Category Archives: Global Summitry

The Changing Shape and Influence of the Informals

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The UN General Assembly’s High Level Week has come and gone. And so has the unique UN gathering – The ‘Summit of the Future’ with the passage of the long anticipated, ‘Pact for the Future’. So, it’s not surprising that those of us concerned with global governance, global order and global summitry have turned our attention to the – Informals and most evidently the upcoming two Summits – the G20 Summit hosted this year by Brazil and the BRICS+ Summit hosted by none other than Russia. As it turns out, the third key Informal, the G7 has already been held by Italy in Apulia on June 13-15th.

The Informals emerged in 1975 with the creation of the G6 then the G7 a year later. While the G7 enlarged to the G7/8 in 1998, with the inclusion of Russia, it returned to being the G7 in 2017 when Russia that had been suspended with its annexation of Crimea in 2014, abandoned the Informal for the G20. The G20 began in 1999 with finance ministers and central bankers. It evolved into a leaders summit with the global financial crisis in 2008. The G20 members in attendance at the first Leaders’ Summit called by George W. Bush were: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The BRICs called their first leaders gathering in Yekaterinburg Russia in 2009. It emerged as the BRICS with the addition of South Africa at the Sanya China meeting in 2011.  These three, the G7, the G20 and the BRICS have remained the key informal annual leaders’ summits. The question remains, however, how effective have these 3 Summits been? Have they been able to shape the global order and advance collective global governance leadership? In other words, have they been effective?

Let me first focus on the BRICS+. This year’s gathering is the first convening of the BRICS+, an enlarged BRICS group. This year’s Summit is significant for the current member enlargement but also for its hosting by Russia. Yes, this year the BRICS+ is hosted by Russia – a pariah for the West due to the Ukraine War. My colleague, Stewart Patrick, a senior fellow and director of the Global Order and Institutions Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) published a BRICS+ piece on September 9, titled, “BRICS Expansion, the G20, and the Future of World Order”. On the first point, enlargement, Stewart suggests:

Putin has also invited more than two dozen other countries that have applied for or are considering membership in the expanding club. The gathering is meant to send an unmistakable signal: Despite the West’s best efforts to isolate it, Russia has many friends around the world.

This meeting in Russia will take place in Kazan the capital of Tatarstan. In addition to the original members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, besides all the many invited guest there are the new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though it should be noted that Saudi Arabia has technically not accepted membership but will attend in any case. Now Stewart’s explanation for this expansion:

No doubt, BRICS expansion evinces a growing global dissatisfaction with and a determination to challenge the structural advantages that advanced market democracies continue to enjoy in a global order that was in many respects made by the West, for the West. Reducing those exorbitant privileges, including by creating alternative, parallel institutions, is the fundamental purpose of BRICS+.

And the prospects of further expansion is highly possible. According to Putin, as described by Stewart:

According to Putin, thirty-four countries have expressed an interest to join the club, “in one form or another.” Some two dozen countries have reportedly applied for membership, among them Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam. More may be waiting in the wings, like Indonesia, which applied and then withdrew its application a decade ago. The most recent applicant is Türkiye, a member of NATO—albeit one that seeks to keep its options open. The group, in other words, seems destined to expand.

So what are the goals and how effective has the current BRICS+ been. As noted above, the BRICS+ members loudly proclaim the need to add the Global South to the major multilateral institutions whether the UN, and especially the UN Security Council, or the major financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF.

At the extreme, according to my colleague Oliver Stuenkel and his co-author Alexander Gabuev in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, titled, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order”:

Putin summarized the agenda of Russia’s BRICS presidency in remarks in July as part of a “painful process” to overthrow the “classic colonialism” of the U.S.-led order, calling for an end to Washington’s “monopoly” on setting the rules of the road.

But the makeup today, and likely in the near future, has its limitations as described by Oliver and his co-author:

But despite its allure, the club must grapple with an internal fissure. Some of its members, chief among them China and Russia, want to position the grouping against the West and the global order crafted by the United States. The addition of Iran, an inveterate adversary of the United States, only deepens the sense that the group is now lining up on one side of a larger geopolitical battle. Other members, notably Brazil and India, do not share this ambition. Instead, they want to use BRICS to democratize and encourage the reform of the existing order, helping guide the world from the fading unipolarity of the post–Cold War era to a more genuine multipolarity in which countries can steer between U.S.-led and Chinese-led blocs.

There clearly are differences in the view of its members as to what this Informal is designed to accomplish. And evidently not all members are equal. In particular China exerts strong influence on the original members and it, along with Russia, have pushed for expansion notwithstanding Brazil and India’s reticence:

Brazil and India are therefore wary of the BRICS’ hardening orientation. Both were initially opposed to China’s push to expand the group, which Beijing first proposed in 2017 under the rubric of “BRICS Plus.” Brazil and India were keen to retain the club’s exclusivity, worried that adding more members to the bloc would dilute their own influence within it. In 2023, China stepped up its diplomatic campaign and pressured Brazil and India to support expansion, mostly by casting their resistance as tantamount to preventing the rise of other developing countries. Keen to preserve its own standing in the global South, India dropped its opposition, leaving Brazil no choice but to go along with expansion. Brazil did lobby against adding any overtly anti-Western countries—an endeavor that failed spectacularly when Iran was announced as one of the new members that year.

It appears that the BRICS+ has taken on what appears to be a growing anti-western tilt and in the extreme case an anti-US position. In particular Russia, given its experience of US and European sanctions since the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine has urged the toppling of the US dollar dominance according to Alexander and Oliver:

In this fight against the Western “monopoly,” Putin identified the most important campaign as the quest to weaken the dominion of the dollar over international financial transactions. This focus is a direct result of Russia’s experience with Western sanctions. Russia hopes that it can build a truly sanctions-proof payments system and financial infrastructure through BRICS, involving all member countries.

But what has the BRICS accomplished beyond expressing distaste for the current global order leadership.

Stewart targets what he sees as the goals of the BRICS+ on the differences within:

On its face, BRICS+ is a formidable economic bloc,comprising half of the world’s population, 40 percent of its trade, and 40 percent of crude oil production and exports. The coalition can use this leverage not only to demand a more equitable international order but also to act on those ambitions, for instance by establishing a parallel energy trading system, deepening commercial links among members,creating an alternative system of development finance, reducing dollar dependence in foreign exchange transactions, and deepening technology cooperation in fields from AI to outer space. Expect BRICS+ to seek opportunities in each area.

