Category Archives: Global Governance

In a Trump World, ‘Widening the Who’ in the Global Order

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Now we are out a bit early. But that’s not surprising because of the US national elections on Tuesday night. So a few thoughts on that and then a redirection to the, “what do we do about the global order in the light of Trump’s return, including many of his former advisers, to the White House”

The electoral equation in the end proved to be rather simple if also somber. Harris lost too many non-college and latino men and she won women – but not by nearly enough. With the Latinos, Trump won 32 percent in 2020; in 2024 Trump won about 45 percent.  Harris,  on women, won 54 percent but Biden in 2020 won 57 percent. The Harris statistic on women is dismaying.

Now I am not one to focus and comment on US elections – other than as a ‘somewhat informed’ but non-expert – but it does seem to me that the Harris campaign did not strategically break through with a host of electoral groups with her message. And she needed to to secure the Presidency. As Michael Hirsh described in FP: 

Despite overpowering Trump in their only debate on Sept. 10 and raising more than $1 billion in donations in just three months—a new record—Harris often floundered when challenged to deliver a convincing summary of her agenda on critical issues such as the economy and immigration. She also fumbled badly in explaining her flip-flops on issues such as fracking (which she once opposed and later supported, but without pointing out the simple fact that improved technology had made it environmentally safer). That led Wall Street Journal commentator Peggy Noonan to label Harris an “artless dodger.”

Worse, possibly, was the view expressed by Opinion Writer Peter Baker who suggests that Trump represents a significant current of American thinking. As he wrote in the NYT:

The assumption that Mr. Trump represented an anomaly who would at last be consigned to the ash heap of history was washed away on Tuesday night by a red current that swept through battleground states — and swept away the understanding of America long nurtured by its ruling elite of both parties. … With his comeback victory to reclaim the presidency, Mr. Trump has now established himself as a transformational force reshaping the United States in his own image.

 

No longer can the political establishment write off Mr. Trump as a temporary break from the long march of progress, a fluke who somehow sneaked into the White House in a quirky, one-off Electoral College win eight years ago. With his comeback victory to reclaim the presidency, Mr. Trump has now established himself as a transformational force reshaping the United States in his own image.

 

Populist disenchantment with the nation’s direction and resentment against elites proved to be deeper and more profound than many in both parties had recognized. Mr. Trump’s testosterone-driven campaign capitalized on resistance to electing the first woman president.

In fact, according to Baker, Trump was appreciated for all his effrontery and racism:

Rather than be turned off by Mr. Trump’s flagrant, anger-based appeals along lines of race, gender, religion, national origin and especially transgender identity, many Americans found them bracing. Rather than be offended by his brazen lies and wild conspiracy theories, many found him authentic.

So with Trump in the White House and his people in the Administration where do we go? On the immediate geopolitical front we are very likely to see rising tensions with China – though I believe there is a path to less tension. We are very likely to see pressure on Ukraine to halt the conflict with Putin even at the cost of transferring Ukrainian lands to Russia – a real cost and speaking of costs we are likely to see a blizzard of tariffs on Chinese goods and possibly beyond. But it is a bit early to fill in the contours of Trump 2.0 foreign policy.

But, instead, let me look at the outline of the direction we saw coming from Democrat and Democrat-leaning experts and operatives. In particular let me look briefly at the design described by Anne-Marie Slaughter in a recent Foreign Affairs piece titled: “How America Can Succeed in a Multialigned World: The Importance of Building Truly Global Partnerships”. Anne-Marie is currently CEO of the think tank New America. From 2002 to 2009, she was Bert G. Kerstetter ‘66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs and Dean of the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. In 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appointed her as the first woman Director of Policy Planning in the U.S. State Department. She has been a ‘close in’ Democratic voice and it is why I refer to this article to give an inside possible glimpse at where the Harris administration might have moved had she been elected and indeed the possibility of Anne-Marie’s very real likely participation.

Anne-Marie is quite aware that there are two challenges this Biden administration faced and would be front and center for a Harris administration – the rising geopolitical tensions with Russia, and with China and with Iran, but also the existential global governance threats, climate, finance and weakened multilateralism and the institutions that no longer served global order purposes. Anne-Marie moved back to gaze at the Biden administration and its effort to build not just an alliance system but beyond that to a ‘multipartner world’. As Anne-Marie declared:

It [the Biden administration] has reanimated and expanded traditional alliances such as NATO and strengthened and created a host of new diplomatic and security partnerships. Secretary of State Antony Blinken described in Foreign Affairs a network of “partners in peace,” the result of an intense diplomatic strategy to safeguard U.S. interests abroad while rebuilding competitiveness at home.

Yet as she described the effort:

 These partnerships are important and valuable. Still, the Biden strategy overall has tilted too far in the direction of geopolitical competition over global cooperation, even as it tries to do both at once. To strike the right balance, the next administration must partner with a wider variety of global actors, focus those partnerships more on existential global threats, and accept a more decentralized, messier world that welcomes leadership from many different quarters.

 

The concept of “multistakeholder governance” holds that all actors who have a stake in the outcome of a specific decision, whether a state, an international institution, a corporation, or a municipality, find a place at the table at some point in the decision-making process.

So the future of multipartnering was just not just constructed on state, regional and international organizations but extending to non-state and substate actors. As Anne-Marie argues:

The concept of “multistakeholder governance” holds that all actors who have a stake in the outcome of a specific decision, whether a state, an international institution, a corporation, or a municipality, find a place at the table at some point in the decision-making process.

Her conclusion for this multipartner approach is as follows:

A national security strategy dedicated to building a multipartner world will still leave plenty of room for the United States to lead on the global stage. Moreover, embracing multisector partnerships gives open societies such as that of the United States a leg up in in geopolitical competition, given the autonomy and energy of American civic, corporate, philanthropic, technological, scientific, and educational institutions.

This wide multipartner approach, as described in part by Anne-Marie Slaughter, is unlikely to be captured and furthered by the incoming Trump administration. But it is worth keeping in mind and may well be an approach that will be valuable for many national, regional and international actors in the near future, even if not for a Trump America.

Meanwhile, another piece in a multipartner world is a possibility. And we at the China-West Dialogue (CWD) are keenly examining the role today of Middle Powers in furthering efforts to meet the challenge of global threats and to diminish the ratcheting up of geopolitical tensions. We are currently examining with colleagues across the globe the potential for Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD)  to tackle global threats and stabilize the global governance environment. As the lead co-chair of the CWD, Colin Bradford has written:

Global pluralism, developed in 2020-2023, posits the existence already of “autonomous” strategies and independence in foreign policies as a “global political dynamic” in global relations.  Pluralism is a core concept for CWD, in that it leads to the “pluralization” of relations with China as an “alternative framework” to address the toxic tension in the bilateral China-US relationship in recent years. This has been the goal of CWD from its foundation.

 

In the last year of CWD exchanges, the importance of Middle Powers and Middle Power Diplomacy has arisen as the domestic driver of pluralism.  This new CWD series seeks to elucidate the factors enabling countries to be Middle Powers and the features of their international behaviors which are effective in addressing global systemic challenges.

 

A better understanding of these factors and features could facilitate proactive national efforts to deliberately contribute to global pluralism by “punching above their weight” and to influence global governance outcomes that include China and the US but which “globalize” those outcomes, rather than narrow them by allowing great power dominance to prevail.

We have examined with colleagues globally, and always with our colleagues from China in the CWD process, Middle Power actions from Japan and Latin America, especially Brazil, and Korea shortly with Turkey, Indonesia and the ASEAN to come and also with examinations of Europe and the US and China and MPD.

