Informal global leadership can help steady the ship – from EAF November 26, 2024

Happy Thanksgiving Weekend – Enjoy!

This piece forst appeared at EAF – https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/11/26/informal-global-leadership-can-help-steady-the-ship/

“All evidence suggested that Brazil’s G20 Summit was going to bean exceptionally difficult summit for the United States and its departing President Joe Biden — and it proved to be so with the USPresident appearing as all too evidently a ‘lame duck’ and the shadow of Biden’s successor, Donald Trump, all too evident in leaders’ discussions.

It has been a busy period for the informal international forums(‘Informals’). The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) met inPeru on 15–16 November, followed immediately by the G20Leaders’ Summit in Brazil on 18–19 November. If these two summits were not enough, the BRICS+ Summit ran in Kazan,Russia on 22–24 October and the East Asia Summit also met inOctober. Leaders and their ministers have had significant opportunities to engage with other heads of government and state.

The question is whether these summits advanced globalgovernance policies or handled the current international context rifewith geopolitical tensions built on the back of conflicts in the Middle East and in Europe, US–China strategic competition and the growing populist and illiberal governments challenging the liberal order? The influence of Informals — especially the G20 but tovarying degrees the G7, BRICS, APEC and the many minilaterals such as the US–Japan–South Korea and China–Japan–South Korea trilateral frameworks — may grow in the increasingly fragmented global order.

The role of Informals has evolved before. Following the eruption of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, there was discussion among experts about whether the just created G20 Leaders’ Summit was a‘crisis committee’ or a ‘steering committee’. In either case, it was presumed to be a capable of generating collective efforts of these key countries. There was strong approval of the G20 efforts to tackle the financial crisis and most observers would agree that their collective efforts aided at the time in getting past the financial crisis.

There was a tendency, naturally, to hone in on the collective G20 leaders’ efforts in the years that followed. The G20 announced efforts to coordinate among its 19 countries and the European Union — and now the African Union — with statements of implementation and agreed coordinated efforts expressed in verylengthy leaders’ communiques or declarations. Yet there was limited implementation by national governments and the international organisations.

The hope was then that the annual gatherings of G20 leaders would allow leaders to finalise collective efforts to make globalisation work for all and to provide a setting where advances could be secured for critical global issues like institutional financial reform, debt management and climate financing. These meetings also sought to achieve collective agreement to press forward on theSustainable Development Goals unanimously approved at the United Nations in 2015. But little of any of this was concluded.

The annual leaders gatherings, especially the G20, have provided at least valuable opportunities for leaders to reach beyond the collective gathering and arrange highly helpful bilateral meetings.For example, the 2023 APEC Summit in San Francisco enabled Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden to meet on the margins. This bilateral meeting is widely recognised as stabilising US–China relations and reopening various lines of communication, including military-to-military communication that had been suspended following the visit to Taiwan by then speakerof the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi.

At the 2024 Peru APEC Summit, the two leaders met again. In thefading days of his presidency, Biden hoped to advance US–China relations. While the leaders were able to publicly express the hope for further cooperation, and there was agreement to maintain human control over nuclear weapons, the shadow of incumbent US president Donald Trump’s return clearly cooled the opportunities for further advancing efforts and left Xi warning over Taiwanese independence and other ‘red lines’.

Besides serving as the setting for leaders of the two leading powers to talk, the Peru APEC meeting also provided the setting for other leaders to hold critical meetings. One clear instance was Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and South Korean President YoonSuk-yeol. The two leaders held their second meeting in just over a month and enabled the two leaders to discuss the threat posed by recent North Korean efforts. They also pledged to continue ‘shuttle diplomacy’. Given the fraught relations between the two countries the meetings proved quite valuable.

The annual informals have created it seems numerous instances of leaders ‘huddling’ together, which has aided diplomacy. These diplomatic instances should not be underestimated, with the G20 representing two-thirds of the world’s global population and 85 percent of global GDP. Further, the G20 gathering in Brazil will have created space for various leader discussions on the eve of Trump’s return. Future gatherings at these summits may prove to be evenmore critical as opportunities to collaborate on trade, finance or climate in the face of Trumpian chaos will be difficult to come by otherwise.