Stewart also applauds various group actions:

Like the G7 and G20, the BRICS group has launched an expanding array of initiatives and partnerships across multiple issue areas, from energy to health to sustainable development. The result is an impressive and increasingly dense transnational latticework of networked minilateralism, with a heavy focus on South-South cooperation.

Yet the major collective BRICS efforts have been limited. In fact, we have two only: the New Development Bank (NDB) and a currency swap arrangement, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) which has remained unused notwithstanding all the discussions of an alternative to the US dollar. As to the NDB it has not had a major financing impact with many criticizing it for relying too much on private financing. For an insightful discussion of the BRICS please listen to the podcast I undertook with York University’s Gregory Chin, “Summit Dialogue, S2, Ep 7, An Interview with Gregory Chin on the BRICS+ and the New Development Bank”

Frankly the collective efforts have been at best works in progress with far more rhetorical expression than practical implementation. As Stewart remarks:

To date, BRICS has been more effective at signaling what it is against—namely,continued Western domination of the architecture of global governance—than what it stands for.

And Alexander and Oliver further note:

In this fight against the Western “monopoly,” Putin identified the most important campaign as the quest to weaken the dominion of the dollar over international financial transactions. This focus is a direct result of Russia’s experience with Western sanctions. Russia hopes that it can build a truly sanctions-proof payments system and financial infrastructure through BRICS, involving all member countries.

The talk of de-dollarization is rife but the dethroning of the dollar is nowhere to be seen at the moment. So that is a first look at the expanded BRICS.

What then is the current status of the G20? First it should be noted the G20 has enlarged as well with the addition of the African Union in 2023. A key strength of the G20, unlike the G7, is that the G20 includes advanced economic and Global South members. In principle this wider membership corrects for the skewed membership of the G7 where no significant Global South members are present. This evident avantage has however fallen to the tensions generated in a far more geopolitical tense international system. Stewart reflects on the impact of the rising geopolitical tensions:

Of particular concern is the future of the Group of 20 (G20). Even before BRICS expansion, it had become a microcosm of growing global rifts. A further hardening of these divisions would undercut the G20’s fundamental raison d’être: namely, to help bridge gulfs between—and leverage the capabilities of—important countries that are not inherently or necessarily like-minded.

 

Among the biggest uncertainties is what impact the BRICS+ will have on the role and functioning of the G20, which will hold its own summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18–19 under this year’s chair, Brazil.Since the G20’s elevation to the leader level in 2008, one of its ostensible comparative advantages has been that it provide a setting for flexible coalitions of consensus to emerge that transcend rigid blocs.

 

The expansion of BRICS certainly has the potential to exacerbate these dynamics, by splitting the G20 into opposed G7 and BRICS+ factions.

Though much anticipation was paid to the G20 broad membership, the geopolitical and now the ant-Western tensions reflected in the BRICS+ may hobble the very needed collective global governance efforts ascribed to the G20.

We will come back to the G20 as we approach the G20 Summit scheduled for November 18th and 19th, in Rio de Janeiro as we look to take the measure of G20 effectiveness.

Image Credit: LinkedIn

This Post was originally posted at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter: https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/the-changing-shape-and-influence?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

 

‘Once in a Generation’ – Well Maybe Not; But ‘Small Ball’ At Least

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Well, the UN ‘Summit of the Future’ (SoTF) has come – and gone.  What does the appearance and passing of the SoTF, and the continuation of the UN General Assembly’s High-level Week tell us about the state of the UN and the condition of global multilateralism? If I may be so bold it is – “not good!” But there may be a thread or two that might lead to more effective multilateralism.  Still I suspect after the most recent Posts this immediate conclusion can hardly be a surprise. Reflecting on  the UN proceeding, Bloomberg reported:

The United Nations General Assembly’s annual meeting in New York is often mocked as a farce for the endless speeches and the traffic snarling the city. This year’s gathering feels more like tragedy.

The violence and chaos engulfing the globe put questions around the UN mandate — “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” — in stark relief.

Antonio Guterres is the first to admit that the secretary-general of the UN has no power, just a voice (emphasis added). It’s one he uses time and time again like a modern-day Cassandra to lament that the world is currently experiencing the most conflicts since the organization was founded in 1945. The past three years were the most violent in three decades, according to one think tank.

So the international context is not good. But looking specifically at the SoTF, let’s look at the result. On the positive side the UN passed, ultimately unanimously the ‘Pact for the Future’. Why I say ultimately is because the document’s final passage suffered from great power intrigue before the Pact of the Future was agreed to and passage concluded. As pointed out by IISD, the International Institute for Sustainable Development:

The Summit of the Future opened with some drama when the Russian Federation tabled its objection to several paragraphs in the outcome documents: the Pact for the Future, the Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin tabled Russian objections and, according to AlJazeera:

Vershinin also stressed that the pact could not be viewed as creating “new mandates and obligations” for states as it is “simply a declaration, and a very vague one.

In the face of these objections, interestingly, the Republic of Congo – representing Africa’s 54 nations – and Mexico, rejected the Russian amendments and preventing them from going through. With the loud opposition from members of the Global South to Russia’s objections, the  IISD reported:

… after months of negotiations, the Pact was adopted. UN General Assembly (UNGA) President Philémon Yang thanked the Co-Facilitators for steering a complex negotiating process and described the just-adopted Pact as a reflection of “our pledge” to lay the foundation for a sustainable, inclusive, and peaceful global order.

On the positive side, the final Pact appears to retain the Security Council reform initiative. Though the Action numbers have changed, it appears that the reform provision has been retained:

Action 40. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform as a matter of priority and without delay …

 

Encourage the submission of further models and the revision of already presented models by States and Groups of States for the structured dialogues with a view to developing a consolidated model in the future based on convergences on the five clusters, and the models presented by Member States.

