The CWD focused recent attention on the global management of debt and the growing threat of a sovereign debt crisis. After a number of virtual gatherings and much focused discussion, the CWD completed a Debt Management Proposal that CWD passed to folks in India as India scheduled the first G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers Ministerial at Bangalore, or its official name, Bengaluru.
The CWD Debt Proposal Summary is currently posted at the Global Solutions Initiative. but we do anticipate that the full Proposal will be up at the Global Summitry Project shortly. Meanwhile, I also wanted give you a flavor for the intense discussions that went on among CWD principals working on the Proposal. First, I wanted to link you to the Debt Management analysis prepared by Deborah Brautigam at SAIS that was published as: “The Developing World’s Coming Debt Crisis: America and China Need to Cooperate on Relief” in Foreign Affairs published on February 20th.
And then I wanted to give you a flavor of the deep discussion that went on for several weeks. This is a short back and forth that took place with Deborah Brautigam, Johannes Linn and Richard Carey on February 21st. I have smoothed the discussion and elaborated on the many acronyms in the back and forth:
“Johannes Linn
If I had one wish, Deborah, after reading your excellent article in Foreign Affairs, it would have been that you had explained more fully the nature of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HPIC) process. In my view it was not “debt cancellation” by the IFIs, but the paydown of IFI debt with resources from bilateral donors and some International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) net income (which could otherwise have been contributed to International Development Association (IDA)). If I understood the [current] Chinese proposal for the establishment of a World Bank trust fund in parallel with an existing IMF trust fund to pay off IMF debt (as you mention), then that would in effect be parallel to the HPIC approach, and one wonders why the World Bank didn’t accept that. It could be that World Bank did not want to risk having bilateral donors reduce their new IDA contributions in reaction, which would have meant less new IDA money for the poorest countries.
It appears that the issue with multilateral debt relief is the following: there is no free lunch — if the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) take a hit on their balance sheet and give up their long-established “preferred creditor status”, they risk a downgrading and higher risk exposure and thus more restricted prudent use of capital market funding. IDA will have fewer resources for new lending. In effect, other developing countries will pay the price for multilateral debt cancellation. If they go for a HPIC-like solution then bilateral donors will have to pay, burdening either donor countries’ tax payers (which, one could argue, is not unreasonable); this might risk that their contributions to IDA and other concessional multilateral windows will drop and thus concessional new money from MDBs for the poor countries will decline (in which case other developing countries would again pay the price).
By the way, a straightforward comparison of debt outstanding across creditor classes, while relatively easy to compile, tells only a partial story. One really should look at the net present value of debt service obligations across creditor classes, since that reflects the real cost of debt to countries, allowing for very different terms under which different classes of debt are contracted. Under this approach private debt will weigh much more heavily and MDB debt less so. It would be interesting to see what happens to Paris Club debt versus Chinese debt.
Deborah Brautigam
My own view is that the World Bank should have explored the establishment of a Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT) – an IMF trust – equivalent more seriously. There was a view expressed that China wanted it to be funded in proportion to voting shares, which was deemed infeasible, but the IMF trust is, I believe, funded by voluntary contributions. This would have been a start.
As I recall during HIPC, since the debt relief was counted as “aid”, countries did reduce their non-relief funding. I remember that Japan warned that this would be the consequence.
Richard Carey
The decision to adopt and implement the “enhanced HIPC” was taken at the Cologne G8 Summit in 1999, after agreement at the previous Summit in Birmingham in 1998 that the following year the Summit would definitively deal with debt.
In that intervening year, the details were hammered out in the contentious process as previously described. Funding of multilateral debt reduction came from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) concessional aid essentially (the IMF used some of its own resources for the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), with a call for bilateral contributions to cover additional needs, and the MDRI was extended to all countries with less than $380 per capita, whether they had been in the HIPC program or not).
The key mover was Clare Short, then new Labour Government Secretary of State with a new Department of International Development (DFID) and a new White Paper which endorsed the 1996 DAC International Development Goals (IDGs). She flew to Washington to help Brian Atwood, then the Head of USAID, face down Treasury and State who held that the 1996 DAC Goals had not been endorsed. The position was that this initiative did represent US agreement for what eventually became the IDGs. The story of how the HIPC became linked to the goal for poverty reduction is told in Chapter 10 of the recent history of the DAC.
In 1998 the Jubilee 2000 Campaign for Debt Reduction was having a major impact on public opinion. Short saw an opportunity to make debt relief conditional on poor countries drawing up poverty reduction strategies. To establish that link, Short had to fly to Washington to face down USAID Administrator Brian Atwood and objections from Treasury and State that the US had never agreed to the OECD’s DAC International Development Goals. With her position that Prime Minister Blair would publicly criticize President Clinton if he failed to support the IDGs (eventually to become the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 1998 G8 Communique endorsed them in resounding terms. That is how the enhanced HIPC came to be based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. (Note that CWD Common Framework proposal involves countries adopting medium term strategies based on the “new development narratives”…).
A subplot in this story was that the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), was lost to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), although the 1999 Cologne G8 Communique had briefly welcomed the CDF. As Chapter 10 in the DAC History relates, a joint note circulated on April 5, 2000, by James Wolfensohn and Stanley Fischer sought to square the circle of the urgency of the PRSPs to deliver fast on debt relief and the more time-consuming task of bringing multiple stakeholders into a country-led long-term development platform:
For some time the formulation of “PRSPs incorporating the principles of the CDF” became a standard phrase. But eventually the battle for the CDF was lost and this formula faded away. And without the CDF, the HIPC PRSPs essentially left out agendas such as infrastructure, urbanisation and rural development. The MDGs were essentially human development/wellbeing- based proxies – these left-out agendas only came back with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015.
In the present case of the CF, medium term country strategies based on the “new development narratives” can in principle be built on the basis of nationally owned SDGs and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to the Paris Climate Change Agreement. But let us see what is emerging in Finance Ministers and Central Bankers meeting in India this week and beyond. And, with bond financing now a major part of the picture, impact investing by the private sector and asset managers on the basis of projects and programs that are green, social, sustainable and sustainability linked (GSSS) seems to be in vogue. Also, as mentioned, the article by the Lazard Sovereign Debt Unit has useful ideas -e.g., on how bondholders can be brought into early agreements with special bonds that provide a payoff for “haircuts” if and when the economy is in much better shape.
Johannes Linn
By the way, one question we all seem to studiously avoid in this discussion about debt relief is how to prevent a new debt crisis a few years down the road, after we solve this one. In the mid 1990s I was involved in establishing the broad design of HPIC – moving from basic concept to decision in principle – with President James Wolfensohn at the World Bank, so it is particularly frustrating to see the debt issues being replayed all over again, except that it may be an even more intractable problem now than it was then.”
Hope you like it.
Image Credit: IMF