While the Informals’ value for the global order it seems is largely inthe opportunity for leaders to connect and make diplomatic and security progress, the collective efforts of these gatherings cannot be completely dismissed. They may not support collective policy implementation as was once hoped but these summits do enable leaders — often the host country leaders — to amplify critical policy initiatives.

This has proven the case for the Brazil G20 Summit whereBrazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva used his G20 presidency to highlight the need for a global wealth tax on billionaires in a larger effort to support middle- and low-income countries. And the Declaration did at least create the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty. The Alliance is an initiative of Brazil that aims to create instruments to combat hunger and inequality at a global level. The Brazilian wealth tax on billionaires proposal could have raised hundreds of billions of dollars but such a commitment failed to make the Rio de Janeiro Declaration.Nevertheless, the collective expression in the Declaration and the Alliance that was created did hopefully provide a marker for the future.

The way Informals bring leaders together and foster collective diplomatic action will be increasingly important for upholding therules-based order, protecting international peace and spurring policy progress in an increasingly fragmented global order —especially with Trump’s return on the horizon.

Alan Alexandroff is Director of the Global Summitry Project and Co-Chair of the China-West Dialogue (CWD). When he teaches, he does so at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto.

 

Image Credit – G20

 

Maintaining ‘Entanglement’: APEC Summit Discussions including the Xi-Biden Bilateral Summit

Doing some quick catch up on the APEC Summit that was held between November 11th and 17th in San Francisco. The main event, as it turned out, was the much discussed bilateral summit between China’s Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden. While the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) meetings to receive some attention – more for what didn’t happen than what was secured – the APEC gathering activity was dominated by US-China Bilateral Summit and there was some attention paid to the other bilateral Summit of note that between President Xi and the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

The Post here is constructed from several Substack Posts in Alan’s Newsletter: “Maintaining ‘Entanglement‘: APEC Summit discussions and more” and “It’s working; just not like what was anticipated: The sudden rise of Bilaterals”; and “So Success, or What? Final thoughts on the Summits in San Francisco”. Feel free to subscribe to my Substack: Alan’s Newsletter

Maintaining ‘Entanglement’: APEC Summit discussions and more

It appears that we are likely to see a meeting this month of President Xi and President Biden at the margins of the APEC Summit. I think that is a good thing. What can we, or should we, expect from such a summit of leaders of the two leading powers? While contemplating this question, I was caught by two articles written by Brookings colleague, Ryan Hass. Ryan has recently been named director of the John L. Thornton China Center and holds the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at Brooking is also a senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies. Ryan has contributed two first rate articles on US-China relations – what they are, and what they need to be.*

First, there is the big question of where US-China relations are, and then where they need to be? There is little question that Ryan is correct in believing that the US and the global order would be far worse off if China were to exit the current international system fragmenting what is still a critical -and I believe necessary – ‘single international community’. As Ryan urged in one of the two contributions, this a recent Foreign Affairs piece:

Washington should aim to preserve a functioning international system that supports U.S. security and prosperity—and that includes China rather than isolates it. Meanwhile, the United States should maintain a strong military to deter China from using force against the United States or its security partners and seek to sustain an overall edge over China in technological innovation, particularly in fields with national security implications. … Washington’s goal should be to keep China entangled in a global system that regulates interstate behavior and pushes Beijing to conclude that the best path to the realization of its national ambitions would be to operate within existing rules and norms.

‘Entanglement’ as a strategic aim strikes me as ‘right on target’.

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Advancing Global Governance by Revitalizing a Regional Institution

While I have suggested earlier that I don’t think an initial  focus on building regional or multilateral institutions is necessarily the best first step in global governance and possibly a means to ‘tone down’ geopolitical competition rhetoric and action, I am now about to contradict myself and this position. For, in the end, there are some obvious regional and international institutions that could encourage collaborative action and push global governance collaboration. And, in fact, I have in mind an obvious one that has – as a current Chinese slang term might well describe it – ‘tang ping’  躺平 – or ‘lying flat’. It is the Trilateral Summit.