It is there but we wait to see results. There appears to many at the UN to be a greater ‘majority’ to reform the Security Council, and how it works. Such reform seems to include a growing consensus to permanently add members to the Security Council. For some time now the US has lead the charge to include India, Germany , Brazil and Japan, though without a veto, and Ambassador Thomas-Greeleaf announced a US position urging two permanent seats for developing country members and a spot for a SIDS (Small Island Developing States) seat. Yet final agreement appears to be out of the reach for the members.

Now, interestingly there were a variety of insights provided by Richard Gown, currently the UN Director for the International Crisis Group, who was interviewed on the 25th by Ravi Agrawal, editor in chief of Foreign Policy. In this FP: Live session titled: “Can the United Nations Still be Effective?”, Gowan, who has long been involved with the UN, suggested that what was most interesting in the Pact was not Security Council reform but the effort to focus on digital governance and  the initiation of negotiations on AI in the Digital Compact, Annex I: Global Digital Compact:

“Objective 5. Enhance international governance of artificial intelligence for the benefit of humanity”

56. We therefore commit to:

(a) Establish, within the United Nations, a multidisciplinary Independent International Scientific Panel on AI with balanced geographic representation to promote scientific understanding through evidence-based impact, risk and opportunity assessments, drawing on existing national, regional and international initiatives and research networks (SDG 17);

(b) Initiate, within the United Nations, a Global Dialogue on AI Governance involving Governments and all relevant stakeholders which will take place in the margins of existing relevant United Nations conferences and meetings (SDG 17).

Gowan suggested in the interview that the effort here with AI might well bear fruit in years to come with rules on digital governance and AI. It will in his view be looked at retrospectively as the Pact for the Future provided the framework for critical digital governance success.

Gowan was also clear-eyed when it came to the UN and its capacity to constrain and resolve conflict. He was blunt that what he called ‘first order’ crises – Ukraine and Gaza currently, due to great power rivalries and political actions are currently out of the reach of the UN to achieve any level of success and ultimately political resolution. On the other hand, what he described as ‘second order’ conflicts – an example Sudan, where most great power rivalries are not at play, can be subject to UN collective peace efforts.

So it is evident that many of the conflict crises are outside effective UN efforts. Still, Gowan reminded us that ‘everyday multilateralism’ is at the heart of today’s UN efforts. While the UN today cannot end wars, it is critical in providing significant action and progress in mitigating the consequences of violence, pandemics, and natural and climate disasters. UN agencies may be the only major players in these circumstances.

Finally, Gowan pointed out where attention needed to be paid to these recent UN summit efforts. The declarations and pacts could be largely ignored; the statements and speeches by Heads of Government and State could equally be set aside and forgotten but the actual gathering of leaders could enable numerous bilateral and minilateral meetings at the margin of the formal meetings.  These highly informal discussions could be settings where positions could be staked out and possible positive steps could be agreed by leaders that later translated into real progress. It might be ‘small ball’ but it could ultimately lead to progress. The informality is evident and such in-person gatherings could easily be missed but quietly and ‘below the radar’ such quiet conversations could provide  real opportunity to resolve the all too difficult and seemingly intractable moments of violence. This is informal, very informal ‘multilateralism’. But progress may be possible.

Image Credit: IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute)

This Post first appeared at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/once-in-a-generation-well-maybe-not?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

More than Just Sustaining the G7 – The G7 at 50

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The 50th annual G7 meeting was just held in Apulia Italy as leaders work, so they say, to coordinate economic policy in the context of rising geopolitical tensions. It  seems at this 50th G7 gathering, however, it is far more about geopolitics, and the shadow of Trump, than it is about global governance policy efforts.

The G7  leaders, the U.S., UK, Canada, Japan, Germany, Italy, and France have been tasked with host Italy to discuss in various sessions:  climate change, migration, and international development, as well as a discussion on AI led by Pope Francis. But that is not the ‘heart’ of summit discussions at this G7. It is rather discussions on Russia and the Ukraine War. Most pertinently, G7 leaders reached agreement to utilize Russia’s seized assets, most of which were frozen in the EU financial system, to provide a loan of up to $50 billion in support for Ukraine.

And there was a heavy emphasis, identified in the G7 Leaders’ Communique, of China. The Communique took on China for its continuing support for Russia. As noted by FT contributors Henry Foy and James Politi:

The joint statement at the end of their summit in Italy included a far tougher stance towards China than in the past, exposing the escalating frustration both in the US and Europe with Beijing’s critical support to Russia during the war in Ukraine.

 

We will continue taking measures against actors in China and third countries that materially support Russia’s war machine, including financial institutions, consistent with our legal systems, and other entities in China that facilitate Russia’s acquisition of items for its defense industrial base.  In this context, we reiterate that entities, including financial institutions, that facilitate Russia’s acquisition of items or equipment for its defense industrial base are supporting actions that undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine. Accordingly, we will impose restrictive measures consistent with our legal systems to prevent abuse and restrict access to our financial systems for targeted individuals and entities in third countries, including Chinese entities, that engage in this activity. We will take robust action against actors who aid Russia in circumventing our sanctions, including by imposing severe costs on all those who fail to immediately cease providing material support to Russia’s aggression and by strengthening domestic enforcement and stepping up our business engagement to promote corporate responsibility. We call on financial institutions to refrain from supporting and profiting from Russia’s war machine. We will take further steps to deter and disrupt this behavior.

Concluding on China, the FT suggested G7 leaders no longer underestimated China’s strategic actions toward Russia and economic ones toward all the G7 countries:

A second person familiar with the talks said: “The era of naivety towards Beijing is definitely gone now and China is to blame for that, honestly. … “China is everywhere in the G7, to be frank,” said a senior EU official. “The question we have is how to calibrate our actions to take in response.”

For analysts and officials the G7 Communique expressed much about taking on China and heightening the ‘new Cold War’ rhetoric. A good example,  David E Sanger of the NYT and author of New Cold War: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s  Struggle to Defend the West.

The point here is the noted diminishment,  if not outright absence of global governance policy expression and leadership. At the G7. Of course it is not that the leadership didn’t identify collective economic policy. How could it not in ever too long annual Statement – yes 36 pages – which started with a series of presumed priorities including a long list of notable global governance priorities:

Engaging with African countries, in a spirit of equitable and strategic partnership. As they work to deliver sustainable development and industrial growth for their people, we are advancing our respective efforts to invest in sustainable infrastructure, including through the PGII, and we launched the Energy for Growth in Africa initiative, together with several African partners.

