Stopping the War; or Maybe Not Yet

We’ve known for some time by examining history that it’s much easier to start a war than it is to stop one. And I suspect the Russia-Ukraine war will prove to be no different. A ceasefire may well be had but this will occur in spite of Trump’s loud insistence that a ceasefire be reached by both parties not because of it, and him. 

Let’s start though with the larger context – that is Trump as the initiator of the ceasefire efforts. I was interested in a sort of mea culpa moment expressed by colleague, Stephen Walt. Stephen is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University and is also a columnist at Foreign Policy (FP). In a recent piece in FP entitled, “What I Got Wrong About Trump’s Second Term”, he zeros in on the fact that it is Trump pushing the ceasefire effort. As he admits: 

“That said, there’s no question that I got some important things wrong.”

 

“I underestimated Trump’s hostility to our principal democratic allies. It was obvious that he thought our NATO partners were overly reliant on U.S. protection (a view shared by all recent U.S. presidents), but it’s now clear that he’s actively and deeply hostile to the democratic principles that these states embody and is openly encouraging illiberal forces within them. As I wrote a couple of weeks ago, the administration’s embrace of the European far right is an attempt to promote a form of regime change throughout Europe—in effect, to MAGA-fy it—and to destroy the European Union as a meaningful political institution. I was aware of Trump’s affinity for illiberal leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and I knew people like Steve Bannon were trying to build a transnational coalition of far-right movements, but I didn’t take those forces seriously enough. … although there was every reason to think that Trump would push for a peace deal and eventually reduce U.S. support for Ukraine, I did not expect him to embrace Russian President Vladimir Putin’s position with such enthusiasm, accuse Ukraine of starting the war, or openly attack Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in public. There may, in fact, be some strategic rationale for what Trump is doing—i.e., he may genuinely believe that the only way to stop the war and eventually drive a wedge between Russia and China is to give Putin everything he wants—but that doesn’t mean this approach will work as intended. It also ignores the long-term impact that this behavior will have on the United States’ standing and image. … Moreover, Trump isn’t breaking these rules because the United States is facing a grave national emergency (which would make it easier for other states to give Washington a temporary pass); he’s trying to blow up the whole order because he thinks the United States will be better off in a world where autocracy is ascendant and leaders do whatever they want. I freely admit that transforming the United States from a defender of international order to a malevolent rogue state was not on my bingo card.”

Well, indeed we were witness to Trump, along with his Vice Presidential puppet, J.D. Vance throwing Ukraine, or at least Volodymyr Zelenskyy ‘under the bus’. Now Zelenskyy  may not have handled that strangely open White House meeting with Trump and Vance quite as adroitly as he might have but he did come back with Ukraine accepting Trump’s ceasefire agreement. As Alexandra Sharp pointed out earlier in the week in a FP World Brief

“The United States agreed to immediately lift its pause on all military aid and intelligence-sharing to Kyiv on Tuesday following talks with senior Ukrainian officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In turn, Ukraine expressed willingness to enact a 30-day cease-fire with Russia and enter immediate negotiations to establish an “enduring and sustainable” end to the conflict—so long as Moscow agrees to do the same.” 

And as she pointed out, Zelenskyy wisely praised Trump’s efforts: 

“Zelensky praised Tuesday’s talks and expressed gratitude for the Trump administration, highlighting the ways that the United States’ plan addressed Kyiv’s initial suggestions. Trump also celebrated the Jeddah meeting, saying, “Hopefully President Putin will agree to that also and we can get this show on the road.” The Kremlin has not yet responded to the cease-fire proposal. But Trump said that he expects to speak with Putin this week, adding, “It takes two to tango.”” 

Now it seems that Putin has seen fit to walk a kinda tightrope on the US ceasefire proposal. An outright rejection would for sure lead Trump to in some manner condemn Putin, probably enhance sanctions on Russia,  and likely ‘throw a bone to Ukraine’ including presumably enhanced military support to pressure a change from Putin. So rather than face any of that immediately we have Putin expressing a kinda tepid yes in a recent press conference but adding a significant number of questions and qualifications. 