Trilateral Summit, you say. Well, yes, actually. The Trilateral Summit is, periodically, a Summit of the ‘key’ East Asia leaders – South Korea, Japan and most meaningfully,  China. A little history here. The Trilateral Summit was first proposed by South Korea in 2004. At that time the three powers met for a separate session at the ASEAN gathering, described as ASEAN plus three. In 2007, at the eighth meeting of the ASEAN plus Three, the leaders agreed to initiate a separate Trilateral Summit. And, in December 2008, the first separate summit was hosted by Japan at Fukuoka. At its initiation the three powers saw the Summit focusing on: closer trilateral relations, the regional economy and disaster relief.  One of the regional security issues that has been in front of leaders repeatedly has been the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic Republic of Korea, the DPRK. In the 2018 summit the FT  described the leaders’ view of the DPRK nuclear weapons program: “the three leaders agreed to co-operate over North Korea and called for Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons completely.” While that agreement may no longer hold, it shows the value of this Summit.

The Summit is not quite a leaders’ gathering. While South Korea is often represented by its President and Japan by its Prime Minister, China has generally been led by its premier, not the President.

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The Strategic Aspects of Biden Trade Engagement in the Asia Pacific

The US foreign policy lexicon has changed. It used to be Asia-Pacific. Now for the Biden Administration it is all about Indo-Pacific. Initially I started this post in the following way: “Please, enough of the Indo-Pacific. Listen to the Biden Administration and it seems that that is all there seems to be in Asia.” Well, that is where the Biden Administration seems to be. Do I think US strategic actions really ‘sucks in India’, one of the world’s most elusive allies, probably not. But I’ll leave the Biden officials to figure that out. So, they will continue to trumpet, ‘Indo-Pacific’. Many of us will continue to use, ‘Asia-Pacific’.

More importantly, however, let’s turn our attention to the substance of Biden strategic policy in this key, if not the key, region in the international system. Our Brookings colleague, Ryan Hass at EAF briefly described Biden foreign policy efforts in the region over the last year – hard to believe that it is only a year and a bit:

America is back’, Joe Biden proclaimed in his first address as president to a global audience. Over the year that followed, the Biden administration delivered a mixed bag in its approach to the Indo-Pacific — several bold strategic strokes, greater than expected continuity with the Trump administration on China policy and timidity on trade policy.

 

A larger challenge for the Biden administration will be its absence of an economic agenda. They have announced plans to release an Indo-Pacific economic framework in 2022. Given that the framework reportedly will be non-binding and will not include trade or investment liberalisation, it may not get a lot of uptake, particularly when the region’s focus is on realising benefits from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and expanding the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

This is the heart of the dilemma in the Biden approach to the Indo-Pacific. Given the growing influence of China, does the Biden policy focus on the geostrategic, or on the regional and global economic. Opinion is clearly divided. Maybe the most surprising is Alan Beattie, the Financial Times trade specialist and opinion columnist. I would have believed, especially given some of his recent trade reviews that he would have strongly urged a focus on the economic but I was wrong. Here he is on February 2nd in an  FT article, titled: “The US doesn’t need CPTPP to assert itself in the Asia-Pacific”:

As for geopolitical clout, recent experience suggests actual firepower is more important than the economic kind.

Trade deals don’t automatically mean political alignment or influence.

 

None of the US’s strategic capabilities — military might, security deals like the Australia-UK-US agreement, cyber security expertise, intelligence-sharing, imposing harsh financial sanctions via the dollar payments system— require CPTPP membership. And all are surely more important in projecting American influence.

 

It’s true that US economic diplomacy over the past decade has been comically weak and inconsistent. It has been undermined by the excessive fear of trade deals among the American public, encouraged by lobbies like organised labour and the steel industry. But its ineptitude over the CPTPP should not lead to a counsel of despair. Trade deals are important, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for American foreign policy to assert itself in the Asia-Pacific.

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The Current Narrative of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Policy: “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

When it comes to China’s current foreign policy, phrases such as “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy” (WWD) and “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) frequently appear. The name WWD originates from a Chinese film series, “Wolf Warrior”, which depicts a patriotic solider battling foreign powers and mercenaries. Nowadays, many refer to China’s increasingly strong statements and assertive diplomatic declarations as WWD.

On the other hand, BRI refers to global infrastructure development projects led by China to promote international cooperation, multilateralism, and trade. It may appear that these two sets of foreign policy approaches rather conflict. However, the phrase “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind” (人类命运共同体), a part of the official narrative of China’s foreign policy may have led to both of these contrasting approaches. What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”? How does this phrase explain trends in China’s recent foreign policies including WWD and also BRI?

What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

By literal translation, the above phrase means “A Community of Shared Fate for Mankind” (SF) rather than, as it is often expressed in English, “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. SF suggests a global order described by China’s President Xi Jinping encompassing the shared rights and responsibility of each nation in terms of “politics, security, economy, culture, and environment” in a globalized world. In President Xi’s words SF is: “to build A Community of Shared Future for Mankind [to] construct a beautiful and clean world with long lasting peace, general security, mutual prosperity, openness, and inclusivity”. At a United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting in July, 2020, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that China will push to build SF by promoting multilateralism in accordance with international laws and “… denounce global hegemony and protectionism”. These and other  remarks by China’s leaders demonstrate, it would seem, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition to achieve greater global influence, and that China is prepared to work with all nations to build a SF. Indeed, not all nations may be agreeable with the ideology of SF. It is inevitable that the CCP will face some frictions when it tries to expand the influence of SF in the world. Therefore, the CCP may have to use a tailored approach in its foreign policies to push its SF agenda.

SF as an Umbrella term for China’s Foreign Policy

President Xi has publicly made statements such as “[the CCP] will reference history and create the future. It must continuously push and construct A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. Under this guidance, top Chinese officials have made clear that China’s foreign policy will revolve around SF. China’s approach to global order, then,  promotes politically correct topics such as climate change, global disparity, and it also opposes terrorism and hegemony. Although it encourages cross-cultural exchange, it makes no explicit mention of protecting the rights of marginalized communities. The vague language in the SF permits CCP officials greater flexibility in deciding what kind of matters are consistent with the SF and therefore align with President Xi’s agenda.

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China-West Relations: Reading the Dynamics and Getting the Mix Right

China-US relations are at a critical juncture in fashioning global order relations in the 2020s.  As Joe Biden approaches inauguration day, there is increasing speculation on what approach he will take toward China.  Theories abound.  There are those in foreign policy circles who are seen as “restorationists” (see Thomas Wright at TheAtlantic for these terms) who tend to have a greater focus on the cooperation component of the relationship.  There are “reformists” who have come to the conclusion that competition and rivalry must define the path for US-China relations.  There are those who see China as the culprit in job loss, technology theft, trade imbalances, the pandemic, climate change and other hits on American pre-eminence.  And there are many with cultural, societal and business ties to China who hope for a period of predictability, and hopefully opportunity.

Clear-eyed self-interest and deep understanding of the new political dynamics need to guide Biden foreign policy. For Biden and his team, it is not just a question how to reframe US international relations after Trump, but how to shape them in response to changed circumstances, domestic constraints, and new defining elements in the global landscape. 

For starters, Asia is more pressing than Europe, the Indo-Pacific region more demanding than the trans-Atlantic, China is more important than Russia, social and environmental issues are more compelling than trade and financial policies, and domestic pressures everywhere mean that international policies are now constrained by and tethered to internal conditions affecting ordinary people.  Global inter-connectivity may be vividly evident, but domestic politics are dominant in defining strategic thrusts.

Biden and his team seem to “get” most of these circumstances, constraints and defining elements.  But, it is not clear that the incoming Administration has yet stared down the underlying political dynamics that will define geopolitical relations among leading powers, especially how to approach China in ways that makes sense to the other significant global players, that will be effective with China and with domestic political constraints. For this, the various “schools of thought” contending with each other to define the overall narrative for US relations with China, each by themselves are less helpful than combining them to address the complexity and importance of this most crucial relationship.

The starting point has to be a clear understanding that China does indeed have strategic interests in meeting US dominance in the Pacific. Additionally, China does use the state and public resources to advance its economic dynamism, does use techniques for internal control which violate international norms on human rights, and does have the scale, scope and dynamism to be a challenger to US predominance, a rival in the Pacific and a competitor in the global economy.  There is no doubt that this is the reality of China today.  The hardening of Xi Jinping’s authoritarian rule in the last four years is real and worrisome. 

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Building Global Order: A Good Day for Global Summitry

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The headline says it all.  Just a quick look at the New York Times: “As Xi and Obama Stress Common Ground Stubborn Differences Persist“.  Or an earlier headline from the same paper: “U.S. and China Agree to Cut Tariffs, but Vie for Trade Blocs“.