 

Acting to enable countries to invest in their future and achieve the Sustainable DevelopmentGoals (SDGs), recognizing that reducing poverty and tackling global challenges go hand in hand.We are doing our part to achieve better, bigger and more effective Multilateral DevelopmentBanks, making it possible for the World Bank to boost its lending by USD 70 billion over the next ten years. We are calling for action from the international community to address debt burdens.

 

Reinforcing global food security and enhancing climate resilience, including by launching the Apulia Food Systems Initiative.  https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders- Communique.pdf 2

 

Reaffirming our commitment to gender equality. Together with International Financial Institutions, we will unlock at least USD 20 billion over three years in investments to boost women’s empowerment.

 

Taking concrete steps to address the triple crisis of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss, including by submitting ambitious 1.5°C aligned Nationally Determined Contributions. We will spearhead global efforts to preserve forests and oceans, and to end plastic pollution.

 

Affirming our collective commitment and enhanced cooperation to address migration, tackle the challenges and seize the opportunities that it presents, in partnership with countries of origin and transit. We will focus on the root causes of irregular migration, efforts to enhance border management and curb transnational organized crime, and safe and regular pathways for migration. We launched the G7 Coalition to prevent and counter the smuggling of migrants.

 

Deepening our cooperation to harness the benefits and manage the risks of Artificial Intelligence (AI). We will launch an action plan on the use of AI in the world of work and develop a brand to support the implementation of the International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems.

 

Fostering strong and inclusive global economic growth, maintaining financial stability and investing in our economies to promote jobs and accelerate digital and clean energy transitions. We also remain committed to strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system and to implementing a more stable and fairer international tax system fit for the 21st century.

 

Acting together to promote economic resilience, confront non-market policies and practices that undermine the level playing field and our economic security, and strengthen our coordination to address global overcapacity challenges.

But this was a gathering where Russia-Ukraine and then China’s support of Russia dominated, so we are told, leader discussions. As note by David Sanger in the NYT: 

But the change in views about China reached far beyond the questions swirling around an endgame in Ukraine. European countries that had worried a few years ago that the United States was being too confrontational with China, this year signed on to the communiqué, with its calls for more robust Western-based supply chains that were less reliant on Chinese companies.

A CSIS report led by John Homre and Victor Cha urged that the G7 expand its membership and “foster a more stable and predictable world order.”

This CSIS report speaks to the global need to elevate the Group of Seven (G7), a bloc of industrialized democracies—the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union—to foster a more stable and predictable world order.

The authors urge an enlargement of the Group – suggesting:

… Australia and South Korea. They bring significant capabilities to the nine priorities identified by G7 leaders, are like-minded partners, and display the trust and reliability required of G7 members.

 

The G7 should establish a formal leader-level outreach mechanism to the Global South and middle-power economies to demonstrate inclusivity and confer legitimacy on the body as a global governance institution. The outreach partners should include the African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

But realistically that is not where the G7 is. It is about critical geopolitical matters to Europe and the United States. If anything, any long view of this Summit – 50 years on – and for a number of us one can cast back to 1975 and Rambouillet, this Informal is much shrunken and quite isolated.

It is worth noting Paul Poast’s assessment in WPR of the G7 at this 50th year:

While the group has evolved, its long-term survival is once again unclear. There are concerns that Trump’s disdain for international cooperation could return in 2025. Nations in Europe, notably Germany and France, are witnessing a far-right resurgence, which could also undermine the G7’s coherence as a gathering of the liberal democratic world’s leading nations. For that matter, this year’s host, Italy, is currently governed by the far-right Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose party has its origins in the country’s fascist movement.

 

Hence, there are once again questions about the summits’ future, let alone whether they will produce more iconic images and momentous outcomes. In short, it’s unclear if the G7 will make it through another five, let alone another 50, meetings.

The shadow of Trump – and his possible return – explains many pronouncements by the current G7 Leaders. Diminished and ‘in a crouch’ seems to best define today’s G7. But even so, it is fair to say that our gaze shifted long ago to the G20. Trump, no Trump, key Middle Powers represent a significant presence and influence in the G20. That’s where to turn our gaze and focus.

Image Credit: Organizer

Calming US-China Tensions

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My colleague, Michael Swaine, now a Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, has produced two very insightful pieces on US-China relations. The longer piece can be found as a Quincy Brief and well worth reading. But if that is not possible, then a shorter examination is set out by Michael at  WPR. The ‘heart’ of both pieces is that stability arising from the Biden-Xi Summit at the margin of the APEC meeting in  San Francisco late in 2023 is far less than meets the eye. As Michael narrates in the WPR piece:

All this means that, far from developing the incentives and the means to avert a crisis or conflict, efforts on both sides to reassure each other on their vital interests are ringing increasingly hollow, with the result that both continue to view each other as engaging in evasive or, worse yet, hypocritical and duplicitous behavior.

And with respect to Taiwan, set out in the Quincy Brief, Michael paints a rather bleak picture:

The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers.

Why have the two leading powers come to such a serious pass in the face of what appeared to be a solid effort to stabilize the relationship at the margins of APEC? Here Michael is clear:

Achieving this requires each nation to match its formal statements clearly and reliably with its actual behavior—in other words, to avoid hypocrisy—with regard to what each side regards as its vital interests, and to do so consistently over time. This in turn requires both sides reaching a mutual understanding of what their vital interests are, the meaningful assurances regarding them that each desires, and what would constitute violations of those assurances and, hence, threats to the concerned party’s vital interests. …

Unfortunately, despite some initial efforts, neither Washington nor Beijing has thus far met these requirements. Perhaps the most prominent example of this failure involves what began as the “Four Noes and One No Intention,” but which Beijing now calls the “Five Noes.” These reportedly affirm that the United States: does not seek a new Cold War with China; does not aim to change China’s political system; is not revitalizing its alliances to counter China; does not support Taiwan’s independence; and does not seek a conflict with China. [WPR]

From Michael’s perspective the United States has failed to reassure China that indeed it is committed to the “Five Noes”. Then, added to this is the failure to provide the reassurances necessary over Taiwan. As Michael describes the Taiwan situation:

  • The increasingly high (and arguably growing) stakes the Taiwan issue presents for both Beijing and Washington;
  • Deepening levels of domestic threat inflation on each side;
  • The growing tendency on both sides to worst case the motives and intentions of others (fed by a persistent lack of trust) while failing to recognize the interactive nature of the rivalry;
  • A resulting steady erosion of confidence in the original, stabilizing bilateral understanding regarding Taiwan reached between Beijing and Washington during the 1970s normalization process, and a related stress on deterrence over assurance;
  • The absence of effective bilateral crisis prevention and management Mechanisms”. [Brief]

While the two articles focus on somewhat different aspects of the US-China relationship, the big conclusion I draw from these two very insightful pieces by Michael is that both leading powers are providing insufficient assurances to the other of the desire of each to maintain the status quo and peaceful relations.

