Category Archives: Grand Strategy

Stopping the War; or Maybe Not Yet

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We’ve known for some time by examining history that it’s much easier to start a war than it is to stop one. And I suspect the Russia-Ukraine war will prove to be no different. A ceasefire may well be had but this will occur in spite of Trump’s loud insistence that a ceasefire be reached by both parties not because of it, and him. 

Let’s start though with the larger context – that is Trump as the initiator of the ceasefire efforts. I was interested in a sort of mea culpa moment expressed by colleague, Stephen Walt. Stephen is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University and is also a columnist at Foreign Policy (FP). In a recent piece in FP entitled, “What I Got Wrong About Trump’s Second Term”, he zeros in on the fact that it is Trump pushing the ceasefire effort. As he admits: 

“That said, there’s no question that I got some important things wrong.”

 

“I underestimated Trump’s hostility to our principal democratic allies. It was obvious that he thought our NATO partners were overly reliant on U.S. protection (a view shared by all recent U.S. presidents), but it’s now clear that he’s actively and deeply hostile to the democratic principles that these states embody and is openly encouraging illiberal forces within them. As I wrote a couple of weeks ago, the administration’s embrace of the European far right is an attempt to promote a form of regime change throughout Europe—in effect, to MAGA-fy it—and to destroy the European Union as a meaningful political institution. I was aware of Trump’s affinity for illiberal leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and I knew people like Steve Bannon were trying to build a transnational coalition of far-right movements, but I didn’t take those forces seriously enough. … although there was every reason to think that Trump would push for a peace deal and eventually reduce U.S. support for Ukraine, I did not expect him to embrace Russian President Vladimir Putin’s position with such enthusiasm, accuse Ukraine of starting the war, or openly attack Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in public. There may, in fact, be some strategic rationale for what Trump is doing—i.e., he may genuinely believe that the only way to stop the war and eventually drive a wedge between Russia and China is to give Putin everything he wants—but that doesn’t mean this approach will work as intended. It also ignores the long-term impact that this behavior will have on the United States’ standing and image. … Moreover, Trump isn’t breaking these rules because the United States is facing a grave national emergency (which would make it easier for other states to give Washington a temporary pass); he’s trying to blow up the whole order because he thinks the United States will be better off in a world where autocracy is ascendant and leaders do whatever they want. I freely admit that transforming the United States from a defender of international order to a malevolent rogue state was not on my bingo card.”

Well, indeed we were witness to Trump, along with his Vice Presidential puppet, J.D. Vance throwing Ukraine, or at least Volodymyr Zelenskyy ‘under the bus’. Now Zelenskyy  may not have handled that strangely open White House meeting with Trump and Vance quite as adroitly as he might have but he did come back with Ukraine accepting Trump’s ceasefire agreement. As Alexandra Sharp pointed out earlier in the week in a FP World Brief: 

“The United States agreed to immediately lift its pause on all military aid and intelligence-sharing to Kyiv on Tuesday following talks with senior Ukrainian officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In turn, Ukraine expressed willingness to enact a 30-day cease-fire with Russia and enter immediate negotiations to establish an “enduring and sustainable” end to the conflict—so long as Moscow agrees to do the same.” 

And as she pointed out, Zelenskyy wisely praised Trump’s efforts: 

“Zelensky praised Tuesday’s talks and expressed gratitude for the Trump administration, highlighting the ways that the United States’ plan addressed Kyiv’s initial suggestions. Trump also celebrated the Jeddah meeting, saying, “Hopefully President Putin will agree to that also and we can get this show on the road.” The Kremlin has not yet responded to the cease-fire proposal. But Trump said that he expects to speak with Putin this week, adding, “It takes two to tango.”” 

Now it seems that Putin has seen fit to walk a kinda tightrope on the US ceasefire proposal. An outright rejection would for sure lead Trump to in some manner condemn Putin, probably enhance sanctions on Russia,  and likely ‘throw a bone to Ukraine’ including presumably enhanced military support to pressure a change from Putin. So rather than face any of that immediately we have Putin expressing a kinda tepid yes in a recent press conference but adding a significant number of questions and qualifications. 

As the Italian think tank, ISPI pointed out in an insightful piece titled, ‘Putin and the ‘No’ to the Truce’: 

“Putin is not saying ‘no’ to Washington and Kiev’s ceasefire proposal, but he is not saying yes either. And he is laying out his own conditions , saying he needs “further clarification.” The Russian president, 48 hours into his wait since announcing his proposal for a month-long interim truce two days ago in Jeddah , said any ceasefire must lead to “a final solution” to the conflict that addresses its “root causes.”  “The idea itself is good and we support it unconditionally,” he said, “but there are issues that we need to discuss, and I think we need to discuss them with our American colleagues and partners,” adding that otherwise Ukrainian forces “will be given the opportunity to withdraw, regroup and rearm,” just as the Russian army advances into the Kursk region , the Russian salient captured by Kiev’s troops.”

 

“The preconditions set by Putin for a ceasefire essentially coincide with Moscow’s war objectives: recognition of Moscow’s annexation of four partially occupied southeastern regions ( Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk ) and the Crimean peninsula; Kiev’s commitment to never join NATO; and the organization of new elections that will lead to the replacement of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russia is also pushing for a NATO retreat, whose expansion to the east, according to the Kremlin’s narrative, would have ‘forced’ Moscow to order the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In fact – according to several observers – Putin’s interlocutory response is due to two needs: on the one hand, he does not want to be accused of obstructing the agreement to which Trump has formally adhered, on the other, he knows that at this moment the war is turning in his favor and he does not intend to give up without obtaining something in return .” 

Now it is the case that Zelenskyy has doubts about the ceasefire effort. First he is dealing with Russia but more pertinently Zelenskyy remains insistent that any agreement that follows the short ceasefire must provide security guarantees for Ukraine. But for the moment the focus is on Russia. And as Mary Ilyushina and Sammy Westfall of the Washington Post noted:

“Putin said Thursday he supports in principle the idea of a 30-day ceasefire — proposed by the United States and to which Ukraine has agreed — but noted that its implementation raises many questions, particularly regarding verification across a long front line. Such a tactic could allow Russia to engage in protracted negotiations without immediately rejecting an offer.” 

 

“Putin also said the 30-day reprieve could be used by Ukraine to regroup and rearm, hinting that he would seek to impose his own conditions on the framework of the pause, such as a halt to Western weapons supplies or a ban on mobilization.” 

Meanwhile, the G7 foreign ministers gathered in Canada and pressed Russia to accept the current ceasefire proposal. In the Statement issued at the end of the meeting the foreign ministers declared:  

“G7 members reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

 

They welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. G7 members applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

 

G7 members called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. They discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. G7 members underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.” 

In addition, UK Prime Minister Starmer added further pressure. As described in the NYTimes:

“On Saturday [March 15th], Mr. Starmer convened a video conference with 30 leaders, from Europe, NATO, Canada, Ukraine, Australia and New Zealand, to muster support for his coalition, which Britain is spearheading with France. He said military officials would meet again on Thursday to begin an “operational phase,” though he did not give details about the mission of the force, nor did he announce that any other countries had committed troops to it.

 

“I’ve indicated a willingness for the United Kingdom to play a leading role in this,” Mr. Starmer said at a news conference after the meeting. “If necessary, that would be troops on the ground and planes in the sky.”

And, finally, another piece of the European effort to support Ukraine appears to be falling in place. There now appears to be agreement on a new German government led by Friedrich Merz. As described in the NYTimes: 

“Friedrich Merz, the likely next chancellor of Germany, announced on Friday that he had secured the votes to allow for extensive new government spending, including for defense, clearing the way for a stunning turnabout in German strategic and fiscal policy before he even takes office.” 

 

“The measures would lift Germany’s hallowed limits on government borrowing as they apply to military spending. It would exempt all spending on defense above 1 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product from those limits, and it would define “defense” broadly to include intelligence spending, information security and more.

Effectively, that would allow Germany to spend as much as it can feasibly borrow to rebuild its military.” 

The ‘yes but no’ by Putin may not have long to live. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio made it clear following the foreign ministers meeting, as described in the FT that the administration would soon examine the state of the ceasefire proposal and the positions of the two parties:

“Rubio, who has previously indicated Kyiv would have to make territorial concessions, on Friday signalled Moscow would also have to do so. “I’ve never heard President Trump say that Russia has a right to take all of Ukraine and do whatever they want there,” he said. He added Trump’s national security team will convene this weekend after the president’s envoy Steve Witkoff returns from Moscow to examine the Russian position.”

Ending wars is not easy. And the end is not yet in sight, seemingly. Still, pressure appears to remain on. 

This Post first appeared on my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/stopping-the-war-or-maybe-not-yet

Image Credit: BBC

 

 

 

Europe into the Breach

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It wasn’t long ago that demands for a more ‘strategic autonomy’ approach for Europe seemed to slip away with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Steven Erlanger of the NYTimes wrote of Europe’s response to Russian aggression at the time:

“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the greatest challenge to European security since the end of the Cold War, but the Europeans have missed the opportunity to step up their own defense, diplomats and experts say. Instead, the war has reinforced Europe’s military dependence on the United States.”

Not only was there dependence on the US on the Ukrainian battlefield, the first in Europe since World War Two, but there was a growing acceptance of Biden administration efforts to strengthen alliances and partnerships:

“Washington, they note, has led the response to the war, marshaled allies, organized military aid to Ukraine and contributed by far the largest amount of military equipment and intelligence to Ukraine. It has decided at each step what kind of weapons Kyiv will receive and what it will not.”

 

“But the goal of President Emmanuel Macron of France for “strategic autonomy” — for the European Union to become a military power that could act independently of the United States, if complementary to it — has proved hollow.”

