by him that the G20 is a “gabfest” and  that “it is what it always has been, which is largely pointless”! 

To prove his point,  Alan Beattie links us to his March 13, 2009, article , published a month before the London G20 summit, which was arguably the most important economic summit ever. Entitled “the gap of twenty”, he wrote back then rather definitively that “there should be little doubt…that the divisions seen on display have already dissipated the G20’s ability to spread confidence”.

The Indonesian G20 Summit has in fact demonstrated that without the G20 there would be no global leadership platform which could bring together a finite number of major actors in global affairs from an eclectic array of regions and regime types to address the war in Ukraine, US-China relations, and global systemic challenges. 

What Alan Beattie gets wrong in both 2009 and now more recently just prior to the Bali Summit is to fail to see that “domestic  constituencies “do indeed drive the “domestic calculus”.  The dynamics of global summitry are intended to push the frontiers of public discourses in order to mainstream ambition as good governance rather than to be an exercise in fancy pants diplomacy.  The term “gabfest” trivializes the efforts by global leaders and their officials, advisers and experts to provide societies with the vocabulary for understanding global risks and with vision for global solutions.   

What has gone on all year before the Leaders’ Bali gathering is the tedious developments of policy proposals that will work and the quest for pushing  feasibility frontiers to the maximum that domestic  and financial constraints will bear.   

The  G20 process is essential for global survival and for guiding global systems toward sustainability instead of disaster. The Indonesian Summit has underlined this critical point.

Image Credit: SMA Negeri 1 Singaraja

By Guest Blogger Colin Bradford who is lead-co-chair of the China-West Dialogue (CWD), co-chair of the Vision20, global fellow of the Berlin Global Solutions Initiative (GSI), and non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution.

 

The Twin Threats to Global Governance and Global Summitry

It is a challenging G20 Summit. For any host. No less so for Indonesia, the first Global South leader in a follow on series of Global South hosts.

This year in November the G20 Summit is scheduled for Bali to then be followed in 2023 by India. India will then be followed in 2024 by Brazil and presumably, though not yet announced South Africa in 2025. So, what’s the problem? Well, in principle nothing. But these Global South hosts are only slowly becoming accustomed to leadership roles where advancing the global governance agenda is called for in the leadership role.

The second dilemma is the dramatic impact of renewed geopolitics. The growing tensions and rivalry between China and the US now dominate relations between these two leading powers. These bilateral tensions have been amped significantly higher by the Russian aggression against Ukraine.  War in Europe, as we haven’t seen in decades now sharpens differences between China and the United States. These difficult bilateral relations have now been further strained by Taiwan tensions following US House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to the island state. These strains are reflected in the undermining of collaborative global governance relations between the two, and more broadly the apparent hobbling of multilateral relations.

So, two threats to advancing critical global governance policy at the global summitry level. These threats are particularly enhanced where domestic politics dominates and global leadership emerges rather more as an afterthought.  And it would seem that is exactly what our Host faces. First, the dominance of domestic politics. This feature of Indonesian leadership politics is precisely what is identified by Shafiah Mushibat in his recent post at EAF titled: “Indonesia steps innocently onto the international stage”:

In Indonesian politics, the domestic audience and interests still trump the global audience and global common interests. This is not unusual, and it’s reasonable, considering that foreign policy involves actions and activities by governments that aim to defend and promote national interests. But Indonesia is quickly discovering that marrying its international roles, responsibilities and expectations that go with them to national interests that please domestic audiences is not altogether easy.

Mushibat concludes that the Indonesian President has chosen to emphasize the domestic politics of Indonesia’s leadership of the G20. He writes:

Approaching the G20 presidency, the Indonesian government initiated many activities to promote its role domestically. This included raising awareness of the G20’s ‘benefits’, such as the direct economic benefits of hosting the summit. In a November 2021 speech, Widodo pressed the country to make the most of its strategic position in the G20 presidency and ‘prioritise national interests’. Explaining how the G20 presidency will benefit the country has been a main part of the government’s effort to ensure domestic support for all the efforts.

