Protests against the zero-COVID policy in China quickly spread across the country. While Anti-COVID protests are certainly not a new global phenomenon, such a public and widely spread expression of frustration towards the Chinese government is rarely seen.
This note examines the Chinese top level leadership’s approach to the zero-COVID policy; why it led to mounting public anger and frustration; and where it may lead.
The Initial Approach – Central Government’s Blame Avoidance
While President Xi vowed that he will “supervise and deploy (COVID-19 prevention operations) personally”, the COVID-19 prevention throughout the country took on a decentralized approach.[1] In other words, the order (of no COVID cases) was delivered by the Central Government, but it was up to the local authorities to interpret the order and execute it. For instance, each province has its own mandatory QR code system that rated users’ risk of exposure to COVID-19, and each province had its own domestic and international arrival quarantine requirements.
As power becomes more consolidated within the CPC, it would only appear plausible that the whole country would take on a centralized approach for COVID-19 strategy such as a national QR code system and a standardized requirement for traveling and quarantine. Nevertheless, these decentralized approaches were permitted to continue in the past two years. Frequently, these inconsistent COVID policies among provinces and regions in China caused confusion and frustrations among residents and travellers. This could be viewed as the Central Government’s strategy for ‘blame avoidance’. By providing an opaque order of “no COVID cases”, the Central Government shifts responsibilities to the local governments while leaving them to interpret its own plan. If the strategy is successful, the Central Government, or President Xi himself, could take credit as the operations are overseen by him “personally”.[2] In the event that the strategy is unsuccessful, or controversial, residents naturally would hold the local government accountable as they implemented these procedures.
Too Little To Lose?
A stable society based on rapid economic growth has been a key goal of the CPC. The idea of “you can earn money and spend money but don’t touch politics” is an unspoken social contract among many Chinese and foreign citizens and companies. While China enjoyed rapid economic growth, so also its middle class. Owning at least an apartment and a vehicle and living comfortably have already become the default goal of many middle class citizens. Based on the prerequisite of not participating in politics, these goals are achievable when the balance of the ability to earn a decent wage and reasonable cost of living is maintained. The Chinese citizens know very well that what they have accomplished and acquired could be lost very quickly if they are disobedient to the government. Therefore, most citizens have chosen to refrain from directly criticizing the government for its actions.
With a decelerating economy, however, this balance of economic advancement and political silence is eroding. In major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, it is hardly possible for youth to find a job that pays high enough to support themselves and afford an apartment or vehicle. The draconian COVID measures further impeded citizens’ ability to find jobs and get paid; hence, their ability to make new purchases. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, real estate development between January 2022 to July 2022 dropped by 6.4 percent while residential investment dropped by 5.8 percent.[3] On the other hand, major online shopping platforms often publish sales volume during November 11th, Single’s Day.[4] According to Sohu News, online shopping platforms such as Alibaba and Tmall both recorded double digit or triple digit growth in sales volume in the past several years.[5] Nevertheless, Tmall did not disclose its sales volume for 2022, instead it published a statement that “the sales volume was largely the same as last year”.[6] These moderated data could also suggest that the general public prefers to save their money instead of spending it given their job stability is affected by the unpredictable COVID policies.
Long term COVID lockdowns in Shanghai, Urumqi, and other regions will also impede economic growth. The hidden social contract of “you can earn money and speed money but don’t touch politics” requires both parties to honor it. When the CPC’s COVID policy can no longer guarantee the general public, or China’s middle class an opportunity to grow and achieve their dreams, the public also no longer has the obligation, or feels that it need stay quiet and not judge the government. The recent large scale protests across China exemplifies that the zero-COVID policy has shaken the most basic interests of the middle class: the ability to make a decent living and not speak against the government. As the citizens have very little to lose, it becomes more evident that protesting against the policy is the only way to promote change.
A Result of the Protest
Following the protests across China, numerous regions have already announced plans to drop COVID testing requirement and “optimize” the current zero-COVID strategy.[7] Vice Premier Sun Chunlan stated that China’s medical system has proven to be robust, the weakening of the omicron variant and over 90 percent vaccination rate provide opportunities for optimization in pandemic prevention methods.[8] Sun’s statement did not mention the protests, or zero-COVID policy.[9]
The CPC may have decades of experience in stopping a public demonstration in a single location by mobilizing large scale police forces and digital surveillance. However, decentralized protests on large scales across the country leaves the CPC little in the way of tools to respond. Certain provinces easing COVID restrictions are a sign the voices of the protestors are heard, but completely changing the course of the zero-COVID policy is not likely since such a change in policy would be equivalent to President Xi admitting mistakes as the COVID policies are personally supervised by him.
For China’s top level leadership, it faces a dilemma of loyalty to President Xi or economic growth. Remaining loyal to President Xi requires continued support to the zero-COVID policy while promoting economic growth requires easing in the zero-COVID policy. The CCP’s recent action in easing some COVID policy is a sign that the CPC senior leadership compromised on the absolute loyalty to President Xi’s zero-COVID policy. Nevertheless, the compromise is delivered through euphemisms such as COVID optimization.