As identified by my colleague, Charles Kupchan, a former Obama official and currently a senior fellow at CFR and a professor of international affairs at Georgetown:

“There is very little appetite for autonomy if that means distance from the United States,” he said, “because the war has underscored the importance of the American military presence in Europe and the guarantee it extended to European allies since World War II.”

But as they say: ‘that was then, and this is now’. Built on Trump’s early efforts to end the war, browbeating, it would seem, Ukraine to accept a cession of fighting, Europe is back. And it starts with Germany and its likely new Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. As identified by Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and Laura Pitel in Berlin for the FT:

“Chancellor-to-be Friedrich Merz has agreed a deal with his likely coalition partner to inject hundreds of billions in extra funding into Germany’s military and infrastructure, in a “fiscal sea change” designed to revive and re-arm Europe’s largest economy.”

 

“A provision would exempt defence spending above 1 per cent of GDP from the “debt brake” that caps government borrowing, allowing Germany to raise an unlimited amount of debt to fund its armed forces and to provide military assistance to Ukraine.”

 

“The future [German] coalition partners will introduce another constitutional amendment to set up a €500bn fund for infrastructure, which would run over 10 years. They are also planning to loosen debt rules for states.”

The German effort by this likely new government underlines the growing sense of emergency in Europe as Trump threatens to not defend NATO members who fail to adequately spend on in their own defense:

“Germany’s massive fiscal stimulus has also underlined the sense of urgency in Europe, spurred by US President Donald Trump’s threat to unwind the US guarantees that have long underpinned the continent’s security. “This is a fiscal sea change for Germany,” said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg. “Merz and his coalition-to-be are rising to the occasion.”

The fiscal actions announced are all the more startling given the CDUs earlier opposition to reforming the debt brake:

“Merz’s conservative CDU/CSU had opposed reforms to the debt brake before the February 23 election. However, hours after coming first in the nationwide vote, the staunch transatlanticist declared that Europe needed to achieve “independence” from Washington given that Trump appeared “largely indifferent” to Europe’s fate.”

This defense response doesn’t stop with just Germany in Europe, however. The EU appears also to be stepping up as well. As noted at the Italian research institute ISPI, the EU is stepping up as well:

“Yesterday, for the first time, the approval by the European Council of aplan to increase the defense and security of member states represented a – European – response to the change in the international order underway. The heads of state and government of the 27 have approved the 800 billion euro plan for rearmament illustrated by the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen. The agreement provides greater flexibility for member states on defense spending and debt and a 150 billion fund, in addition to opening the possibility of evaluating additional financing options. But above all, it indicates the urgency, matured in recent weeks, to change pace and contribute to the defense of Kiev and the continent, with or without US support.”

The shock of the ‘Trump abandonment’ of Europe is evident. Here is a view expressed by Francoise Hollande in the most recent Economist issue. Hollande served as President of France from 2012 to 2017:

“We need to be clear: while the American people may still be our friends, the Trump administration is no longer our ally. This is grave. It marks a fundamental break with the historic relationship between Europe and America and the link established after the second world war with the creation of the Atlantic alliance. It is unfortunately, however, indisputable. It is no longer merely a question of declarations designed to dumbfound, but of actions that mark much more than a disengagement: a strategic about-turn combined with an ideological confrontation. The signs of this reversal have been accumulating in recent weeks. The bewildering and degrading scenes in the Oval Office were the illuminating culmination.”

 

“In addition to this reversal of responsibility for the outbreak of war in Ukraine, with Volodymyr Zelensky portrayed as a dictator and Vladimir Putin as a leader respectable enough to be a regular interlocutor, there has been an unrestrained attack on the principles on which the Western alliance was previously founded.”

In the end, Hollande sets out what he sees as the necessary European response:

“So we have to admit that our alliance with America is broken for the foreseeable future, and draw all the consequences. I can think of at least three.”

 

“The first is that we must continue to intensify our aid to Ukraine. This means seriously increasing the French contribution, which is currently particularly low compared with that of Germany or Britain.”

 

“The second is the need to prioritise providing Ukraine with security guarantees. It is too early to define the form these will take or to talk about the presence of soldiers on the ground. But it is clear that if Europe wants to protect its current borders, it must shoulder its share of responsibility for the security of its closest neighbour, especially if America abdicates this responsibility.”

 

“The third consequence is the urgency of accelerating European defence spending and beefing up European capabilities.”

And the European response to Trump’s aggressive actions in Ukraine extend beyond the 27, or at least the 26 as Hungary has refused to sign on the EU action, to now include the UK, Norway and possibly Turkey. So from Jeanna Smialek from the NYTimes Brussels office in an article entitled, “Europe Races to Craft a Trump-Era Plan for Ukraine and Defense”:

“Much of Europe is now making a show of standing by Ukraine: Britain and France have indicated a willingness to send troops as a peacekeeping force if a deal is reached, and Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain has called for support from a “coalition of the willing.””

 

“Ms. von der Leyen’s plan to “rearm” Europe includes the €150 billion loan program and would also make E.U. budget rules more flexible to enable countries to invest more without breaching tough deficit limits.”

And this coalescing in Europe extends possibly to the French nuclear deterrent:

“France is willing to discuss extending the protection afforded by its nuclear arsenal to its European allies, President Emmanuel Macron said on Wednesday, as the continent scrambles to fend off heightened Russian aggression and diminishing American support.”

 

““I have decided to open the strategic debate on protection through deterrence for our allies on the European continent,” Mr. Macron added.”

But the Trump bullying of Ukraine seemingly has had, it seems, some political results as well, at least for the moment. Ukraine has indicated that it will in the coming weeks join negotiations to end the conflict. As identified in the FT, 

“Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the talks as he wrapped up a summit on Thursday with EU leaders, who rallied round the Ukrainian president and pledged to increase their own defence capabilities.”

 

“The war must be stopped as soon as possible, and Ukraine is ready to work 24/7 together with partners in America and Europe for peace,” Zelenskyy said in a post on Telegram after the Brussels summit. “Next week, on Monday, I am scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia to meet with the Crown Prince [Mohammed bin Salman]. After that, my team will remain in Saudi Arabia to work with American partners. Ukraine is most interested in peace.””

And, it would appear that the US-Ukraine mineral deal is back:

“Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, said the meeting with Ukraine would seek to agree [to] a framework for “a peace agreement and an initial ceasefire”.”

 

“The talks will be focused on the minerals deal that the US has struck with Ukraine as well as a possible ceasefire.”

It has been an exhausting, rather dismaying several weeks of Trump destructiveness. A dramatic turn in strategic partnerships has occurred, and there are now significant questions over the stability of the global order as Martin Wolf writes in the FT: 

“These are merely two sets of decisions in the whirlwind that has accompanied the second Trump presidency. But for the outside world, they are of huge significance. They represent the end of liberal, predictable and rules-governed trading relationships with the world’s most powerful country and also the one that created the system itself. They also represent the abandonment by the US of core alliances and commitments in favour of a closer relationship with an erstwhile enemy. Trump clearly thinks Russia more important than Europe.”

As Wolf points out, it is more than possible that the EU and the UK can replace the US militarily but that can’t occur in the short term:

“The EU plus UK has a combined population 3.6 times Russia’s and a GDP, at purchasing power, 4.7 times larger. The problem, then, is not a lack of human or economic resources: if (a big if) Europe could co-operate effectively it could balance Russia militarily in the long run. But the difficulty is in the medium run, since Europe is unable to make some crucial military equipment, on which it and Ukraine depend. Would the US refuse to supply such weapons if Europeans bought them? Such a refusal to supply would be a moment of truth.”

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/europe-into-the-breach

Image Credit: France 24

 

The Many Possible Shapes for the Global Order: A Quick Look Back & Forward

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The Trump attack on interdependence – particularly economic – has felt foolish and destructive but without question – relentless. What appeared to be a stalling out with Biden’s ill-disguised protectionism, has now turned into repeated blows against an open trading system and a collaborative global order. 

MInouche Shafik, former president of Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and a member of the House of Lords referenced a well-known transformation in  a recent piece in PS: 

““The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.” This famous quote, often attributed to Antonio Gramsci, feels particularly pertinent today, as the international order that has defined the past century undergoes a profound shift.” 

What is passing away? And what is emerging? Joe Nye, the very well known International relations maven has examined exactly that in another  recent piece in PS.  As he describes Trump policy actions: 

“Globalization refers simply to interdependence at intercontinental distances. Trade among European countries reflects regional interdependence, whereas European trade with the US or China reflects globalization. By threatening China with tariffs, US President Donald Trump is trying to reduce the economic aspect of our global interdependence, which he blames for the loss of domestic industries and jobs.” 

Can globalization be reversed? Nye argues it certainly has in the past. As he describes: 

“But can economic globalization be reversed? It has happened before. The nineteenth century was marked by a rapid increase in both trade and migration, but it came to a screeching halt with the outbreak of World War I. Trade as a share of total world product did not recover to its 1914 levels until nearly 1970.” 

It is striking how long it took for global economic interdependence to recover to levels that matched the late nineteenth century. But what is also interesting is how not long ago in fact there was much attention focused on an enhanced global order. Take a look at this piece published in 2001. This Introduction was written by one of the book’s principal contributors, and a close colleague, Arthur Stein. Arthur, today, is a Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at UCLA. Arthur has been a significant international relations force at UCLA for years now. He prepared the Introduction for the 2001 volume titled, “The New Great Power Coalition”. As an aside I played a minor role in the volume with a chapter on China’s entry into the WTO.  Now, back to Arthur’s examination. There is no missing the cautious but still optimistic tone that Arthur conveys for this era following the real tensions of the Cold War and the emergence of US leadership. As he writes: 

“In short, we believe that in this era following a global conflict, the prospects for global cooperation conflicts lie in the relations between the Great Powers. Constructing a Great Power concert would make possible the establishment of a cooperative world order and truly global international organizations.” …

 

“In more general terms, however, we conclude that the movement from unilateral to multilateral incentives, norms, and structures appears to be useful in enlisting members in an  encompassing coalition. The world is now in the process of creating new high-prestige and selective clubs in the fields of economics, politics, and even the military. Once enough of these clubs in the fields overlap (regionally and functionally), they will form a linked structure that could combine into an encompassing coalition, with the latter representing the sustaining cooperation developed in separate regions and issue areas.”