And as to the second and growing threat – the destructive impact of geopolitical tensions – they are real:

Indonesia has been lauded as representing the voices of developing nations and emerging economies outside of the G20, but its presidency faces major challenges — mainly because of the geopolitical implications from the Russia–Ukraine war. While the G20 has performed important functions for member states and the world at large, it struggles with balancing the pursuit of its members’ national interests with a genuine commitment to the global common good. As the world grapples with economic and health recovery from COVID-19 and the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on food and energy supplies, the global common good and how to achieve it is the vital interest.

The corrosive impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global cooperation cannot be underestimated. It has ramped up Biden Administration efforts to build alliances and partnerships. Included in that circle of partnership efforts is the G7 where the United States has emphasized the ‘like mindedness’ and democratic character of the G7. With all the emphasis on the G7 there seems to be little room for a Biden collaborative focus on the G20. Working the G20 with China in particular with all its Ministerials, Working Parties and Task Forces is a key but apparently a key not willing to be turned by the Biden Administration.  The G20, of course, includes Russia and much of the US G20 public discussion has urged the exclusion of Russia from the Summit. Rather than a focus on advancing collaborative efforts the public statements have been on Russia’s exclusion and questioning China, at least in public, on its positioning with respect to Russia.

Meanwhile Widodo has tried to smooth the difficult Russian presence by inviting the Zelenskyy, the President of Ukraine to attend at Bali as well. But the critical focus has to be on the Biden Administration to ‘grab’ the G20 ring, avoid the Russian distraction, and focus on critical multilateral global governance initiatives.

Image Credit: East Asia Forum

Evaluating Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Legacy

 

The remarkable thing about former Prime Minister Abe is that he started out as a nationalist. In his early years as a politician he focused on restoring Japan’s pride after the shame of World War II and the Tokyo Tribunal. As a prime minister, however, he took both a more pragmatic and a more internationalist approach. Shinzo Abe ended up having a global impact: not only, did he build more regional connections across the Indo-Pacific than any previous Japanese Prime Minister; he also rose up to become the defender of the liberal international order during the Trump Presidency, making strides both in developing international trade agreements and in advancing security alliances.

Shinzo Abe came from a blue blood political family, based in a Yamaguchi prefecture, the former Chōshū Domain (長州藩, Chōshū-han) that led the Meiji Restoration along with Satsuma and Tosa. His grandfather Kishi had led the industrial development of Manchukuo in the 1930s and served as Minister of Commerce in the Tojo Cabinet. Arrested by the American military in 1945 as suspected war criminal, he was released without trial in 1948, in part due his potential role as conservative leader in post-war Japan. He served as Prime Minister from 1957-1960, during which he led the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Abe’s uncle, Sato Eisaku was also Prime Minister from 1964 to 1972. In fact Prime Minister Eisaku was the longest uninterrupted Prime Minister until Shinzo Abe outlasted him!  Abe’s father, Abe Shintaro, was a leading politician in his time, serving as minister in various portfolios (including the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Foreign Affairs) between 1972 and 1986. He was narrowly defeated as potential Prime Minister.

In the 1990s and 2000s, Shinzo Abe was well-known for his denunciation of the Tokyo tribunal and its conclusions on Japanese guilt, his links with nationalist groups, and advocacy of a “beautiful” or normal Japan with full autonomy and a real army. The issue that motivated him the most throughout his political life was to change the constitution written by the American occupiers, particularly Article 9, which formally forbade Japan to hold an Army or have the right of belligerency. This was a mission inherited from his grandfather, Kishi. And Shinzo Abe did bring that agenda to office in his first term as Prime Minister in 2006-2007, and quickly lost public support for it.

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Constructing an Inclusive Order: Avoiding Fragmentation and Worse – Disorder

Two summits completed and another off in the distance, but impacted by these just completed summits. A crowded summit schedule has begun.

The statements were voiced and the Leaders’ Communique issued by the G7 at Schloss Elmau to be followed by more speeches and statements and the issuing of the “Strategic Concept”  a once ever ten year statement by NATO at Madrid.