The rising gyre of action and response between the two is underlined by Michael:

In China, U.S. assertions that the One China Policy has not changed, or that its relations with Taiwan remain unofficial, thus fall on deaf ears. And the apparent hypocrisy of U.S. behavior is then used to justify more provocative Chinese actions, which lead many Americans to conclude that Beijing is jettisoning its commitment to peaceful unification.

This worsening situation is made even more dangerous by the absence of substantive crisis prevention and management mechanisms and procedures between the two nations. It is true that Washington and Beijing have recently agreed to resume a nascent military–to–military crisis communication working group that remained suspended since 2019 and appear to be working to revive a few other more established agreements designed to avoid incidents in the air and at sea. [Brief]

For Michael the heavy reliance on military deterrence, as opposed to material bilateral reassurance is at the heart of the shaky relations between the two. What is needed is clear, according to him:

There are, however, concrete steps that the U.S. government, Congress, and civil society can take to reduce the mounting tension around the Taiwan issue and remove it as a major factor driving the growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Most importantly, both sides must reverse the tendency to regard the island as a surrogate for the overall U.S.–China strategic competition.

This requires, as a first step, efforts to reduce the overall intensity of the bilateral rivalry, by eliminating the heretofore divisive, often politically–induced, zero–sum rhetoric that has dominated much of the dialogue in Washington and Beijing, and ending, to the extent possible, the mismatch between the words spoken and actions taken on both sides.” “… Such overblown rhetoric and hypocrisy deepen distrust and signal that there is no potential common ground on critical issues such as Taiwan’s future. They reinforce worst–case assumptions about motives and therefore increase the likelihood that manageable crises will become severe conflicts.[Brief]

Michael then sets out a rather lengthy list of reassuring statements that the US might express to undermine any trajectory toward confrontation and conflict. As he says:

These statements would represent a clear shift from the current drift toward confrontation and abandonment of the “One China” normalization understandings with China over Taiwan. They would not constitute a new U.S. policy so much as an attempt to restore policy understandings that have maintained peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades.”[Brief]

In an ideal world such efforts backed by equally reassuring statements and actions from China could well represent an optimal path for US-China relations in the immediate circumstances. Unfortunately, in a Presidential election year and with the heavy cloud of a possible Trump re-election and his growing wild rhetoric of an 8-month campaign, it seems to me Michael’s solutions in these circumstances may well unfortunately be overreach. What therefore can be done in this difficult period.

It would be nice if a Leaders Summit was planned relatively soon but unfortunately the Brazil G20 Summit is scheduled to  take place after the US election. Thus a bilateral meeting at the margins of a summit is not going to be possible. Bad timing I’m afraid. In the face of a poor calendar the best that might be hoped for are confidence building gatherings of senior officials. Here too the G20 can be useful. There are a large number of ministerial sessions that provide the setting for side meetings by US-China senior officials. These bilateral side gatherings provide opportunities where expressions of reassurance could be had and public statements made that underline the US-China effort to maintain stability and express specific collaborative policy initiatives. It might provide just the kind of opportunities that Michael believes might help stabilize US-China relations.

Image Credit: France24

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/calming-us-china-tensions?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&triedRedirect=true

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Brazil’s G20 Hosting Year – 2024

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So the G20 Host – this year Brazil – is beginning to crank it up by announcing many G20 meetings now planned over the coming summit cycle. And we  are fortunate that the current leader of Brazil is not Jair Bolsanaro, no fan of the G20. Instead, we have the return to the Brazilian presidency, after a significant hiatus, of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula. That is important. Even though Lula can go a bit ‘over the deep end’ on the Global South,  he is committed to addressing climate change as well as critical global development subjects such as ending poverty, enhancing education and gender equality.

I was fortunate last week to participate in a session examining Brazil’s hosting year in the broader context of ‘Rethinking the Future of Multilateralism’. This session was a continuation of the ongoing effort by the Global Solutions Initiative (GSI) to examine the Informals, particularly in this case, the G20. GSI presents, among other things, the Global Solutions Summit that goes off annually in Berlin on numerous global governance subjects. At this recent virtual GSI session a very helpful presentation was provided by Feliciano Guimaraes of CEBRI. CEBRI along with FUNAG and IPEA – all Brazilian think tanks, are all part of the official T20 Organizing Committee for the Brazil hosting year. Back to that in a moment.

What has Brazil ‘put out’ as the priorities of the Brazilian hosting? It appears these are its priorities:

  • Social inclusion  and the fight against hunger
  • Energy transition and sustainable development
  • Reform of global governance institutions

Now a big ‘shout out’ to the first two priorities. These are demanding goals but linked to Brazilian international policy efforts. But the third is a bit of a warning. Institutional reform – whether of the UN or the IFIs – the IMF and the World Bank – are perennial subjects.  Over the recent years, if not before, it has become all too apparent that reform in the current geopolitical context is not possible. Look at the recent HLPF Summit – the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, held by the UN last September. Lots of talk but …  And now we are accelerating toward the Summit of the Future, this coming September 2024. Again great hope:

The Summit of the Future is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

Valiant goals, but the will and collaborative energy is not there I’m afraid.