Returning to Minouche Shafik this is what she sees as the new global order, one that others, as well, have suggested is emerging: 

“The world today is very different. It is a multipolar world, with China, Russia, India, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, and the Gulf states challenging the old order, alongside other emerging powers demanding a greater voice in shaping the rules of the international system. Meanwhile, belief in “universal values” and the idea of an “international community” has waned, as many point to the hypocrisy of rich countries hoarding vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic and the response to the Ukraine war compared to the failures to act in response to humanitarian crises in Gaza, Sudan, and many other places.” 

 

“We may be heading to a zero-order world in which rules are replaced by power – a very difficult environment for smaller countries. Or it may be a world of large regional blocs, with the United States dominating its hemisphere, China prevailing over East Asia, and Russia reasserting control over the countries of the former Soviet Union. Ideally, we can find our way to a new rules-based order that more accurately reflects our multipolar world.”

Regional blocs may be in order. Or, possibly the reassertion of a form of geopolitical and ideological blocs. That seems to be what is described by colleague, G. John Ikenberry. In an article in International Affairs, penned at the beginning of last year, entitled, “Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order”, John writes this about the emerging global order:

“Today, among the many impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the most consequential may be that it marks the moment—the tipping-point—when history reversed course, pushing the world back in the direction of geopolitical and ideological groupings.” 

 

“Today, we might call these three groupings the global West, the global East, and the global South. One is led by the United States and Europe, the second by China and Russia, and the third by an amorphous grouping of non-western developing states, led by India, Brazil and others. Each ‘world’ offers grand narratives of what is at stake in the Ukraine conflict and how it fits into the larger problems and prospects for twenty-first century world order.” 

 

“Each offers ideas and programmes for the reorganization and reform of global rules and institutions. Each has its own constructed history, its own list of grievances and accomplishments. Each has its leaders, projects and ideological visions.” 

 

“These Three Worlds are not blocs, nor even coherent negotiating groups. They might best be seen as informal, constructed and evolving global factions, and not as fixed or formal political entities.”

 

“The Three Worlds are not best defined as poles so much as loose coalitions seeking to shape global rules and institutions. States in these three ‘worlds’ occupy different locations in the global system, creating shared interests and affinities that, taken together, shape patterns of interstate behaviour. The Three Worlds are defined in important respects by diplomacy— that is, by speeches, summit meetings and UN gatherings in which leaders advance their visions of world order. Each grouping has a loose political identity and a range of more-or-less consistent convictions about what constitutes a desirable and legitimate international order.”

I think it is difficult to know where we are at this moment, and more so where we are going. It is evident, however, that the world we have experienced over the last decades is being hammered out of existence especially by Trump 2.0. As David Wallace-Wells describes it in a NYTimes Opinion article, written just the other day: 

“But each declaration of imperial desire is that mercurial kind of Trumpist speech act, in which a given utterance can be both meaningless and full of portent at the same time, self-disavowing even as it also demonstrates the president’s world-shaping power.” 

 

“And whatever comes of Trump’s retrograde dreams of manifest destiny, the implicit challenge to the legacy geopolitical order is just as striking: If we want these things and these places, who is going to stop us?” … 

 

“What comes next? New paradigms rarely arise fully formed. But if we spent the last four years watching Joe Biden’s ineffectual attempt to revive some rickety version of the moralistic postwar order, it is supremely clear what Donald Trump would like to replace that pretense with: the principle that global chaos opens up opportunity for great powers long hemmed in by convention and deference.” 

 

“The MAGA riposte is, Let’s not be naïve and let’s not be suckers: We are all wolves on the world stage, and the game begins when we show our teeth.”

It would be valuable if new rules, principles, and norms emerged but at the moment what we can see is the dramatic impact of power on interstate relations. For the moment we are less driven by the emergence of order but by its opposite.  But we will come back here at Alan’s Newsletter to examine  – likely repeatedly – the shape of the global order as I think there may be surprises, possibly many surprises we have not anticipated given the immediate and dramatic attention to Trump.

The Post originally appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-many-possible-shapes-for-the

All comments and subscriptions are welcome

 

 

All Purpose Tools – with Destruction in Mind

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It was hard to swallow the various initiatives and proposals that flooded from the White House and indeed Trump’s lips this week. Where does one start – with Gaza and the crazy Trump ‘wacko’ notion of the ‘Riviera of the  Mediterranean’? Or, do we look at a somewhat lower decibel view – the threats and or actions by Trump when it comes to tariffs. Tariffs, these things you remember up until Trump as a policy instrument that  used to be about trade policy. Well, not any more according to Trump. 

It was dismaying and equally disheartening to listen to the various efforts by his advisors past and present to normalize the actions along with Republicans in Congress while the loyal opposition, the  Democrats, seem ‘rooted in their seats’ with what appears to be only minor ‘huffing and puffing’ against the many mania actions by the President. 

What seems most startling is his recent flood of actions – Executive Orders and Memos – take us back to Trump 1.0 – but worse. The Trump Gaza proposal seems to be – without question – the winner of the week though. As Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman of the NYTimes, point out:

While his announcement looked formal and thought-out — he read the plan from a sheet of paper — his administration had not done even the most basic planning to examine the feasibility of the idea, according to four people with knowledge of the discussions, who were not authorized to speak publicly. 

 

Inside the U.S. government, there had been no meetings with the State Department or Pentagon, as would normally occur for any serious foreign policy proposal, let alone one of such magnitude. There had been no working groups. The Defense Department had produced no estimates of the troop numbers required, or cost estimates, or even an outline of how it might work.

 

There was little beyond an idea inside the president’s head.

And as David Leonhardt, also of the NYTimes, noted: 

For all the early energy of his presidency — the flurry of executive orders, confirmations and firings — Trump has looked less disciplined this week than he did in the initial days after returning to office. The last few days have instead conjured the chaos of his first term, when his grand pronouncements often failed to change government policy. 

Back to the Gaza proposal, for  a moment.  It is worth noting Aaron David Miller’s view as set out recently in his FP in a piece titled, “Trump Makes Population Transfer an American Policy”. Miller has had a long connection with  the region. He was a former U.S. State Department Middle East analyst and importantly a negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations there. As he wrote: 

From my 27 years of working in the official U.S. Arab-Israeli diplomacy business, I can say President Donald Trump’s Gaza gambit goes above and beyond the craziest and most destructive proposal any administration has ever made (and there have been some strange ones). In one fell swoop, standing next to an Israeli leader who looked like the cat that just swallowed a dozen canaries, the president let loose on a scheme that is not just impractical but dangerous.

 

Trump has now harnessed U.S. prestige and credibility to propose an idea that will be perceived as forced transfer or worse; validated the all-too-dangerous fantasies of the Israel right; undermined key U.S. partners Egypt and Jordan; made his own goal of Israeli-Saudi normalization that much harder; and for good measure sent an unmistakable signal to authoritarians everywhere that they have the right to assert control over other people’s territory. 

Clearly, it is ‘stomach churning’ to many that have been involved in the long unsuccessful effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and more recently to end the Gaza war. Arab partners have uniformly rejected the Trump proposal for Gaza and Israeli support at least to the extent of organizing the Israeli military to aid voluntary evacuation as pointed out by Alexandra Sharp at FP: 

Such suggestions have sparked a flurry of behind-the-scenes diplomacy to stop the joint Israel-U.S. proposal. Both Jordan and Egypt have refused to accept displaced Gaza residents, with Jordanian King Abdullah II rejecting any efforts to annex the territory and Cairo stating that the plan “constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law, and infringes on the most basic rights of the Palestinian people.” Egyptian officials told Time magazine that such a plan could undermine the country’s peace treaty with Israel and harm the region’s stability.

 

Saudi Arabia also strongly rejected the proposal and vowed not to sign a normalization deal with Israel—a foreign-policy priority for the Trump administration—without the creation of a Palestinian state that includes Gaza.

In the face of the Gaza proposal, Trump’s recent tariff actions against Canada, Mexico and China, seem positively tame. Still, though, it was rather crazy stuff threatening 25 percent across the board tariffs on Canada and Mexico only to hold off for 30 days after discussions with Mexican and Canadian leaders and then applying 10 percent across the board tariffs against China. The ultimate outcomes remain unknown though it is startling that Trump’s actions to delay action comes after accepting, at least in the Canadian case, proposals that had been offered significantly earlier. And not unlike the Gaza proposal, it is hard to discern either the methods or the ultimate goal of Trump’s proposals and demands. Is there a method or a clear goal?   The question that faces allies and foes alike is: is there a method to the madness? Not surprisingly experts and opinion writers have in the past, and in the early days of this  second Trump Administration are trying to assess what objectives and outcomes is Trump attempting to achieve? And what diplomatic means is Trump employing to achieve those objectives. 

On the latter Aaron Blake has suggested that there are four possible explanations for this current Trump 2.0 approach. In a piece in the Washington Post (Wapo)  titled, “4 explanations for Trump’s shocking Gaza proposal”, Blake gives us the following possible explanations for the outburst from Trump on Gaza at the press conference with Benjamin Netanyahu. He suggests:

  1. It is a distraction – “And there’s no question that Trump, more than ever, is “flooding the zone” with bold (and often legally dubious) actions that challenge everyone to keep up.” 

  2. It is a negotiating ploy “This could be Trump threatening the unthinkable to force Middle Eastern countries to pursue a more sustainable peace. It would basically be: If you guys can’t figure it out, we’re coming in.” 