What have we learned from this G7 and the NATO gatherings? Let me first focus on the G7 Summit. Well, first it is relevant that we take into account the position expressed by one of the longstanding observers of the summit process, Sheffield’s Hugo Dobson. As he concluded, along with his colleague Greg Stiles in Global Policy , reflecting their review of the German G7 and in particular the Leaders’ Communique:

In summary, and despite what we have tried to do here, beware reading too much either positively or negatively into a single summit document. Rather, this communiqué should be placed in the context of a network of summits – most immediately the NATO Summit in Madrid later this week and looking further ahead to the Indonesian-hosted G20 Summit later this year.

And it is a summary and caution well worth heeding. Nevertheless, the tone is worth further comment. The G7 took the time and the Communique to underscore their self characterization as a democratic forum. In their Communique opening the G7 declared:

 As open democracies adhering to the rule of law, we are driven by shared values and bound by our commitment to the rules-based multilateral order and to universal human rights. As outlined in our Statement on support for Ukraine, standing in unity to support the government and people of Ukraine in their fight for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future, we will continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on President Putin’s regime for its unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, while stepping up our efforts to counter its adverse and harmful regional and global impacts, including with a view to helping secure global energy and food security as well as stabilising the economic recovery. 

 

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The Missing Mechanisms – Examining the Current Summitry Cycle: Rome G20 and Glasgow COP26

So many summits recently: from the Rome G20 Summit, to the Glasgow COP26 Summit, to APEC, and finally the East Asia Summit. It is the crescendo of the annual summitry cycle. And, this year, 2021, was particularly noteworthy. In this summit cycle we had in person leaders gatherings at the Rome G20 Summit, immediately followed by the 5-year COP ‘check-in’ with many G20 leaders flying off directly to the Glasgow Summit following the Rome G20 Summit. It is not a surprise given the importance of these summits that colleagues have been attracted to assessing the advances, or the limitations of these gatherings and then more generally to examine the overall effectiveness they present of multilateral leadership.  One of the key assessments, not surprisingly, is to determine whether these summits, and therefore the multilateralism underpinning them can meet the rising global governance challenges facing the international system. Prime Minister Draghi who chaired the recently concluded G20 Rome Summit had this to say about multilateralism, and inferentially the G20:

“Multilateralism is the best answer to the problems we face today. In many ways it is the only possible answer,”  he said in his opening comments on Saturday. 

 

From the pandemic, to climate change, to fair and equitable taxation, going it all alone is simply not an option. We must do all we can to overcome our differences”.

Yet the judgements from the experts have generally been measured, even rather downbeat, over the current G20 and COP26 and other summitry efforts. Broadly there is recognition of some material advances in the global governance agenda, especially concerning climate change efforts but the fundamental – and many would argue the urgent and necessary collective actions – seem to elude global summitry policy making. And, most agree that more global order needs are just out of reach. Here, my colleague Yves Tiberghien in East Asia Forum (EAF)  had this to say about the G20 and the critical multilateral efforts:

The G20 is currently unable to function as the incubator for the reform of global governance institutions that the world needs to manage global markets and pressing systemic risks. It is proving unable to manage the great frictions between established and emerging powers.

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The Current Narrative of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Policy: “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

When it comes to China’s current foreign policy, phrases such as “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy” (WWD) and “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) frequently appear. The name WWD originates from a Chinese film series, “Wolf Warrior”, which depicts a patriotic solider battling foreign powers and mercenaries. Nowadays, many refer to China’s increasingly strong statements and assertive diplomatic declarations as WWD.

On the other hand, BRI refers to global infrastructure development projects led by China to promote international cooperation, multilateralism, and trade. It may appear that these two sets of foreign policy approaches rather conflict. However, the phrase “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind” (人类命运共同体), a part of the official narrative of China’s foreign policy may have led to both of these contrasting approaches. What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”? How does this phrase explain trends in China’s recent foreign policies including WWD and also BRI?

What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

By literal translation, the above phrase means “A Community of Shared Fate for Mankind” (SF) rather than, as it is often expressed in English, “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. SF suggests a global order described by China’s President Xi Jinping encompassing the shared rights and responsibility of each nation in terms of “politics, security, economy, culture, and environment” in a globalized world. In President Xi’s words SF is: “to build A Community of Shared Future for Mankind [to] construct a beautiful and clean world with long lasting peace, general security, mutual prosperity, openness, and inclusivity”. At a United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting in July, 2020, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that China will push to build SF by promoting multilateralism in accordance with international laws and “… denounce global hegemony and protectionism”. These and other  remarks by China’s leaders demonstrate, it would seem, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition to achieve greater global influence, and that China is prepared to work with all nations to build a SF. Indeed, not all nations may be agreeable with the ideology of SF. It is inevitable that the CCP will face some frictions when it tries to expand the influence of SF in the world. Therefore, the CCP may have to use a tailored approach in its foreign policies to push its SF agenda.

