Tag Archives: Middle Power Diplomacy

Still in Search of Middle Power Leadership

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In a world of continuing geopolitical tensions, myself and colleagues from CWD have been determined to probe into the role(s) of Middle Powers (MPs) and to describe Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) all in the hopes of uncovering how MPs might assist in stabilizing international relations and the current global order.

Back in December I took my first crack at the subject with this Alan’s Newsletter Substack Post – ‘A Start on Middle Powers and Their Diplomacy’. Also, CWD, then ‘China-West Dialogue’ and now, perhaps, ‘Changing World Dialogue’ called on some of our expert compatriots to examine MPs and MPD in a variety of settings.

As I wrote then:

“So, where did we look? We in fact used the fall of 2024 to showcase a number of possible MPs and to examine the policies and political behaviors followed. At CWD we held the following Zoom sessions:

 

· Our lead off was on Japan with Mike Mochizuki (GWU) as the Lead Organizer;

· then Active Non-Alignment with Latin America, led by Jorge Heine (BU) and former Ambassador for Chile as the Lead Organizer;

· South Korea with Yul Sohn (Yonsei University) as the Lead Organizer;

· Turkey with Guven Sak (Tepav) as the Lead Organizer;

· Australia and New Zealand with Shiro Armstrong (ANU/EAF) as Lead Organizer assisted by our own Richard Carey (OECD Alumnus); and

· Indonesia and ASEAN with Maria Monica Wihardja (ISEAS) as the Lead Organizer.”

Why focus on these global order actors? Well, as I suggested at the time:

“Then we were interested in what influence, or potential influence these MPs expressed in the growing global order/disorder – growing tensions between the United States and China and the unremitting regional conflicts in the Middle East and Europe. Where, if anywhere, were MPs influencing international relations and enhancing, perhaps, international stability and advancing global governance actions especially in such critical areas as climate transition, climate finance, debt management, global financial regulation and more? These efforts, we anticipated, could stabilize global relations in the face of current damaging international actions and the sour relations held by the leading powers, China and the US. We were determined to look at MPs, especially with the return of a US Trump administration and the possible significant impact of Trump 2.0 on global order stability.”

This past weekend I was reminded of MP presence and action in a piece in the Toronto Star by a colleague from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, Joseph Wong. These days Joe teaches at the Munk School but he also serves as Vice President International at the University. Just recently he wrote this piece titled, “Rise of the middle powers. Here’s how Canada can wean itself off of U.S. dependence”. Wong’s focus, not surprisingly, was on Canada and the role of MPs in shaping the global economy and strengthening democratic practices but Joe saw Canada’s actions in the face of Trump 2.0 as part of a larger MP picture to weaken the negative impact of major powers in the larger global order. As he wrote:

“As leaders of the G7 countries prepare to meet in Kananaskis next week, middle power nations, such as Canada, need to step up and take on leadership roles in restructuring the global economy, shoring up democratic practices internationally and investing in talent to boost productivity and innovation at home.”

 

“The simultaneous efforts by industrial economies to diversify their foreign economic relations have the potential to restructure the world economy. Each of these economies on its own may be a middle power, but together, they represent a sizable portion of the global economy.”

 

“Imagine if each of these middle powers reduced their trade dependence on the U.S.by just 10 per cent and made up that deficit by solidifying alternative trade partners and building up new and more resilient supply chains. Together they could collectively rewire the circuitry of the global economy for the long-term.”

So the Wong piece was a reminder of the potential influence of yes, MPs. And my on again off again MP focus was reignited. It is evident as this Post unfolds that MP action is on the minds of many of my colleagues as we see the aggressive policies of Trump 2.0. Mathias Jobelius, the Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s office in New York just recently wrote a piece that examined the undermining of the key multilateral institution the UN now entering its 80th year. Jobelius assessed the state of multilateralism in an IPS piece, titled: “Unfinished Business”. In that piece he raised the question of whether multilateralism could continue to exist in an emerging multipolar world. He answered in the positive and declared this:

“The answer is ‘Yes’. The basics are all in place. The overwhelming majority of countries would like a rules-based order and support the principles of the UN Charter, even if they resist its selective application.”

And how could this be achieved, Jobelius turned to MPs:

“This needs to be utilised — for example, by creating an alliance of medium-sized powers. If 20 large middle powers from all continents with a commitment to multilateralism were to join forces, they would carry enough weight to counter the big power politics and strengthen the multilateral order.”

Continuing the MP narrative, my colleague Bruce Jones from Brookings and a number of his compatriots, Ravi Agrawal, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Karin von Hippel, Lynn Kuok and Susana Malcorra identified the critical role for such MPs in a piece these authors, did for the World Economic Forum (WEF) White Paper compendium titled: “Shaping Cooperation in a Fragmenting World” that was published in January 2024. Their chapter, is titled, “Global Security “Cooperation” in an age of distrust and insecurity: Managing distrust and forging responses despite it necessitates new approaches that include establishing new partnership mechanisms”. In the piece they acknowledge the growing conflict in the international system:

“The international system has never been free of violence and inequity. Yet today, as violence is rising, order is eroding and the spectre of nuclear war is casting its menacing shadow, greater urgency – and creativity – is needed to reduce the risk of conflict.”

Part of their solution as offered in the piece includes the creation of a an institution that is built in part on MPs, what they describe as a “middle/major powers” grouping – an M-10 (or similar), as these authors call it. And what is that:

S“At this moment of intense need, a standing mechanism that links the western major and middle powers with the non-Western ones (Brazil, India, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, etc.) would create a diplomatic mechanism that could straddle the increasingly bifurcated worlds of the G7, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and the expanded BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, plus newly admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).”

 

“The proposed grouping – a kind of “coalition of the capable” – would have the diplomatic flexibility and heft to raise the costs to the great powers for actions or behaviour that seriously undermined the multilateral order and the quiet diplomatic channels to help find de-escalatory off-ramps and similar mechanisms.”

 

“Within this, there should be a “middle powers mediation group” on issues like Russia/Ukraine. Unlike the various unilateral peace initiatives attempted to date, a middle-powers grouping with cross-regional representation would have the diplomatic weight, the range of perspectives and the combined geopolitical clout to change the terms of debate around viable pathways to war termination and a stable peace.”

So, MPs could as they see it buttress the impaired multilateral system. Good and sensible ideas but yet we do not see such initiatives at least in this moment of the global order. Unfortunately, in fact, there are MP initiatives that have not ‘taken off’ as I found out. Let me just mention one that seemed significantly promising: the ‘Alliance for Multilateralism’. I was quite taken with this initiative and focused on it in my chapter in Lim Wonhyuk’s edited volume for Brooking’s, Unfinished Transformation: Domestic Politics and International Relations since the Covid-19 Pandemic”. at that time with my chapter, “The Possibilities for “Effective Multilateralism” in the Coming Global Order”. The initiative seemed to me as a major MP effort. As I then described it in the chapter:

(P. 124)* “What may be helpful, in fact, is a designation recently proposed by the cur­rent French foreign minister, Jean­ Yves Le Drain, along with the German foreign minister, Heiko Maas. In 2019, these foreign ministers launched the new “Alliance for Multilateralism,” tied to the United Nations. The leaders and the participants in this alliance are not referred to as middle powers, but the host and cohost countries and the participants are all designated as “goodwill pow­ers.” This designation emphasizes the collective action purpose of this contemporary multilateralism. There is no reference to “middle powers,” or powers generally, which, as I have just pointed out, is rather misleading in any case. Thus, “goodwill powers” may be a useful term. We will come back to the idea of goodwill powers as we explore “effective multilateralism” in the final section.”

 

(P. 127) “Let us return for a moment to the Alliance for Multilateralism. It appears as yet to be another instance of effective multilateral effort in the contempo­rary global order. As pointed out above, this initiative was launched by the foreign ministers of France and Germany. Its initial meeting was on April 2, 2019, in New York during the German UN Security Council Presidency. It was followed by a meeting on September 26, held during the High-Level Week at the UN General Assembly. The meeting was called by Germany and France and was cohosted by Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore, and Ghana. Forty­ eight countries participated in this September gathering.”

 

(P. 128) “The goals, as declared by the Alliance, are:

· to protect and preserve international norms, agreements and institu­tions that are under pressure or in peril;

· to pursue a more proactive agenda in policy areas that lack effective gov­ernance and where new challenges require collective action; and

· to advance reforms, without compromising on key principles and values, in order to make multilateral institutions and the global political and economic order more inclusive and effective in delivering tangible results to citizens around the world.

The Alliance also makes a point of identifying its outreach to nonstate actors as stakeholders and partners for the challenges the Alliance faces. The Alliance has held four meetings since its creation. These gatherings sought to promote, among other things:

· improved governance for the digital world. The Alliance bolstered support for the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace;

· implementation of international humanitarian law to protect the work of humanitarian workers and space for humanitarian action and support for the fight against impunity, at the opening of the session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on February 24, 2020; and

· support for the central role of the World Health Organization in the man­agement of COVID­19.”

The Alliance for Multilateralism seemed like a dramatic instance of real world MP action and MPD. But it appears as though the network did not survive its initiation.

I suspect, and others seem to suspect as well that the Informals – the G7, the G20 and the BRICS+ – might provide the environment for possible MP action. And indeed just as I was finishing off this Post – sorry for this rather unusually lengthy Post – I was met with a piece that does exactly that. So my good colleague John Ikenberry from Princeton and some of his colleagues, Victor Cha, from CSIS and Georgetown University and John Hamre from CSIS just published in Foreign Affairs, “How Global Governance Can Survive With the Right Reforms, the G-7 Can Sustain the Rules-Based Order.” There they see the prospect for global governance action from the G7:

“The body that develops solutions to today’s global problems must becomposed of governments that trust each other, share similar values,possess significant economic and political power, and have a trackrecord of working together. This is where the G-7 comes in.”

 

“But the G-7 can aim for meaningful action that sustains global order. By coordinating their economic, development, security, energy, and technology policies, its members can impose sanctions to deter conflict, set rules and norms to keep pace with technological innovation, punish predatory economic behavior, support democratic governance, combat disinformation, and help the developing world with food security and labor standards.”

The problem, however, as I see it in their focus on the G7 is that their hope for such action requires altering the current membership and the ways that it currently operates. As they say:

“Before they can play this role, however, the G-7 must be overhauled.”

It seems to me that effective action by MPs or MPs plus some major powers possibly can only occur on an informal basis otherwise we are back to, dare I say it, UN reform. Realistically, changes of the sort proposed by John and his colleagues are unfortunately unlikely to happen. Still a focus on the Informals with the G7 occuring on June 15-17th in Canada, the BRICS+ Summit scheduled for July 6-7th in Rio de Janeiro and G20 Summit in Johannesburg on November 22-23rd, all are worth watching closely for signs of MP and possibly beyond MP collective action. We will certainly be watching and reporting.

The Post appeared originally at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/still-in-search-of-middle-power-leadership

*The page numbers are used here as there is no digital version of the Lim Wonhyuk volume, as I mentioned in an earlier Substack Post.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Start on Middle Powers and Their Diplomacy

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It is kinda like wading into a well-developed cornfield; no, maybe it’s more like a cornfield with some incendiary devices strewn throughout. Anyway, this fall the China-West Dialogue (CWD) has waded into a rather concentrated discussion with colleagues and experts around the globe on an examination of Middle Powers (MPs) and their behaviors and policies – Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD).

So, where did we look? We in fact used the fall to showcase a number of possible MPs and to examine the policies and political behaviors of them. At CWD we held the following Zoom sessions:

At CWD we held the following Zoom sessions: 

  • Our lead off was on Japan with Mike Mochizuki (GWU) as the Lead Organizer;
  • then Active Non-Alignment with Latin America, led by Jorge Heine (BU) and former Ambassador for Chile as the Lead Organizer;
  • South Korea with Yul Sohn (Yonsei University) as the the Lead Organizer;
  • Australia and New Zealand with Shiro Armstrong (ANU/EAF) as Lead Organizer assisted by our own Richard Carey (OECD Alumnus); and 
  • INDONESIA and ASEAN with Maria Monica Wihardja (ISEAS) as the Lead Organizer.

These were all really terrific sessions with ‘super’ efforts to bring speakers to the sessions who could speak to MP characteristics and describe MPD. Now, these sessions were all held under Chatham House Rules but I have received remarks from some of our speakers and permission to quote these remarks here at this Post.  

 So, why was the CWD looking at questions of MPD? Certainly, for one, we were examining first which states seemed to qualify as MPs  in today’s global order/disorder?  Then we were interested in what influence, or potential influence these MPs expressed in the growing global order/disorder – growing tensions between the United States and China and the unremitting regional conflicts in the Middle East and Europe.  Where, if anywhere, were MPs influencing international relations and enhancing, perhaps, international stability and advancing global governance actions especially in such critical areas as climate transition, climate finance, debt management, global financial regulation and more? These efforts, we anticipated, could stabilize global relations in the face of current damaging international actions and the sour relations held by the leading powers, China and the US of each other. We were determined to look at MPs especially with the return of a US Trump administration and the possible significant impact of Trump 2.0 on global order stability.

Let me turn in this Post to the remarks of some of our speakers in the Australia and New Zealand session.  All the sessions were great but interestingly, two of our speakers in this session described diametrically opposing views of the impact of MPs on the current international order. One was Gareth Evans, a strong proponent for MPs and their influence in international relations. Gareth is rather well known of course. He was an Australian politician, representing the Labor Party in the Senate and House of Representatives from 1978 to 1999. He is probably best known as the  Minister for Foreign Affairs, a position he held from 1988 to 1996. Like most inquiries, Gareth starts by trying to define what a MP is. It is not an easy task. As he writes: 

For me, there are three things that matter in characterizing  middle powers: what we  are not, what we are, and the mindset we bring to our international role.

As he then describes it: 

‘Middle powers’ are those states which are not economically or militarily big or strong enough to really impose their policy preferences on anyone else, either globally or (for the most part) regionally.  We are nonetheless states which are sufficiently capable in terms of our diplomatic resources, sufficiently credible in terms of our record of principled behaviour, and sufficiently motivated to be able to make, individually, a significant impact on international relations in a way that is beyond the reach of small states.

 

And we are states, I would argue, which generally (although this can wax and wane with changes of domestic government) bring a particular mindset to the conduct of our international relations, viz. one attracted to the use of middle power diplomacy. I would describe ‘middle power diplomacy’, in turn, as having both a characteristic motivation and a characteristic method:

 

  • the characteristic motivation is belief in the utility, and necessity, of acting cooperatively with others in addressing international challenges, particularly those global public goods problems which by their nature cannot be solved by any country acting alone, however big and powerful; and
  • the characteristic diplomatic method is coalition building with ‘like-minded’ – those who, whatever their prevailing value systems, share specific interests and are prepared to work together to do something about them.

Gareth reviews policy initiatives he sees advanced by MPs over the years and described by him as: 

Our [MP] impact I think is more likely to be on individual issues, involving what might be called ‘niche diplomacy’, than across the board.  But that said, some of those niche roles, as I have just listed. can be of much greater than merely niche importance.

Finally, Gareth sets out what he believes are likely to be possible future initiatives, by at least Australia acting as a MP:

Looking to the future, there are a number of areas in which Australian middle power diplomacy can potentially make a real difference, whether by way of agenda-setting, North-South bridge-building (an aspiration of the MIKTA group within the G20), or simply building critical masses of support for global or regional public goods delivery. These areas include:

 

–   working to make the East Asian Summit become in practice the preeminent regional security and economic dialogue and policy-making body it was designed to be;

 

–   maintaining a leading advocacy role in support of free and open trade, including globally through the WTO and regionally through RCEP and the CPTPP, and vigorously resisting likely protectionist assaults by the Trump administration;

 

–   working to harness, without over-relying on an increasingly erratic US, the collective middle-power energy and capacity of a number of regional states of real regional substance – including India, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Vietnam –  to visibly push back (through mechanisms like a Quad+, optically useful though not purporting to be a formal military alliance)  against potential Chinese overreach in the region;

 

–   at the same time, actively arguing for the US as well as China to step back from the strategic competition brink, and embrace and sustain over time the spirit of détente which, which dramatically thawed relations between the US and Soviet Union: this would involve both sides living cooperatively together, both regionally and globally, respecting each other as equals and neither claiming to be the undisputed top dog;

 

–   building on our longstanding nuclear risk reduction credentials, bridging the gap between those who, on the one hand, will settle only for the kind of absolutism embodied in the Nuclear Ban Treaty, and on the other hand, the nuclear armed states and those sheltering under their protection who want essentially no movement at all on disarmament;

 

–   becoming an acknowledged global leader, not just bit player, in the campaign against global warming, putting our green energy transition money where our mouth is.” 

 

It is a MPD projected to counter at least some of the likely erratic behavior of Trump 2.0 international actions. 

It is evident that Gareth Evans accepts, in fact promotes, the current and continuing reality of MPs and their capacity to act positively even in a turbulent international setting. This positive MP and MPD view is, as it turns out, in dramatic contrast to another of our Australia speakers, Andrew Carr. Andrew Carr is an Associate Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. His remarks contrast vividly with those of Gareth Evans. While, as I pointed earlier, Chatham House Rules prevail at CWD, fortunately Andrew and a colleague Jeffrey Robinson of Yonsei University published a recent piece in International Theory, “Is anyone a Middle Power? The case for Historicization”. There Andrew and his colleague lay out their view of MPs and MPD. 

We find that while there is some variation, middle power theory can no longer help us distinguish or interpret these states. As such, we conclude the middle power concept should be historicized.

 

In blunt terms, the middle power concept does not capture anything substantive about the behaviour of mid-sized states. It should therefore not be used by scholars any further.

Andrew sees the concept as historically grounded and no longer sustains relevance and in his view must be assigned to a historical period of international relations. The two experts make it clear that using MP and MPD has outlasted its usefulness.

This is a rather clear statement and probably needs some further explanation. Now, interestingly the two researchers examine six MPs – the traditional MPs, Australia and Canada but as well newly emerging MPs – Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and Mexico. Now Carr and his colleague suggest that there are 30 MPs but their analysis relies on the six just identified. They come away, however, suggesting this:

Argument 1: the middle power concept is unable to shed its 20th century historical legacy 

 

Argument 2: contemporary states no longer reflect the core theoretical propositions of the middle power concept 

There is much insight from the analysis of these two experts. Yet the bottom line is clear: 

The evidence from our six case studies is not universal, but clear trend lines and patterns can be observed. As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’.

Put another way the changing international structure is reshaping the behavior of MPs:

As international structures change so too will the power, status, and actions of non-great power states. The changes occurring today are removing the foundations upon which the middle power concept was explicitly created, as supporters and legitimizers of the US-led liberal international order.

So, where does that leave us in understanding which states are the MPs and what can we expect from MPs? Is there a MPD? Does such MPD correspond to what Gareth Evans describes; or are we in a global  order today where such MPD can only be seen ‘in  the rear view’ as Andrew Carr explains with his colleague Jeffrey Robertson?

Well, this is only the beginning of an answer but it is useful to look to a recent piece by Dr. Dino Patti Djalal. Now, Dr. Djalal is the founder and chair of the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) and chair of the Middle Power Studies Network (MPSN). In November Dr. Djalal published Middle Power Insights: 1st Edition. What is immediately evident is the membership of MPs in this Report was somewhat distinct from previous authors, at least from Gareth Evans. 

Like others, of course Djalal attempts to identify the current universe of MPs and what policies they promote. As Djalal describes: 

In this article, I refer to middle powers as countries that, by virtue of their considerable size (population and geography), weight (economic, diplomatic, and military strength), and ambition, are placed between the small power and great power categories.

While the objective measures, size and weight are fairly well described, ‘ambition’ is not so easily determined. With these features Djalal suggests: 

Of the 193 countries in the world today, around two dozen qualify as middle powers – some are in the Global North but the majority are in the Global South.

Here, then, is an emerging shift in today’s MPs. We are looking at MPs many of whom today are in the Global South and their behavior is also shifting: 

While all of the middle powers of the North are committed to military pacts, most middle powers in the Global South are non-aligned and tend to pursue strategic hedging. In fact, while the middle powers of the North have developed a fixed view against China, those in the Global South (except India and South Korea) tend to have an open mind and are keen to explore closer relations with China.

 

Unlike those in the North, middle powers of the South are also generally more averse in using sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. 

 

It also matters that the Middle Powers of the Global South, relative to those of the Global North, are generally strong proponents of “non-interference” and are more sensitive about the principle of “equality”.

So their policy behavior is less intrusive and by implication less committed to global policy. It would seem to suggest that many of today’s MPs target their actions at the region. As Djalal describes: 

More and more, middle powers are positioning themselves to be a driving force in shaping regional architecture, thus compelling them to step up their response to the challenges inherent in their neighborhood. They are also spearheading various minilateral initiatives that can potentially supplement the provision of global public goods and also enhance the space for meaningful dialogue.

 

By constantly resorting to strategic hedging and diversifying their strategic relationships, middle powers can render multipolarity less volatile and more stable.

At a minimum, then, according to Djalal, the new Global South MPs exercise their MPD at the regional level and possibly in small groups, minilaterally, at the international level. More clearly needs to be examined here. 

So, today was a start but just a start. Much more will need to be examined. We will return to today’s Middle Powers and their Middle Power Diplomacy, especially as the Trump administration unveils its foreign policy actions. 

Image Credit: geopoliticalcompass.com

The New Global Leadership, perhaps

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So there is a lot of spinning now that it is clear – he’s coming back. And as we look out on the global order the current international system appears chaotic enough, even before Donald Trump returns to the White House. As described by Flavia Krause Jackson in Bloomberg: 

North Koreans are fighting in Europe for the first time. Israel is resisting US efforts to halt fighting with Hezbollah and Hamas. China regularly conducts military exercises surrounding Taiwan. Nuclear war is suddenly a risk amid surging tensions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

And that’s even before Donald Trump returns to the White House.

What are possibly answers to this growing chaos? One very clear note appears to be Middle Powers and their capacity to gain influence and importantly perhaps maintain greater openness notwithstanding a world dominated by Trump 2.0.  And these tensions are already apparent as Flavia summarizes the just recently concluded Brazil G20 Summit:

This was the week Lula was supposed to cement his status as the preeminent leader of the developing world. Instead, the chaotic summit he hosted in Rio highlighted his inability to bridge growing divisions between global superpowers. In a surprise anti-climax, Lula even canceled his end-of-summit press conference two hours after it had been scheduled to start.

Still, the first big unknown is how chaotic the new Trump administration can wind up the international system and are there possibilities to ease some of this Trump chaos? How, and who, possibly will seek to temper the chaos and propel forward both global political and economic relationships. Here, Shiro Arnstrong in an EAF piece titled, “Trump-proofing economic security in Asia” sets the stage:

The United States has gone from enforcer to spoiler of the rules-based economic order as it deals with domestic challenges and threatens a return to its pre-World War 2 isolationism. The rest of the world has to avoid the United States dragging the global economy down with it.

In the presumed Trump withdrawal from alliances and partnerships, his determination to close the open trading world with Trump’s loud noises over America First, and its many tariffs, there is a noticeable attention shift to the potential role of Middle Powers in retaining and augmenting, possibly, the global economy for one.

Now, there are all sorts of questions surrounding this attention to Middle Powers and their influence in advancing  the global order. Needless to say it starts with who are the Middle Powers. And, not surprisingly, there is no agreement on who the likely actors are under that apparently highly fungible label. So we know there is the ‘traditional’  Middle Power label that describes at least Canada and Australia. Then there are the new ‘Big Boys’ today – Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and at least for some South Africa and even Nigeria. And then there are the relatively close US partners, or other possible regional powers, so, Turkey, Mexico, Japan and South Korea.  What can I say, it is a recipe with the main ingredient up to the expert or analyst.

And then there is the logic and possible action of Middle Power policy. Now this is a tough category often rather muted in current analyses.  But Shiro gives us some direction here. He targets Trumpworld:

There will be pressure all over the world to ‘protect’ domestic production from a flood of Chinese and other goods shut out of the US and looking for new markets.

There will of course be pressure to cut losses by dealing with Trump 2.0:

The incremental choices of countries to do deals with Trump’s United States — managed trade deals and voluntary export restraints — may be diplomatically expedient but will weaken the rules that underpin global trade and are against their core long term interests. That would reinforce the trajectory of the global economy heading towards an economic nosedive of the kind it suffered in the 1930s.

The Middle Power alternative:

It will be up to the middle powers like Australia and Japan — that cannot change the status quo unilaterally but are large enough to mobilise coalitions of countries for change — to keep the global economy open and save the furniture of the multilateral trading system.

 

Middle powers must convince China and the European Union that their best course of action is to avoid large-scale retaliation and go in the other direction, opening up their economies further. That will make them better off and make the global economy larger, even with restricted access to the US market. …

 

The economic coercion that China deployed against Australia in 2020 and Japan earlier was blunted by the multilateral trading system which, despite its weaknesses, allowed Australian exporters, for example, to find alternative markets and provide an exit ramp from the problem, with the last of Chinese trade restrictions lifted in October 2024. The open global trading system crucially ensures that there are alternative buyers and sellers.

As Shiro concludes, enlarging if possible but at least maintaining the open trade world – with as wide a set of actors as possible, is slightly counterintuitively called for and the answer presumably to Trump tariffs:

The multilateral trading system is the biggest source of economic security for open trading nations. That includes Southeast Asia, which is more exposed than other countries with its high trade shares that are its source of prosperity and security.

 

Utilising platforms in ASEAN-centred institutions and connecting them to other efforts in Europe to promote collective action is where the strategic focus needs to be now, on trade, climate action and other global public goods, otherwise we risk a much smaller, poorer and less secure world.

Interestingly, and as noted earlier, there is a growing interest in Middle Power action in the face of the about to reappear Trumpworld. Another proponent for Middle Power action is Dani Rodrik. Rodrick, a deep thinker when it comes to the global system, has written recently on the role of Middle Powers in the evolving global order. Rodrik is the Ford Foundation Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is co-director of the Reimagining the Economy Program at the Kennedy School and of the Economics for Inclusive Prosperity network. In a recent piece in Project Syndicate (PS),  Rodrik suggests that while Middle Powers are unlikely to become a bloc but rather quite possibly able to possibly shape a variety of paths prompting a far more multipolar environment:

While some American national-security elites seek continued US primacy, others seem resigned to an increasingly bipolar world. A more likely outcome, however, is a multipolar world where middle powers exert considerable countervailing force, thus preventing the US and China from imposing their interests on others.

 

The middle powers are unlikely to become a formidable bloc of their own, mainly because their interests are too diverse to fit into a common economic or security agenda. Even when they have joined formal groupings, their collective impact has been limited.

 

Perhaps the most important contribution middle powers can make is to demonstrate, by their example, the feasibility of both multipolarity and diverse development paths in the global order. They offer a vision for the world economy that does not depend on either America’s or China’s power and goodwill. But if middle powers are to be worthy role models for others, they must become responsible actors – both in their dealings with smaller countries and in promoting greater political accountability at home.

A world that does not depend on the leading powers that is the vision from Rodrik. For this, and other perspectives, the China-West Dialogue (CWD) has directed recent energies this fall to sessions on Middle Powers and Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD). With great thanks to our Lead Co-Chair, Colin Bradford CWD constructed a series of sessions on a number of key Middle Powers. We began this Middle Power Diplomacy series with a Zoom session on Japan with lead organizer, Mike Mochizuki of George Washington University. From there we turned our attention to Latin America in a Zoom session led by our good colleague Jorge Heine from Boston University and a number of colleagues who published a recent volume: “Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option”. From there we shifted to a session on South Korea prepared by the lead organizer, Yul Sohn from Yonsei University. And most recently we turned our attention to Turkey with colleague Guven Sak as the lead organizer. Guven is from The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). Still, to explore are sessions on Australia and New Zealand with lead organizer Shiro Armstrong from ANU and EastAsiaForum (EAF) and Indonesia and ASEAN with lead organizer Monica Wihardja from ISEAS in Singapore.

There is much learning at hand and hopefully we will be able to draw out the means for Middle Powers to resist the more destructive Trump 2.0 efforts. We will return to these conclusions in the future.

This first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter. Comments and subscriptions are welcome.

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/152039338/share-center

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