  3. He’s leaning into the madman theory even more – ““The idea is basically to make other countries believe you’re completely unpredictable and capable of anything, to keep them in line.”

  4. His sudden imperialist streak is very real – ““It’s possible all of this imperialistic talk is bluster. But it’s also possible that Trump feels freed up in his second term, after years of leveraging “America First” for political gain, to change it up and make the expansion of the United States (in areas he actually cares about) a key plank of his legacy.”

All have some validity. It is evident that the approaches vary from slightly ‘off kilter’ – the madman theory, to a strategic gambit – a negotiating ploy.   I don’t think it is possible to draw strong conclusions at this early Trump 2.0 stage. What we do know however, that particularly with respect to the Gaza proposal, he is on his own untethered to his advisers and key cabinet members. And in the case of the ‘Gaza bomb’ it had one added dramatic effect – it left Netanyahu completely off the hook from any sharp questioning from global media over immediate Gaza actions on the ceasefire, and beyond, the role of the Palestinian Authority, and the future of a “two state solution”. It was a significant timely encounter completely avoided.

With respect to Trump’s goals, assuming there are such animals, it is hard to ignore the fact that his actions seem intended to dismantle the order that the US built; to see the United States as demanding fealty to a leading power and the shape of relations the US is striving to build under Trump 2.0. Decades of building integrated markets in North America, and likely  beyond, are now threatened by Trump’s bellicose actions. Yet according to Bob Davis in FP in a piece titled, “Trump Has the Whole Global Trade System in His Sights”, this is Trump’s goal: 

But he has a bigger goal in mind for his second term with plans he is still cooking up. Trump seeks to remake global trade based on what he calls “reciprocity”—treating other countries, supposedly, in the same fashion as they treat the United States. China is not the target this time—or at least not the only one. He has his sights set on any country with which the U.S. has a large, persistent trade deficit, which in his mind means it is treating the U.S. “terribly.” Success would mean sharply reducing the trade deficit, no matter which country he hits or what other geopolitical goals it impedes.

Maybe he does, maybe he doesn’t have this goal in mind. He is swinging tariffs as an ‘all purpose tool’ with destruction in mind. We will be watching. 

Image Credit: France 24

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/156695312/share-center

 

 

“What Can We Expect?”: A Second Look At America’s Political Transition

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Well, hello, we’re back! I do hope the holidays proved to be a warm time and filled with family and friends. Now, I was ‘chomping at the bit’ to return to Alan’s Newsletter before the end of the Biden administration and the return of Donald J Trump. We are looking at the transition of administrations – focusing on foreign policy.

So where we left Alan’s Newsletter at this first Post of ‘What Can We Expect’ – the last Post of the year 2024, was me actually looking at the end of the Biden administration – and, as I said: “… trying to focus on the end of the Biden administration: what folks conclude about the Biden initiatives and where that then leads, possibly,  for the upcoming Trump administration”, especially targeting US-China policy. 

In this earlier Post I looked primarily at trade and technology policies – and there seemed to be much to be desired – though it was interesting to get Biden’s last words on his own assessment of his administration’s efforts. But now I want to extend the analysis by turning to national security. Interestingly, and as I noted in the earlier Post I was keen to review, none other than Senator McConnell, a dominant Republican figure over several decades in Congress and the Republican majority leader from 2015 to 2021, making him the longest-serving Senate party leader in U.S. history. And for the moment he remains in the Senate and an influence on some at least. But to get there – to McConnell that is,  I thought it worthwhile to first look at Fareed Zakaria’s early 2024 FA article, “The Self-Doubting Superpower: America Shouldn’t Give Up on the World It Made” Fareed has a large public role in assessing US international politics as the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and he also writes a weekly column for The Washington Post. Fareed starts out acknowledging the Biden administration’s turn – and not for the better – in international economic policy making: 

“And yet, much of his governing strategy has been predicated on the notion that the country has been following the wrong course, even under Democratic presidents, even during the Obama-Biden administration. In an April 2023 speech, Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, criticized “much of the international economic policy of the last few decades,” blaming globalization and liberalization for hollowing out the country’s industrial base, exporting American jobs, and weakening some core industries.”

Now, I remain rather sceptical of the consequences these folks assign to trade policy but it continues to be a ‘warm blanket’ for many analysts and politicians. Fareed acknowledges it, it but then situates the US in the global order as still a dominant presence: 

“On measure after measure, the United States remains in a commanding position compared with its major competitors and rivals. Yet it does confront a very different international landscape. Many powers across the globe have risen in strength and confidence. They will not meekly assent to American directives. Some of them actively seek to challenge the United States’ dominant position and the order that has been built around it. … The challenge for Washington is to run fast but not run scared. Today, however, it remains gripped by panic and self doubt.” 

Fareed raises the real prospect that the US will quail from continued leadership in the global economy but in fact even beyond that to global order and national security relations as well: 

“The most worrying challenge to the rules-based international order does not come from China, Russia, or Iran. It comes from the United States. If America, consumed by exaggerated fears of its own decline, retreats from its leading role in world affairs, it will open up power vacuums across the globe and encourage a variety of powers and players to try to step into the disarray.” 

 

“Since 1945, America has debated the nature of its engagement with the world, but not whether it should be engaged to begin with. Were the country to truly turn inward, it would mark a retreat for the forces of order and progress. Washington can still set the agenda, build alliances, help solve global problems, and deter aggression while using limited resources—well below the levels that it spent during the Cold War. It would have to pay a far higher price if order collapsed, rogue powers rose, and the open world economy fractured or closed.”

Now the actions by the departing Biden administration may have already done some real damage to relations with allies – this the determination by Biden to kill the Nippon-US Steel deal. As Alan Beattie described it in his FT ‘Trade Secrets’ column:

“Still, some of us were also moderately hopeful that Biden’s long history as an alliance-builder in international relations might weigh reasonably heavily in the balance. That’s where we were largely wrong. When it came down to it, steelmakers were prioritised above all. As a unionised industry located in electoral swing states (Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) with tariff protection inherited from Donald Trump and national security and environmental rationales, however specious, they ticked too many boxes to ignore.” 

 

“All politics is local, including trade politics, but the politics here is quite weird. It’s surreal that the geopolitically important practice of friendshoring is being sabotaged by a USTR with no specialism in national security and a union leader both acting in defiance of colleagues who are closer to the issues at hand. Tai’s obsession with the steel industry has extended to sending groups of USTR officials on tourist trips to do photo-ops with steelworkers. This is vibes-based trade policy backed up by show-and-tell.” 

So, the focus on allies and partners in firming trade relations and building resilient supply chains with them is, in this instance, revealed as hollow: 

“When it came to it, it wasn’t the substance but the vibe of protecting the steel industry that prevented the Biden administration giving friendshoring a fair go. It’s a sad end for a respectable but ultimately unloved idea.” 

And, it suggests that the US under Biden is not ‘walking the walk’ when it comes to friendshoring but also undermining trust with, in this case, one of its closest allies in the Indo-Pacific, Japan.

All right then, focusing more directly on national security, let me turn to Rush Doshi who is a colleague – an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is also senior fellow for China and director of the Initiative on China Strategy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and importantly he served the Biden White House at the National Security Council (NSC) as the Director and later Deputy Senior Director for China and Taiwan from 2021 to March 2024. So involved with Biden national security. Having just emerged from the Biden administration, how does he now view the requirements of US national security policy today? Well, Rush assists us in a FA article produced in late November. There he wrote: 

“Without corrective action, the United States faced a growing risk of being surpassed by China technologically, dependent on it economically, and defeated militarily in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.” 

 

“The Biden administration focused on rebuilding American strength by focusing on its foundations at home and its relationships with partners abroad, an approach summed up in its “invest, align, compete” tagline.

 

“That formula can also serve as a way to fulfill the Trump administration’s vision of “peace through strength.” But rebuilding American power will require the Trump administration to undertake new efforts, too, that depend on bipartisan congressional support and the buy in of the American public.”

 

“But the foundations of that strength have atrophied, especially since the end of the Cold War. The administration will need to undertake significant structural reforms to remedy these weaknesses.”

 

“The United States needs to fix its defense industrial base to rapidly deter China and, if necessary, defeat it in a potential conflict. At present, the United States would expend all its munitions within a week of sustained fighting and would struggle to rebuild surface vessels after they were sunk, with a national shipbuilding capacity less than that of one of China’s larger shipyards.”

 

“Washington also needs to protect its critical infrastructure from cyberattack. China has compromised U.S. critical infrastructure upon which millions of Americans rely, including water and gas, transportation, and telecommunications systems, with the aim of inciting chaos, sowing panic, and reducing U.S. will in a conflict scenario.” 

 

“Finally, the United States needs to invest in reindustrialization and technological leadership. China already accounts for more than 30 percent of global manufacturing, can innovate successfully, increasingly leads in the sectors of tomorrow, and is redirecting massive amounts of capital into manufacturing as its housing market stagnates. The result, a second “China shock” akin to the one that flooded U.S. markets with cheap Chinese goods at the beginning of this century, will threaten the United States’ future as an industrial power and leave it more dependent on China than China is on the United States. 

 

“National security is not just about foreign policy. Trump’s team should remember that the key to this decisive decade is not just what the United States does abroad. What it does at home to improve its competitive position may be even more important.” 

What is more than interesting is that Rush urges these major efforts after just emerging from several years at the Biden administration. Now what does that say about the Biden years. 

So, finally, let’s turn to what I promised you above Mitch McConnell. Now McConnell is more than willing to attack the Biden administration for what he describes as a weak national security effort. But it also urges Trump to avoid just focusing on China and in doing so ignore the real threat to Europe – and to the US obviously, from Russia’s Ukraine efforts. As McConnell describes:

“Trump would be wise to build his foreign policy on the enduring cornerstone of U.S. leadership: hard power.” 