Trump America with its hypernationalist focus and its likely transactional initiatives fails to promote any kind of global order optimism; but there are other pathways. We need to explore these further and promote those that appear promising.

This was first posted as a Substack POst at Alan’s Newsletter. All comments and free subscriptions are welcome

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The Changing Shape and Influence of the Informals

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The UN General Assembly’s High Level Week has come and gone. And so has the unique UN gathering – The ‘Summit of the Future’ with the passage of the long anticipated, ‘Pact for the Future’. So, it’s not surprising that those of us concerned with global governance, global order and global summitry have turned our attention to the – Informals and most evidently the upcoming two Summits – the G20 Summit hosted this year by Brazil and the BRICS+ Summit hosted by none other than Russia. As it turns out, the third key Informal, the G7 has already been held by Italy in Apulia on June 13-15th.

The Informals emerged in 1975 with the creation of the G6 then the G7 a year later. While the G7 enlarged to the G7/8 in 1998, with the inclusion of Russia, it returned to being the G7 in 2017 when Russia that had been suspended with its annexation of Crimea in 2014, abandoned the Informal for the G20. The G20 began in 1999 with finance ministers and central bankers. It evolved into a leaders summit with the global financial crisis in 2008. The G20 members in attendance at the first Leaders’ Summit called by George W. Bush were: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The BRICs called their first leaders gathering in Yekaterinburg Russia in 2009. It emerged as the BRICS with the addition of South Africa at the Sanya China meeting in 2011.  These three, the G7, the G20 and the BRICS have remained the key informal annual leaders’ summits. The question remains, however, how effective have these 3 Summits been? Have they been able to shape the global order and advance collective global governance leadership? In other words, have they been effective?

Let me first focus on the BRICS+. This year’s gathering is the first convening of the BRICS+, an enlarged BRICS group. This year’s Summit is significant for the current member enlargement but also for its hosting by Russia. Yes, this year the BRICS+ is hosted by Russia – a pariah for the West due to the Ukraine War. My colleague, Stewart Patrick, a senior fellow and director of the Global Order and Institutions Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) published a BRICS+ piece on September 9, titled, “BRICS Expansion, the G20, and the Future of World Order”. On the first point, enlargement, Stewart suggests:

Putin has also invited more than two dozen other countries that have applied for or are considering membership in the expanding club. The gathering is meant to send an unmistakable signal: Despite the West’s best efforts to isolate it, Russia has many friends around the world.

This meeting in Russia will take place in Kazan the capital of Tatarstan. In addition to the original members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, besides all the many invited guest there are the new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though it should be noted that Saudi Arabia has technically not accepted membership but will attend in any case. Now Stewart’s explanation for this expansion:

No doubt, BRICS expansion evinces a growing global dissatisfaction with and a determination to challenge the structural advantages that advanced market democracies continue to enjoy in a global order that was in many respects made by the West, for the West. Reducing those exorbitant privileges, including by creating alternative, parallel institutions, is the fundamental purpose of BRICS+.

And the prospects of further expansion is highly possible. According to Putin, as described by Stewart:

According to Putin, thirty-four countries have expressed an interest to join the club, “in one form or another.” Some two dozen countries have reportedly applied for membership, among them Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam. More may be waiting in the wings, like Indonesia, which applied and then withdrew its application a decade ago. The most recent applicant is Türkiye, a member of NATO—albeit one that seeks to keep its options open. The group, in other words, seems destined to expand.

So what are the goals and how effective has the current BRICS+ been. As noted above, the BRICS+ members loudly proclaim the need to add the Global South to the major multilateral institutions whether the UN, and especially the UN Security Council, or the major financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF.

At the extreme, according to my colleague Oliver Stuenkel and his co-author Alexander Gabuev in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, titled, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order”:

Putin summarized the agenda of Russia’s BRICS presidency in remarks in July as part of a “painful process” to overthrow the “classic colonialism” of the U.S.-led order, calling for an end to Washington’s “monopoly” on setting the rules of the road.

But the makeup today, and likely in the near future, has its limitations as described by Oliver and his co-author:

But despite its allure, the club must grapple with an internal fissure. Some of its members, chief among them China and Russia, want to position the grouping against the West and the global order crafted by the United States. The addition of Iran, an inveterate adversary of the United States, only deepens the sense that the group is now lining up on one side of a larger geopolitical battle. Other members, notably Brazil and India, do not share this ambition. Instead, they want to use BRICS to democratize and encourage the reform of the existing order, helping guide the world from the fading unipolarity of the post–Cold War era to a more genuine multipolarity in which countries can steer between U.S.-led and Chinese-led blocs.

There clearly are differences in the view of its members as to what this Informal is designed to accomplish. And evidently not all members are equal. In particular China exerts strong influence on the original members and it, along with Russia, have pushed for expansion notwithstanding Brazil and India’s reticence:

Brazil and India are therefore wary of the BRICS’ hardening orientation. Both were initially opposed to China’s push to expand the group, which Beijing first proposed in 2017 under the rubric of “BRICS Plus.” Brazil and India were keen to retain the club’s exclusivity, worried that adding more members to the bloc would dilute their own influence within it. In 2023, China stepped up its diplomatic campaign and pressured Brazil and India to support expansion, mostly by casting their resistance as tantamount to preventing the rise of other developing countries. Keen to preserve its own standing in the global South, India dropped its opposition, leaving Brazil no choice but to go along with expansion. Brazil did lobby against adding any overtly anti-Western countries—an endeavor that failed spectacularly when Iran was announced as one of the new members that year.

It appears that the BRICS+ has taken on what appears to be a growing anti-western tilt and in the extreme case an anti-US position. In particular Russia, given its experience of US and European sanctions since the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine has urged the toppling of the US dollar dominance according to Alexander and Oliver:

In this fight against the Western “monopoly,” Putin identified the most important campaign as the quest to weaken the dominion of the dollar over international financial transactions. This focus is a direct result of Russia’s experience with Western sanctions. Russia hopes that it can build a truly sanctions-proof payments system and financial infrastructure through BRICS, involving all member countries.

But what has the BRICS accomplished beyond expressing distaste for the current global order leadership.

Stewart targets what he sees as the goals of the BRICS+ on the differences within:

On its face, BRICS+ is a formidable economic bloc,comprising half of the world’s population, 40 percent of its trade, and 40 percent of crude oil production and exports. The coalition can use this leverage not only to demand a more equitable international order but also to act on those ambitions, for instance by establishing a parallel energy trading system, deepening commercial links among members,creating an alternative system of development finance, reducing dollar dependence in foreign exchange transactions, and deepening technology cooperation in fields from AI to outer space. Expect BRICS+ to seek opportunities in each area.

Stewart also applauds various group actions:

Like the G7 and G20, the BRICS group has launched an expanding array of initiatives and partnerships across multiple issue areas, from energy to health to sustainable development. The result is an impressive and increasingly dense transnational latticework of networked minilateralism, with a heavy focus on South-South cooperation.

Yet the major collective BRICS efforts have been limited. In fact, we have two only: the New Development Bank (NDB) and a currency swap arrangement, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) which has remained unused notwithstanding all the discussions of an alternative to the US dollar. As to the NDB it has not had a major financing impact with many criticizing it for relying too much on private financing. For an insightful discussion of the BRICS please listen to the podcast I undertook with York University’s Gregory Chin, “Summit Dialogue, S2, Ep 7, An Interview with Gregory Chin on the BRICS+ and the New Development Bank”

Frankly the collective efforts have been at best works in progress with far more rhetorical expression than practical implementation. As Stewart remarks:

To date, BRICS has been more effective at signaling what it is against—namely,continued Western domination of the architecture of global governance—than what it stands for.