As the Italian think tank, ISPI pointed out in an insightful piece titled, ‘Putin and the ‘No’ to the Truce’: 

“Putin is not saying ‘no’ to Washington and Kiev’s ceasefire proposal, but he is not saying yes either. And he is laying out his own conditions , saying he needs “further clarification.” The Russian president, 48 hours into his wait since announcing his proposal for a month-long interim truce two days ago in Jeddah , said any ceasefire must lead to “a final solution” to the conflict that addresses its “root causes.”  “The idea itself is good and we support it unconditionally,” he said, “but there are issues that we need to discuss, and I think we need to discuss them with our American colleagues and partners,” adding that otherwise Ukrainian forces “will be given the opportunity to withdraw, regroup and rearm,” just as the Russian army advances into the Kursk region , the Russian salient captured by Kiev’s troops.”

 

“The preconditions set by Putin for a ceasefire essentially coincide with Moscow’s war objectives: recognition of Moscow’s annexation of four partially occupied southeastern regions ( Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk ) and the Crimean peninsula; Kiev’s commitment to never join NATO; and the organization of new elections that will lead to the replacement of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russia is also pushing for a NATO retreat, whose expansion to the east, according to the Kremlin’s narrative, would have ‘forced’ Moscow to order the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In fact – according to several observers – Putin’s interlocutory response is due to two needs: on the one hand, he does not want to be accused of obstructing the agreement to which Trump has formally adhered, on the other, he knows that at this moment the war is turning in his favor and he does not intend to give up without obtaining something in return .” 

Now it is the case that Zelenskyy has doubts about the ceasefire effort. First he is dealing with Russia but more pertinently Zelenskyy remains insistent that any agreement that follows the short ceasefire must provide security guarantees for Ukraine. But for the moment the focus is on Russia. And as Mary Ilyushina and Sammy Westfall of the Washington Post noted:

“Putin said Thursday he supports in principle the idea of a 30-day ceasefire — proposed by the United States and to which Ukraine has agreed — but noted that its implementation raises many questions, particularly regarding verification across a long front line. Such a tactic could allow Russia to engage in protracted negotiations without immediately rejecting an offer.” 

 

“Putin also said the 30-day reprieve could be used by Ukraine to regroup and rearm, hinting that he would seek to impose his own conditions on the framework of the pause, such as a halt to Western weapons supplies or a ban on mobilization.” 

Meanwhile, the G7 foreign ministers gathered in Canada and pressed Russia to accept the current ceasefire proposal. In the Statement issued at the end of the meeting the foreign ministers declared:  

“G7 members reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

 

They welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. G7 members applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

 

G7 members called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. They discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. G7 members underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.” 

In addition, UK Prime Minister Starmer added further pressure. As described in the NYTimes:

“On Saturday [March 15th], Mr. Starmer convened a video conference with 30 leaders, from Europe, NATO, Canada, Ukraine, Australia and New Zealand, to muster support for his coalition, which Britain is spearheading with France. He said military officials would meet again on Thursday to begin an “operational phase,” though he did not give details about the mission of the force, nor did he announce that any other countries had committed troops to it.

 

“I’ve indicated a willingness for the United Kingdom to play a leading role in this,” Mr. Starmer said at a news conference after the meeting. “If necessary, that would be troops on the ground and planes in the sky.”

And, finally, another piece of the European effort to support Ukraine appears to be falling in place. There now appears to be agreement on a new German government led by Friedrich Merz. As described in the NYTimes

“Friedrich Merz, the likely next chancellor of Germany, announced on Friday that he had secured the votes to allow for extensive new government spending, including for defense, clearing the way for a stunning turnabout in German strategic and fiscal policy before he even takes office.” 

 

“The measures would lift Germany’s hallowed limits on government borrowing as they apply to military spending. It would exempt all spending on defense above 1 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product from those limits, and it would define “defense” broadly to include intelligence spending, information security and more.

Effectively, that would allow Germany to spend as much as it can feasibly borrow to rebuild its military.” 

The ‘yes but no’ by Putin may not have long to live. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio made it clear following the foreign ministers meeting, as described in the FT that the administration would soon examine the state of the ceasefire proposal and the positions of the two parties:

“Rubio, who has previously indicated Kyiv would have to make territorial concessions, on Friday signalled Moscow would also have to do so. “I’ve never heard President Trump say that Russia has a right to take all of Ukraine and do whatever they want there,” he said. He added Trump’s national security team will convene this weekend after the president’s envoy Steve Witkoff returns from Moscow to examine the Russian position.”

Ending wars is not easy. And the end is not yet in sight, seemingly. Still, pressure appears to remain on. 

This Post first appeared on my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/stopping-the-war-or-maybe-not-yet

Image Credit: BBC

 

 

 

Europe into the Breach

 

It wasn’t long ago that demands for a more ‘strategic autonomy’ approach for Europe seemed to slip away with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Steven Erlanger of the NYTimes wrote of Europe’s response to Russian aggression at the time:

“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the greatest challenge to European security since the end of the Cold War, but the Europeans have missed the opportunity to step up their own defense, diplomats and experts say. Instead, the war has reinforced Europe’s military dependence on the United States.”

Not only was there dependence on the US on the Ukrainian battlefield, the first in Europe since World War Two, but there was a growing acceptance of Biden administration efforts to strengthen alliances and partnerships:

“Washington, they note, has led the response to the war, marshaled allies, organized military aid to Ukraine and contributed by far the largest amount of military equipment and intelligence to Ukraine. It has decided at each step what kind of weapons Kyiv will receive and what it will not.”

 

“But the goal of President Emmanuel Macron of France for “strategic autonomy” — for the European Union to become a military power that could act independently of the United States, if complementary to it — has proved hollow.”

As identified by my colleague, Charles Kupchan, a former Obama official and currently a senior fellow at CFR and a professor of international affairs at Georgetown:

“There is very little appetite for autonomy if that means distance from the United States,” he said, “because the war has underscored the importance of the American military presence in Europe and the guarantee it extended to European allies since World War II.”

But as they say: ‘that was then, and this is now’. Built on Trump’s early efforts to end the war, browbeating, it would seem, Ukraine to accept a cession of fighting, Europe is back. And it starts with Germany and its likely new Chancellor, Friedrich Merz. As identified by Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and Laura Pitel in Berlin for the FT:

“Chancellor-to-be Friedrich Merz has agreed a deal with his likely coalition partner to inject hundreds of billions in extra funding into Germany’s military and infrastructure, in a “fiscal sea change” designed to revive and re-arm Europe’s largest economy.”

 

“A provision would exempt defence spending above 1 per cent of GDP from the “debt brake” that caps government borrowing, allowing Germany to raise an unlimited amount of debt to fund its armed forces and to provide military assistance to Ukraine.”

 

“The future [German] coalition partners will introduce another constitutional amendment to set up a €500bn fund for infrastructure, which would run over 10 years. They are also planning to loosen debt rules for states.”

The German effort by this likely new government underlines the growing sense of emergency in Europe as Trump threatens to not defend NATO members who fail to adequately spend on in their own defense:

“Germany’s massive fiscal stimulus has also underlined the sense of urgency in Europe, spurred by US President Donald Trump’s threat to unwind the US guarantees that have long underpinned the continent’s security. “This is a fiscal sea change for Germany,” said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg. “Merz and his coalition-to-be are rising to the occasion.”

The fiscal actions announced are all the more startling given the CDUs earlier opposition to reforming the debt brake:

“Merz’s conservative CDU/CSU had opposed reforms to the debt brake before the February 23 election. However, hours after coming first in the nationwide vote, the staunch transatlanticist declared that Europe needed to achieve “independence” from Washington given that Trump appeared “largely indifferent” to Europe’s fate.”

This defense response doesn’t stop with just Germany in Europe, however. The EU appears also to be stepping up as well. As noted at the Italian research institute ISPI, the EU is stepping up as well:

“Yesterday, for the first time, the approval by the European Council of aplan to increase the defense and security of member states represented a – European – response to the change in the international order underway. The heads of state and government of the 27 have approved the 800 billion euro plan for rearmament illustrated by the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen. The agreement provides greater flexibility for member states on defense spending and debt and a 150 billion fund, in addition to opening the possibility of evaluating additional financing options. But above all, it indicates the urgency, matured in recent weeks, to change pace and contribute to the defense of Kiev and the continent, with or without US support.”

The shock of the ‘Trump abandonment’ of Europe is evident. Here is a view expressed by Francoise Hollande in the most recent Economist issue. Hollande served as President of France from 2012 to 2017:

“We need to be clear: while the American people may still be our friends, the Trump administration is no longer our ally. This is grave. It marks a fundamental break with the historic relationship between Europe and America and the link established after the second world war with the creation of the Atlantic alliance. It is unfortunately, however, indisputable. It is no longer merely a question of declarations designed to dumbfound, but of actions that mark much more than a disengagement: a strategic about-turn combined with an ideological confrontation. The signs of this reversal have been accumulating in recent weeks. The bewildering and degrading scenes in the Oval Office were the illuminating culmination.”

 

“In addition to this reversal of responsibility for the outbreak of war in Ukraine, with Volodymyr Zelensky portrayed as a dictator and Vladimir Putin as a leader respectable enough to be a regular interlocutor, there has been an unrestrained attack on the principles on which the Western alliance was previously founded.”

In the end, Hollande sets out what he sees as the necessary European response:

“So we have to admit that our alliance with America is broken for the foreseeable future, and draw all the consequences. I can think of at least three.”

 

“The first is that we must continue to intensify our aid to Ukraine. This means seriously increasing the French contribution, which is currently particularly low compared with that of Germany or Britain.”

 

“The second is the need to prioritise providing Ukraine with security guarantees. It is too early to define the form these will take or to talk about the presence of soldiers on the ground. But it is clear that if Europe wants to protect its current borders, it must shoulder its share of responsibility for the security of its closest neighbour, especially if America abdicates this responsibility.”

 

“The third consequence is the urgency of accelerating European defence spending and beefing up European capabilities.”

And the European response to Trump’s aggressive actions in Ukraine extend beyond the 27, or at least the 26 as Hungary has refused to sign on the EU action, to now include the UK, Norway and possibly Turkey. So from Jeanna Smialek from the NYTimes Brussels office in an article entitled, “Europe Races to Craft a Trump-Era Plan for Ukraine and Defense”:

“Much of Europe is now making a show of standing by Ukraine: Britain and France have indicated a willingness to send troops as a peacekeeping force if a deal is reached, and Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain has called for support from a “coalition of the willing.””

 

“Ms. von der Leyen’s plan to “rearm” Europe includes the €150 billion loan program and would also make E.U. budget rules more flexible to enable countries to invest more without breaching tough deficit limits.”

And this coalescing in Europe extends possibly to the French nuclear deterrent:

“France is willing to discuss extending the protection afforded by its nuclear arsenal to its European allies, President Emmanuel Macron said on Wednesday, as the continent scrambles to fend off heightened Russian aggression and diminishing American support.”

 

““I have decided to open the strategic debate on protection through deterrence for our allies on the European continent,” Mr. Macron added.”

But the Trump bullying of Ukraine seemingly has had, it seems, some political results as well, at least for the moment. Ukraine has indicated that it will in the coming weeks join negotiations to end the conflict. As identified in the FT

“Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the talks as he wrapped up a summit on Thursday with EU leaders, who rallied round the Ukrainian president and pledged to increase their own defence capabilities.”

 

“The war must be stopped as soon as possible, and Ukraine is ready to work 24/7 together with partners in America and Europe for peace,” Zelenskyy said in a post on Telegram after the Brussels summit. “Next week, on Monday, I am scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia to meet with the Crown Prince [Mohammed bin Salman]. After that, my team will remain in Saudi Arabia to work with American partners. Ukraine is most interested in peace.””

And, it would appear that the US-Ukraine mineral deal is back:

“Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, said the meeting with Ukraine would seek to agree [to] a framework for “a peace agreement and an initial ceasefire”.”

 

“The talks will be focused on the minerals deal that the US has struck with Ukraine as well as a possible ceasefire.”

It has been an exhausting, rather dismaying several weeks of Trump destructiveness. A dramatic turn in strategic partnerships has occurred, and there are now significant questions over the stability of the global order as Martin Wolf writes in the FT

“These are merely two sets of decisions in the whirlwind that has accompanied the second Trump presidency. But for the outside world, they are of huge significance. They represent the end of liberal, predictable and rules-governed trading relationships with the world’s most powerful country and also the one that created the system itself. They also represent the abandonment by the US of core alliances and commitments in favour of a closer relationship with an erstwhile enemy. Trump clearly thinks Russia more important than Europe.”

As Wolf points out, it is more than possible that the EU and the UK can replace the US militarily but that can’t occur in the short term:

“The EU plus UK has a combined population 3.6 times Russia’s and a GDP, at purchasing power, 4.7 times larger. The problem, then, is not a lack of human or economic resources: if (a big if) Europe could co-operate effectively it could balance Russia militarily in the long run. But the difficulty is in the medium run, since Europe is unable to make some crucial military equipment, on which it and Ukraine depend. Would the US refuse to supply such weapons if Europeans bought them? Such a refusal to supply would be a moment of truth.”

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/europe-into-the-breach

Image Credit: France 24