 

“To pretend that the United States can focus on just one threat at a time, that its credibility is divisible, or that it can afford to shrug off faraway chaos as irrelevant is to ignore its global interests and its adversaries’ global designs.”

 

“China poses the gravest long-term challenge to U.S. interests. But although successive presidents have acknowledged this reality, their actual policies have been inconsistent.”

 

“In so doing, it [Trump] must not repeat the mistakes of President Barack Obama’s so-called pivot to Asia. The Obama administration failed to back up its policy with sufficient investments in U.S. military power.” 

Against the grain I suspect of many of the MAGA Republicans including, possibly Donald Trump, McConnell urges: 

“The United States needs a military that can handle multiple increasingly coordinated threats at once. Without one, a president will likely hesitate to expend limited resources on one threat at the expense of others, thereby ceding initiative or victory to an adversary.The United States must get back to budgets that are informed by strategy and a force-planning construct that imagines fighting more than one war at once.”

 

“The United States’ security and prosperity are rooted in military primacy. Preserving that decisive superiority is costly, but neglecting it comes with far steeper costs.”

For McConnell, then, there is a real need to underpin current US economic strength with policy initiatives: 

“I am not naive about the downsides of international trade, but there is no question that free markets and free trade have been responsible for much of the United States’ prosperity.”

 

“That’s why the United States and like-minded free-market economies must work together to reform the international trading system to protect U.S. interests from predatory trade practices—not abandon the system entirely.  Without U.S. leadership in this area, there is little question that Beijing will be able to rewrite the rules of trade on its own terms.”

Finally, there is a real abiding requirement, from this side of the Republican Congressional majority – directed to the MAGA Republicans and urging  this critical need for the incoming Trump administration:

“Trump will no doubt hear from some that he should prioritize a single theater and downgrade U.S. interests and commitments elsewhere. Most of these voices will argue for focusing on Asia at the expense of interests in Europe or the Middle East.  Such thinking is commonplace among both isolationist conservatives who indulge the fantasy of “Fortress America” and progressive liberals who mistake internationalism for an end in itself.”

 

“Neither camp has committed to maintaining the military superiority or sustaining the alliances needed to contest revisionist powers.” 

So, there you are. McConnell is urging ‘a full court press’ to maintain a dominant US military position and global leadership. Will Trump and his MAGA Republicans in Congress follow through. I have my doubts. 

Image Credit: Getty Images

This Post first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter –

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/what-can-we-expect-a-second-look?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

“What Can We Expect?”: In the First Instance

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Now you might think, with that title, that I’d be delving into Trump 2.0. Well, not exactly in the first instance. Instead, I am trying to focus on the end of the Biden administration: what folks conclude about the Biden initiatives and where that then leads, possibly, for the upcoming Trump administration. Now, to be clear, I’m not trying to guess where the Trump administration is likely to take us. Not with the inconsistent Trump at the helm again; but it would be good if the incoming administration might choose to take a hard look at what the Biden administration hoped to achieve with its policy initiatives and where, in fact, it found itself in the increasing disorder in the international system. We are particularly interested, not surprisingly, in the state of US-China relations in the face of four years of Biden strategy and policy. What has China done in reaction to Biden strategic competition? And what does the United States do now in the face of today’s US-China competition?

Just the other day, Tom Friedman from the NYT gave us a peek of what he saw in a recent visit to Beijing and Shanghai. Where is China today in the face of the challenging US relations: the end of US engagement, the rise in tensions with Trump 1.0 and the Biden strategic competitive policy. Friedman in an opinion article titled, “How Elon Musk and Taylor Swift Can Resolve U.S.-China Relations” makes “no bones about it” and early in the opinion piece he writes:

I just spent a week in Beijing and Shanghai, meeting with Chinese officials, economists and entrepreneurs, and let me get right to the point: While we were sleeping China took a great leap forward in high-tech manufacturing of everything.

And he starts with Trump 1.0:

If no one has told Donald Trump, then I will: His nickname on Chinese social media today is “Chuan Jianguo” — meaning “Trump the (Chinese) Nation Builder” — because of how his relentless China bashing and tariffs during his first term as president lit a fire under Beijing to double down on its efforts to gain global supremacy in electric cars, robots and rare materials, and to become as independent of America’s markets and tools as possible.

What Trump 2.0 now faces in today’s China that he helped to create is, according to Tom:

The China that Trump will encounter is a much more formidable export engine. Its advanced manufacturing muscles have exploded in size, sophistication and quantity in the last eight years, even while consumption by its people remains puny.

 

China’s export machine is so strong now that only very high tariffs might really slow it down, and China’s response to very high tariffs could be to start cutting off American industries from crucial supplies that are now available almost nowhere else. That kind of supply-chain warfare is not what anyone, anywhere needs.

Further, Tom signals what a Trump administration must now do in the face of much more evident competitor:

But if we don’t use this time to respond to China the way we did to the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, with our own comprehensive scientific, innovative and industrial push, we will be toast.

So for Tom what it requires is a ‘full court press’ – ‘A Sputnik Moment’ by the US under a second Trump administration. Hmm, if really required one has to wonder if given today’s US politics there is anything even somewhat similar to that much earlier, “all hands on deck” type US strategy.

Tom Friedman, however, is not the only one calling for a concerted US national effort to deal with a charging China that the US helped to create. More focused on the technology/science/innovation front is the examination by my good colleague Scott Kennedy from CSIS. Scott is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at CSIS and recently he examined the US-China technology competition in Foreign Affairs, in an article titled, “How America’s War on Chinese Tech Backfired And Why Trump’s Plans Would Make Things Even Worse.

But just before going there I thought it was worth setting up that examination by focusing on probably one of Joe Biden’s last public talks as President, this at Brookings in Washington, just a few days ago on December 10th. The remarks were titled by the White House as, “His Middle-Out, Bottom-Up Economic Playbook”. There was a fair bit of coughing and missing words in the transcript but the message was clear enough:

Today, here at Brookings Institution, I would like to talk about pivotal actions we’ve taken to rebuild the economy for the long haul, you know, and how we’re — how we’re at a critical, in my view, moment in the direction the economy is going to take.

 

After decades of trickle-down economics that primarily benefited those at the very top, we — we’ve written a new book that’s growing the economy — the middle-out and the bottom-up — that benefits, thus far, everyone. And that’s going to be the test with go- — going forward.

 

I was determined to restore U.S. leadership in industries of the future.

 

We understood we needed long-term investments for the future. Investing in America agenda, which includes my Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act — together, they mark the most significant investment in America since the New Deal. And that’s a fact. I mean, whether it’s good or bad, that’s the fact.

 

We not only — we not only beat the pandemic; we broke from the economic orthodoxy that has failed this nation, in my view, for a long time — a theory that led to fewer jobs, less economic growth, and bigger deficits.

 

And the best way to build that in America was to invest in America, invest in American products and invest in the American people — not by handing out tax breaks to those at the top.

But the tools employed by the Biden administration, as described by the President, barely touched the protections initiated by Trump 1.0 and advanced further in some cases by the Biden administration. But Scott targets exactly those initiatives by the Biden administration, particularly in the technology innovation sectors. As he describes:

Washington’s array of tools is highly expansive: export controls, tariffs, product bans, inbound and outbound investment screening, constraints on data flows, incentives to shift supply chains, limits on scholarly exchange and research collaboration, industrial policy expenditures, and buy-America incentives.

 

The goals of these measures are equally diverse: slow China’s progress in the most advanced technologies that have dual-use potential, reduce overdependence on China as a source of inputs and as a market for Western goods, deny China access to sensitive data, protect critical infrastructure, push back against economic coercion, protect the United States’ industrial competitiveness, and boost its manufacturing employment.

And he concludes by arguing:

Beijing’s shift toward a more expansive and assertive form of mercantilist techno-nationalism poses genuine risks to the prosperity and economic security of the United States and others. Something must be done, to be sure, but Washington’s increasingly restrictive policies have yielded highly mixed results.

So it’s not that China doesn’t pose a challenge but the solutions chosen by the Biden administration, in part built on the earlier Trump years, raise serious concerns and pose real questions in the face of Trump 2.0:

As President-elect Donald Trump returns to power, his administration would be wise to reflect on the fact that existing restrictions on Chinese technology have yielded decidedly mixed results. The Biden administration has described its strategy as a “small yard, high fence,” or placing high restrictions on a small number of critical technologies. That yard is already growing, with negative unintended consequences for the United States.

What then can be done, according to Scott. It seems to be in several parts. First, according to him:

Washington needs to set clear priorities, identifying the most urgent threats that deserve a response. Otherwise, the United States will be dragged into a game of whack-a-mole or, more worryingly, try to block all commercial ties with China. To the extent that the United States attempts to deny technologies to China, the only sustainable approach involves working with allies and other countries so that the United States will not be outflanked by China and lose technology leadership in the rest of the world. If the Trump administration pursues extensive decoupling from China, the result will most likely be an isolated, poorer, and weaker United States.

And additionally Scott targets international organizations and multilateral initiatives:

The Trump administration would also be unwise to ignore global institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, as doing so would dramatically raise the likelihood of unbounded conflict. Instead, Washington should intensify multilateral cooperation to set new rules for global economic activity in order to avoid a race to the bottom.

 

The United States may in some instances need to take unilateral steps to maintain its relative technology superiority, but excessive economic security measures will mean less innovation, slower economic growth, reduced profits, and fewer jobs. With a combination of wise domestic policies, collaboration with allies, and investment in international institutions, the United States can achieve both prosperity and security.

This latter focus is welcome, it seems to me. As bad as some of the Biden tariff and sanction approaches have been, certainly the dismantling of the WTO trade and investment policies stand out, in particular, because earlier administrations were vital to the creation of the multilateral trade framework. While it was, and is imperfect, as any multilateral instrument is, it is a ‘damn sight better’ than where we are today. Geneva at the moment is dead.

But it is not just the economy/technology front that demands apparently a concerted Trump administration effort. There is also national security. The message, it seems, is being delivered by one of the key figures over decades, that is none other than Senator Mitch McConnell.

I plan to return to Senator McConnell, and a number of others on national security, after the holiday break. But it is holiday time and I plan to put down my pen for the holidays. Look for me back here at Alan’s Newsletter in the week of January 6th – 2025, if not earlier. Have a great Holiday time!

This Post first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter.

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/what-can-we-expect-in-the-first-instance

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The ‘Global Order’: ‘Who is on First’

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I was trying very hard to ignore the impending vote for US president upcoming next week. We will have plenty of time to contemplate the action and consequences of the presidential choice on US foreign policy and global leadership.

But then again I was not fully able to ignore the consequences for the international order of this event. I was caught by a very recent Special Report from CIGI on: “Scenarios of Evolving Global Order”. Now CIGI is located in Waterloo Ontario and CIGI stands for the Centre for International Governance Innovation. I have a small soft spot for the think tank as I and a number of close colleagues spent some good years there when it launched as a global affairs outfit and, I think produced some good early work on global governance, among other things.

Anyway, the Report is interesting as it attempts to:

… fill a gap between the analysis of current trends and mapping of potential futures by outlining five possible scenarios for an evolving global order. These five scenarios represent a spectrum from the most modest plausible change (reform of the current system) to the most radical (transformation of the whole system due to a global shock).

There clearly is much current discussion over the evolving global order in the context of significant geopolitical tensions between the two leading powers and the numerous conflicts burdening international relations. So the Report describes 5 different scenarios built on these assumptions:

• The current international system is not working; international institutions, including the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions, are unable to address most contemporary challenges.

• Responses to contemporary global challenges are siloed, nationally and institutionally.

• The United States’ global leadership is waning due to reduced capacity and internal focus.

• The relative economic power of liberal democracies is diminishing.

• Emerging powers — including, but not limited to, China and India — are increasingly asserting their influence and driving change.

• Finding new pathways of international cooperation on security issues may be more elusive, meaning attention may focus on cooperation on economic issues.

• Deglobalization, and regional integration as an alternative to multilateralism, continues to accelerate by many, but not all, measures.

• Momentum for nationalist and isolationist policies continues to build in many countries.

The result five different scenarios as filled out by the author team:

Scenario 1: Reform of the Existing Global System

Scenario 2: Replacement of the Existing Global System

Scenario 3: The Emergence of a Bloc-Based Global System

Scenario 4: A Case of Disorder

Scenario 5: Transformed Global Order

Each scenario is interesting and for every scenario there are two pathways described by the authors leading to an identified outcome:

The authors’ view is that these five scenarios broadly represent core directions that global order may evolve toward in the coming months and years. They acknowledge that there are numerous potential pathways that the five scenarios could take — by choosing only two for each, many possibilities remain for further exploration.

Now each scenario is worth assessing – and I will try and examine some perghaps at a later date, but I was struck by the perspective the authors identified for the structure and the dynamics for all five scenarios. As the Report suggested:

All of the scenarios explored assume the current and evolving global dynamics are multipolar (rather than other forms such as bipolar, hegemonic or concerted). It is, of course, possible that global order does not continue to evolve in  a multipolar way — for example, that one group of states forms a security and economic coalition in a way that dominates all the rest or that the world devolves into a bipolar world utterly dominated by American and Chinese spheres of control. The world is currently operating with multipolar dynamics on most issues, and this is likely to continue into the future.

Now that assumption of a multipolar system struck me. The reason is I came across an interesting Substack Post from Clarence Gu and Chenghao Sun, ChinAffairs+ describing in the Post titled “Yan Xuetong & John Mearsheimer Conversation: Who Shapes Global Order, and Who Will Win the Competition?”an interesting encounter, the third in fact, between these two experts. Now Yan Xuetong is the Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, a highly prestigious university in China and John Mearsheimer is, as he describes himself, “the  R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982 and an international relations theorist. More specifically, I am a realist.”

Now I have known John for many years as we were graduate students together at Cornell University with the same adviser, the recently passed Richard N Rosecrance, renowned international relations expert. But we were seldom on the same side of the fence when describing the underlying dynamics of the international system. But that is neither here nor there.

Both Yan Xuetong and John are known for their focus in international relations on ‘realism’, and in fact John’s  writings identify what is known as ‘offensive realism’. And while the two differ to a degree in this encounter at Tsinghua in Beijing they both strongly endorse the notion that the system is driven by the need by states to maintain dominance in a current bipolar not multipolar world (You will note by the way that the quotes that follow have been slightly edited due at times to  imperfect transcription). As John describes the international system:

How do you survive the international system? The system is where there is no higher authority. The answer is very simple. You want to be very powerful. You want to maximize your power, you cannot be certain of the intentions of those other states. It pays to be really powerful, to pay to be a hegemon.

 

If you think more specifically, the argument is that you can only be a regional hegemon, number one. Number two, you want to make sure that no other state is a regional hegemon. The ideal situation is to be the only regional hegemony in the international system.

 

All of this is to say we are involved today, in an intense security competition. It shows no signs going away. And if anything will get worse with the passage of time. This is a tragic situation. It has nothing to do with Chinese culture or American culture. And many people in China blame the United States for this trouble. … So my argument is, it’s the system that has caused this intense security competition.

Yan Xuetong is even more direct. He states:

The new trend of global order is Counter-Globalization. Then certainly today, I think because today’s title is Global Order and US-China relationship, we have to talk about how the relationship between China and US impact the current global order, my understanding is that the China-US relationship just like John argued that it will be intensified in terms of conflicts.You cannot expect China and US suddenly find a way to set down those disputes become the partners. If that happens, it means our theories are wrong. And actually, why the China-US conflicts are increasing and intensifying. It’s because now we’re in a bipolar configuration. The power structure is not multipolar.

 

The power structure is not multipolar. The current power structure is bipolar. And in the IR community, we all agree the situation after the World War One was multipolar, and after World War Two is bipolar.

 

What I mean is that the historic experience tells us, today we still have to understand what the international configuration is. It is not multipolar, not unipolar, it is bipolar, because except China no other major powers have capability or national power that account for 1/3 of the United States. None of them, except China. I don’t know how exactly we can do the measurement, but at least China’s capability is larger than 1/3 of the United States, possibly I would say 2/3 of the US.

Well, I won’t go into the five scenarios at this point though they are worth reviewing. The point here is to raise concern over analyses that are largely driven by structure rather than dynamics generated by policy – security, economic and political. These are the drivers that shape international outcomes. It is difficult at this moment to determine whether the structure is slightly less hegemonic, or is already bipolar, or in fact has become multipolar. The real analytic need, however, is to focus on the leading states and their foreign policy determinations. Structure is there, of course, but it does not drive foreign policy action or outcomes.

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. All comments and free subscriptions are welcome

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Leadership – or Not

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The killing of Yahya Sinwar in Gaza, as many observers have suggested, may impact on the continuation, or a possible cessation of the conflict in Gaza. Some like Tom Friedman of the NewYork Times, and other commentators have even suggested that it could have possibilities beyond just the Gaza conflict. But all this rightly raises again the influence – and dare I say the leadership – of the United States. This question of US leadership brings attention not just to Israel and the region but beyond and raises real questions of US leadership with the global order.

On the Middle East front the US has expressed strongly its belief that it is time to end the war. As David Sanger of the NYTimes suggested in his  analysis of the current state of relations:

Within hours of the death of the Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on Thursday, President Biden and his aides scrambled to design one last push for a broad de-escalation of violence in the Middle East: a cease-fire and hostage deal in Gaza, a pullback from Israeli attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon, a confident declaration of victory by Israel that might allow it to forgo a major retaliation against Iran.

It is time for this war to end,” Mr. Biden said as he emerged from Air Force One when it landed outside Berlin late Thursday. He added that he had called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and urged him to “move on” from the war and focus on building a new political landscape for the region.

Tom Friedman elaborated on what was required beyond just a ceasefire, if the cessation is to have a real impact on international stability:

The broad idea is for the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, to agree to appoint the economist and former P.A. prime minister Salam Fayyad — or someone of his sterling reputation for incorruptibility — as the new Palestinian prime minister to lead a new technocratic cabinet and reform the Palestinian Authority, root out corruption and upgrade its governance and security forces.

Such a reformed Palestinian Authority would then formally ask for — and participate in — an international peacekeeping force that would include troops from the U.A.E., Egypt, possibly other Arab states and maybe even European nations. This force would be phased in to replace the Israeli military in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority would then be responsible for rebuilding Gaza with relief funds provided by Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E. and other Arab Gulf states, Europeans and most likely the U.S.

 

A reformed Palestinian Authority, with massive Arab and international funds, would attempt to restore its credibility in Gaza, and the credibility of its core Fatah organization in Palestinian politics — and sideline the remnants of Hamas.

The problem, at least immediately, however, is as David Sanger points out is that there is no interest by Prime Minister Netanyahu, it seems at this moment, to accept even a ceasefire let alone steps beyond:

Nothing in his face-offs with Mr. Netanyahu suggests that the Israeli prime minister will take his advice or seize the chance to turn the military victories into a lasting political accomplishment. One of Mr. Biden’s senior aides said the administration’s concern was that the killing of Mr. Sinwar, and before him the killing of the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, ratifies in Mr. Netanyahu’s mind his certainty that he was right to deflect American calls for de-escalation over the past few months.

These observations seem to target the immediate difficulties that such a US plan envisages. But it is beyond that. The underlying question that is there, and ultimately more impactful, is the influence of the US in this situation but beyond it in other international arenas such as the Ukraine, the South China Sea and Taiwan. What is the capacity and policy chops of the US to influence and indeed to pressure allies and foes alike to accept outcomes that the US identifies as improving the state of relations and hopefully terminating conflict and stabilizing, or even possibly improving relations among the countries and more broadly the system?

As Ross Douthat of the NYT recently wrote in an article titled, “America needs a President”:

In neither case, though, does the world’s most powerful country seem to have a real handle on the situation, a plan that it’s executing or a clear means of setting and accomplishing its goals.

He further argues:

Scenarios where great powers end up led around by their allies and clients are not historically unusual. But it’s hard to escape the impression that America’s current difficulties are linked to a very specific problem: the vacuum at the heart of this presidency, the slow fade of Joe Biden from the normal execution of his duties, the general uncertainty about who is actually making decisions in U.S. foreign policy.

But it seems to me that a focus on the twilight of the Biden years as an explanation for US inability to shape conflict outcomes is a bit of a cop out. Rather as I see it, it seems to me that the US has come to a point where it is unwilling to fashion credible threats on friends and more importantly on foes. The key action mechanics of leadership – credible threats and equally credible assurances – are increasingly missing.  As noted by Douthat:

Today’s restoration of deterrence could become tomorrow’s overreach or quagmire. For another, America has global responsibilities, not just regional ones, and a widening war in the Middle East could be bad for the American position in Asia and Eastern Europe no matter its outcome for the immediate participants. If the United States can’t exert real leverage over countries that it arms and supports, a weakening Pax Americana will end up hostage to too many interests not our own.

And that is the concern and the nub of the global order issue. And while there is a reflection, as noted above, that it is this President who has lost influence recently as he comes to the end of his Presidency, the weakness of America’s efforts extend beyond this, it appears to me.

The dilemma in my mind lies more with the rise of nationalist, even populist politics. We need not go to the most extreme versions of this populist view, as expressed by Donald Trump.The fact is it has spread to Democratic politics with Biden but it would appear with his advisers and to Democratic Presidential candidate, Vice President Harris as well. It can be seen most prominently with US trade policy. You need go no further than this administration’s determined effort to neuter the international trade dispute mechanism, the WTO. In addition, it extends to the growing willingness of US administrations, starting with Trump but infecting the Biden administration also to use tariffs, and increasingly so, as a trade policy. Michael Froman, currently President of the Council on Foreign Relations, and who served as the U.S. Trade Representative from 2013 to 2017 during the Obama Administration has examined current US trade policy:

For much of the last century, in response to the disastrous 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariffs, the United States’ international economic policy was focused on liberalization and integration. Competitiveness, efficiency, and growth were the metrics of success. This framework achieved many of its objectives, contributing to the biggest reduction in poverty in human history, opening vast new markets to U.S. exports, and greatly strengthening the comparative advantage of U.S. firms. At the same time, attention it paid to particularly vulnerable groups of workers and their communities. The advent of China as a strategic competitor further highlighted the limitations of that approach. The rules-based system was not designed to accommodate an economy that is so large and so integrated and yet is determined to follow a fundamentally different set of rules.

The result is the enlargement of protectionism signaled by National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan:

April 2023, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan delivered a critique of the neoliberal consensus that had served as the foundation for international economic policy for nearly a century. In a prominent speech, Sullivan suggested that the United States was moving on from an agenda of global integration and trade liberalization.

 

To protect Americans and to take on China, Sullivan contended, Washington would no longer shy away from raising tariffs, imposing restrictions on exports and foreign investment, and engaging in domestic industrial policy. It was an important speech for a number of reasons, not the least of which was that it was delivered by the national security adviser, not the treasury secretary, commerce secretary, or U.S. trade representative. …

 

Consistent with Sullivan’s framework, the Biden administration has embraced a range of economic tools: export controls, restrictions on inward and outbound foreign investment, tariffs, industrial policy, and antitrust enforcement. Many of these tools enjoy broad bipartisan support.

 

If they are to form the basis of a new, enduring Washington consensus, however, the next president—whether Trump or Kamala Harris—will need to develop a more systematic approach to using them. That means understanding their limitations, developing principles to guide their use, and grappling fully with the tradeoffs they involve.

But I am not heartened by this approach on trade, and the wider implications of a nationalist approach to policy well beyond trade policy. The direction of US leadership is troubling. We are only too aware of where it could go with Trump but the signals are not positive for a Harris administration either.

Image Credit: US Institute for Peace

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter and is a Substack Post from there. All comments and free subscriptions are welcome.

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US Tensions Over a Leading Role

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So, I was ruminating a bit on the question of US diplomacy coming off of the previous Substack Post and particularly the Jessica Matthews’s targeting of Biden foreign policy in the upcoming Foreign Affairs article “What Was the Biden Doctrine? Leadership Without Hegemony”. As a reminder, this is what she wrote and I quoted in last week’s Substack:

 

But he [Joe Biden] has carried out a crucial task: shifting the basis of American foreign policy from an unhealthy reliance on military intervention to the active pursuit of diplomacy backed by strength.

 

He has won back the trust of friends and allies, built and begun to institutionalize a deep American presence in Asia, restored the United States’ role in essential multilateral organizations and agreements, and ended the longest of the country’s “forever wars”—a step none of his three predecessors had the courage to take.

 

All of this happened in the face of grievous new threats from China and Russia, two great powers newly allied around the goal of ending American primacy. Biden’s response to the most pressing emergency of his term—Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—has been both skillful and innovative, demonstrating a grasp of the traditional elements of statecraft along with a willingness to take a few unconventional steps. … But he has carried out a crucial task: shifting the basis of American foreign policy from an unhealthy reliance on military intervention to the active pursuit of diplomacy backed by strength.

Now I concluded that analysis with a Matthews’s quote with my concluding remark: “Now it seems to me there are questions over the effective use of diplomacy of this Administration but that is for another day.” Well this is another day and I want to focus a little on the current effectiveness of US diplomatic policy.

There appears to be a growing split over whether the US has had, or should I say, will choose to move forward with sharper diplomatic policies and initiatives rather than, if I can put it bluntly, ‘Reach for the Gun’. In fact, in the end, there are questions of whether the US will involve itself at all in serious but distant conflicts especially in the face of seriously weakened multilateral institutions. The foreign policy question is actually two questions then: will a Harris Administration respond to foreign policy crises with sharp diplomacy or resort to force and even more dramatically not only how the US may engage but whether it will engage at all.

Shortly after Harris and Waltz assumed the mantle of leadership of the Democratic Party that a strong positive view was identified. For instance Mark Hannah and Rachel Rizzo wrote the following in FP:

When applied to foreign policy, it could inform a pragmatic, forward-looking realism that’s all too rare in Washington. This sentiment aligns with a growing expert consensus.

 

A recent Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study concluded that the United States’ current approach to the world is “poorly adapted to the challenges of today and tomorrow.” It also noted a widespread demand among analysts for “a major strategic reorientation.” This reorientation could be from an everything-everywhere-all-at-once approach to a more judicious and strategic use of American might.

Let’s start with what appears to be the positive efforts of the current Biden policy efforts and conjure it  as a likely course of action for a new Harris Administration.  The immediate diplomatic approach is the recent Biden actions focused on its key geopolitical concern – that is its perceived strategic competitor and threat – its biggest rival – China. Notwithstanding the tough back and forth the two have undertaken recent discussions that appear to be designed to stabilize this most difficult bilateral relationship. The evidence for this is the recently concluded visit of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to China. This most recent meeting with Wang Yi who is the chief Chinese foreign affairs official for President Xi was not the first. For Sullivan and Wang this was one of a series of interactions as described by Demetri Sevastopulo in the FT:

It was the first of several secret rendezvous around the world, including Malta and Thailand, now called the “strategic channel”. Sullivan will arrive in Beijing on Tuesday [August 27th] for another round of talks with Wang in what will be his first visit to China as US national security adviser.

 

While the backchannel has not resolved the fundamental issues between the rival superpowers, says Rorry Daniels, a China expert at the Asia Society Policy Institute, it has aided each’s understanding of the other. “It’s been very successful in short-term stabilisation, communicating red lines and previewing actions that might be seen as damaging to the other side,” she says.

The two leading powers do not see ‘eye-to-eye’ on the role of diplomatic interactions.  China in particular does not accept the framework of stabilization in the context of competition – the US view. Still, there does appear to be a certain diplomatic stabilization as described by Sevastopulo leading up to this most recent series of meetings in Beijing:

Sullivan strived to get Wang to understand the new reality — that the nations were in a competition but one that should not preclude co-operation. “That was a really hard jump for the Chinese,” says the second US official. “They wanted to define the relationship neatly [as] we’re either partners or we’re competitors.”

 

The Chinese official said China did not accept the argument. “Wang Yi explained very clearly that you cannot have co-operation, dialogue and communication . . . and at the same time undercut China’s interests.

 

They discussed possible deals for a summit, including a compromise that would involve the US lifting sanctions on a Chinese government forensic science institute in return for China cracking down on the export of chemicals used to make fentanyl. They also talked about resurrecting the military-to-military communication channels China had shut after Pelosi visited Taiwan. And they discussed creating an artificial intelligence dialogue.

 

Rush Doshi, a former NSC official who attended the meetings with Wang, says it was important to explain to China what the US was doing — and not doing. “Diplomacy is how you clear up misperception and avoid escalation and manage competition. It’s actually not at odds with competition but part of any sustainable competitive strategy.

And in this most recent set of meetings in Beijing, Sullivan was able to meet not just President Xi, important in and of itself,  but critically a meeting with General Zhang Youxia:

Mr. Sullivan’s meeting with Gen. Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, was the first in years between a senior American official and a vice chair of the commission, which oversees China’s armed forces and is chaired by Mr. Xi.

The Biden Administration regarded the Beijing meetings, therefore, as important diplomatic effort in stabilizing great power relations:

Sullivan tells the FT that he was under no illusions that the channel would convince China to change its policies, but he stressed that it had played an instrumental role in helping to shift the dynamic in US-China relations.

All you can do is take their policy, our policy, and then try to manage it so that we can take the actions we need to take and maintain stability in the relationship,” Sullivan says. “We have been able to accomplish both of those things.”

If managing great power relations was the US diplomatic goal, that seems to be successfully achieved for the moment. But that positive framing is not replicated in wider global order relations and the US efforts or lack thereof. Thus, the assessment of wider US diplomatic efforts is not nearly as upbeat. This is the message of Alexander Clarkson,  a lecturer in European studies at King’s College London in his analysis of US foreign policy in his WPR article titled: “For Much of the World, the Post-American Order Is Already Here”:

This gradual waning of American influence outside of core areas of strategic focus rarely features in ferocious debates in Washington between those who believe that the U.S. should remain deeply involved in global affairs and the so-called Restrainers on the left and MAGA Republicans on the right who are skeptical of security commitments outside U.S. borders.

 

The limits of the United States’ ability to influence developments on the ground in destabilizing conflicts, or the responses of states engaged in them, have been particularly visible with civil wars in Myanmar and Sudan that barely feature in domestic American news cycles. In both cases, U.S. policymakers distracted by developments elsewhere failed to anticipate emerging escalation dynamics and then failed to develop the strategic leverage needed to rein in brutal armies and militias whose backing from other states rapidly widened devastating wars.

 

Washington’s flailing in the face of conflicts within Myanmar and Sudan that have now become wider geopolitical crises is a product of long-term shifts in the global balance of power. While Washington will continue to play a decisive role in managing conflicts that involve great power competition, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the tensions between Israel and Iran and China’s strategic assertiveness under Xi Jinping, in many other parts of the world the U.S. impact will be limited to diplomatic press releases expressing grave concern.

Clarkson sees US actions and inactions as a reshaping of the global balance of power. But I suspect it is an unwillingness to exercise direct diplomatic action to what is seen to be a distant conflict. It is also an evident result of the undermining, including by the United States, of effective diplomatic action by the UN. The weakening of the formal institutions – the WTO in trade policy and the UN in security and peace efforts – is now ‘coming home to roost’ at the US doorstep. US inaction is matched by the inability of these and other formal institutions to take on, stabilize and hopefully resolve difficult and potentially threatening conflicts.

The Harris Administration, if it wins, needs to address the manner of engagement but in too many instances the likely failure of foreign policy engagement at all. Much is currently wanting in US foreign policy. It is unclear if a Harris Administration is likely to tackle, and if so, how, these difficult foreign policy questions.

Image Credit: YouTube

This Post was originally posted at Alan’s Newsletter. Your comments are welcome as well as free subscriptions to Alan’s Newsletter

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Responding to Disorder

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I have to start with the Biden press conference last night, of course. I wish Biden’s performance could allay concerns about his competence but, unfortunately, it was not good enough to do that.  Biden was certainly less combative than what was on display earlier but the stubbornness has not abated. And the mistakes remain. So, the Democrats are stuck for the moment.

Let’s turn now to the focus of this Post: coping with the disorder in the current international system and the real fear for the electoral outcome.

My close colleague, Yves Tiberghien, Professor of Political Science and the Konwakai Chair in Japanese Research, and also the Director of the Center for Japanese Research at the University of British Columbia put his finger on the stability/instability tension in the current global order. As he wrote recently for the Asia-Pacific Foundation:

In the current moment we are witnessing a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, with several dangerous hot spots and an acceleration of tit-for-tat dynamics.

The prime movers in this situation are China and the U.S., each animated and constrained by their domestic politics that sometimes limit their ability to deeply understand each other and engage in strategic, long-term calculations. The moves that each of them makes – which are usually framed as being defensive and reactive – are feeding a cycle of interactions that is transforming the region.

The central tension between the two leading powers is not aided by the current fallout from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the war in Gaza but the macro disorder is driven in the first instance by difficult US-China interests. And, it is because of the knotty interactions and the prospect for even greater bilateral tensions that so many of us are kinda ‘quaking in our boots’ over the impending national US elections. I was caught by the insight and ‘unexpressed’ emotion of one of the NYT’s most well known Opinion Columnists, Tom Freidman. He just recently wrote in the NYT, a piece titled: “The Devil May Be Enjoying This Election Season, but I Am Not”:

Both men running for president right now are unfit for the job: One is a good man in obvious cognitive and physical decline, and the other is a bad man who lies as he breathes, whose main platform is revenge — and who is in his own cognitive tailspin.

It kinda chills one’s ‘political soul’ when contemplating current US politics and policy.  It leaves open the prospect of dangerous international politics that demands effective Presidential leadership – which is exactly what seems to be missing in the current presidential contest. As Friedman writes:

At the same time, we are in the middle of defining the post-post-Cold War order, now that the U.S.-dominated post-Cold War order has come unstuck since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Managing a hostile Russia — aligned with an increasingly hostile China, aligned with malign actors like Iran and North Korea, and super-empowered nonstate actors like Hamas, the Houthis and Hezbollah — will take not only incredibly wise U.S. leadership but also a U.S. leader able to forge multiple alliances. The post-post-Cold War world can’t be managed by a lonely American superpower telling all its allies to spend more on defense or we will leave you to the tender mercies of Vladimir Putin.

Turning back to Yves Tiberghien for a moment, Yves identifies 3 hotspots in the current international scene: The Philippines, North Korea and Taiwan. Let me look at just one, what Yves identifies as the number one hotspot, the Philippines:

This is the top hot spot right now, and one without good safeguards or guardians. Some view it as perhaps the closest example in the region to a 1914 scenario. There is an urgency for talks between high-ranking officials in the U.S. and China talks, but the Biden Administration is distracted.

Now I will avoid any comparative historical references, – you know, it is just like World War I, or just like the Iraq decision etc.  I am not attracted to this form of analysis. And you should be careful as well. For my part having examined, rather long ago, the dramatically complex interactions and unique diplomatic actions of long ago political figures, including especially those political decisions leading up to World War I – thank you James Joll, these comparisons fail to attract me. The primary reason is most analyses comparing historical crises focus on the similarities but almost never examine the often dramatic differences in these historical comparisons. There are not only similarities but differences as well. And both must be examined, though they seldom are.

So let’s leave historical comparisons aside and let’s turn to a recent analysis. I was very pleased to see a just released piece by Ryan Hass in Foreign Affairs, titled: “Avoiding War in the South China Sea”. Ryan is from Brookings and is currently the Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center and he is also the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. Ryan served from 2013 to 2017, as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff. From what I know he retains links with many in the Biden Administration.

There are a number of valuable insights that Ryan conveys in the current problem. Let’s first start with the problem. The South China Sea (SCS) dispute arises over the Spratly Islands with ongoing territorial disputes among Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam concerning “ownership” of the Spratly Islands, a group of islands and associated “maritime features” (reefs, banks, and cays etc.) and strong positioning in the South China Sea. The central bully in this story is China that essentially claims all of the South China Sea.  Nevertheless, the others also maintain their individual country claims. In 1999 the Philippines ran an old vessel, the Sierra Madre aground on the Second Thomas Shoal. China initially demanded that the Philippines remove the vessel and has harassed the Philippine efforts to resupply the military personnel that remain on the vessel though to this point China has been unsuccessful in preventing Philippine resupply. As Ryan points out:

The risk remains high that an incident could result in the death of a Filipino soldier, potentially triggering the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty and bringing American and Chinese forces to the brink of conflict.

That is the heart of the problem for the US, China and the Philippines. Threading the needle is what it will take; and of course that is exactly what chills those of us looking at the current race for the presidency. But Ryan suggests a policy that enhances deterrence and limits what Yves described as ‘tit-for-tat’ actions.

For Washington, success is upholding the credibility of its alliance commitments, avoiding conflict with China, and preventing Chinese occupation of Second Thomas Shoal. Achieving these results will require Washington to weigh every policy decision against whether it does more to prevent or provoke a crisis. Second Thomas Shoal is a strategic challenge with a military dimension.

It is a touchy balance of maintaining commitment, and thereby deterring China and at the same time not giving full rein to the strategic – and not so strategic actions in the US and in fact in the Philippines,  to tip over into conflict. Reflecting this balance is Ryan’s positioning:

It is not a military problem with a military solution. Washington must resist pressure to frame this issue as a test of wills between the United States and China and instead leverage Beijing’s bullying at Second Thomas Shoal to strengthen its relationships in the region.

Given the conflicting imperatives of the three major participants, the United States will need to walk a tightrope. It cannot allow itself to beseen as passive in the face of Chinese pressure against its treaty ally. On the other hand, Washington must preserve its position as defender of the status quo, thereby sharpening the contrast with China’s revisionist attempts to alter the situation at Second Thomas Shoal.

It is, as Ryan points out, critically important to signal soundly to China, US commitment without creating reactive offense:

U.S. policymakers must resist the urge to turn Second Thomas Shoal into a contest of wills between the United States and China and urge Beijing to do the same. The more the standoff becomes publicly framed as a showdown between great powers, the more likely that nuclear-armed rivals could find themselves in a nose-to-nose confrontation over a rusting boat.

And I think sensibly Ryan urges the following:

Washington should enlist as many concerned countries as possible to privately counsel Beijing against further escalation. Greater engagement by more actors, especially the Southeast Asian states that Beijing seeks to pull closer, will make the current dispute seem less like a binary clash between the United States and China.

The United States’ best option for limiting risk is to chart a middle path between succumbing to a military test of wills and putting pressure on the Philippines to give in to Chinese pressure. Conflict is possible, but far from preordained.

All this examination underscores the complexity and careful steps required to contain tit-for-tat US-China actions that could lead to a security disaster. It is hard now not to contemplate the worst with either crazy Trump, for sure but now possibly a seriously diminished Biden. We can only hope that the presidential outcome is not as currently predicted.

Image Credit: Al Jazeera