But back to the efforts of Brazil as host of the G20. It is evident that the administration and structure of the G20 has broadened and deepened over the years. Take a look at its current development of the structure and policy process as we have set it out recently at the Global Summitry Project website. Today, there are well developed Sherpa and Finance Tracks as pointed to by Feliciano Guimaraes. And as he further points to Brazil’s efforts, it is making advances to, as he points out, “to establish a close dialogue with the G20 Sherpa and Finance tracks with a view to increasing the incidence of T20 recommendations.”   Further, there are many Working Groups and Task Forces developing policy proposals. And as Feliciano points out there is a Brazilian emphasis on the Engagement Groups as well with the hope that:

The G20 Social Summit – Social guarantees civil society’s participation and contribution in discussions and policy formulations related to the G20 Summit.

It encompasses the activities of 12 Engagement Groups, in addition to initiatives and events coordinated between the sherpa and finance tracks and non-governmental actors, as well as initiatives from G20 countries’ societies.

A key highlight of this engagement is the upcoming Social Summit, scheduled to take place from November 15 to 17, 2024, on the eve of the G20 Leaders’ Summit, set for November 18 and 19, both hosted in Rio de Janeiro.

During the G20 Social Summit, civil society representatives will present their proposals, marking a significant opportunity for their voices to shape the agenda.

Feliciano emphasizes, in addition to the civil society participation largely presumably through the C20, the importance of the T20. As he sees it:

 … the G20’s “ideas bank,” gathering and disseminating analyses by think tanks involved in global issues, alongside insights from high-level experts. It aims then to influence the negotiations and the final declarations made by the G20.

But Feliciano is not so swept up in the G20 summitry process that he fails to see the challenges posed by this hosting year. He sets out the challenges that Brazil faces:

•Having financial resources to organize hundreds of meetings (government + philanthropy + business);

•Generating credible and impactful ideas/processes/proposals (less is more);

•Managing the G7-BRICS rivalry (G7 – G20) – being a bridge-builder;

•Being more global and less local (cannot mimic Modi’s India);

•Avoiding contamination from the Ukraine War (Indian challenge);

•Managing the growing rivalry between the USA and China in working groups and the summit;

•Being able to propose and innovate – themes, ideas, and processes (depends on organized civil society); and

•Improving the inclusion of new actors in the processes (W20, C20, and L20).

These challenges are formidable and limit ultimately the advances that Brazil can bring to the summit process. But he also sees opportunities for Brazil. And he sets these out as well:

•Strengthening Brazil’s role in discursive leadership;

•Rebuilding Brazil’s international prestige (G20 + COP30 in Belém);

•Advancing priority agendas – inequality, climate change, and global governance reform;

•Opportunity for strengthening coordination among BRICS+ with the sequence of troikas;

•Empowering organized civil society to participate in major international debates;

•Expanding the range of international topics within Brazilian society; and

•A significant showcase of Brazil’s political capacity to produce credible and feasible ideas/results.

There is opportunity; but we have seen the building of a large summitry machine that is unlikely to be able to make the kind of progress that hosts desire. Looking back over the years since the emergence of the Informals there has been a back and forward motion to these Informals. Leader frustration over the burdening of their efforts to act collectively without being hemmed in by bureaucracies led to attenuation by leaders from policy machinery only to have it grow again over the years to assist leaders in advancing global governance policies. The dilemma is, however, not over the administrative and policy assistance but the weakened state overall of multilateralism. The decision making remains at the leader level and there is little collective commitment. National policy dominates at the cost of collaborative policy making no matter what the structure and policy support.

This Post first appeared on my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/brazils-g20-hosting-year-2024

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Transition and Renewed Focus

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Well it can’t be bad news all the time; at least I hope not. Given the turbulence and death with two ongoing wars – Russia -Ukraine and Hamas and Israel, the renewal, or transition, of several summits is a positive global order sign. At least I hope so.

On the global summitry scene, this week we will witness the transition of G20 hosting from India to Brazil, presumably on December 1st. Thus, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will lead Brazil as the 2024 host of the G20. And what can we expect from Brazilian leadership? According to statements from President Lula: 

“Brazil will focus on reducing hunger and poverty, slowing climate change and global governance reform when it heads the G20 group of the world’s largest economies starting next month, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said on Thursday.”

Brazil is planning to hold the annual leaders’ summit in November 2024. And as Lula has declared: 

“I hope we can address the issues that we need to stop running away from and try to resolve,” Lula at a meeting with cabinet ministers to lay out Brazil’s priorities for the G20.”

Though Lula had, I suspect, hoped to take a triumphant turn as host of the G20, his leadership has been dampened, I suspect, with the election of the other Latin American regional power,  Javier Milei. As described in the Guardian: 

Javier Milei, [is] a volatile far-right libertarian who has vowed to “exterminate” inflation and take a chainsaw to the state, has been elected president of Argentina, catapulting South America’s second largest economy into an unpredictable and potentially turbulent future.

This is no companion for Lula in the G20 and the region. The volatility in recent national elections rolls on.  In this regard note the Netherlands and the strong showing of the anti-Islamic Geert Wilders. After 25 years in parliament, his Freedom party (PVV) is set to win 37 seats, well ahead of the nearest rival, a left-wing alliance. 

So there is volatility in a variety of national scenes that matches the uncertainty in the international scene. It is a troubling warning signal for advancing collective global governance. 

Still forward effort can be had for the moment internationally. Notably we can point to the gathering of foreign ministers of South Korea, Japan and China. This is the first Triple Summit gathering of foreign ministers since 2019. Faced with the pandemic but more pointedly the tensions between Koea and Japan no Triple Summit gathering has occurred. As chronicled in the SCMP:  “… the host, South Korea’s Park Jin, said after the meeting that the three ministers reaffirmed their agreement to hold the summit as soon as mutually convenient, according to Seoul-based Yonhap News Agency. 

“We will continue efforts to make sure that the holding of a summit will materialise in the near future,” Park was quoted as saying.” 

The key to this emerging initiative is the current improvement in relations between Korea and Japan. This easing of tensions has reopened the prospect of trilateral gatherings and the matching Indo-Pacific gatherings that includes the United States with this Trilateral effort. It is not an answer to the tensions generated by the US-China rivalry but it builds a better Indo-Pacific base. 

And in the category of renewed focus, and it is, is the major climate gathering  – starting this Thursday, COP28. As described by the think tank,  IISD

“The 2023 UN Climate Change Conference will convene from 30 November to 12 December 2023 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). It will comprise the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 28);

In a letter dated 13 January 2023, the UNFCCC Secretariat announced that Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology and UAE Special Envoy for Climate Change, has been appointed to serve as COP 28 President-Designate.”