Professor Kerry Brown has suggested in Xi: A Study in Power that President Xi frequently prioritizes political goals over economic goals. However, the power of the middle class and the people cannot simply be ignored during the CPC’s decision making process.[10] The recent protests across China perhaps best exemplifies that.
What Happens Next?
While President Xi is in favor of using technology to advance the state surveillance apparatus, it may be unlikely that the government will decide to crackdown on all protests in China. Not only are there limited resources, but also it may further amplify the issue and attract more international criticism. President Xi’s current position may be more secure than ever following the 20th Party’s Congress, but he still needs to make sure to retain support from the general public. Harvard’s Alastair Ian Johnson suggests that “many indications made clear that [Xi] was popular among the lower- and middle-income population”[11] Nevertheless, these groups of people who worked in labor jobs and traveled around the country are among the hardest hit by the impact of his zero-COVID policy. Therefore, instead of crushing his own support base by police raids, it may be wiser for Xi to show some level of flexibility to permit local governments to ease some restrictions.
Drastic changes are unlikely to take place in the short term. As some COVID restrictions gradually ease, some confusion and frustration will likely continue due to the decentralized approach of the COVID policies, inconsistent requirements across the country, and mixed messages from CPC senior leadership. As the society gradually returns to normal, there may be an opportunity for a short term rebound in economic growth. Nevertheless, given the general unfavorable macroeconomic trends across the world, is rebound unlikely to last for long.
China also faces a number of emerging domestic challenges such as aging population, youth unemployment, public and private debt issues, and a slowing economy. As Johnston pointed out, Xi “… is much more comfortable as a status quo policy maker who keeps the population under control through ever-growing surveillance measures and ideology, especially nationalism and appeals to traditional Chinese values”.[12] However, these emerging trends will possibly force President Xi and his administration to take on a new approach. Abundant documentation of these public protests clearly shows that the youth are the majority of participants. Without the ability to find a job, unemployed youth are unlikely to join China’s middle class cohort. Hence, the unemployed youth are less likely to support President Xi and his administration. The utmost urgent goal for the CPC to maintain social stability is perhaps tackling high youth unemployment. As China is seeking to transform into a high-tech manufacturing and service based economy, providing more opportunities in training in manufacturing especially in the renewable energy sector is a feasible way to reduce youth unemployment and create more jobs.
Implications for the West
Many Western and U.S. politicians believed that integrating China in world trade was a mistake and China’s rapid economic growth did not promise a more free and more democratic China. Under the “autocracy vs democracy narrative”, it is becoming more frequent that Western countries use phrases such as “China does not share our values” to justify a tougher stance against China. The recent protests, however, contradicts these Western narratives. The CPC may not embrace values such as Western style of individual freedom and democracy, but many Chinese people do. Evidently, these recent protests showcase that values such as freedom of expression and democracy have been introduced and accepted by the Chinese people, but they just have not yet materialized.
President Xi’s power may now be more stable, but he will be facing a new set of challenges. In 2023, China is expected to engage with the US to further solidify some agreements during President Xi and Biden’s meeting which includes discussion on climate change, security, and macroeconomic issues. Competition between China and the US will likely continue while some cooperation in climate and macroeconomic issues are expected.
For the West, working directly with the CPC may be considered inappropriate and an unpopular opinion. As China’s COVID restrictions gradually ease, more engagement at sub-national levels can promote a better understanding of the Chinese people and the West. It may be unrealistic to expect a movement that fundamentally changes the CPC, but increased communication instead of decoupling will allow Chinese citizens to learn about the rest of the world and eventually affect CPC’s decision making.
References
[1] “‘始终坚持人民至上、生命至上’——习近平总书记指挥打好统筹疫情防控和经济社会发展之战述评”. Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 28, 2022.
https://www.mca.gov.cn/article/xw/tt/202203/20220300040856.shtml
[2] Ibid.
[3] “2022年1-7月全国房地产开发投资下降6.4%”, National Bureau of Statistics, August 15, 2022.
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/202208/t20220814_1887334.html
[4] November 11 is written as 11, 11 or called double 11. The number 11 is a symbol of individuals who are single. Single’s Day is the Chinese equivalent to Black Friday where items are sold at significantly discounted prices to attract customers.
[5] “双11”第十四年：不再公布总交易额 电商挥别“黄金时代”, Sohu News, November 12, 2022. https://www.sohu.com/a/605060205_100106037
[6] Ibid.
[7] “孙春兰强调:总结基层经验做法 推动防控措施持续优化”,中华人民共和国中央人民政府, December 1, 2022.
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2022-12/01/content_5729886.htm
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Brown, Kerry. XI: A Study in Power. London: Icon, 2022. P.107, 110.
[11] Alastair Ian Johnson. “Xi Versus the Street, The Protests in China Could Herald a Turbulent New Era”, Foreign Affairs, November 30, 2022.
[12] Ibid.
Guest Bloggers – CWD Researchers
Image Credit: The Indian Express