The Strategic Aspects of Biden Trade Engagement in the Asia Pacific

The US foreign policy lexicon has changed. It used to be Asia-Pacific. Now for the Biden Administration it is all about Indo-Pacific. Initially I started this post in the following way: “Please, enough of the Indo-Pacific. Listen to the Biden Administration and it seems that that is all there seems to be in Asia.” Well, that is where the Biden Administration seems to be. Do I think US strategic actions really ‘sucks in India’, one of the world’s most elusive allies, probably not. But I’ll leave the Biden officials to figure that out. So, they will continue to trumpet, ‘Indo-Pacific’. Many of us will continue to use, ‘Asia-Pacific’.

More importantly, however, let’s turn our attention to the substance of Biden strategic policy in this key, if not the key, region in the international system. Our Brookings colleague, Ryan Hass at EAF briefly described Biden foreign policy efforts in the region over the last year – hard to believe that it is only a year and a bit:

America is back’, Joe Biden proclaimed in his first address as president to a global audience. Over the year that followed, the Biden administration delivered a mixed bag in its approach to the Indo-Pacific — several bold strategic strokes, greater than expected continuity with the Trump administration on China policy and timidity on trade policy.

 

A larger challenge for the Biden administration will be its absence of an economic agenda. They have announced plans to release an Indo-Pacific economic framework in 2022. Given that the framework reportedly will be non-binding and will not include trade or investment liberalisation, it may not get a lot of uptake, particularly when the region’s focus is on realising benefits from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and expanding the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

This is the heart of the dilemma in the Biden approach to the Indo-Pacific. Given the growing influence of China, does the Biden policy focus on the geostrategic, or on the regional and global economic. Opinion is clearly divided. Maybe the most surprising is Alan Beattie, the Financial Times trade specialist and opinion columnist. I would have believed, especially given some of his recent trade reviews that he would have strongly urged a focus on the economic but I was wrong. Here he is on February 2nd in an  FT article, titled: “The US doesn’t need CPTPP to assert itself in the Asia-Pacific”:

As for geopolitical clout, recent experience suggests actual firepower is more important than the economic kind.

Trade deals don’t automatically mean political alignment or influence.

 

None of the US’s strategic capabilities — military might, security deals like the Australia-UK-US agreement, cyber security expertise, intelligence-sharing, imposing harsh financial sanctions via the dollar payments system— require CPTPP membership. And all are surely more important in projecting American influence.

 

It’s true that US economic diplomacy over the past decade has been comically weak and inconsistent. It has been undermined by the excessive fear of trade deals among the American public, encouraged by lobbies like organised labour and the steel industry. But its ineptitude over the CPTPP should not lead to a counsel of despair. Trade deals are important, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for American foreign policy to assert itself in the Asia-Pacific.

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A Veteran Chinese Diplomat – Cui Tiankai – speaks to the Media

Cui Tiankai, China’s former ambassador to the U.S. made a public appearance on December 20, 2021, in Beijing. It was his first public comments since leaving his U.S. ambassadorial post and returning to China. Additionally, this image shows Ambassador Cui more recently sitting down with Ian Goodrum for a moderated interview on January 10, 2022 with the ChinaDaily.

During Cui Tiankai’s earlier December speech* he stressed that:

Since the purpose of the struggle [between the U.S. and China] is to protect the interests of the people and the overall strategy, then during the struggle, [we] should reduce the cost and influence to our interests and grand strategy as much as possible. In principle, [we] don’t fight unprepared wars; don’t fight wars that we are not confident with; don’t fight wars due to anger; don’t fight wars of attrition. The people worked very hard for their prosperity; we absolutely cannot have anyone take that away. Also, we absolutely cannot lose it due to our own carelessness, slack, and incompetence. 

Moreover, Cui Tiankai claimed that:

The status-quo of U.S.-China relations will continue, the U.S. would not accept the rise of another major power of a different political system, ideology, culture, and even race.

 

In terms of America’s China policy, there is a strong factor of racism. Some people mention it, but some people don’t. The U.S. will inevitably do whatever it takes and everything it can to suppress, contain, separate, and surround to overwhelm China even without a bottom line. To this effect, we need to have a clear mind and full preparedness to confront a future unstable, difficult, and even roller-coaster-like future of U.S.-China relations.

These views are sobering to say the least.

Cui Tiankai remains a close ally to Xi Jinping, and his experience in the U.S. makes him perhaps the most competent person among China’s senior officials in understanding the U.S. from China’s perspective. Katsuji Nakazawa in an article for the Nikkei Asia explains that Cui Tiankai’s speech aimed to modestly warn Xi Jinping not to engage in unnecessary conflicts with the U.S. and divert China’s current ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” (WWD) and hardline foreign policy towards the U.S. However, Ambassador Cui’s remark could also have served  as a wake-up call for top leaders to accept that China may not be in an optimal position to engage in further conflicts.

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