Many were disappointed by this COP28 leadership choice. However, it was a regional choice question with the Asia-Pacific Group determining the President (The regional groups include: The African Group, the Asia-Pacific Group, the Eastern Europe Group, the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) and the Western European and Others Group (WEOG)) but it is what it is and COP 28 does appear to signal some progress. As Lisa Friedman of the NYTimes points out, progress may well be had at COP28 because of the following:

“The first is what’s called the global stocktake. This is the first formal assessment of whether nations are on track to meet a goal they set in Paris in 2015 to limit the rise in average global temperatures to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels. 

…Second, there is an expectation that nations will finalize the so-called “loss and damage” fund they agreed to create last year. The major questions to be resolved include who will pay into the fund and who will have access to the money. 

Finally, there is the political agreement that could emerge from the summit. It is likely that nations could agree on a deal to replace polluting fossil fuels with clean energy such as wind and solar power. The question is whether nations agree to phase out fossil fuels and, if so, what caveats are attached.”

The gathering is huge. Diplomats from nearly 200 countries, and many heads of state and government, will gather to try to draft a plan to accelerate the global transition away from fossil fuels. 

We shall see, but the possibilities are there especially given that China and the US confirmed following agreement between John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua that the US and China are committed to:

“Both countries support the G20 Leaders Declaration to pursue efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030 and intend to sufficiently accelerate renewable energy deployment in their respective economies through 2030 from 2020 levels so as to accelerate the substitution for coal, oil and gas generation, and thereby anticipate post-peaking meaningful absolute power sector emission reduction, in this critical decade of the 2020s.” 

Even in these troubled times, it appears that progress is possible. We will follow it. 

This Post was originally a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/transition-and-renewed-focus?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Image Credit: GreenBiz

Troubles with Global Summitry

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We are definitely in the midst of Global Summitry gatherings. With the BRICS Summit just recently ended, we are deep into the G20 weekend gathering in New Delhi. So much commentary has accompanied these summitry gatherings. But I caution casual observers and readers: there are way too many assessments and conclusions drawn by all those folks that unfortunately barely pay attention to Global Summitry through much of the year. You can see this in the various ‘hair on fire’ commentaries in the assessments and consequences of the actions of key players in both the BRICS and now especially with the G20. Too many declarations of the G20 demise; firm conclusions that China and Russia would block any consensus statement that sought to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; the fragmentation of global summitry with the rise of the BRICS plus and the demise of the G20 with leaders from Russia and China choosing to absent themselves from summit.

Now don’t get me wrong, the geopolitical pressures, particularly rising US-China competition and opposition and condemnation of Russia for its unprovoked aggression on Ukraine are impactful. The geopolitics has seemingly hindered the G20 in advancing global governance policies. Yet the global governance agenda and goals remain. Look at the G20 agenda as described by Damien Cave in the NYT:

The agenda in New Delhi includes climate change, economic development and debt burdens in low-income countries, as well as inflation spurred by Russia’s war in Ukraine. If members can reach consensus on any or all of these subjects, they will produce an official joint declaration at the end.

In the ‘hair on  fire’ camp here is a piece by Alec Russell in the FT

The countdown to the talks was dominated by news that Xi was not going to attend. This was widely seen as a major blow to the G20, and an acceleration of the shift to a world in which a China-led bloc is facing off against a US-led one, with many countries hovering in the middle.

But the collective global governance effort has not been stymied. Indian efforts to reach consensus have proven successful. The G20, thanks to India, has released the Declaration a day early. Our good fortune. As described by the Indian Sherpa the Declaration was:

… a complete statement with 100% unanimity” that highlights India’s “great ability to bring all developing countries, all the emerging markets, China, Russia, everybody together at the same table and bring consensus.

He went on:

Urging adherence to the United Nations Charter, the New Delhi statement says: “All states must refrain from the threat or use of force to seek territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.

So there we are, a consensus statement has been issued. As often is the case, the document was not short, some 29 pages of declaration plus pages of annex.  Nevertheless it ended on a ‘high note’:

81. We reiterate our commitment to the G20 as the premier forum for global economic cooperation and its continued operation in the spirit of multilateralism, on the basis of consensus, with all members participating on an equal footing in all its events including Summits. We look forward to meeting again in Brazil in 2024 and in South Africa in 2025, as well as in the United States in 2026 at the beginning of the next cycle. We welcome Saudi Arabia’s ambition to advance its turn for hosting the G20 Presidency in the next cycle. We also look forward to the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024 as a symbol of peace, dialogue amongst nations and inclusivity, with participation of all.

But a reading of the Declaration raises again the question: what success has in fact been achieved? As Caves points out:

But how much progress has the G20 made toward its ambitions? And what can be expected from this year’s meeting in India on Saturday and Sunday? … Then what? Often, not much, when it comes to real-world results. Most of the grouping’s joint statements since it formed in 1999 have been dominated by resolutions as solid as gas fumes, with no clear consequences when nations underperform.

‘Solid as gas fumes’. Well, in many respects the Declaration is no more than a statement of collective progress – what have we collectively identified as worthy of committing to and implementing. And, I did note, in an earlier Substack Post, Not Simply the Pace of Summitry that Leaders and their official are working toward commitment but:

So, let me at least raise in this Post, what I believe is the ‘continuum of action and commitment’ available to leaders in these various Leaders’ Summits. This continuum identifies the extent to which global governance policies have been secured. We move from the aspirational, often set out in the leaders’ declarations or communiques all the way to implementation by a country. What is evident from the continuum is that these folks are governmental leaders. And, as a result no matter what the communique announces, individual leaders’ may, or may not, actually implement a collective wish set out in a declaration.  This is well beyond just the aspirational.

The continuum, as I see it, is:  Consultation/ Cooperation/ Coordination/ Collaboration – the 4Cs of global governance progress, as I see it. Distinguishing between these concepts can be quite difficult. And of course, beyond this is, collectively achieving the actions, proposals and policies that are set out in the communiques, or announced at the Leaders’ gatherings.

And that is paydirt. Collectively achieving the actions set out in all these Summit Declarations – implementing policy in other words – is global governance success. Such implementation lies generally at the national political level, although there are instances where international organizations do in fact implement.