SF as an Umbrella term for China’s Foreign Policy

President Xi has publicly made statements such as “[the CCP] will reference history and create the future. It must continuously push and construct A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. Under this guidance, top Chinese officials have made clear that China’s foreign policy will revolve around SF. China’s approach to global order, then,  promotes politically correct topics such as climate change, global disparity, and it also opposes terrorism and hegemony. Although it encourages cross-cultural exchange, it makes no explicit mention of protecting the rights of marginalized communities. The vague language in the SF permits CCP officials greater flexibility in deciding what kind of matters are consistent with the SF and therefore align with President Xi’s agenda.

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Which Countries are Middle Powers – And Why are They Important to the Global Order? Part 1

I had a debate very recently with my China-West Dialogue (CWD) colleague, Colin Bradford. In a memo we were working on for CWD, he described the two major trade agreements, CPTPP and RCEP. He then added:

 

These two trade agreements show that middle powers are able to take multilateral actions on their own that make an impact.(*)  

But which countries do we see achieving that? And behind that, why have analysts and policy makers become significantly more interested these middle powers in the Trump era recently past?

Counting the Middle Powers

The debate begins with the ‘Who’. Though Colin and I were generally agreed on the content of the article, we went around in circles over which countries we could, and should, identify as middle powers. Now, I was more than ready to forgive Colin his vague characterization of middle powers and then broad inclusion of the same – after all he is an economist – but soon thereafter I stumbled over a rather recent article by Bruce Jones, also of Brookings. and a well known international relations analyst. The article found in FA and titled, “Can Middle Powers Lead the World Out of the Pandemic? Because the United States and China Have Shown They Can’t” tackled the question of the current middle power membership. Given the subject matter of the article, Bruce was called upon to identify in some manner, the states that captured the current set of middle powers:

The concept of “middle powers” is imprecise and somewhat inchoate, but it generally refers to countries that are among the top 20 or so economies in the world, lack large-scale military power (or choose not to play a leading role in defense), and are energetic in diplomatic or multilateral affairs. These countries were seeking to fill part of the international leadership void even before the crisis, particularly when it came to buttressing the rickety multilateral system.

So, there we were. I had no difficulty acknowledging that the term was “imprecise and inchoate” but as for the rest of the features identified by Bruce, well, not so sure. Increasingly, I came to suspect that this was likely to be one of those classic international relations definitions – unclear and contested.

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The Evolving Role of Japan in the Liberal Order

 

My podcast guest, Phillip Lipscy and were fortunate enough recently to attend a major conference on Japan’s leadership in the Liberal Order.  This conference was organized by my good friend and colleague, Professor Yves Tiberghien of the University of British Columbia and its Centre for Japanese Research Worksop. Many Japanese colleagues joined experts from North America to discuss the role of Japan in the Liberal Order, especially under the current Abe Government. It is clear that Japanese foreign policy has changed. But how much. One need only look at Japan’s major role in picking up the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after President Trump withdrew the United States from it.  The vigorous Japanese leadership efforts resulted in the conclusion of the TPP 11with all members other that the United States agreeing to the revised TPP. And Japan has hosted the G20. Nevertheless, the question remains why and how far has Japanese foreign policy changed. There seems to me to be a rather mixed Japanese leadership role but let’s join Phillip in getting his views of Japanese leadership in the Liberal Order. 

Phillip has recently joined the University of Toronto from Stanford University as an Associate Professor of Political Science at the UoT and is the new Chair in Japanese politics and global affairs and Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Japan at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy here at the the University of Toronto. Phillip has published extensively on Japanese politics and foreign policy.

So come join us as we discuss the role of Japan in the current Liberal Orde. This is Episode 17 of the Summit Dialogue Series at Global Summitry at iTunes or at SoundCloud. .