China-US relations are at a critical juncture in fashioning global order relations in the 2020s. As Joe Biden approaches inauguration day, there is increasing speculation on what approach he will take toward China. Theories abound. There are those in foreign policy circles who are seen as “restorationists” (see Thomas Wright at TheAtlantic for these terms) who tend to have a greater focus on the cooperation component of the relationship. There are “reformists” who have come to the conclusion that competition and rivalry must define the path for US-China relations. There are those who see China as the culprit in job loss, technology theft, trade imbalances, the pandemic, climate change and other hits on American pre-eminence. And there are many with cultural, societal and business ties to China who hope for a period of predictability, and hopefully opportunity.
Clear-eyed self-interest and deep understanding of the new political dynamics need to guide Biden foreign policy. For Biden and his team, it is not just a question how to reframe US international relations after Trump, but how to shape them in response to changed circumstances, domestic constraints, and new defining elements in the global landscape.
For starters, Asia is more pressing than Europe, the Indo-Pacific region more demanding than the trans-Atlantic, China is more important than Russia, social and environmental issues are more compelling than trade and financial policies, and domestic pressures everywhere mean that international policies are now constrained by and tethered to internal conditions affecting ordinary people. Global inter-connectivity may be vividly evident, but domestic politics are dominant in defining strategic thrusts.
Biden and his team seem to “get” most of these circumstances, constraints and defining elements. But, it is not clear that the incoming Administration has yet stared down the underlying political dynamics that will define geopolitical relations among leading powers, especially how to approach China in ways that makes sense to the other significant global players, that will be effective with China and with domestic political constraints. For this, the various “schools of thought” contending with each other to define the overall narrative for US relations with China, each by themselves are less helpful than combining them to address the complexity and importance of this most crucial relationship.
The starting point has to be a clear understanding that China does indeed have strategic interests in meeting US dominance in the Pacific. Additionally, China does use the state and public resources to advance its economic dynamism, does use techniques for internal control which violate international norms on human rights, and does have the scale, scope and dynamism to be a challenger to US predominance, a rival in the Pacific and a competitor in the global economy. There is no doubt that this is the reality of China today. The hardening of Xi Jinping’s authoritarian rule in the last four years is real and worrisome.
But it is also the case that China is a leading member of the G20, more committed than some to making it work and using it to strengthen multilateral approaches to global challenges. China takes its role in the United Nations, and especially in the UN Security Council, seriously. In response to pressure from Europe in September, China committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 and peak carbon emissions by 2030, new targets for China. Also, in September, China made an explicit call for a multilateral effort to deal with data security and digital governance, as a signal of its interest in global negotiations on these matters. These two initiatives by China occurred in the context of the EU-China negotiations of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) which, after seven years, of negotiations, was completed a day before the end 2020 and the end of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s six-month term as president of the EU Council.
It was perfectly predictable that Xi Jinping would want to complete this negotiation before Biden takes office and within Chancellor Merkel’s presidency of the EU. The fact that there was concern in the Biden team that the EU-China agreement went forward without waiting for Biden to take office so the US and Europe could jointly pressure China for more concessions manifests misunderstandings of Europe’s strategic thrust. Not only had the EU declared in May that the EU views China as a “systemic rival” and an “economic competitor” but it is well known that Europe is seeking more “strategic autonomy” for itself, which means acting independently of the US if also in concert with it. Furthermore, China had a keen interest in finishing the agreement by the end of 2020, precisely to avoid the US and Europe “ganging up” on China.
What is necessary now is for the new US administration to grasp the degree to which countries in Europe and in Asia, while eagerly welcoming the renewed presence of the United States in international negotiating forums, are also committed now to their own strategic direction and want to work with the United States but not be submissive to it. Joe Biden’s own statement that “America is back at the head of the table” is a disturbing utterance that reflects a global order that is past.
Pluralism is America’s friend in the current context. The fact that Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Japan, Korea and other players are “leading” on their own independently of whether the US is with them or not is a good sign for the future of diplomacy. Plurilateralism, the joint interaction of a group of significantly important countries (SICs), provides a more effective dynamic for reaching international agreements than do bilateral or trilateral relationships. The greater complexity of plurilateral dynamics create more vectors of interests. In turn, these dynamics create more room for maneuver for each player and greater flexibility in positioning. In addition, ‘shifting coalitions of consensus’ from issue to issue replace blocs and fixed groupings across issues, adding space.
As a result, what will work best now for the United States in recalibrating geopolitical relations is to reframe the US-China bilateral relationship as China-West relations which will bring in not only Europe, but Japan, Korea and Canada, Australia and others who have a stake in the outcomes and leverage and influence on the issues involved. The United States would do well to re-embed itself in the Asia-Pacific by participating robustly in APEC and the East Asia Summits, which the Trump Administration failed to do. The United States also would do well to work with other governments, institutions and NGOs to strengthen democracies but not hold a ‘Summit for Democracy’ that only serves to highlight ideological differences at a time when the relevant parties, including China, need to get down to collaborative global governance.
Biden’s foreign policy plans emphasize making American foreign policy work for average Americans. There is no way in which escalating conflict with China works for average Americans: not for farmers, who are selling record numbers of products to China; not for workers, who will bear the brunt of escalating U.S. military expenditures and the declining competitiveness that comes from isolation; not for young people, who want to see the U.S. and China working together to tackle the major challenges of our time: environmental destruction, inequality, extremism and the dangers of unregulated technological innovation.
The China-West Dialogue, a group of European, Canadian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean and American thought leaders who have met during 2020, concludes that there are multiple challenges to be worked on, a variety of countries that can play constructive roles in advancing them, and that the narrative that emerges on China-West relations will not be driven by just having the United States at ‘the head of the table’. By reframing the fraught US-China bilateral relationship as China-West relations and by embracing the range of issues to be addressed by it, possibilities for progress will be enhanced and unnecessary frictions and misunderstandings avoided.
Image Credit: ifri.org