And Alexander and Oliver further note:

In this fight against the Western “monopoly,” Putin identified the most important campaign as the quest to weaken the dominion of the dollar over international financial transactions. This focus is a direct result of Russia’s experience with Western sanctions. Russia hopes that it can build a truly sanctions-proof payments system and financial infrastructure through BRICS, involving all member countries.

The talk of de-dollarization is rife but the dethroning of the dollar is nowhere to be seen at the moment. So that is a first look at the expanded BRICS.

What then is the current status of the G20? First it should be noted the G20 has enlarged as well with the addition of the African Union in 2023. A key strength of the G20, unlike the G7, is that the G20 includes advanced economic and Global South members. In principle this wider membership corrects for the skewed membership of the G7 where no significant Global South members are present. This evident avantage has however fallen to the tensions generated in a far more geopolitical tense international system. Stewart reflects on the impact of the rising geopolitical tensions:

Of particular concern is the future of the Group of 20 (G20). Even before BRICS expansion, it had become a microcosm of growing global rifts. A further hardening of these divisions would undercut the G20’s fundamental raison d’être: namely, to help bridge gulfs between—and leverage the capabilities of—important countries that are not inherently or necessarily like-minded.

 

Among the biggest uncertainties is what impact the BRICS+ will have on the role and functioning of the G20, which will hold its own summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18–19 under this year’s chair, Brazil.Since the G20’s elevation to the leader level in 2008, one of its ostensible comparative advantages has been that it provide a setting for flexible coalitions of consensus to emerge that transcend rigid blocs.

 

The expansion of BRICS certainly has the potential to exacerbate these dynamics, by splitting the G20 into opposed G7 and BRICS+ factions.

Though much anticipation was paid to the G20 broad membership, the geopolitical and now the ant-Western tensions reflected in the BRICS+ may hobble the very needed collective global governance efforts ascribed to the G20.

We will come back to the G20 as we approach the G20 Summit scheduled for November 18th and 19th, in Rio de Janeiro as we look to take the measure of G20 effectiveness.

Image Credit: LinkedIn

This Post was originally posted at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter: https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/the-changing-shape-and-influence?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

 

Growing Closer to the Summit of the Future

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So, we are closing in on the consequential “UN Summit of the Future” (SoTF). This UN gathering will occur this coming fall on September 22-23rd during the UN General Assembly’s high-level week. This Summit, as was the case with the earlier SDG Summit, will be attended by many Heads of State and Government. 

Now this is not the first occasion that I found myself raising the SoTF. I did so back in March in a Substack Post, entitled: “The Impact of the UN Summit of the Future (SOTF)”. At that time I noted the hope from the UN and the Secretary General, Antonio Guterres for this second of two major UN gatherings: 

The Summit of the Future (SoTF) is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

If only to take the measure of this formal multilateral institution – the UN, it is useful that we closely examine the UN and the Secretary General’s effectiveness through the actions and conclusions of this second of the Two Summit. It has become evident to most, if not all commentators that this formal security institution and its many specialized agencies,  like the formal financial and trade institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO – have all become enfeebled with age, conflicting North-South objectives and rising geopolitical tensions between major powers including Russia, China, the US and Europe. In addition, the rules often require consensus that as pointed out recently by Frederic Menard and Jennifer Welsh and her colleagues, in a new volume on global governance,  Afterworlds: Long Covid and International Relations leads to the following conclusion: 

The second weakness of contemporary multilateralism—its reliance on particular representations of power and interests—means that it maintains a system whereby a consensus among sovereign governments is required to advance collective policy on global problems, even when that consensus effectively results in the lowest common denominator.

There is a strong sense that these institutions are no longer ‘fit for purpose’, yet there is little hope for renewal in the face of the ‘rising disorder and fragmentation in international relations’. 

But back to the UN and this critical Summit. The UN describes the path to the SoTF as follows: 

The 75th Anniversary of the United Nations was marked in June 2020 with a declaration by Member States that included 12 overarching commitments along with a request to the Secretary-General for recommendations to address both current and future challenges. In September 2021, the Secretary-General responded with his report, Our Common Agenda, a wake-up call to speed up the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and propel the commitments contained in the UN75 Declaration. In some cases, the proposals addressed gaps that emerged since 2015, requiring new intergovernmental agreements. The report, therefore, called for a Summit of the Future to forge a new global consensus on readying ourselves for a future that is rife with risks but also opportunities. The General Assembly welcomed the submission of the “rich and substantive” report and agreed to hold the Summit on 22-23 September 2024, preceded by a ministerial meeting in 2023. An action-oriented Pact for the Future is expected to be agreed by Member States through intergovernmental negotiations on issues they decide to take forward. 

This self-described pathway by the UN and its Secretary General highlights the key measure of success and renewal – the “Pact for the Future” (Pact).  Richard Ponzio, Director and Senior Fellow, Global Governance, Justice & Security at The Stimson Center, and a close watcher of the UN, raised that very same question with his opinion piece on the Pact with its title – “Summit of the Future: A Historical Pivot or Mere Footnote?” But after a reading of his opinion piece and then a review of both the zero draft and now what is called the compilation draft it leaves the answer difficult to discern. As Richard pointed out, however, this compilation draft is not yet an end point. As he describes: 

Time is running short, with the first revision of the Pact for the Future not expected until shortly after the UN Civil Society Conference, from May 9-10 in Nairobi, which is focusing on the Summit of the Future.

Now  the zero draft covered 20 pages. Additions and emendations and significant paragraph rewrites by member states left the compilation draft at 255 pages leaving much to accomplish for those about to hold the pen after Nairobi. Moreover, as Richard points out, there is a movement ‘afoot’ to leave final results – the final document, to sometime in the future: 

A more recent argument to gather steam that could further kick the can down the road and result in underwhelming outcomes by September is the notion that as a consensus-based world leaders document, the Pact for the Future is already pitched at an appropriate length, tone and level of ambition. Hence, the logic follows that the technical details could be fleshed out by diplomats and others after the summit.

But  the current document as I pointed out earlier remains fixed more on the ‘what’ but hardly anything on the ‘how. There is little in the current document on how can the UN, the Secretary-General, and others actually advance and implement reforms and changes agreed to by the Member States. Unfortunately, the ‘what’ is decidedly more easy to lay out than the ‘how’. Thus, for example, there is a call for UN Security Council reform – an issue that has dogged the UN system for years but the compilation draft, just as the earlier zero draft, still fails to actually provide suggested reforms in membership,how many countries will be permanent, how large will the the Security Council be, which countries will hold a veto, if any at all, etc., etc.

Now Richard does suggest there there are four major initiatives that appear to be coming together:

A biennial summit on the global economy to bring the G20 and the UN closer to expand development financing for the 2030 Agenda (Sustainable Development Goals) and improve global economic governance. 

 

An emergency platform for better addressing complex global shocks, such as pandemics or large-scale environmental disasters (although influential countries, such as Pakistan and Cuba, question its purpose and cost). 

 

A Global Digital Compact with human rights-based principles to lay the foundations for broader governance of cybertech, including AI. 

 

A Declaration on Future Generations, which, if backed by an authoritative intergovernmental body, a special envoy and monitoring tool, could achieve the status and impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

If Richard is correct, and these are the most likely changes and reforms to be adopted by the UN and also likely to be adopted as a legacy for the current Secretary General as he comes to the end, and likely retirement in 2026 after his second term, well, I am concerned.  A biennial summit with the G20 is possible but then what is likely to be accomplished – I’m not sure. But an emergency platform – that seems to me to be a stretch and as for the other two other initiatives, they suggest a presence but likely in form but without substance. 