Bottom line: it requires a lot more than a statement in a Leaders’ Declaration to achieve global governance progress. But a number of us are watching including my colleagues at the CWD process.

This Post was originally uploaded to my Substack – Alan’s Newsletter. Feel free to subscribe.

Image Credit: Al Jazeera

 

 

Not Simply the Pace of Summitry: In then end, it is all about the 4Cs

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I posted recently here at Alan’s Newsletter on the upcoming BRICS Summit – Puzzling over a BRICS Enlargement. And BRICS, as I described in the Post, is a ‘big deal’ in the pantheon of Leaders’ Summits. I also noted the possible ‘reignition’ of the Trilateral Summit – China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (Korea). But this is not the current extent of summit activity. There is, in fact, another Trilateral Summit that is about to gather – what I am referring to as a ‘Second Trilateral Summit’. This is the gathering at Camp David of the leaders of Japan, Korea and the United States. And since that gathering is tomorrow, Friday, I thought I’d get this Post out in anticipation of the Camp David Trilateral Summit of the three leaders.

‘Global summitry’ – the extent, importance and consequence of these leaders’ gatherings and the global governance progress achieved at these gatherings is, not surprisingly, at the heart of the Global Summitry Project (GSP). It is here in the e-journal Global Summitry, in our work with colleagues in the China-West Dialogue (CWD), and the strengthening of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and our work with students and researchers through the GSP including the articles, podcasts and videos.

Well let’s turn back, for just a moment to the upcoming  Summit. What, you say, a second trilateral summit? Well, yes, actually. The JapanTimes sets out possible goals for such a Trilateral Leaders’ gathering – the Second Trilateral Summit :

In a major step toward making trilateral cooperation a more permanent fixture, U.S.President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and South Korean leader Yoon Suk-yeol will agree to hold three-way summits at least once a year, while also conducting more frequent joint military drills around the Korean Peninsula and bolstering intelligence-sharing, including real-time warning data on North Korean missile launches.

The three leaders are also expected to signal deeper cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, supply chain resilience and fighting economic coercion.

The one-day meeting — the three leaders’ first stand alone summit not held on the sidelines of a separate event — will take place against the backdrop of North Korea’s ever-improving nuclear and missile programs as well as China’s growing military assertiveness. Both issues will be high on the agenda.

But first and foremost, the summit is expected to focus on laying the foundation for a more durable trilateral relationship that can withstand political change, namely the growing partnership between two of the most powerful democracies in Asia.

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Advancing Global Governance by Revitalizing a Regional Institution

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While I have suggested earlier that I don’t think an initial  focus on building regional or multilateral institutions is necessarily the best first step in global governance and possibly a means to ‘tone down’ geopolitical competition rhetoric and action, I am now about to contradict myself and this position. For, in the end, there are some obvious regional and international institutions that could encourage collaborative action and push global governance collaboration. And, in fact, I have in mind an obvious one that has – as a current Chinese slang term might well describe it – ‘tang ping’  躺平 – or ‘lying flat’. It is the Trilateral Summit.

Trilateral Summit, you say. Well, yes, actually. The Trilateral Summit is, periodically, a Summit of the ‘key’ East Asia leaders – South Korea, Japan and most meaningfully,  China. A little history here. The Trilateral Summit was first proposed by South Korea in 2004. At that time the three powers met for a separate session at the ASEAN gathering, described as ASEAN plus three. In 2007, at the eighth meeting of the ASEAN plus Three, the leaders agreed to initiate a separate Trilateral Summit. And, in December 2008, the first separate summit was hosted by Japan at Fukuoka. At its initiation the three powers saw the Summit focusing on: closer trilateral relations, the regional economy and disaster relief.  One of the regional security issues that has been in front of leaders repeatedly has been the nuclear weapons program of the Democratic Republic of Korea, the DPRK. In the 2018 summit the FT  described the leaders’ view of the DPRK nuclear weapons program: “the three leaders agreed to co-operate over North Korea and called for Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons completely.” While that agreement may no longer hold, it shows the value of this Summit.

The Summit is not quite a leaders’ gathering. While South Korea is often represented by its President and Japan by its Prime Minister, China has generally been led by its premier, not the President.

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Scepticism Again Abounded Prior to the Opening of a G20 Leaders’ Summit – But Then …

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Alan Beattie, veteran G20 watcher from the Financial Times, has regaled us once again with reasons to dismiss G20 summits before they begin.  On November 14th,  a day before the Indonesian G20 summit begins in Bali, we are treated to the conclusion by him that the G20 is a “gabfest” and  that “it is what it always has been, which is largely pointless”! 

To prove his point,  Alan Beattie links us to his March 13, 2009, article , published a month before the London G20 summit, which was arguably the most important economic summit ever. Entitled “the gap of twenty”, he wrote back then rather definitively that “there should be little doubt…that the divisions seen on display have already dissipated the G20’s ability to spread confidence”.

The Indonesian G20 Summit has in fact demonstrated that without the G20 there would be no global leadership platform which could bring together a finite number of major actors in global affairs from an eclectic array of regions and regime types to address the war in Ukraine, US-China relations, and global systemic challenges. 

What Alan Beattie gets wrong in both 2009 and now more recently just prior to the Bali Summit is to fail to see that “domestic  constituencies “do indeed drive the “domestic calculus”.  The dynamics of global summitry are intended to push the frontiers of public discourses in order to mainstream ambition as good governance rather than to be an exercise in fancy pants diplomacy.  The term “gabfest” trivializes the efforts by global leaders and their officials, advisers and experts to provide societies with the vocabulary for understanding global risks and with vision for global solutions.   

What has gone on all year before the Leaders’ Bali gathering is the tedious developments of policy proposals that will work and the quest for pushing  feasibility frontiers to the maximum that domestic  and financial constraints will bear.   

The  G20 process is essential for global survival and for guiding global systems toward sustainability instead of disaster. The Indonesian Summit has underlined this critical point.

Image Credit: SMA Negeri 1 Singaraja

By Guest Blogger Colin Bradford who is lead-co-chair of the China-West Dialogue (CWD), co-chair of the Vision20, global fellow of the Berlin Global Solutions Initiative (GSI), and non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution.