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UN at 80

Glancing Back; But Also Looking Forward

So, we are rolling into an important time for multilateral and regionally strategic action, though realistically it always is an important time. On the multilateral front, notably there is the annual high-level week of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Here a sort description as expressed by John Haltiwanger and Rishi Iyengar at FP:

“World leaders and diplomats will flood into New York City in the coming days for the annual high-level week of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which kicks off on Monday. This year marks the 80th session of UNGA—and it comes at a challenging moment for the world and the U.N. itself.”

I suspect it will give us a ‘temperature reading’ on the UN as it enters UN80. 

On the regional front there was the meeting this week between Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum and Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney. Closer trade and economic relations were the agenda as both advance to renegotiate USMCA – the United States-Mexico-Canada free trade arrangement – and yes with Donald Trump. Past bilateral agreements make stronger Canada-Mexico ties slightly fraught.

But in setting this discussion up, let me take the temperature on the effectiveness of the Informals – that is the G7, the BRICS and most importantly, the G20. This year’s G20 gathering is hosted by South Africa in November and there has been more than enough friction between Trump and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa. It currently appears as though President Trump will not attend the summit, but the US will be represented by his Vice President J.D. Vance. There is real tension, especially as the United States is scheduled to take hosting of the G20 for 2026. 

Thinking about  the role and impact of the Informals, most notably the G20, I turned to good colleagues, Colin Bradford and Johannes Linn both from Brookings and elsewhere. Both have long been observers of the Informals but especially the G20. Indeed both were early advocates, along with Canada’s former Finance Minister and then Prime Minister of Canada Paul Martin for a G20 and then a G20 leaders-led multilateral institution. To reflect on the Informals and particularly the G20, I reviewed several pieces from Bradford and Linn but most particularly the piece these colleagues wrote after the first of several summits ending with the Cannes Summit in 2011 – “A History of G20 Summits: The Evolving: Dynamic of Global Leadership”. Journal of Globalization and Development (2):2. The piece enabled my colleagues to reflect on what had been accomplished with the early G20 summits and what the challenges ahead were.

The two, Bradford and Linn were, as the piece reveals, keen observers and strong advocates for a leaders-led multilateral collaborative institution. As they initiated this piece they wrote: 

“The G20 summit of key world leaders emerged as a significant institutional component of the global governance architecture from its first surprise gathering in Washington, D.C. in November 2008 to the most recent summit meeting in Cannes in November 2011.” 

And the purpose as they saw it of the creation of the Informals starting with the G7: 

“Over nearly 40 years the annual G6/7/8 summits dealt with a wide array of issues, ranging from short term financial, economic and political crises, to longer term economic, social, environmental and security issues.” 

But the challenges were evident from the commencement of the Informals:

“However, less progress was made in the area of macroeconomic management and coordination, including effective surveillance, resolution of balance of payments and exchange rate imbalances among major economies, and progress on trade liberalization.” 

Though the US expressed little interest in moving the G20 to the leader level, the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), and the threat it posed to global finance, changed minds: 

“Just prior to the US election ending the presidential term of George W. Bush, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as president of the European Union, and Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, visited Camp David, a presidential retreat in Maryland, at the invitation of US President George W. Bush. On Saturday afternoon, October 18th, they announced their intention to call a summit involving nations from around the world to reflect the world-wide nature of the financial crisis but they did not indicate which configuration they would choose.” … 

 

“The first G20 Summit was held in Washington, DC, on November 15, 2008, at the National Building Museum, with ministers of finance joining the leaders for each G20 nation, plus the Netherlands and Spain, which President Sarkozy had pushed to include, in addition to the heads of various international institutions. This made for a huge summit table, exacerbating the problem of size of an enlarged summit grouping. But the purpose and the outcome of the summit was to discuss “principles of reform” – coordinated stimulus to prevent a deep recession and reform of the global financial system to prevent a recurrence of the crisis –, rather than to reach specific agreements, and to set in motion processes among G20 ministers of finance, which would develop a more specific and ambitious agenda.” 

And something like a conclusion went like this:

“The good news is that the G20 embraces a much broader group of countries, cultures and economies than the G8. The G20, for all its flaws, is a realistic and broadly representative meeting of the world as it is and will increasingly be, not the world that was. In addition, the G20 has a strong foundation in the ten-year history of the G20 ministerial meetings, developing a strong network among officials of communication, consultation and concertation. The strength of this network of senior officials is the foundation of G20 Summits and provides the means of moving the global agenda forward continuously from one presidency to the next.” 

 

“The bad news is that the G20 summits appear to the public around the world to be more conflictive than cooperative, and hence less effective. But if the idea of G20 Summits is also to connect leaders to their publics in providing global leadership on issues that are simultaneously domestic and international, then the embodiment of the domestic political conflicts in the global treatment of those issues makes summits more real and less rarified.”

 

“The G8 Summits were exercises in diplomacy and international cooperation. The G20 Summits thus far into their history are more complex exercises embodying contradictory forces arising from domestic political struggles to deal with the new inter-connectedness of challenges and the new nexus of the global and domestic dimensions of economic problems affecting the ordinary citizen.”

 

The challenges were, and are, real. In a sneak peak over the impact and influence of the Informals, let  me identify a small snippet of a very large edited volume by by Andreas Freytag and Peter Draper, as editors for, The Elgar Companion to the G7, being published by Edward Elgar Publishing, in the near future. I was fortunate enough to participate with a chapter entitled, “The rise and decline of the First Informal: the changing character of the G7 summit”. Notwithstanding the lead the chapter examines all the key Informals. From my perspective the Informals are close to unique for the fact that they are leader-led: 

“Much has been made by observers and experts of the informal nature of these bodies in contrast to conventional formal institutions. And indeed this was a quite different institutional construction, as early observers like Nicholas Bayne and other diplomats were quick to point out. But even these early observers of the Informals did not make enough of the fact that these Informals were annual summits, yes, but also, and pointedly, that these particular forums, the G7, G8 and G20 were, and are, leader-led.” 

 

“Beyond the question of representation, however, there is the continuing, crucial question about the effectiveness of all these Informals. What impact have these Informals had in fashioning policy and, most critically, in advancing collaboration and global governance policymaking?” …

 

 

“Without giving the “story” away at this point in the narrative and analysis of the Informals, it is evident in reviewing the life of the Informals that international relations forces have had a dramatic impact on all the Informals and their capacity to advance collaborative global governance policymaking. And examination of their structures and processes shows that they have not led to the desired policy leadership that was hoped for by early political leaders. This, then, is not just a story of the rise of the Informals, but equally, it would seem, their “fall”.” 

Multilateral collective action remains a promise unfulfilled in the global order. Global leadership continues to fall short in the maelstrom of geopolitical tensions of the leading states. 

And it is then not surprising that I turn to bilateral and regional actions in the midst of all this geopolitical rivalry, especially in the context of Trump 2.0. I was, therefore, attracted to the consequences of the meeting of the leaders of Mexico and Canada.  As described in the Daily Review of WPR:

“Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum hosted Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney this week for a summit in Mexico City that likely would not have happened if not for the ongoing challenge posed by Donald Trump’s return to the White House.”
“Trump has imposed tariffs of 35 percent on Canada and 25 percent on Mexico, ostensibly as punishment for failing to address cross-border drug trafficking and illegal migration, though many goods are exempt due to the U.S.-Mexico-Canda Agreement, the free trade deal that the three countries signed during Trump’s first term as a replacement for NAFTA.”
But the future of USMCA is unclear. Again from WPR a view of the future: 

“With the USMCA coming up for a mandatory review next year, Trump is expected to use that occasion to seek further concessions from Canada and Mexico—perhaps not only on trade but also on other issues like migration and security cooperation. Sheinbaum and Carney know that they will have more leverage in those negotiations if they forge a united front, but first they have some repair work to do in their own bilateral relationship.” 

In the first negotiation severe tensions were created by a bilateral dael between Mexico and the US: 

“Canadian officials were taken aback when, during negotiations over the USMCA in 2018, Mexico struck a preliminary bilateral trade deal with the U.S. that threatened to leave Canada out in the cold.”

So, this brings us to now:  “As part of their bid to mend ties, Carney and Sheinbaum signed a new “comprehensive strategic partnership,” which they said would “complement” the USMCA. They also agreed to strengthen direct commercial links between the two countries, including through maritime trade that doesn’t rely on crossing U.S. territory.”

“At next year’s review, the three countries will need to agree on whether to renew it—potentially with updated provisions. Failing to do so will trigger a series of annual reviews beginning in 2027 for ten years, before its scheduled expiration in 2036.” 

“Given Trump’s penchant for unpredictability and chaos, nothing can be ruled out. For Canada and Mexico, steering the talks to a mutually beneficial outcome will mean first overcoming the mistrust between them.” 

So there we are: ‘glancing back; but looking slightly askew at the immediate future. 

Image Credit: Observer Research Foundation

Crisis and Reform at the UN

I’ll start by returning to a subject I broached in this earlier Substack Post, Finding Success for the BRICS+, where I raised questions over the impact at the conclusion of the Conference on Financing for Development:

“Just concluded in Seville Spain is the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4). As noted by SDSN, The UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) which operates under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, and designed to mobilize a network to drive action on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change this summit gathering is designed to”:

  • Adequately finance the UN system;
  • Increase financing for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
  • Increase their financing of the global commons; and
  • Agree on reforms of the international financial markets to ensure that savings flow to the poorer countries in the world.

According to author, Minh-Thu Pham, a nonresident scholar in the Global Order and Institutions Program at CEIPin an article titled: “The Compromiso de Sevilla Marks a New Path for Development Finance”:

“At the outset of FFD4, the four co-facilitators—Mexico, Nepal, Norway, and Zambia—agreed that the AAAA [Addis Ababa Action Agenda] and the September 2024 UN Pact for the Future, which contained language committing to reforming international financial architecture, must be the minimal level of agreement in Sevilla.”

 

“The ultimate document they produced underscores a collective obligation to advance development, rather than a mere bargain between the Global North and South. Indeed, the very name—Compromiso de Sevilla—signals this distinction: While English speakers might hear “compromise” in the Spanish “compromiso,” the word actually means “commitment,” a linguistic nuance that captures the document’s aspirational rather than merely transactional character.”

She goes on further to argue:

“Despite some disappointments, the Compromiso de Sevilla is a major win for the Global South, particularly developing countries most vulnerable to economic shocks. It marked the emergence of a new path for international cooperation, based on three principles: maximizing development impact, giving Global South countries greater voice and influence over financial and debt structures, and strengthening country leadership and country-led initiatives. The fact that an outcome was reached by consensus provides yet another signal that a new breed of multilateralism is emerging to meet the needs of the moment—albeit one without the United States.”

How does she see the outcome? Well, that seems pretty clear:

“Ultimately, the Compromiso de Sevilla is a substantive advance both for the Global South and the cause of multilateralism. Four key policy provisions stand out.”

 

“Lacking an effective global architecture for managing sovereign debt, the world’s poorest countries are paying more on servicing their debt than on health and education combined. Despite sharp North-South differences, negotiators reached agreement on important initiatives to lower debt burdens:

 

Creating a borrowers forum with a secretariat in the UN Conference on Trade and Development to provide borrowing states a platform to coordinate

 

Convening a new working group under the UN secretary-general, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, tasked with examining responsible borrowing and lending practices

 

Endorsing increased local-currency lending to reduce pressure in crises

 

Establishing a global debt registry housed at the World Bank

 

Calling for a strengthened G20 Common Framework

Agreeing on an intergovernmental dialogue at the UN on closing gaps in the debt architecture.”

Yet she is willing to see that in the end:

“As Zambia’s UN ambassador Chola Milambo declared, “at the end of the day, it’s going to be implementation that matters.” To build on the Compromiso de Sevilla, the Spanish hosts and the UN proposed a Sevilla Platform for Action to encourage partnerships between member states, civil society, and the private sector to announce initiatives to operationalize and execute specific elements of the agreement. The platform now includes over 130 initiatives, cutting across thematic areas, methods, and political coalitions. Collectively, they suggest increasing awareness that complex multilateral agreements need relentless follow-up efforts to become a reality. Some initiatives may fail, but through sheer volume of ideas and effort, others will have an impact. (Helpfully, the UN has created a digital registry of all initiatives under the Platform for Action.)”

As the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) reviews and ultimately comments on the results of Seville:

“UN Member States have approved the outcome document of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) and transmitted it to the Conference for adoption. The ‘Compromiso de Sevilla’ recognizes the annual financing for development (FfD) gap of USD 4 trillion and launches “an ambitious package of reforms and actions to close this financing gap with urgency,” while catalyzing sustainable development investments at scale.”

The reality is that it is not the number of initiatives – as striking as they may appear to be – and the result here is 130 initiatives, but it is as the Zambian UN ambassador is quoted as saying, how much implementation of these initiatives occurs.

There are a multitude of initiatives notwithstanding the UN faces a $USD 4 trillion gap. And there is growing recognition of a deep financing crisis at its many institutions. As a result of UN80 the Secretary General Antonio Guterres has been seeking a 20 percent reduction in its workforce and consolidations wherever possible.. As Colum Lynch of Devex made clear:

“The U.N.’s financial future just got worse.

For weeks, the world body’s leadership has been plotting out plans for slashing funding and downsizing its workforce by at least 20%.”

 

“But the recent passage of a law clawing back more than $1 billion in U.S. funding to the United Nations for everything from peacekeepers to human rights promotion and nutritional supplements for children in conflict zones has made it clear it will have to dig deeper. And it coincides with a State Department announcement on Tuesday that the U.S is withdrawing from UNESCO.”

 

“The White House “rescissions” — provisions to cancel congressionally appropriated funds — would cut more than $361 million in funding for U.N. peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ballooning Washington’s already whopping peacekeeping arrears to about $1.8 billion, according to Better World Campaign. The U.N. maintains that the U.S. is legally obligated to pay its full share of peacekeeping costs.”

 

“A proposed House budget for fiscal year 2026 that is making its way through the House appropriations committee envisions even deeper cuts, capping peacekeeping funding at about $560 million, a roughly 54% cut from 2025. The funding for international organizations would drop from about $1.54 billion to $310.2 million. It would also prohibit funding for several U.N. agencies that are unpopular among Republicans, including UN Human Rights and the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.” …

 

“The package also targets another critical funding account, the international organizations and programs account, with over $450 million in voluntary U.S. funding for UNICEF ($142 million), the U.N. Development Programme ($81.5 million), UN Human Rights ($17.5 million) and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ($3.5 million).”

The Trump administration’s latest action, as just noted above, is to announce that it is leaving UNESCO. As described by Lynch:

“In announcing its decision to leave UNESCO, a State Department spokesperson said the Paris-based agency’s recognition of the “State of Palestine” ran “contrary to U.S. policy” and contributed to anti-Israel rhetoric. The spokesperson also accused UNESCO of advancing “divisive social and cultural causes” at odds with the “America First” foreign policy.””

And as Lynch further points out these cuts and terminations have occurred before:

“The cuts are being imposed before the U.S. has even concluded its own long-awaited 180-day review of U.S. contributions to international organizations, and before Mike Waltz, president Trump’s nominee to lead the U.S. delegation at the U.N., has been confirmed by Congress and begins his work.”

So where does that leave the UN when it comes to trying to achieve the critical SDGs, Agenda 2030, the UN’s global development strategy:

“The 10th Edition of the Sustainable Development Report published just this past June features the updated SDG Index and Dashboards, which assess and rank all UN Member States on their performance across the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. It also introduces a new SDGi Index, focused on 17 headline indicators to measure overall SDG progress since 2015.”

 

“Despite these important gains”, as described by António Guterres Secretary-General of the United Nations, “conflicts, climate chaos, geopolitical tensions and economic shocks continue to obstruct progress at the pace and scale needed to meet the 2030 target. This year’s Sustainable Development Goals Report finds that only 35 per cent of SDG targets are on track or making moderate progress. Nearly half are moving too slowly and, alarmingly, 18 per cent are in reverse. We face a global development emergency.”

 

“Over 800 million people are trapped in extreme poverty and hunger. Carbon dioxide levels are at the highest in over two million years, and 2024 was the hottest year on record, surpassing the 1.5°C threshold. Peace and security have worsened, with over 120 million people forced from their homes, more than double the number in 2015. Meanwhile, debt servicing costs in low- and middle-income countries reached a record $1.4 trillion, squeezing resources needed for sustainable development.”

Likely all the nations will soldier on for the next five years at the UN trying to achieve the 17 goals. But let me make a suggestion. If implementation is the measure of success, maybe the preferred strategy for completing Agenda 2030 is to identify a priority group of SDG goals – a little like a return to the MDGs – but in this case say five goals. Then having chosen the ‘priority five’ the UN and all the members then put their collective energies on reaching the targets for those five goals. I would further suggest that the UN members choose, and then focus on this subset of five priority goals based, it seems to me, on those critical five where the data is most available and complete across all the members. The ‘priority five’ could enable national actors to track and report on implementation. Success could possibly then breed success. And if the UN and the national actors could accept that there was overreach with the 17 targets and Agenda 2030 – and course correct, well maybe success is still possible.

Anyway it’s a thought.

Epilogue: ProJune 26, 2025, marks 80 years since the signing of the UN Charter. The UN Secretary-General launched the UN80 Initiative to modernize the organization and address emerging global challenges.

This Post first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter. https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/crisis-and-reform-at-the-un

 

 

Multilateralism: No Longer a Crisis but Sadly, ‘Just Kinda Fading Away’

It has been labelled, ‘the crisis of multilateralism’ particularly as it targeted the UN and some of its specialized agencies, like the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) . But it seems to me, and I suspect to many other observers and experts that we are beyond just a crisis. With the return of Donald Trump we are witnessing the ‘fading away of multilateralism’. As noted in the WPR, Daily Review:

“Anyone who works on the U.N. or multilateral affairs more generally deserves a very long summer vacation this year. The past six months have wreaked havoc on the U.N. system, as the Trump administration has created enormous financial and political disruption. Many international officials will be heading to the beach unsure of whether they will have jobs by the end of the year due to U.S. funding cuts.”

Well, it is now 80 years in, yes 80 years since the creation of the UN. As pointed out by Richard Gowan who is currently the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group writing in FP:

“Today, the U.N. has 193 members, but amid ongoing bloodshed in Ukraine and Gaza and elsewhere, none of them—including the five veto powers in the Security Council—can pretend that it is succeeding.”

 

“The Trump administration has meanwhile plunged the institution, which has long been short on cash, into a financial crisis by withholding almost all funds for its activities. Secretary-General António Guterres has directed staff to slash the workforce by a fifth in 2026”

 

“Big U.N. humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Program, which are heavily reliant on U.S. support, are making even more drastic cuts. In private, very senior international officials speculate that the U.N. may go the way of the League of Nations.”

Well, that statement is rather depressing. So, what is the institution focused on? Well, according to Gowan:

“Diplomats lament the situation but note that their political masters in capitals have other priorities. Governments the world over are concentrating on how to deal with U.S. tariffs and evaluating how Washington’s policies will impact their security. Few have time to worry about multilateral affairs—or the appetite to pick a fight with Trump over second-order concerns in the U.N.system. Officials accept that, at a minimum, the organization will have to take the pain and do “less with less.”” …

 

“By some criteria, the U.N. has always been a disappointment. The crafters of the U.N. Charter, who proposed the organization at conferences in Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, envisaged an organization that would allow the big victorious powers that emerged from World War II—the United States, Soviet Union,China, Britain, and France—to police the world. That vision fell apart almost as soon as the U.N. started to operate, as the Cold War began and the European empires began to disintegrate.”

 

“One reason that U.N. members are tiptoeing around a broader debate on the organization’s future—in addition to competing priorities with the United States—is that they worry it would degenerate into another shouting match over how to allocate scarce resources to these priorities.”

Even in the face of such difficulties, and they are powerful, Gowan at least hopes there is a future. As he argues:

“Even when it comes to geopolitics, the organization still has a few continuing strengths that are worth recognizing and preserving.

 

First, it remains a space where the major powers meet, identify each other’s red lines, and bargain on a day-to-day basis at a time when other channels of communication are closed or difficult.”

And he concludes – and I think this is important – there is yet voice and possible progress:

“For the time being, it is necessary to accept that the United Nations will enter its ninth decade smaller and poorer than the past. It is certainly far less influential than its founders hoped. But if it can remain open as a channel both for major power bargaining and for smaller states to make their voices heard, then it will continue to have diplomatic value. If its operational arms can at least maintain services to the world’s neediest populations despite U.S. and other aid cuts, then it will help the vulnerable through a dangerous time.”

 

“As the U.N.’s members navigate a wildly uncertain world, they should at least aim to maintain some of the organization’s basic contributions to handling global disorder.”

That note of hope is important and I will return to what Gowan describes as “major power bargaining and for smaller states to make their voices heard”. There may yet be forward action; and we need to keep looking for it.

Then there is the dismantling of US aid and multilateral support. As pointed out by the Economist in an article on US foreign aid:

“First the guillotine’s blade fell. Now the death warrant must be signed. Almost as soon as Donald Trump took office for a second time he began defunding programmes he disliked. But under the constitution only Congress has the right to say how America spends its money. So Mr Trump has sent the legislature a “rescission” package, requesting that it claw back $9.4bn of spending that it had previously approved.”

 

“In 2023 America spent $80bn on foreign aid, including money for humanitarian assistance, development and healthcare. Americans think that they are more generous than they are. When pollsters ask them to estimate what proportion of its budget the federal government spends helping people abroad, the average answer is 26%. In reality it is about 1%, 0.25% of America’s GDP. But the money matters a lot to its intended beneficiaries. America contributes a significant share of the world’s foreign aid, including 40% of humanitarian aid. Reducing that will lead to the closure of some programmes and destabilise international organisations that administer the money, such as the World Health Organisation and World Food Programme.”

As I sit here today finalizing this Post, subject to some saving efforts – PEPFAR – The United States President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, for instance – the rescission bill seems destined to pass and be signed into law.

Finally, the Informals have not escaped the ‘Trump axe’. In this instance it is not so much funding, though that may happen as well, but action. The G20 is not scheduled to hold its Summit, this year in South Africa, until November 22-23rd. But that has not prevented the US from already being disruptive. The G20, as those who have read this Substack know, or have examined for instance the description of the G20 and its actions at the Global Summitry Project (GSP) website, the G20 is today a highly developed set of Ministerial gatherings, Task Forces, Working Groups and an elaborate set of Engagement Groups all working in some manner toward initiatives at the Summit. Well, key US officials, namely Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent have chosen to avoid attending their respective ministerial gatherings. Most recently is the Secretary of the Treasury. As pointed out by Colleen Goko and Kopano Gumbi at Reuters:

“Another no-show by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Donald Trump’s tariff threats and rising tensions between Washington and BRICS countries all look set to overshadow this week’s meeting of G20 finance chiefs in Durban, South Africa.”

 

“Several key officials including Bessent skipped February’s Cape Town gathering of finance ministers and central banks in the grouping, already raising questions about its ability to tackle pressing global challenges.”

Now Bessent, apparently, will skip this latest G20 finance and central bankers gathering. This has raised real concern about G20 progress. As described by Josh Lipsky, in this same Reuters piece, the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council:

“I think it’s problematic not to have the world’s largest economy represented at the table, at least at a senior political level,” said Josh Lipsky, chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council.”

 

“”It raises questions about the G20’s long-term viability,” said Lipsky, adding that Bessent’s absence foreshadowed U.S. plans for a slimmed-down, “back to basics” G20 when it assumes the grouping’s rotating presidency next year.”

We have had continuing discussions among Changing World Dialogue (CWD) colleagues over the impact of U.S. presence or absence for the G20 at South Africa and further the impact of the U.S. G20 hosting role which is set to occur in 2026. I suspect the impact on both is a function of just how disruptive the U.S. might be. Yes, there is a real price to pay for U.S. absence and some think the Informals cannot proceed without the U.S. Yet it seems to me, if the U.S. is determined to torpedo key subjects and possible progress on such issues as climate change or development financing then maybe we can live without it for now.

While I lean, if ever so slightly, to proceeding without U.S. attendance, if the U.S. is determined to be destructive and willful, well then without may be the preference. But for that to occur, it seems to me it can only occur if Major/Middle Powers – some of Canada, Australia, UK, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia or Brazil – are prepared to act collectively and to advance global governance action, at least for now, in plurilateral grouping. I and others have been trained on Major/Middle Power collective efforts. I must say to date there is little development to chronicle. That will need to change. Now, there’s the rub.

More on this as we go forward.

Multilateralism: It is Just Largely Talk Now

While you will see that the main focus of this Substack is on multilateralism, and its current failure, I couldn’t let Trump’s disrespect for the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa pass without some comment. Once again in the Oval Office, as described in the NYTimes,  Trump let his lack of understanding, his lack of facts rule the day. It showed the absolute worst of Trump. The American people should be ashamed that a leader is willing to so distort US relations with potentially friendly leaders:

“In an astonishing confrontation in the Oval Office on Wednesday, President Trump lectured President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa with false claims about a genocide against white Afrikaner farmers, even dimming the lights to show what he said was video evidence of their persecution.”

 

“The meeting had been expected to be tense, given that Mr. Trump has suspended all aid to the country and created an exception to his refugee ban for Afrikaners, fast-tracking their path to citizenship even as he keeps thousands of other people out.”

 

“But the meeting quickly became a stark demonstration of Mr. Trump’s belief that the world has aligned against white people, and that Black people and minorities have received preferential treatment. In the case of South Africa, that belief has ballooned into claims of genocide.”

One last point, a good point it appears, though still somewhat uncertain, Trump will attend, apparently,  the G20 Summit gathering in November in South Africa. As reported in the NYTimes

“South Africa presented a framework for a trade deal, the president said, and the two sides agreed to hold further discussions to iron out the specifics of an agreement. He said that Mr. Trump indicated that he would attend the Group of 20 summit in Johannesburg in November, despite suggestions by his administration that the United States might skip it.” 

 So now back to today’s main subject, multilateralism. Back in December 2024 in a Substack Post here at Alan’s Newsletter, “Focusing on the Future – Where are we on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and some other things?” I leaned on Homi Kharas, my good colleague at Brookings to give me some hope that states, many states, were turning to focus on the sustainable development goals (SDGs). And Homi and some of his colleagues did. As I wrote at the time: 

“Even more pointedly, Homi suggested that a vein of optimism was called for. The reason: technology could provide the necessary fillip to efforts to achieve the SDGs. Under the header, “ Technology is finally delivering on its promise to make major economic production and consumption structures more sustainable””  

While that may be the case for some it is clearly not the case for the second Trump administration. As Dashveenjit Kaurashveenjit Kaur wrote rather depressingly this last March in Sustainability News

“The US has officially rejected the UN Sustainable Development Goals, citing sovereignty concerns and claiming a mandate from voters to prioritise American interests over global frameworks.” 

 

“When world leaders gathered at the United Nations headquarters in New York in September 2015, they created what many called a “blueprint for a better future” – the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Then-president Obama pledged American commitment to the ambitious 15-year roadmap designed to transform our world by 2030.” 

 

“This week, and the United States has executed a stunning, although not unexpected about-face: the Trump administration has declared it now “rejects and denounces” these very same global objectives, becoming what appears to be the first nation to abandon the framework since its unanimous adoption.” 

 

“The consequential announcement arrived not through a high-profile press conference or presidential statement. Still, it nested in diplomatic remarks delivered by Edward Heartney, Minister Counselor to ECOSOC at the US Mission to the United Nations.” 

 

““Put simply, globalist endeavours like Agenda 2030 and the SDGs lost at the ballot box,” Heartney stated in the prepared remarks. “Therefore, the United States rejects and denounces the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, and it will no longer reaffirm them as a matter of course.”” 

Now maybe this declaration from a mid-level bureaucrat can ultimately be swept away if the Trump administration changes its mind – as we’ve seen it wouldn’t be the first occasion for sure, still the statement is rather chilling and appears to meaningfully undermine the multilateral effort that to this point not very successfully, notwithstanding two recent UN summits that focused wholly or in part on on the SDGs. 

This episode is just a small part of the growing acknowledgement that the heart of multilateralism, the UN and its many specialized agencies are failing. Many of us concerned with global stability and order focus a fair amount on the numerous multilateral efforts. But there does seem to be a certain amount of denial going on. 

Now, in this context of faltering multilateralism, I was attracted by the recent piece penned by my colleague, Peter Singer. Peter among other things writes the Substack Global Health Insights.   Now Peter was special adviser to the director general of the World Health Organization from 2017 to 2023. He  is today emeritus professor of medicine at the University of Toronto and a former chief executive of Grand Challenges Canada. Peter understands the faltering UN effort. As he posted recently at his Substack, in a piece titled, “UN leadership: relentlessly focused on results?”: 

“Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has recently taken to tweeting, “The mission of the UN is more urgent than ever.” This is certainly true, but not in its current version — replete with process and plans. There is, of course, a reform initiative, called UN80; however, it seems more focused on managerial efficiency and restructuring than results. The UN needs a new mission: Get Stuff Done.” 

With the current round of new leadership appointments,  Peter turns to leadership, and its central importance: 

“Yet despite their importance, the UN system has often struggled to deliver timely, measurable outcomes—an issue exacerbated by dwindling trust and funding. With Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) badly lagging and support for the UN increasingly under threat, the need for results-focused leadership [emphasis added] is more urgent than ever.” 

 

“The UN desperately needs leaders who are singularly focused on delivering measurable results. Without results, there is no trust; without trust, there is no funding. Results must be the cornerstone of any leadership candidacy.” 

If leadership is key, then, Peter points to critical upcoming opportunities for the UN system and what is necessary for the incoming leadership: 

“A key lever is leadership. Over the next three years, (at least) three major UN bodies will select (or elect) new leaders: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2025, the UN Secretariat in 2026, and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2027. The future of the UN may well hinge on whether these new leaders possess one crucial characteristic: a relentless focus on results.” 

 

“Results must be the cornerstone of any leadership candidacy.”

 

“This results focus is fully compatible with other perspectives that will drive these elections, such as gender and regional representation.” 

 

“Having had experience with a UN agency election and tried (and not fully succeeded) to help transform a UN agency into one that prioritizes results above all, I witnessed firsthand the barriers that make implementing a results-focused strategy difficult.” 

So as Peter portrays it what is necessary for successful multilateralism is leadership dedicated to results that can be shown. Only with this will trust be built and with trust, according to Peter, funding will be forthcoming. With that in hand, he then targets the current effort to choose new leadership:

“This is the acid test. Leaders who have a proven track record of achieving tangible outcomes are more likely to replicate that success at the UN. The UN is awash with process. But there is a gap between planning and execution.” … 

 

“In addition to personal examples, candidates should be able to provide compelling analysis and tangible solutions for improving measurable results at the agency they wish to lead.” … 

 

“From my experience, two elements are essential to fast-tracking progress: innovation and data.” … 

 

“Effective governance is even more important than management. Leaders must work with governing bodies to improve the results focus of the organization. UN governance tends to focus more on planning and process than on execution and results.” … 

 

“Changing the culture of an organization is key to making results-focused strategy, management, or governance sustainable. UN organizations tend to be highly hierarchical, which means leadership has an outsized impact on culture.” … 

 

“As member states, civil society, and donors engage in these critical leadership selections, they must champion candidates who are relentlessly focused on results. The future of the UN depends on it.”

And with that Peter concludes: 

“Nevertheless, imagine a UN system where, in five years, every agency is led by someone relentlessly focussed on results and on getting things done. It would be a very different—and far more effective and sustainable —UN than the one we see today.” 

The ‘pitch’ for critical leadership is sensible and important especially in the context of upcoming leadership searches and appointments. But I remain hesitant to accept that this will ‘turn this ship around’.   It seems to me that in the end the critical element remains national effort and the determination for members to forge collective policy whether health policy, climate change whatever. As Gordon La Forge. 2025 in his piece,  “The U.N. Is Still the Best Forum to Tackle AI Governance”. Reminds us in his recent piece in WPR:

“The late Richard Holbrooke once quipped that blaming the U.N. for international dysfunction is like faulting Madison Square Garden when the Knicks lose. Put another way, the U.N. continues to struggle with what could be called the 193-body problem: Nation-states are the world’s dominant form of political organization, but they are neither well-equipped to solve planetary challenges nor designed to defend the best interests of humanity as a whole, which often conflict with national imperatives.” 

It may require ‘coalitions of the willing’ to press ahead with new leadership on advancing critical and necessary policy. We cannot let the 193-body problem of the UN, or the ‘big boys’ problem, US, China and Russia to torpedo critical policy efforts. It is time to end just the talk. Using a plurilateral approach to push forward is critical though possibly incomplete. More on that soon. 

Credit Image: UN Dispatch

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter: https://substack.com/home/post/p-164155148

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‘Once in a Generation’ – Well Maybe Not; But ‘Small Ball’ At Least

Well, the UN ‘Summit of the Future’ (SoTF) has come – and gone.  What does the appearance and passing of the SoTF, and the continuation of the UN General Assembly’s High-level Week tell us about the state of the UN and the condition of global multilateralism? If I may be so bold it is – “not good!” But there may be a thread or two that might lead to more effective multilateralism.  Still I suspect after the most recent Posts this immediate conclusion can hardly be a surprise. Reflecting on  the UN proceeding, Bloomberg reported:

The United Nations General Assembly’s annual meeting in New York is often mocked as a farce for the endless speeches and the traffic snarling the city. This year’s gathering feels more like tragedy.

The violence and chaos engulfing the globe put questions around the UN mandate — “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” — in stark relief.

Antonio Guterres is the first to admit that the secretary-general of the UN has no power, just a voice (emphasis added). It’s one he uses time and time again like a modern-day Cassandra to lament that the world is currently experiencing the most conflicts since the organization was founded in 1945. The past three years were the most violent in three decades, according to one think tank.

So the international context is not good. But looking specifically at the SoTF, let’s look at the result. On the positive side the UN passed, ultimately unanimously the ‘Pact for the Future’. Why I say ultimately is because the document’s final passage suffered from great power intrigue before the Pact of the Future was agreed to and passage concluded. As pointed out by IISD, the International Institute for Sustainable Development:

The Summit of the Future opened with some drama when the Russian Federation tabled its objection to several paragraphs in the outcome documents: the Pact for the Future, the Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin tabled Russian objections and, according to AlJazeera:

Vershinin also stressed that the pact could not be viewed as creating “new mandates and obligations” for states as it is “simply a declaration, and a very vague one.

In the face of these objections, interestingly, the Republic of Congo – representing Africa’s 54 nations – and Mexico, rejected the Russian amendments and preventing them from going through. With the loud opposition from members of the Global South to Russia’s objections, the  IISD reported:

… after months of negotiations, the Pact was adopted. UN General Assembly (UNGA) President Philémon Yang thanked the Co-Facilitators for steering a complex negotiating process and described the just-adopted Pact as a reflection of “our pledge” to lay the foundation for a sustainable, inclusive, and peaceful global order.

On the positive side, the final Pact appears to retain the Security Council reform initiative. Though the Action numbers have changed, it appears that the reform provision has been retained:

Action 40. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform as a matter of priority and without delay …

 

Encourage the submission of further models and the revision of already presented models by States and Groups of States for the structured dialogues with a view to developing a consolidated model in the future based on convergences on the five clusters, and the models presented by Member States.

It is there but we wait to see results. There appears to many at the UN to be a greater ‘majority’ to reform the Security Council, and how it works. Such reform seems to include a growing consensus to permanently add members to the Security Council. For some time now the US has lead the charge to include India, Germany , Brazil and Japan, though without a veto, and Ambassador Thomas-Greeleaf announced a US position urging two permanent seats for developing country members and a spot for a SIDS (Small Island Developing States) seat. Yet final agreement appears to be out of the reach for the members.

Now, interestingly there were a variety of insights provided by Richard Gown, currently the UN Director for the International Crisis Group, who was interviewed on the 25th by Ravi Agrawal, editor in chief of Foreign Policy. In this FP: Live session titled: “Can the United Nations Still be Effective?”, Gowan, who has long been involved with the UN, suggested that what was most interesting in the Pact was not Security Council reform but the effort to focus on digital governance and  the initiation of negotiations on AI in the Digital Compact, Annex I: Global Digital Compact:

“Objective 5. Enhance international governance of artificial intelligence for the benefit of humanity”

56. We therefore commit to:

(a) Establish, within the United Nations, a multidisciplinary Independent International Scientific Panel on AI with balanced geographic representation to promote scientific understanding through evidence-based impact, risk and opportunity assessments, drawing on existing national, regional and international initiatives and research networks (SDG 17);

(b) Initiate, within the United Nations, a Global Dialogue on AI Governance involving Governments and all relevant stakeholders which will take place in the margins of existing relevant United Nations conferences and meetings (SDG 17).

Gowan suggested in the interview that the effort here with AI might well bear fruit in years to come with rules on digital governance and AI. It will in his view be looked at retrospectively as the Pact for the Future provided the framework for critical digital governance success.

Gowan was also clear-eyed when it came to the UN and its capacity to constrain and resolve conflict. He was blunt that what he called ‘first order’ crises – Ukraine and Gaza currently, due to great power rivalries and political actions are currently out of the reach of the UN to achieve any level of success and ultimately political resolution. On the other hand, what he described as ‘second order’ conflicts – an example Sudan, where most great power rivalries are not at play, can be subject to UN collective peace efforts.

So it is evident that many of the conflict crises are outside effective UN efforts. Still, Gowan reminded us that ‘everyday multilateralism’ is at the heart of today’s UN efforts. While the UN today cannot end wars, it is critical in providing significant action and progress in mitigating the consequences of violence, pandemics, and natural and climate disasters. UN agencies may be the only major players in these circumstances.

Finally, Gowan pointed out where attention needed to be paid to these recent UN summit efforts. The declarations and pacts could be largely ignored; the statements and speeches by Heads of Government and State could equally be set aside and forgotten but the actual gathering of leaders could enable numerous bilateral and minilateral meetings at the margin of the formal meetings.  These highly informal discussions could be settings where positions could be staked out and possible positive steps could be agreed by leaders that later translated into real progress. It might be ‘small ball’ but it could ultimately lead to progress. The informality is evident and such in-person gatherings could easily be missed but quietly and ‘below the radar’ such quiet conversations could provide  real opportunity to resolve the all too difficult and seemingly intractable moments of violence. This is informal, very informal ‘multilateralism’. But progress may be possible.

Image Credit: IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute)

This Post first appeared at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter

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The UN ‘Summit of the Future’ (SoTF) and the Enduring Weakness of Multilateralism

In last week’s Post, with part of the same title as this week’s Post at Alan’s Newsletter, I began an examination into the weakening of multilateralism in the current global order. It is a particularly appropriate time to look at the state of multilateralism, and particularly a focus on the classic ‘Formal’ institution, the United Nations.  This is a key week in the life of the UN.

The UN General Assembly is gathering, as pointed to by Nudhara Yusuf from Stimson described to:

So, UNGA79 really stands for the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, which begins on September 10th, 2024 … UNGA79 this time of year though, we’re referring to the wonderfully energized chaos that is about to descend onto 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Ave New York during UNGA High-Level week [emphasis added] when the general debate is opened. This will be on the 24th of September and run through the end of the week. Of course, the key thing on all our minds are the days right before that, with the Summit of the Future Action Days from 20-21 September and the Summit of the Future itself from 22-23 September.

The gathering of heads of government and state at the special UN session is to complete and agree on the following:

Its agreed outcomes of the Pact for the Future and annexed Declaration on Future Generations and Global Digital Compacts should be priority areas for Heads of States in their statements.

Colum Lynch at Devexexamined recent UN developments including the SDG Summit in 2023 and now, at the doorstep, the Summit for the Future in 2024:

The roots of the future summit date back to 2020, when world leaders marked the 75th anniversary of the U.N.’s founding, issuing a declaration asking [Secretary General Antonio] Guterres to outline his vision for a modern multilateralism to better “respond to current and future challenges.” The following year, Guterres issued Our Common Agenda, which maps out a course for the U.N. over the next 25 years.

 

Many of Guterres’ original proposals — for instance, the creation of a Futures Lab to measure the impact of policies over the long haul and the reform of the trusteeship council established to manage decolonization to advocate on behalf of future generations — were scaled back or scrapped altogether. And there remains persistent skepticism that a decades-long push for the expansion of the U.N. Security Council — to include emerging powers from Asia, Africa, and Latin America that have emerged since World War II — will succeed this time around.

Clearly reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is at the absolute heart of urgent reform of the multilateral system. This was made clear with the very recent announcement by the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenleaf  that added additional US proposed reforms:

  1. Create 2 permanent seats for Africa in the Council;
  2. A new elected seat for Small Island Developing States (SIDS); and
  3. Engaging in tech space negotiations in Council reform

The Pact for the Future, the key outcome document of the SoTF has now gone through 4 deeply negotiated revisions, with the 4th revision released just a few days ago (September 13th). In the first 3 revisions there was no agreed reform text and yet finally in this 4th revision we see at least the articulation of proposed ‘features of reform’ fo this key UN institution:

Action 41. We will reform the UN Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.

 

69. In response to the growing urgency to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations’ abilities to maintain international peace and security as set out in the UN Charter, we agree on the following guiding principles identified in the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council (IGN) in accordance with decision 62/557 of the General Assembly as parameters for reform:

(a) Redress the historical injustice against Africa as a priority and, while treating Africa as a special case, improve the representation of the underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups, such as AsiaPacific and Latin America and the Caribbean.

(b) Enlarge the Security Council in order to be more representative of the current UN membership and reflective of the realities of the contemporary world and, taking into account our commitments of Sustainable Development Goal 16.8, increase representation of developing countries and small- and medium-sized states.

(c) Continue discussions on the issue of representation of cross-regional groups, taking into account that Small Island Developing States, Arab States, and others, such as the OIC, have been mentioned in the discussions of the IGN.

(d) Intensify efforts to find an agreement on the question of the categories of membership taking into account the discussions held in the IGN process.

(e) The total number of members of an enlarged Council should ensure a balance between its representativeness and effectiveness.

(f) The working methods should ensure the inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable functioning of an enlarged Council.  (g) The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use.

(h) As part of a comprehensive reform, the inclusion of a review clause should be considered to ensure that the Security Council continues over time to deliver on its mandate and remains fit for purpose.

As is evident this Action item, 41, does not describe actual agreed changes. For that one needs to turn to Action 42:

Action 42. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform as a matter of priority and without delay.

 

70. We support the Member States driven nature of the reform of the Security Council, and will intensify efforts for the reform through the IGN in accordance with General Assembly Decision 62/557 and other relevant resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly, such as resolution 53/30. Building on the recent progress achieved in the IGN, including through more transparency and inclusivity and by enhancing its institutional memory, we decide to:

(a) Encourage the submission of further models and the revision of already presented models by States and Groups of States for the structured dialogues with a view to developing a consolidated model in the future based on convergences on the five clusters, and the models presented by Member States.

It is evident that this Action Item 42 is in UN-speak. I have had to rely on close colleagues much more schooled in the UN than I am. Indeed you can listen to valuable webinar on the subject: of “The UN Summit of the Future: What to Expect”, with several colleagues including Anne-Marie Slaughter CEO of New America and led by close Carnegie Endowment of International Peace (CEIP) colleague, Stewart Patrick. There I learned there will be an Intergovernmental Negotiation that would lead to a consolidated model of reform to ultimately be voted on. My colleagues believed that this was a significant step forward on reform. Looking at it I remain somewhat skeptical but will rely on my knowledgeable friends that something – that reform proposals – will advance at the UN and that reforms are in fact coming.

Finally, I couldn’t end without referencing my Substack colleague’s examination of the impact of the Summit of the Future. So Peter Singer at Global Health Insights recently posted a piece titled: “Will the Summit of the Future lead to a more results-based United Nations?” Peter examines all 60 action items and concludes:

On full display at the Summit is what’s wrong with the UN: a failure to execute on what’s already agreed.  In September, the only acronym the UN needs is GSD — Get Sh*t Done. (If you’re a diplomat, feel free to substitute “Stuff.”)

Peter is particularly frustrated over the failure of the Organization and its member states to advance the 2015 agreed Sustainable Development goals (SDGs), what the UN calls Agenda 2030:

The UN suffers from planning disease. Any successful real-world entity does 10% planning and 90% execution (and the planning is built on the results of execution).  In the UN, it’s the reverse.

Peter argues that the UN must first develop “better ways to translate data into results.” Then it must: “support countries to scale innovations that are already reaching millions to reach tens or even hundreds of millions of people.” And finally he urges:

It could look at countries that are performing well and those that are not and how the latter could be more like the former.  It could examine what the agency is doing to support countries to get on track, and how it could do it better, and how well it is working with other agencies to support countries.

I think the latter point is particularly critical because in the end in this case it is not so much the UN, and the UN agencies that are responsible  for achieving the SDGs but the Member countries that will make the SDGs happen – or not. And, unfortunately, it is the Member States that are only too evidently unwilling, or politically and administratively unable to make SDG progress. A too obvious example – the United States. This is a Member State where the SDGs never pass the lips of its leaders and their officials.

The questions surrounding the outcomes and implementation of the  SoTF lie as much, or more,  ‘at the feet’ of the national governments. It is not a heartwarming view. So, yes, we need to address the inadequacies of the international organizations. Reform and updating is required and little has occurred over the decades. But the heart of the system is states and their capacity and, or willingness to work together to achieve progress. As Sophie Eisentraut declared in her FP article, “Can the West Revive Multilateralism?”:

As world leaders descend on New York for the United Nations Summit of the Future this week, rules-based multilateralism is in a dismal state. Amid the international community’s failure to conclude a global pandemic treaty and the U.N. Security Council’s paralysis in the face of both Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict, it’s hard to recall the last success of multilateral cooperation.

Among governments, accusations of double standards and broken promises, from delivering COVID-19 vaccines to providing meaningful debt relief, are mounting. Against this backdrop, the summit looks like a desperate attempt to rebuild confidence—particularly among countries in the global south as they navigate a multilateral system that even the U.N. secretary-general describes as caught in “colossal global dysfunction.”

The ‘enduring weakness’ is ultimately laid at the feet of national governments. And from today’s perspective – and on the eve of the Summit of the Future – it is not a very pretty sight.

This Post originally appeared at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter. Comments are welcome as are free subscriptions

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The Troubles with Multilateralism: Two

So this week’s Post may be ‘a bit lighter’ than usual. But I have an excuse: there is a celebration afoot in the family this weekend – my younger daughter is getting married – much activity is planned. Still here is this week’s thinking on global order matters on ‘Alan’s Newsletter’.

Now, where were we?  Ah yes, focusing on diplomacy and the difficulties of multilateralism, especially among the Formals. Now Richard Gowan recently wrote a piece examining the UN, especially in the light of the upcoming September UN Summit of the Future. Richard oversees the International Crisis Group’s advocacy work at the United Nations, liaising with diplomats and UN officials in New York. Richard also is a Research Associate and Associate Director for Policy at the Center on International Cooperation at NYU.

As Richard describes it in his article, “Redefining the UN’s Prime Purpose” there is a growing sentiment to diminish the UN’s role in peace and security matters. This seems to go all the way to the top of the UN chain. As Richard writes:

Even some of the organization’s leaders appear to think that the UN may be wise to take a lower profile on security concerns and focus its energies elsewhere. … In 2021, he [Antonio Guterres] published a report on the future of multilateralism entitled ‘Our Common Agenda’… In 2023, Guterres released a fuller New Agenda for Peace. This contained a frank assessment of the poor state of international relations, and urged states to reinvest in diplomacy. It included interesting passages on the security challenges posed by AI, new biotechnologies, and other scientific advances. Yet the document struck a humble note, emphasizing that the UN’s ability to address many conflicts is limited and that international interventions often backfire. Instead, one of its themes is that states should invest more in their domestic conflict prevention efforts.

And the bottom line, according to Richard, is reducing the UN role:

In line with the Common Agenda, the Secretary General has portrayed the summit as an opportunity for presidents and prime ministers to launch new ideas about global governance. Diplomatic discussions about the summit – and a Pact for the Future that is meant to come out of it – have further highlighted the difficulties of talking about security at the UN.

This stepping away from conflict abatement efforts seems to extend through a significant number of UN Members and somewhat surprisingly, or maybe not, depending on your point of view, it appears to be expressed by Members of the Global South. Richard has in fact picked up on this thread of thinking from the Global South:

Many UN members from the so-called Global South have made it clear that the summit and pact should focus on the economic problems that they face today. Scores of developing countries are now carrying unsupportable debt burdens, and want the summit to help them unlock affordable financing.

Many of these UN members from the Global South – what used to be referred to in the past as the Third World, or the developing world, or even as the NAM, the ‘Nonaligned Movement’  have made it clear that the upcoming Summit of the Future and the Pact for the Future should focus on their economic problems, especially in the light of significant and growing debt but also in financing the green transition that they all face today.

The dilemma of course is, if the UN backs away from conflict suppression, then who, or what, can the global order rely on. It is evident that there is a hard limit on what the UN can do in the face of great power conflict for the moment but there are many conflicts where the UN is, and has played a role in limiting, and in some instances ending, conflict. The problem has been that the efforts are slow and too often barely effective and these peace efforts can extend for far too many years. So new approaches are called for and likely include stronger immediate pressure and serious diplomatic actions backed possibly by strong sanctions and in some limited cases early intervention. As Richard concludes:

Even if the UN’s narrowly defined security role is shrinking, multilateral cooperation is still essential to addressing the security of states and individuals in a wider sense. So it is possible that the UN will see its traditional mediation and peacekeeping roles shrink, while still contributing to making the world a safer place through other strands of work.

Reliance on more active diplomacy needs to be considered especially in  a world where there is a growing threat of conflict, violent conflicts such as Ukraine and the Gaza wars. But there also needs to be a shift in thinking how, and when, to turn to force is warranted. Dan Drezner from Drezner’s World, and Tufts, and other things, points to the weakness of diplomatic thinking and action. In the case he discusses this is on the part of one of the leading powers, the United States. As Dan in this Foreign Affairs article titled, “How Everything Became National Security: And National Security Became Everything” points to US thinking and action in foreign policy and how it has become dominated for far too long by an overweening national security mindset:

Consider the history of the National Security Strategy, the report on current threats that the president is supposed to deliver to Congress annually, although in practice it is usually released less often. A review of post-1990 reports reveals a steady expansion of qualifying concerns: energy security, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, and terrorism, among many others.

 

In the 70 years since, the definition of national security has been stretched almost beyond recognition. New technologies have multiplied the vectors through which external forces can threaten the United States. Furthermore, because security issues command greater staffs and budgets, policy entrepreneurs have strong incentives to frame their interests as matters of national security. The forces that push issues into the national security queue are far more powerful than the forces that lead policymakers to exclude them. Nevertheless,even with this expansion, the United States has been blindsided by events: 9/11, the COVID-19 pandemic, the October 7 attacks. Simply having a longer list of threats hasn’t really helped prepare for the unexpected.

The need for strategic recalculation by the US and among the major powers is all too apparent today. What that recalculation is, and how to implement that, is a discussion for another day.

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Image Credit: Geneva Environment Network

The Trouble with Today’s Multilateralism: An Intro

 

So in this week’s Post I was all set to hone in on the struggles over reenergizing faltering multilateralism in the current global order. Today’s  troubles encompass the formal institutions – the Formals – from the UN, and many of its specialized agencies to the international financial ones – the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. And the troubles extend to the Informals, the G7, the G20 to the BRICS+ and more. The struggles over multilateralism are the flip side of the return, seemingly ever more strongly power politics – the wars in the Ukraine and Gaza, and geopolitics, especially the rise in bilateral tensions between China and the United States.

But before I could go there, I couldn’t ignore the just excellent article – recommended by my colleague, and China expert, John Gruetzner – in Foreign Affairs by Zongyuan Zoe Liu, titled, “China’s Real Economic Crisis: Why Beijing Won’t Give Up on a Failing Model”. This very good piece leaned strongly into the discussion I had raised in my previous Alan’s Newsletter Post, ‘China, Seemingly, Stays the Course’. The Post chronicled the disappointment expressed by analysts and experts in the West primarily but in a rather more modulated form in China as well. The disappointment according to these experts emerged over the failure in the Third Plenum to initiate significant economic reform in the Chinese domestic economy and a clear determination to tackle domestic consumption.

Liu gets it right:

The Chinese economy is stuck. … But there is a more enduring driver of the present stasis, one that runs deeper than Xi’s growing authoritarianism or the effects of a crashing property market: a decades-old economic strategy that privileges industrial production over all else, an approach that, over time, has resulted in enormous structural overcapacity.

 

Simply put, in many crucial economic sectors, China is producing far more output than it, or foreign markets, can sustainably absorb. As a result, the Chinese economy runs the risk of getting caught in a doom loop of falling prices, insolvency, factory closures, and, ultimately, job losses.

 

Since the mid-2010s, the problem has become a destabilizing force in international trade, as well. By creating a glut of supply in the global market for many goods, Chinese firms are pushing prices below the breakeven point for producers in other countries. In December 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that excess Chinese production was causing “unsustainable” trade imbalances and accused Beijing of engaging in unfair trade practices by offloading ever-greater quantities of Chinese products onto the European market at cutthroat prices.

 

Despite vehement denials by Beijing, Chinese industrial policy has for decades led to recurring cycles of overcapacity. At home, factories in government-designated priority sectors of the economy routinely sell products below cost in order to satisfy local and national political goals.

Now there continues to be some contention over whether in fact production is below cost but I I was pleased by Liu’s ‘recommendation’ that the two – the West and China – consider options other than just piling on the tariffs. Liu correctly points out the negative consequences of such trade policy:

A China that is increasingly cut off from Western markets will have less to lose in a potential confrontation with the West—and, therefore, less motivation to de-escalate. As long as China is tightly bound to the United States and Europe through the trade of high-value goods that are not easily substitutable, the West will be far more effective in deterring the country from taking destabilizing actions. China and the United States are strategic competitors, not enemies; nonetheless, when it comes to U.S.-Chinese trade relations, there is wisdom in the old saying “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.

That is why I have suggested negotiating – and one aspect in this case could be Voluntary Export Restraints or VERS. VERS are not super policy  actions – I get that  but they do encourage bilateral discussions rather than just unilateral penalties. As Liu suggest:

The U.S. government should discourage Beijing from building a wall that can sanction-proof the Chinese economy. To this end, the next administration should foster alliances, restore damaged multilateral institutions, and create new structures of interdependence that make isolation and self-sufficiency not only unattractive to China but also unattainable. A good place to start is by crafting more policies at the negotiation table, rather than merely imposing tariffs. … If the government [China] also implemented voluntary export controls, it could kill several birds with one stone: such a move would reduce trade and potentially even political tensions with the United States; it would force mature sectors to consolidate and become more sustainable; and it would help shift manufacturing capacity overseas, to serve target markets directly.

While working through the WTO might be preferable, and many analysts suggest such an approach for multilateral trade frictions, realistically that course of action is out of reach for the moment.

So there you are on the Third Plenum and global trade.  Let me at least turn to the original subject for this Post; let’s at least open the discussion on multilateralism and its problems. I was particularly attracted to a piece published recently by Pascal Lamy. Pascal Lamy (pascallamy.eu) is currently the Vice-President of the Paris Peace Forum, and coordinator of the Jacques Delors Institutes (Paris, Berlin, Brussels). Importantly, Pascal Lamy served two terms as Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) from September 2005 to September 2013. He is someone that is very familiar with critical aspects of the multilateral system. Recently his piece, ‘Reshaping the Global Order’ was published in a large edited volume by colleagues from the Center for China & Globalization, CCG,  Henry Huiyao Wang and Mabel Lu Miao, Enhancing Global Governance in a Fragmented World: Prospects, Issues, and the Role of China. Now Lamy sets out the critical structural issues that impair today’s multilateralism efforts. As he says:

The main long-term, structural factors at play can be summarized by sovereignty as a founding principle of an international order, by the obsolescence of the previous order, and by the US-China rivalry.

It is not surprising that he identifies ‘sovereignty’ as the first key to multilateralism’s problems:

Sovereignty has been, is, and will remain the main obstacle to building a fully fledged international order as long as it is accepted as the core principle of international law.

So many analysts acknowledge the burst in new actors in the international system: substate actors, regions and cities and also non-state actors like NGOs, large public and private corporations but all struggle against dominant state actors. National sovereignty dominates international relations and often leads to unilateral actions that undermines wider cooperation.

Then there is ‘obsolescence’.  This focuses around the elements of the system, especially the Formals that were put in place at the end of World War Two at a time when the Global South that has had such a recent impact on international relations existed primarily as colonies of the West:

Obsolescence has to do with the origins of the current global system, the architecture of which dates from arrangements made after the Second World War. The ‘universal’ nature of these arrangements is increasingly seen as a product of a past pattern of Western dominance at a time when new nation states are now reshuffling the old power distribution …

Lamy then targets the impact of the evolving international order:

All in all, the previous international order is being shaken by increasing North-South and East-West tensions and frustrations, and by a change in the balance between geoeconomics and geopolitics, the former losing the force it had gathered in recent decades, and the latter regaining its past dominance over world affairs. We are thus moving toward less of a rules-based system, and more toward the use of force. This context obliges us to consider new paths, tentative as they may be.

And finally Lamy underlines the rise of geopolitical tensions, especially between China and the United States, and the impact that these tensions have had on the current multilateral order:

The intensification of the US-China rivalry is the third main factor shaping the demise of the international order, as this rivalry increasingly pits the two main world superpowers against each other. Indeed, they now believe they have become dangerously vulnerable to each other—hence a change of view on both sides about globalization. Whereas the US and China previously celebrated the benefits of increased economic interdependence in fostering development and reducing poverty, they are now trying to address what today they consider as overdependence and have embarked on a decoupling journey which challenges the rest of the world with hard binary choices and which permeates international life in the form a sort of ‘cold war 2.0.’

So what is to be done? How can a multilateral system be revivified and made effective – bringing greater stability to the global order and energizing transnational global governance efforts?

That’s where we will start in the next Post.

Image Credit: Geneva Interdisciplinary Centre for Economics and Law

This Blog originally appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter – https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/the-trouble-with-todays-multilateralism?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

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Challenging Leadership and Stability in the Global Order

There are some recent insights worth examining. These insights underscore the current difficulties of US leadership in the global order. There are at least three critical issues that challenge US foreign policy leadership today. These include: the ‘shadow of Trump’; the continuing primacy demand of US leadership; and the harm inflicted by current US economic policy making. All three and more undermine continuing US foreign policy leadership in a changing global order.

First there is the ‘shadow of a Trump return’ to the US presidency. As quixotic as the first Trump term was, it appears that this prior Trump term likely will be a pale shadow of how a second Trump presidency will conduct itself. There are strong indications that Trump will direct retribution on those such as the Justice Department that he believes undermined his first term as President. And there will be others. And his inconsistent nationalist-isolationist impulses will likely once again be on full display in his relations with NATO, Ukraine, Russia and China. Buckle up!  It could be very ugly. But meanwhile the shadow of his return has caused friend and foe alike to hedge their relations with the US allies, Global South and Middle Power players, and, of course, presumed foes.

So, that is one source of current harm to US leadership. Then there is the continuing determination by the Biden Administration to maintain the US sole superpower leadership role. This can also be read as the US hegemonic position in the global order. The dilemma of US leadership in a changing power order is all too evident. And it is likely to carry forward into the next administration whatever the political stripe it is.

We were alerted to this dilemma really some time ago and by none other than former National Security Advisor, H.R.McMaster. McMaster was appointed in 2017 by President Trump and after leaving office he wrote about his career in: “Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World”. There he raised the notion of ‘strategic narcissism”. While there is some contention over whether this concept was first voiced by the great international relations theorist, Hans Morgenthau, and McMaster raises that possibility, the point is the concept itself. Morgenthau did write an essay in 1978 called, “The Roots of Narcissism,” but McMaster in his book carried the concept forward in his description of ‘strategic narcissism’. For McMaster, ‘strategic narcissism’ was:

the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans.

I believe this concept and its elaboration helps us with a central concept in US foreign policy making. This framing aids us in understanding US approaches to leadership in international relations. That view was underlined in the recent piece by Ben Rhodes. It is well worth reviewing the insights provided by Rhodes in this very recent Foreign Affairs (FA) article. Rhodes has been directly involved in US foreign policy where from 2009 to 2017, he served as U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting in the Obama administration. He has been close to Democratic policymaking for a long time including being close with many in the current Biden Administration. As he wrote recently in the FA piece outlining what he sees as a needed reassessment of Democratic foreign policy making:

An updated conception of U.S. leadership—one tailored to a world that has moved on from American primacy and the eccentricities of American politics—is necessary to minimize enormous risks and pursue new opportunities. … Meeting the moment requires abandoning a mindset of American primacy and recognizing that the world will be a turbulent place for years to come. Above all, it requires building a bridge to the future—not the past.

In particular Rhodes points to the Trump ability in current presidential competition to build on the negative reaction to Democratic policy making in the period after the end of Cold War and the ‘triumph’ of US leadership:

Trump has also harnessed a populist backlash to globalization from both the right and the left. Particularly since the 2008 financial crisis,

large swaths of the public in democracies have simmered with discontent over widening inequality, deindustrialization, and a perceived loss of control and lack of meaning. It is no wonder that the exemplars of post–Cold War globalization—free trade agreements, the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and the instruments of international economic cooperation itself—have become ripe targets for Trump.

And these insights also alert us to yet another weakness in the international system – the fading of multilateralism, at least formal institutions. As Rhodes points out:

Second, the old rules-based international order doesn’t really exist anymore. Sure, the laws, structures, and summits remain in place.

But core institutions such as the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization are tied in knots by disagreements among their members. Russia is committed to disrupting U.S.-fortified norms. China is committed to building its own alternative order. On trade and industrial policy, even Washington is moving away from core tenets of post–Cold War globalization.

Even the high-water mark for multilateral action in the Biden years—support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia—remains a largely Western initiative. As the old order unravels, these overlapping blocs are competing over what will replace it.

Finally, and raised by Rhodes in his article is the Biden Administration’s turn away from free trade and access to the US market as others lower their barriers to freer trade. Protectionism has become rife under the Biden Administration guise of ‘industrial policy’ and such protectionism has been defended, I’d say promoted by Biden folks such as Jake Sullivan. As Sullivan argued early in the Administration, in fact before that in fact, he promoted quite loudly a policy for the middle class. As reported by Michigan State Representative Mari Manoogian, Sullivan urged:

In February 2021, national security advisor Jake Sullivan clearly defined the overarching theme of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy strategy as “foreign policy for the middle class.” The Chicago Council for Global Affairs contends that this Biden doctrine “recogniz[es] the linkages between American domestic strength and U.S. ability to maintain international competitiveness.” Under this new framework, foreign policy decisions, Sullivan indicated, would use the following simple rhetorical question as a basic metric for success: “Is it going to make life better, safer, and easier for working families?

But as FTs Martin Wolf has been loudly pointing out for some time in fact this is a strategy of trade protectionism cloaked within the frame of industrial policy all too frequently.  As Wolf recently wrote at his FT column:

Industrial policy works if it changes the structure of the economy in a beneficial direction. Unfortunately, there are well-known reasons why the attempt could fail. Lack of information is one. Capture by a range of special interests is another. Thus, governments may fail to pick winners, while losers may succeed in picking governments. The more money is on the table, the more the latter is likely to be true. … So, how should we assess this shift in US policy towards industrial policies, matched, on the Trumpian right, by a desire to return to the high tariffs of the late 19th and early 20th centuries?… The answer is that there are now at least three bipartisan positions: nostalgia for manufacturing; hostility to China; and indifference to the international rules that the US itself created. This, then, is a new world, one in which the international trading order could reach a breaking point quite quickly.

All of this is a dramatic threat to the stability and prosperity of the current global order.

Image Credit: E-International Relations