Look, reform of these formal institutions created decades ago is a struggle at the best of times. And, I’m afraid, the state of global governance reform is far from being at the best of times in this growing era of disorder in international relations.

But stay tuned.

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter’.

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Stumbling Over ‘Strategic Narcissism’

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“Advancing global governance and human security for a better future”: A Symposium hosted by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), America-China Public Affairs Institute (ACPAI) and the China-West Dialogue (CWD) 

I had the good fortune to attend a ‘closed’ symposium in Washington this past midweek hosted by the organizations identified above. The Symposium identified the attainment of human security and the advancement of global governance as the key subjects of discussion and debate for the two roundtable sessions. The advance notes for the symposium suggested focusing on: 

How, might 2024 turn out to be a year of opportunity for advancing global governance in addressing human security challenges? What role can the Middle Powers play in moving the global relations forward to address humanity’s quest for security and systemic sustainability?

And as the notes further suggested: 

This half-day event aims for a broad engagement of perspectives from China, the United States, and the Global South on the feasibility of revamping global governance in the current context. We seek to convene leading global policy researchers, practitioners, and advocates to debate and recommend specific global institutional, legal, normative, and operational mechanisms that could inform governments’ participation in the major multilateral events of this year. 

 

The first roundtable session on the attainment of human security was led by Henry Huiyao Wang the President of CCG. And as the notes suggested: 

This session seeks to explore the scope of the concept of human security as a useful tool of generating alternative narratives and dynamics of US-China relations that yield more productive relations in global governance policy.

 

Framing questions:

 

  1. How can the idea of human security [to] be articulated in a way to mediate differences between the United States and China, given the prospects of bilateral cooperation on climate change, health, and AI governance?

  2. Multilaterally, how can the scope of the notion be extended to include norms and principles, such as international humanitarian law, human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and other dimensions in global governance?

  3. Are there specific institutional, legal, normative, and operational mechanisms that can be reformed to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 agenda? What are alternative coalitions that need to, should or can drive global governance leadership?

The second roundtable was led by Colin Bradford, the Lead Co-Chair of CWD and non-resident Senior Fellow, Brookings. The session was designed to explore advancing global governance “in a new global dynamic of pluralism where middle power diplomacy, it was suggested, might play a key role in lowering the ‘temperature’ in great power relations and promoting greater global governance policymaking. As the notes identified: 

Middle Powers exist today with agency and influence to play a role in addressing global threats. Understanding Middle Power Diplomacy and its implications for the global order can generate transformative forces in fostering multilateral consensus on global governance. The Brazilian and South African G20 presidencies during 2024 and 2025, with the US to follow in 2026, could become pivotal focal points for transition to a new era in global relations in which MPD demonstrates the feasibility of advancing humanity’s quest for peace, security, equality, and sustainable development. This session aims for a broad engagement of diverse perspectives, cutting across disciplines, sectors and regions.

 

Framing questions:

 

  1. What is Middle Power Diplomacy and how [can] the concept factor in independent and cross-national policy space to address global governance challenges?
  2. Following the Bali Declaration in November 2022 and the pause in US-China tensions after the Biden-Xi summit in November 2023 in San Francisco, what are the prospects for MPD to play an active role in global governance leadership?
  3. What are specific issues on which greater potential for convergence and cooperation exist in a global governance dimension, not a geopolitical context for MPD to bridge divides and invigorate coordinated efforts between countries?”

There was a lively discussion throughout the two roundtables that revealed, as one participant put it, that there appears to be two trends in our thinking on the current geopolitics. One trend underscored how critical greater cooperation was called for to deal with the growing transnational problems and the second, and a countervailing trend – greater great power rivalry  and competition. With respect to the first trend, it was hoped that various Middle Powers – seen as countries that can and do punch above their weight – say a Sweden, or Singapore, or Braziland more – work to tackle global governance problems such as extreme poverty or climate change ‘green transition’ policy and financing.

While there was a strong sentiment expressed underscoring the agency of Middle Powers in the midst of great power rivalry, especially in the context of Middle Power leadership of the G20 – Indonesia, India, currently Brazil, and to be followed next year by South Africa, there was an equally strong sense of caution and a view that great power rivalry – Russia, China and the United States – appeared to cripple collective action and to undermine Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD). 

Much of our discussion in MIddle Powers and MPD – what was possible in the face of great power competition – was shadowed by what has been labelled in the recent past as ‘Strategic Narcissism’ and I recalled to the group. The term ‘Strategic Narcissism’ was used, if not created by H.R. McMaster in his book,  Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World published in 2020 at the end of the Trump years. McMaster In February 2017 succeeded Michael Flynn as President Donald Trump‘s National Security Advisor.  For McMaster the term was applied to the US role in shaping global order relations. He defined the term as: “the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans.” As he wrote (2020, 18): 

Across multiple administrations, U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy has suffered from what we might derive from Morgenthau’s essay “Strategic Narcissism”: the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans. The two mind-sets that result from strategic narcissism, overconfidence and resignation, share the conceit of attributing outcomes almost exclusively to U.S. decisions and undervaluing the degree to which others influence the future.

McMaster appears to have drawn the concept  from earlier work by the great international relations thinker, Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau identifies the concept in his 1978 essay: “The Roots of Narcissism” with Ethel Person (The Partisan Review. 1978 vol 45(3): 337-347). McMaster, however, creates what is a new phrase and concept by adding “strategic.” How closely McMaster’s interpretation of narcissism represents Morgenthau’s position is debatable. The language of “alienation” and “aspirations exceeding the limits of ability” is drawn verbatim from Morgenthau, but Morgenthau presents them as human problems. The leap by McMaster to apply this analysis to a national level foreign policy is somewhat questionable. In Battlegrounds, however, McMaster writes that in “The Roots of Narcissism” Morgenthau lamented preoccupation with self in foreign policy because it led to alienation from other nations and aspirations that exceed the limits of ability.  America’s stature as the only superpower encouraged narcissism, according to McMaster with a preoccupation with self, and an associated neglect of the influence that others have over the future course of events. Americans began to define the world only in relation to their own aspirations and desires and there are many that continue to do so in current global order analysis.

While there was much caution, even pessimism expressed over the ability of MPD to successfully temper great power dominance and action, general support was expressed for a view acknowledged at the end of the symposium by one participant that it was necessary to try and ‘move the needle’ – to push back against blocs and their rigidity and to support and advance collective global governance policy and action.   

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter

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‘The Black and the White of it’ – The Rules-based Order(RBO) – at an Intriguing Roundtable

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I was fortunate enough last week to join colleagues at the annual ISA in San Francisco in a Roundtable with the above title, or close to it. Enjoy the weekend and this Post at Alan’s Newsletter

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It was a good gathering, actually, a very good gathering! I had the good fortune of joining with many thousands of my colleagues at the International Studies Association (ISA) annual conference, this year in San Francisco. The ISA runs for some 4 days and the attendees joined the conference from across the globe. One thing that was noticeable at this annual gathering was that there seemed to be more international relations (IR) sessions than in the past. And this year I was fortunate enough to chair the following Roundtable: ‘The Black and White’ of the Rules-based Order (RBO): Does it exist? If it does, how to constrain breaches; if not what is to be done?

The session’s origin was in back and forth with my colleagues G. John Ikenberry and Arthur Stein. Though John in the end failed to attend, Arthur, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at UCLA did join us at the Roundtable. And truth be told Arthur and I snuck away from the Conference on Friday to enjoy – the opening game of the San Francisco Giants. So cool!