Let’s be clear, however.  It’s been a good couple of days for global summitry.  As Dan Drezner headlined in his Washington Post blog post this morning: “Best APEC Summit Ever“.  As Dan suggested:

This year’s APEC summit that just wrapped up in Beijing is therefore highly unusual… because stuff got done. Seriously, a LOT of stuff got done.

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Putting the Issue to the Side for the Moment – China-Japan

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It is energizing when strong diplomatic effort, results in a step away from confrontation and conflict. And so it seems to be with China and Japan over the confrontation between the two with respect to the islets in the East China Sea – known either as the Senkakus or the Diaoyu depending which side of the East China Sea you happen to be on.

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Looking at the ‘World’ With Two Lens

Final reflections on the Harvard-Beida conference on US-China relations (see previous blog posts for further information).  If I was a meteorologist, I would suggest that the weather forecast for US-China relations has gone from, partly sunny to partly cloudy.

A number of international relations experts examining the Asian architecture recently have described a growing polarity in the structure of pan Asian relations.  So, for instance Evan Feigenbaum now at the Paulson Institute (a former US official) and Robert Manning (also a former official) but now at the Atlantic Council described in “A Tale of Two Asias” in October in foreignpolicy.com that Asia today consisted first of a “Security Asia” described by the two as “a dysfunctional region of mistrustful powers, prone to nationalism and irredentism, escalating their territorial disputes over tiny rocks and shoals, and arming for conflict.”  And there was a second Asia, what the two authors called “Economic Asia”, a dynamic, integrated Asia with 53 percent of its trade now being conducted within the region itself, …”

The first pole, according to Feigenbaum and Manning  is dominated by the United States while the second has become increasingly dependent on China. For the two experts the dilemma posed by this structure is that Economic Asia is increasingly seen to be at risk by the rise of nationalism and the growing security competition in the region. As Feigenbaum and Manning have written recently in the East Asia Forum in a piece entitled, “The Problem with the Two Asias,” a response to a critical piece written by American University’s Amitav Acharya’s “Why Two Asias May be Better Than None” also posted at the East Asia Forum:

Our principal point is that Asia’s incredible economic dynamism and growing integration are at risk because of debilitating security competition and sharpening political disputes within the region, not just between the United States and China, but among Asia’s major economies as well. … Put simply, competing nationalisms and the scars of national memory remain potent forces in Asia.  And they risk undermining the economic gains that have done so much too promote integration, boost growth and foster opportunity.

At our own conference at Beida, our colleague John Ikenberry from Princeton sketched a similar two pole pan-Asian architecture.  Acknowledging a division in the structural construction between security and economics in Asia,  Ikenberry proposed that the longstanding partial US hegemonic order, as he called it, is giving way to:

In effect, as noted earlier, there increasingly are two quasi-hierarchies in East Asia.  There is an economic hierarchy led by China and a security hierarchy led by the United States. This circumstance creates constraints and dilemmas for the United States.

Now most suggest that the reassertion of classic balance of power dynamics in Asia would be detrimental to all and lead to growing friction and rivalry between the US and China and put pressure on the powers in Asia to choose one or the other.  Ikenberry puts well the unease that appears to pervade Washington circles today:

At the same time, the United States does see China today in the way it has seen potential regional hegemonic rivals in the past.  It is worried that China could amass sufficient wealth and military power to fundamentally alter East Asia. The ultimate danger is the growth of a Chinese rival that would endeavor to drive the United States out of the region and project illiberal ideas and policies outward into the world.

I think the “two poles” construction today still distorts the current Asian architecture.   Feigenbaum and Manning point to the fact that 53 percent of Asia’s trade is now conducted in an intra-regional basis identifying this datum, and others, as indicating that “Asian economies have become increasingly reliant on pan-Asian regional trade.”  But a quick comparison with other regions shows the strength of intra-Asia’s broad intra-regional trade but suggests that it is hardly excessive.  EU intra-regional trade as a percent of global export merchandise trade is 26 percent as opposed to Asia where the intra-regional trade is 16 percent.  Furthermore, any examination of global value chains would suggest that in fact long valuable chains stretch to Europe and North America.  And EU-Asia trade as a percentage of world trade comes in at 3.6 percent.  This rather too static look at intra-Asia trade  and the growing China trade presence in Asia, I believe does lead falsely to a conclusion that there is a security pole, headed by the US, matched by an economic pole dominated by China.

That being said there certainly does appear to be rising nationalist sentiment in Asia among the key players.  And there is no question that interdependence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for stability in the global environment – though I would suggest that “complex interdependence” – globalization, generates a quality different than say the interdependence in the period before World War I.

So what conclusions can one derive from our conversations at Beida and in the surrounding informed blogosphere debate? Here is a part of what I take away from the conversations and readings:

  1. China is ‘driving the bus’ in the region in many issues – especially on the island/islets dispute – and it is driving it in the wrong direction.  China repeatedly appeals to acting only in response – a reactive stance – in the South and the East China Seas island disputes.  But for many, “one man’s reactive is too frequently aggressive behavior to the other”.  The apparent manipulation of the Cambodia host at the most recent ASEAN gathering and the continuing unwillingness to contemplate seriously a binding Code of Conduct or to put the sovereignty disputes away for cooperation on resource development, are all unhelpful and raise the temperature over these disputes.  As Joe Nye so aptly described, “only China can contain China” so as China has become more assertive China, in fact, has begun to contain China in the region (see a more developed view by Nye following the conference posted at the NYT).  So China responding
    with more measured cooperation here would be a fabulous starting point for the new China leadership if it was determined to lower the temperature;
  2. China experts need to consider abandoning a view that every action by the US has only China in mind and that all US actions are designed to contain China.  The US, in fact, has been a primary supporter of Chinese leadership building its economic strength and achieving greater prosperity for all Chinese;
  3. Much attention was paid to the overreaching of the “Pivot” both in US actions but most especially in its rhetoric.  A number of US experts were critical of what they saw as the unnecessarily aggressive statements of US officials.  One expert urged that US and China focus on solutions that preserve face for both suggesting a start with much broader exchange and cultural programs.  Another arguing the reduction in assurances by the US to China urged that the US undertake efforts to build trust.  He has urged in the past that the US could give way on the close-in surveillance of the Mainland, made unnecessary by other surveillance means.
  4. The US, according to many at the Conference needs to work very hard to  avoid “balance of power” actions.  Instead, a look at Stephen Walt’s proposals seem designed in particular avoid balance of power actions.  Walt urges (see his blog post at foreignpolicy.com) positive and negative security cooperation including the involvement of the US and China.  On the positive side he points to possible cooperation on Iran, Korea or anti-terrorism.  It does strike me that Korea is a most apt choice, especially given the DPRK’s recent threats against the US.  On the negative forms of cooperation surely greater efforts to conclude a multilateral Code of Conduct led by the US and China and useful for both sets of island disputes could be extremely valuable.

There is likely more.  Let let me conclude here nevertheless.  The cloudy forecast is a result of the insidious impact of rising nationalism in China, Japan, Korea and elsewhere.  It is time for the new China leadership and the renewed US leadership to build trust and lower the nationalist temperature throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

Image Credit: www.bbc.co.uk

“Pivots” and Great Powers – From One Side

 

The ASEAN meetings last week – and especially the debate – or non-debate as it turned out over territorial challenges in the South China Sea, raised again the question of the US-China relations.  Secretary Clinton expressed publicly again the US position that the territorial disputes among ASEAN members and China needed to be addressed in a “multilateral setting” while China was equally firm that the matter should not even be on the agenda for the ASEAN Ministerial. Though discussed openly by various ASEAN members, the ASEAN ministers were not able to issue a joint communique at the conclusion of the meeting  – the first time in 45 years that such a failure had occurred.

The US-China relationship is the key to stability or instability in the region – and indeed beyond.  As I was thinking about this key bilateral relationship I eyed – and was impressed with – an analysis of China’s strategic concerns in the NYT by Minghao Zhao on July 12 (“The Predicaments of Chinese Power”).  Aside from the evident quality of the article, I was struck by the fact that Minghao Zhao is a research fellow at the China Center for Contemporary World Studies apparently a think-tank of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.  So the NYT is not a usual place for a researcher of his sort to place an op-ed piece.  I will get to this article and the implications for China’s strategic policy but I thought I’d start with the US position.

Now the Obama Administration has signaled – since at least the Honolulu APEC Leaders Summit last year – that with the winding down of US efforts first in Iraq and now Afghanistan – that the United States was back in Asia.  The United States was rebalancing (various terms have been used – the most notable “pivot”)  its strategic efforts from the Middle East  to Asia.  As an example of this rhetorical shift, assess these words from President Obama before the  Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011:

For the United States, this reflects a broader shift.  After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.  In just a few weeks, after nearly nine years, the last American troops will leave Iraq and our war there will be over.  In Afghanistan, we’ve begun a transition — a responsible transition — so Afghans can take responsibility for their future and so coalition forces can begin to draw down.  And with partners like Australia, we’ve struck major blows against al Qaeda and put that terrorist organization on the path to defeat, including delivering justice to Osama bin Laden.

This rebalancing has become know as America’s Asian or Pacific “pivot” – though it is interesting that in the various speeches and press conferences that Obama gave at the time around November 2011 he never referenced the term “pivot”.  But the media has picked it up from others including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who used it in her “America’s Pacific Century” article in November 2011.  At the conclusion she wrote:

This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and–a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.

More recently Robert Merry, the editor of the well-known National Interest, writing a book review for the New York Times’s David Sanger’s newest book Confront and Conceal (in last week’s, July 15, 2012) New York Times “Book Review” Section provided a cogent assessment of Sanger’s – and I suspect his own –  “temperature-taking” of the US-China relationship:

With regard to China, Sanger sees a possible “Thucydides trap” (Sanger earlier made clear that he is taking the term from Graham Allison the former Dean of the Kennedy School) – a reference to the the Greek historian’s narrative of the clash born of Sparta’s fear of Athens’s growing military might.  “We are seeing similar themes today,” he writes, adding that what some perceive as mounting nationalistic fervor in China could lead Beijing to underestimate the American response to Chinese adventures in the South China Sea.

So let’s focus briefly on the “Thucydides trap” and the “pivot” in US strategic policy.  As to the Thucydides Trap, Sanger has the best assessment.  In his NYT January 22, 2011 piece “Superpower and Upstart: Sometimes It Ends Well”  this what Sanger wrote:

Or ask Thucydides the Athenian historian whose tome on the Peloponnesian War has ruined many a college freshman’s weekend.  The line they had to remember for the test was his conclusion: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” … Both Mr Hu and President Obama seemed desperate to avoid what Graham Allison of Harvard University has labeled “the Thucydides Trap” – that deadly combination of calculation and emotion that, over the years, can turn healthy rivalry into antagonism or worse.

The so-called pivot has raised concerns that in fact the US actions may feed the Thucydides trap.  Part of the issue is of course that in the face of a growing fiscal crisis with budgetary cuts likely to be enacted after the election – no matter who wins – that this presentation of a US pivot to Asia is overreach.  While Chinese behavior might be constrained and even constructive in the near future, this would only be likely if Chinese leaders were persuaded that the US had a coherent Asia strategy that is viewed as credible and widely accepted.  That is hardly yet the case.  Indeed many in China have commented on what appears the growing crisis in the US and the decline in the US.  This rather pessimistic view of US leadership and the pivot in policy leads the perception that the Obama administration is long on rhetoric but no strategic policy is likely to be forthcoming.  In fact the rhetoric has fed the view by many in China that US policy remains committed to dominance and a continuing effort to pospone the day of China’s successful rise.  As Ken Lieberthal in his insightful piece in Foreign Policy argued, the pivot impacted in the following way:

In sum, the president’s Asia-wide strategy and some of the rhetoric accompanying it played directly into the perception of many Chinese that all American actions are a conspiracy to hold down or actually disrupt China’s rise.

If, and it is a big if still,  were China’s leaders to conclude that US policy in Asia was a direct challenge to China’s rise and designed only to contain China, then it does seem to set up that poisonous brew that can indeed turn “healthy rivalry” into growing antagonism and even confrontation in Asia.  This would be very bad.

So where is Chinese leadership on its relationship with the United States?  I’ll be back with that shortly.

 

 

Image Credit: circleofblue.org – President Hu and President Obama 2011