So, back to the Conference and the Rountable. The other members of the Roundtable included: Pascale Massot, Assistant Professor, soon to be Associate Professor, in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, Harukata Takenaka, Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) at Tokyo, Andrew Cooper, Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, Yves Tiberghien, Professor of Political Science and Konwakai Chair in Japanese Research at the University of British Columbia and Amitav Acharya the UNESCO Chair in Transitional Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University. The group joined Arthur and I on Thursday morning of the Conference.

So what was the premise of this Roundtable? The intro posed the contrasting views of the RBOs existence.  There are clear statements from the Biden Administration,  NATO partners and other European countries of Russia’s violation of the RBO with its war on Ukraine. We then zeroed in on the Russian view, expressed by among others, Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister who described the state of the global order as seen from Moscow: “Now the UN-centric system is undergoing a deep crisis, the root cause of which was brought on by the decision of certain UN members to replace international law and the UN Charter with some rules-based international order”. A similar view was expressed by Chen Wenqing, a chief security official from China who declared: “Individual states are trying to use the pretext of protesting  [for] democracy to substitute the existing world order based on international law with an artificial rules-based order…”. On the one side an evident and declared rules-based order and on the other something very different. This view declares that international order and international law are something very distinct from this apparent Western construct – The Rules-based Order. And it led us, at this Roundtable to raise the evident question: “… do we even have an RBO? If an RBO does not exist are we condemned to growing rivalry and conflict? If an RBO does exist, then what are the limits on conflict?”

The participants brought a variety of views to this Roundtable and the folks that joined us for the session. They expressed  perspectives and viewpoints from the major powers but not only and took a bird’s eye view of the evolving order and its relationship to the RBO. In the end the participants described the construction and the current state of the house that states, and now others, have built.

Let me try and capture just some of the participant perspectives. Let’s start with two valuable points, among many, that Amitav expressed at the Roundtable. First, according to Amitav, such RBO rules have been developed, shaped and reshaped by states over many centuries. He described a variety of RBOs: rules of diplomacy that go back to the 13 century; the Geneva Convention that goes back to the Code of Manon from 200 BC; the freedom of the seas from the 1th century but before that from small Asian states in Mombasa, Calicut, Malacca and more. Not a single order but a variety of orders. Secondly, the contemporary RBO is the product of a shared effort at San Francisco and not just a US creation. For some time the rules, and in many instances norms, have been refined, and in many cases came together in the 19th century and the West had much to do with it, but so did others.

As described by a number of participants, power shifts can and often do challenge the rules and norms but as pointed out by Pascale institutions can survive power shifts if the legitimacy of purpose can be maintained by some. Different futures are fashioned by states  for each RBO ecosystem – and we witness different evolutions for humanitarian law, from trade, from freedom of the seas and other orders. But the powerful may, and often do, ignore the norms time and time again for convenience. When the powerful are tired, or inconvenienced, they go around the rules and norms. There is a huge amount of arbitrariness in the order,  as described by Andrew. And further, as noted by Arthur all rules have exceptions and cheaters. Rules are created for violating the rules and, as identified for example in trade agreements, such agreements have escape clauses. States at one time or another are willing to enforce rules and on other occasions are all too ready to cheat on the same rules. And it is the case, and it should be noted that when a country complains about others being hypocrites, that state is in fact complaining about the actor being hypocrite, not the rule itself. For Harukata the RBO can be maintained but requires the commitment of leading states to expressly maintain such norms and rules.

Finally, our colleague, Yves described 7 flaws as he saw them  in the contemporary RBO. Among the 7 it is evident that the RBO is weak and needs commitment especially from the more powerful to sustain the order or orders. As he pointed out, in a Westphalian world, any global order is a weak superstructure that requires agreement of major states at creation, and indeed to survive. Like several others Yves suggested hypocrisy, especially, among the leading powers can undermine the RBO but as he notes the power of habits and socialization, even if the order is organized hypocrisy can grow on the members of the order. Norms get integrated. The ideal standards of the RBIO can bestow legitimacy even where hypocrisy lives. Institutional gravity and stickiness as well as the entrepreneurial role of staffers in the IOs can keep the RBO alive, note recent agreements: the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the High Seas Treaty 2023. For Yves, if we really want to promote cooperation and collective commitment toward meeting common challenges and common rules, we have to focus more on the pragmatic as opposed to the high pitched rhetoric demanding adherence to an ideal RBO that does exist.

The session with my colleagues was both revealing and satisfying. They undertook a wide and deep examination of the RBO and realistically examined the contemporary order that as all pointed out is under stress, hindered by hypocrisy but still capable of maintaining constraint and order in the face of a complex interstate environment but also today an engaged substate and non-state set of actors.

 

Image Credit: ISA 2024

 

Continuing the Middle Power Narrative

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In early February CWD highlighted, and I described in the Post at Alan’s Newsletter, “Are They All Middle Powers? Or, Are There None!” this emerging Middle Power narrative:

We hoped this session would be an opportunity to examine and critique “Asia’s Future at a crossroads: A Japanese strategy for peace and sustainable prosperity.” This very valuable Report was the outcome of years of work by the ‘Asia Future’ Research Group (Research Group)  co-convened by Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus of Keio University and Mike Mochizuki of the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University. … The Research Group urged that Japanese policy not be reshaped by the rise in US-China rivalry and the growing geopolitical tensions in the international system generally and in the Indo-Pacific specifically. Alas, that may prove to be quite difficult.

The story of emerging Middle Powers is about to continue with a new Report, this by the Körber Foundation. As noted by Colin Bradford our lead co-chair at CWD in his invitation to CWD participants to join a coming session on March 28th:

Driven by demographic and economic factors and an increasingly self-confident presence on the world stage, emerging middle powers (such as Brazil, India and South Africa) are gaining international influence.

  • ​What foreign policy challenges do emerging middle powers face?  How do they position themselves vis-à-vis China and the war in Ukraine?    And, where do they find common ground with the West, particularly on reforming the international system?

The Report is, “Listening Beyond the Echo Chamber: Emerging Middle Powers Report 2024”. This Report, front and centre in our coming CWD session, presents an intriguing survey and various findings from the following:

The first Emerging Middle Powers Survey polled nearly 1,000 politicians, diplomats, journalists, researchers and private-sector representatives from

India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) as well as from Germany.

The CWD gathering has the good fortune of welcoming Julia Ganter, Programme Director Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative to introduce the Report to CWD. In addition we have remarks from:

  • Steven Gruzd, Head, African Governance and Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg,
  • Manjeet Kripalani, Executive Director, Gateway House Indian Council on Global Relations, Mumbai, and
  • Paulo Esteves, Researcher & fmr. Director, BRICS Policy Center, Rio de Janeiro

The Report identifies the purpose of this research initiative on the part of the Korber:

The aim of our Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative (KEMP) is to promote dialogue between Germany and emerging middle powers, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. With their growing political, economic and demographic weight they are key players for global problem solving and also form the G20 troika in 2024. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown that in Germany, among other places, geopolitical perspectives, foreign policy traditions, and national interests of emerging middle powers

are often not assessed in a realistic manner. To address this, the Körber initiative conducts an annual expert survey and facilitates various dialogue formats in cooperation with Gateway House India, the Brazilian BRICS Policy Centre and the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The initiative is valuable in part because it targets three quite important Middle Powers – India, Brazil and South Africa – all large democratic emerging market powers –  that formed IBSA with the Brasilia Declaration in 2003. While overshadowed by the BRICS and now BRICS+, IBSA remains a useful gathering of key EM powers. Moreover, India, last year, Brazil this year, and South Africa in 2025 will each host the G20 Summit. With the troika mechanism these three countries will be influencing the organization and policy initiatives of the G20.

Back to the current Körber Report. The Report opens with a rather surprising conclusion in its Executive Summary:

despite differences among the four countries, there is a common basis for more meaningful engagement and joint approaches for international reform.

The survey findings are varied and interesting.The broad conclusions:

respondents in India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) identify a different foreign policy challenge as most important for each country – climate change for Brazil, relations with China for India, the war in Ukraine and the Middle East for South Africa – as well as international trade for all three. These are global concerns and respondents in Germany share them.

The Report is particularly interesting in highlighting differences of view between IBSA experts and German ones.

These aspects divide [Germany] them from the IBSA respondents, who perceive international trade as a foreign policy challenge, prefer to mediate between Russia and Ukraine instead of supporting either, view the dollar’s dominance unfavourably and are optimistic about BRICS+. But even in IBSA, some are critical of the group’s expansion to include the likes of Iran.

Finally, the Report brings into focus  what Western interests, I suspect, need to understand and to advance more collaborative action:

Understanding the challenges of the West’s partners must begin with an examination of their specific concerns. Brazilian respondents most often cite climate change and the environment as the most challenging foreign policy issue for their country. Indian respondents see China, which their country has a ‘hot’ border with, as the biggest challenge. In South Africa, the most frequently cited issue is maintaining an autonomous foreign policy between the demands and pressures of different major powers, followed by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. … Taking their ideas seriously would show that the West is ready to include them as equals at the new global high table. Ultimately, this shift in thinking will transform the Western echo chamber into a symphony of voices.

The Report is very revealing and I suspect the CWD session will be lively and likely to advance our Middle Power thinking between and among the participants at the CWD.

More on that later I anticipate.

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Comments are welcome and feel free to subscribe to receive new posts and support my work.

The Impact of the UN Summit of the Future (SOTF)

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The Global Summit Project (GSP), as I’ve written in the past, has targeted as one of its main research interests, the national and international actions to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  It is therefore not a big surprise that I was attracted to my good colleague, Stewart Patrick’s webinar initiative examining the Summit of the Future (SOTF) in the context of global governance. The SOTF, as much of the immediate UN efforts is concerned, in part, with achieving the SDGs. Stewart is the director of the Carnegie Endowment’s (CEIP)  Global Order and Institutions Program. Bravely he brought together for a CEIP webinar conversation – “Is This the Moment to Renew Global Governance? Prospects for the UN Summit of the Future” – Guy Ryder, UN Under-Secretary-General for Policy, Jake Sherman, Minister Counselor, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Minh-Thu Pham, Nonresident Scholar, CEIP. Stewart acted as moderator for this session.

This webinar is well worth listening to. We have folks who have real insights into UN reform and into achieving the SDGs. We will see, I suspect, over the coming months a growing number of presentations and events concerned with SOTF. The SOTF is the second UN summit and like the first will be held at the UNGA opening week in September. And also like the first, Heads of State and Government will be in attendance for this second of the ‘Two Summits’.

The first – the SDG Summit called member leaders to attend at the UN to review the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This first Summit, encouraged by the UN Secretary General,

… carried out a comprehensive review of the state of the SDGs, responded to the impact of multiple and interlocking crises facing the world, and provided high-level political guidance on transformative and accelerated actions leading up to the 2030 deadline for achieving the SDGs.

The SDG Summit was chaired by the President of the General Assembly. The evidence to date reveals, unfortunately, that this most important of  global efforts is way off track and notwithstanding the urging from all to accelerate the effort to achieve the SDGs, it will be a very difficult uphill battle to achieve the goals.

The second of the Two Summits is the Summit of the Future. According to the UN and the Secretary General:

The Summit of the Future is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

The Summit of the Future has already produced a draft – the zero draft – of the final Summit document – the “Pact for the Future”. An extensive document, the Pact for the Future covers five areas:

  • Sustainable development  and financing for development
  • International peace and security
  • Science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation
  • Youth and future generations
  • Transforming global governance

Indeed it is an extensive document and well worth spending some time on. But a review reveals somewhat oddly that the document covers not just UN areas of focus but extends beyond them. This includes, for instance, reforms to international financial architecture, institutions not part of the UN system including the World Bank, the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). The Document does not back away from calling for reform of these institutions as well as those in the UN system – most notably reforming the Security Council:

To enhance our cooperation, we need a multilateral system that is fit for the future, ready to address the political, economic, environmental and technological changes in the world, and with the agility to adapt to an uncertain future. We know that multilateral institutions – especially the Security Council and the international financial architecture – have struggled to address the scale of the challenges they face and live up to the world’s expectations of them. Too often, international commitments that are made, remain unfulfilled. …

 

We reaffirm our declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations [that was 2020], and we commit to accelerating our pursuit of the 12 commitments contained therein, including through the measures outlined in this Pact. We further re-affirm the importance of the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its centre. We recognize that the multilateral system must keep pace with a changing world. To that end, we commit to concrete steps to reinvigorate this system, fill critical gaps in global governance, and accelerate efforts to keep our past promises and agreements. Through this Pact for the Future, we commit to build a multilateral system that delivers for everyone, everywhere. We commit to concrete action in five broad areas, as follows.

The discussion with Stewart in this webinar over the Summit of the Future is animated by very knowledgeable folk from the UN and near it. But a review of the Document reveals, it seems to me, and not so obviously discussed in the webinar, that the SOTF zero draft focuses on the ‘What’.  What needs to be reformed, what needs to be added to the UN and the multilateral system? But what is missing is the ‘How’. It is not the first examination – with strong detail, to discuss the reform and updating of the UN system and indeed beyond that to the international financial architecture. But like earlier documents before it and with serious discussions about this Document what is missing is the ‘How’. How do you in the context of heightened geopolitical tensions, and particular national interests, implement reforms? How do you accommodate the often reasonable demands of the Global South? In the world of 4-Cs – cooperation, collaboration, coordination and commitment – there is little evidence acknowledging ‘commitment’, as opposed to need for cooperation, because in fact it is scarce. In the end national governments are the key to achieving the SDGs and meeting necessary reforms of policies and institutions; and as best I can see and understand this critical element is hard to find.

I can understand the Secretary General urging the organization and the members forward but are we closer to reform of the Security Council after years of discussion? I am afraid we are not there yet and the Pact for the Future cannot hide it.

Image Credit: Summit of the Future & The Role of Geneva – Geneva Environment Network
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Biden Trade Protectionism

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There is a continuing interest in capturing the state of the current global political economy and the global economic policymaking of the major states – the US, China, India, Brazil, Europe, Japan, Korea, and others. Not surprisingly the debate is most active in the US. Experts and officials alike are intent in describing current Biden Administration policy. Most recently some experts have been labeling the global economic framework as ‘post- neoliberalism’, defining it, apparently, in contradistinction to the previous dominant policy framework – ‘neoliberalism’.  The dilemma of course is a definitional one as much as anything else  – the terms are well known, their meaning not so much. 

Recently, colleagues of mine have kicked off a discussion. One, Dan Drezner, from the Fletcher School and the Substack ‘Drezner’s World’ has waded into the policy mix, actually in an article from Reason titled, “The Post-Neoliberalism Moment”. As Dan early in the piece thought to frame first neoliberalism he suggested the following: 

The term neoliberal has been stigmatized far more successfully than it has been defined. For our purposes, it refers to a set of policy ideas that became strongly associated with the so-called Washington Consensus: a mix of deregulation, trade liberalization, and macroeconomic prudence that the United States encouraged countries across the globe to embrace. These policies contributed to the hyperglobalization that defined the post–Cold War era from the fall of the Berlin Wall to Brexit.

Dan made it clear, however, that this economic model no longer dominates: 

In the 16 years since the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberalism has taken a rhetorical beating; New Yorker essayist Louis Menand characterized it as “a political swear word.” Until recently, no coherent alternative set of ideas had been put forward in mainstream circles—but that has been changing. 

And what has been the replacement, well Dan suggests that its the politicians and officials that have been most active in leaving neoliberalism behind:

These ideas are being shaped by powerful officials. The primary difference between Biden and Trump in this area is that Trump’s opposition to globalization was based on gut instincts and implemented as such. The Biden administration has been more sophisticated. Policy principals ranging from U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai to National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan have been explicit in criticizing “oversimplified market efficiency” and proposing an alternative centered far more on resilience.

For elements of this policy transformation one need only look to recent Biden Administration policies including the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. As Dan concludes, the totality of these policy initiatives is: “all represent a pivot to industrial policy—a focus on domestic production.” 

In constructing this post-neoliberalism model, folks argue that there is a necessary trade-off between resilience and efficiency. As Dan suggests: “A key assumption behind post-neoliberalism is that policy makers can implement the right policies in the right way to nudge markets in the right direction.” 

Now another colleague of mine, Henry Farrell from Johns Hopkins, tries his hand at a definition in a recent Substack Post at his ‘Programmable Mutter’, titled, “If Post-Neoliberalism is in Trouble, We’re all in Trouble”. The Post partly responds to Dan, and further articulates Henry’s view of post-neoliberalism. As he describes it: 

A key assumption behind post-neoliberalism is that policy makers can implement the right policies in the right way to nudge markets in the right direction. … I see post-neoliberalism less as a coherent alternative body of thought, than as the claim, variously articulated by a very loosely associated cluster of intellectuals and policy makers, that markets should not be the default solution. … More generally, post-neoliberalism isn’t and shouldn’t be a simple reverse image of the system that it has to remake. It can’t be, not least because it has to build in part on what is already there.

The dilemma, as I see it, for understanding any of these  post-neoliberalism models, and also, though less intensely – neoliberalism, is pretty much all definitional. The base of the problem is not really understanding what ‘resilience’ and ‘efficiency’ really mean. And that in turn causes confusion over trying to then understand ‘globalization’.  And that unfortunately builds vagueness into our understanding of these economic models especially over what we are to understand to be – post-neoliberalism. 

But what isn’t so difficult to understand is the problem that has been created in this post-neoliberal period by current trade policy especially as seen in the United States. Layer it as much as you can but the Biden Administration policy is ‘protectionist’ and the Trump Administration, was, and will in all likelihood be, even more protectionist if Trump is returned to office in late 2024. As Inu Manak has written in a recent piece for the Hinrich Foundation in Australia – a foundation focused on global trade: 

Trade has become toxic, not just on the campaign trail, but in the way that it is discussed by both Democrats and Republicans. “Traditional” US trade policy, which began to form its nearly century-old roots under the leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, has been described by US Trade Representative Katherine Tai as “trickle-down economics,” where “maximum tariff liberalization…contributed to the hollowing out of our industrial heartland. … The current US approach to trade, if it can be called an approach at all, risks weakening US influence abroad and economically disadvantaging Americans at home. It rests on the false belief that retrenchment of “traditional” US trade policy—by putting America First or catering to a select group of US workers and branding such efforts as “worker-centric trade policy”—will somehow restore the United States to a position of hegemonic dominance with no peer competitor. 

The Biden Administration’s allergy to new trade policy initiatives can be seen in its Indo-Pacific economic strategy – the IPEF – the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. This framework is intended to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness for the fourteen countries negotiating the IPEF. The countries included are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam with the United States. The IPEF partners represent 40 percent of global GDP and 28 percent of global goods and services trade. Negotiations have proceeded well for three of the four pillars including supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy pillars but the Biden Administration has decided not to proceed in negotiating for fair and resilient trade. As William Reinsch at CSIS described the situation: 

The commentariat is busy these days debating the future of the Biden administration’s trade policy in the wake of its effective abandonment of the trade pillar in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) negotiations. (The administration says the talks will continue, and I imagine they will, but I don’t see a conclusion, at least before the election.) The policy is clearly a failure at this point, …

As colleague Ryan Haas of the Brookings Institution, and a former US official – from 2013 to 2017, Hass served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff – underscored in his examination of trade policy in the Indo-Pacific: 

These constraints will be most visible on trade. The absence of a credible trade and economic agenda for Asia has been the Biden administration’s greatest weakness. Political and national security imperatives will continue to drive the United States’ approach to trade. Do not expect any outbreak of creativity or boldness on trade by the Biden administration in 2024.

The Biden Administration failed to roll back the tariffs imposed by the Trump trade folk. It is a major failure of US trade policy and an expression of the Biden SAdministration’s trade protectionism. It bodes ill for growing the global economy and achieving productivity gains for the United States and others.

Image Credit: E-International Relations

This Post originally appeared at my Substack Post Alan’s Newsletter – https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/biden-trade-protectionism?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcome=true

 

The SDGs are faltering! What can be done?

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Returning to the SDGs

We have pointed out in the past – either through LinkedIn or in Substack posts that the Global Summitry Project (GSP) has targeted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The issue is now front and center as we enter the UN General Assembly’s return next week.  The 2023 SDG Summit will take place on September 18th and 19th. It will mark the beginning of, at least according to the UN Secretary General, Antonio Gueterres, “a new phase of accelerated progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals with high-level political guidance on transformative and accelerated actions leading up to 2030”. At least that is his hope.

Early on the GSP identified this initiative as a means to assess the health of current multilateralism. First, a quick review of the SDGs:

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The SDGs were passed unanimously at the UN General Assembly in 2015. Agenda 2030, as it was called at the UN, identified 17 goals, 169 targets and at least 241 indicators.

These goals, targets and indicators, unlike the earlier Millennium Development Goals Initiative  – the MDGs – were designed to apply not just to developing countries but to all countries, whether developing or developed. Agenda 2030 was not then just a classic development effort. This effort was, and is, a global project for all states. Achieving the SDGs is about securing global development and achieving global sustainability for all – developing, emerging market and developed economies, Global North, Global South – all. Here are the goals:

Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere

Goal 2: Zero Hunger

Goal 3: Good Health and Well-Being: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

Goal 4: Quality Education

Goal 5: Gender Equality: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

Goal 6: Clean Water and Sanitation: Ensure access to water and sanitation for all

Goal 7: Affordable and Clean Energy: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy

Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth: Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all

Goal 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure: Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

Goal 10: Reduced Inequalities: Reduce inequality within and among countries

Goal 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

Goal 12: Responsible Consumption and Production: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

Goal 13: Climate Action: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

Goal 14: Life Below Water: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources

Goal 15: Life on Land: Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss

Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies

Goal 17: Partnerships for the Goals: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.
The ‘Two Summits’

Now we are on the case of the SDGs at the GSP. As a result we are following what are often referred to as the “Two Summits”. The first is the SDG Summit: The UN Secretary-General calls the SDG Summit [HLPF Summit, September 2023] the “centerpiece moment of 2023.” It takes place at the midpoint – completion of the first 7.5 years toward the final goal – for fully implementing the development agenda, the SDGs, adopted by countries in 2015 in 2030.

In 2024, in addition, a second Summit will take place. The UN will convene the Summit of the Future (SOTF). The theme of this Summit – ‘Multilateral Solutions for a Better Tomorrow.’ In September 2021, the Secretary-General issued a report, ‘Our Common Agenda’ urging a speed up of the implementation of the SDGSs and advancing the commitments contained in the UN75 Declaration. In some cases, the proposals addressed gaps that emerged since 2015, requiring new intergovernmental agreements. The report, therefore, called for the convening of a Summit of the Future to forge a new global consensus on readying for a future that is rife with risks but also opportunities. The General Assembly agreed to hold the SOTF Summit on September 22nd and September 23rd 2024. A ‘Pact for the Future’ is expected to be put before the UNGA and approved.  The Summit’s aim is to reinforce the UN and global governance structures to better address old and new challenges and to formulate a ‘Pact for the Future’ that would help advance the SDGs by 2030.

Overall, the SOTF, it is hoped, will revitalize multilateralism and lead, possibly, to needed multilateral institutional reform and provide a convincing narrative spelling out how the SOTF can:

●  foster enablers of SDG acceleration such as digitalization and access to finance;

●  tackle obstacles to SDG implementation, for example, through the New Agenda for Peace, by promoting effective crisis response through the Emergency Platform, by addressing fake news, and by supporting global public goods financing;

●  reinforce international standards conducive for the SDGs, including Beyond GDP, ‘longtermism’ and rights for future generations, and of course those on human rights and gender; and

●  develop a more networked, inclusive, and effective UN for SDG acceleration through the Emergency Platform, Youth Office, and a biennial summit with IFIs and the G20, among others.

The Multilateral Disconnect

So, where are we? At the midpoint it is evident the implementation of the SDGs is in deep, very deep trouble. As former UN Deputy Secretary General and currently the President of the Open Society Foundations, Mark Malloch Brown has recently written in FP:

Confirmation of that gloomy picture will come at the summit on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on Sept.18-19 . This was meant to be a midway progress review: the implementation period for the 17 interlinked objectives, which include ending extreme poverty and hunger, began in 2016 and is due to end in 2030. The world is far from the right track. Out of 140 metrics by which the SDGs are measured, half are not on the desired trajectory and about one-third have stalled or gone into reverse. … Time and trust are running out, both on the SDGs and the wider restoration and renewal of the multilateral system.
There will be serious efforts at the UN meetings to urge all to focus on the SDGs and accelerate efforts to achieve these goals. But there is a huge problem – a serious disconnect. And it spells continuing problems for collective global governance efforts. There is an unfortunate glaring disconnect here. The urging is  occurring at the multilateral level but the implementation is at the national level. And efforts at the national level are either underwhelming or, sadly, non-existent. Multilateralism continues to largely occur at the national level and as I have pointed out before, key member states, read that the United States – are disengaged from any national effort. US executive and congressional budgeting processes and finance and development policy implementation are simply void of any SDG policy efforts. And the US is not the only member state in this situation. The rhetoric may be there at the international level but today it does not link to national policy action. Now, in the face of the absence of national policy, numerous local and regional actors and non-state actors, corporations and civil society organizations (CSOs) have stepped in. But their efforts, I am afraid, cannot substitute for national efforts. Without that the strong urging will continue at the international level but without serious progress.

What can be done? We will return to this here.

This Post was first uploaded to my Substack at Alan’s Newsletter:

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-sdgs-are-faltering-what-can-be

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Troubles with Global Summitry

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We are definitely in the midst of Global Summitry gatherings. With the BRICS Summit just recently ended, we are deep into the G20 weekend gathering in New Delhi. So much commentary has accompanied these summitry gatherings. But I caution casual observers and readers: there are way too many assessments and conclusions drawn by all those folks that unfortunately barely pay attention to Global Summitry through much of the year. You can see this in the various ‘hair on fire’ commentaries in the assessments and consequences of the actions of key players in both the BRICS and now especially with the G20. Too many declarations of the G20 demise; firm conclusions that China and Russia would block any consensus statement that sought to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; the fragmentation of global summitry with the rise of the BRICS plus and the demise of the G20 with leaders from Russia and China choosing to absent themselves from summit.

Now don’t get me wrong, the geopolitical pressures, particularly rising US-China competition and opposition and condemnation of Russia for its unprovoked aggression on Ukraine are impactful. The geopolitics has seemingly hindered the G20 in advancing global governance policies. Yet the global governance agenda and goals remain. Look at the G20 agenda as described by Damien Cave in the NYT:

The agenda in New Delhi includes climate change, economic development and debt burdens in low-income countries, as well as inflation spurred by Russia’s war in Ukraine. If members can reach consensus on any or all of these subjects, they will produce an official joint declaration at the end.

In the ‘hair on  fire’ camp here is a piece by Alec Russell in the FT

The countdown to the talks was dominated by news that Xi was not going to attend. This was widely seen as a major blow to the G20, and an acceleration of the shift to a world in which a China-led bloc is facing off against a US-led one, with many countries hovering in the middle.

But the collective global governance effort has not been stymied. Indian efforts to reach consensus have proven successful. The G20, thanks to India, has released the Declaration a day early. Our good fortune. As described by the Indian Sherpa the Declaration was:

… a complete statement with 100% unanimity” that highlights India’s “great ability to bring all developing countries, all the emerging markets, China, Russia, everybody together at the same table and bring consensus.

He went on:

Urging adherence to the United Nations Charter, the New Delhi statement says: “All states must refrain from the threat or use of force to seek territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.

So there we are, a consensus statement has been issued. As often is the case, the document was not short, some 29 pages of declaration plus pages of annex.  Nevertheless it ended on a ‘high note’:

81. We reiterate our commitment to the G20 as the premier forum for global economic cooperation and its continued operation in the spirit of multilateralism, on the basis of consensus, with all members participating on an equal footing in all its events including Summits. We look forward to meeting again in Brazil in 2024 and in South Africa in 2025, as well as in the United States in 2026 at the beginning of the next cycle. We welcome Saudi Arabia’s ambition to advance its turn for hosting the G20 Presidency in the next cycle. We also look forward to the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024 as a symbol of peace, dialogue amongst nations and inclusivity, with participation of all.

But a reading of the Declaration raises again the question: what success has in fact been achieved? As Caves points out:

But how much progress has the G20 made toward its ambitions? And what can be expected from this year’s meeting in India on Saturday and Sunday? … Then what? Often, not much, when it comes to real-world results. Most of the grouping’s joint statements since it formed in 1999 have been dominated by resolutions as solid as gas fumes, with no clear consequences when nations underperform.

‘Solid as gas fumes’. Well, in many respects the Declaration is no more than a statement of collective progress – what have we collectively identified as worthy of committing to and implementing. And, I did note, in an earlier Substack Post, Not Simply the Pace of Summitry that Leaders and their official are working toward commitment but:

So, let me at least raise in this Post, what I believe is the ‘continuum of action and commitment’ available to leaders in these various Leaders’ Summits. This continuum identifies the extent to which global governance policies have been secured. We move from the aspirational, often set out in the leaders’ declarations or communiques all the way to implementation by a country. What is evident from the continuum is that these folks are governmental leaders. And, as a result no matter what the communique announces, individual leaders’ may, or may not, actually implement a collective wish set out in a declaration.  This is well beyond just the aspirational.

The continuum, as I see it, is:  Consultation/ Cooperation/ Coordination/ Collaboration – the 4Cs of global governance progress, as I see it. Distinguishing between these concepts can be quite difficult. And of course, beyond this is, collectively achieving the actions, proposals and policies that are set out in the communiques, or announced at the Leaders’ gatherings.

And that is paydirt. Collectively achieving the actions set out in all these Summit Declarations – implementing policy in other words – is global governance success. Such implementation lies generally at the national political level, although there are instances where international organizations do in fact implement.

Bottom line: it requires a lot more than a statement in a Leaders’ Declaration to achieve global governance progress. But a number of us are watching including my colleagues at the CWD process.

This Post was originally uploaded to my Substack – Alan’s Newsletter. Feel free to subscribe.

Image Credit: Al Jazeera