Category Archives: Trumpism

The Latest Post from Alan’s Newsletter – ‘The Spiral of Disorder’ – Building then Destroying Trust – Let’s Continue

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President Donald Trump speaks to supporters at a rally Saturday, Oct. 17, 2020, in Janesville. Angela Major/WPR

“At 9:37 a.m. Wednesday, the president was still bullish on his policy, posting on Truth Social: “THIS IS A GREAT TIME TO BUY!!!” “But in the end, it was the markets that got him to reverse course.” 

And what brought it about, notwithstanding Trump’s assertion he knows what he’s doing: 

 

“The economic turmoil, particularly a rapid rise in government bond yields, caused Mr. Trump to blink on Wednesday afternoon and pause his “reciprocal” tariffs for most countries for the next 90 days, according to four people with direct knowledge of the president’s decision.”

It is turmoil and it accompanies Trump as we’ve seen both in his first four years and now, I think, in a ramped up version in his second. 

The behavior does not change. Now what is this all about? I think David Brooks, a contributor for the PBS NewsHour and an opinion columnist for the NYTimes pinpointed Trump’s underlying motivation and his behavior. As Brooks recently suggested in a piece in The Atlantic, titled, “I Should have Seen this Coming”: 

“If there is an underlying philosophy driving Trump, it is this: Morality is for suckers.The strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must. This is the logic of bullies everywhere. And if there is a consistent strategy, it is this: Day after day, the administration works to create a world where ruthless people can thrive. That means destroying any institution or arrangement that might check the strongman’s power. The rule of law, domestic or international, restrains power, so it must be eviscerated. Inspectors general, judge advocate general officers, oversight mechanisms, and watchdog agencies are a potential restraint on power, so they must be fired or neutered. The truth itself is a restraint on power, so it must be abandoned. Lying becomes the language of the state.” 

 

“Trump’s first term was a precondition for his second. His first term gradually eroded norms and acclimatized America to a new sort of regime. This laid the groundwork for his second term, in which he’s making the globe a playground for gangsters.”

 

“We used to live in a world where ideologies clashed, but ideologies don’t seem to matter anymore. The strongman understanding of power is on the march. Power is like money: the more the better. Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the rest of the world’s authoritarians are forming an axis of ruthlessness before our eyes. Trumpism has become a form of nihilism that is devouring everything in its path.” 

An axis of ruthlessness. Wow! The impact on trade – with the tariff madness is all too apparent. But it is an attack as well  on the alliances and partnerships in the global order that likely brings the most long term damage to the stability of the global  order and these attacks have been ongoing since the first Trump administration. 

This weakening to multilateralism is not just to be laid at the feet of President Trump, however. Some time ago Stewart Patrick, now of the Carnegie Endowment (CEIP) pointed out the faltering of multilateralism. As he wrote in the Oxford journal, Global Summitry, [ a reveal, I was editor at the time] in 2015, he cast back to Obama as he then was, a junior US Senator prior to his first term as President. Obama wrote in 2007 criticizing Bush at that time for the failure to promote greater multilateral action:

“This vision of a multilateral renaissance was premised on the conviction that a new global age had dawned. The core purpose of statecraft was no longer restraining geopolitical rivalry but managing shared dilemmas of interdependence.” 

 

“This broad congruence of interest created unprecedented opportunities for cooperation. But success was not preordained. It required a new international bargain: established powers would grant emerging ones a place at the global head table, and rising powers would accept greater responsibilities for advancing the common good. The administration assumed the United States could engineer global institutional reform on this basis.” 

 

“That confidence proved unfounded. The Obama years show just how resistant formal international organizations are to fundamental change. Two of the most obvious cases are the UN Security Council, whose permanent membership still reflects the world of 1945, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has failed to implement governance reforms that members painstakingly negotiated in 2010. The sources of these logjams are legion. Three of the most important are clashing big power preferences, generic institutional inertia, and inconsistent U.S. leadership (Stein 2008).”

 The weakening of multilateralism accelerated, it seems to me, with Trump, that erosion only slowed somewhat with the Biden years, but now seemingly has returned with a vengeance under Trump 2.0. As Ivo Daalder has pointed to in his recent piece on NATO in FA , titled, “NATO Without America: How Europe Can Run an Alliance Designed for U.S. Control”: 

“Given Trump’s low regard for the alliance and its collective defense commitment, it would be no surprise if his administration decided to withdraw from NATO . In late 2023, Congress passed a law prohibiting the president from doing this without congressional assent—a bill that, ironically, was cosponsored by then Senator Marco Rubio, who is now Trump’s secretary of state.”

 

“Even if he doesn’t withdraw from the alliance, Trump has already seriously undermined it. NATO’s Article 5 collective-defense provision—which says that an attack on any alliance member will be considered an attack on all—derives its credibility less from the formal treaty than from a belief among the members that they are all prepared to come to one another’s defense. In practice, this has meant that the United States, with its vast military, would step up to protect any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump’s words and actions since retaking office—including his direct threats against Canada and Greenland, both of which are part of NATO—have eroded these assumptions.” 

The challenge to NATO’s collective defence with Trump’s uncertainty toward collective action is evident. And many of what I call the Formals, the UN, in particular the UN Security Council and its specialized agencies, the International Financial Institutions, or IFIs, and more are hobbled by the rising geopolitical tensions – the US, Russia and China and the decline in willingness of these and more powers to collaborate. 

Yet as noted above, the weakening in multilateral collaboration has been evident for some time. My colleague, Stewart, reflected on this, and noted the rise of informal institutions. As he then wrote:

“If one focuses solely on formal international organizations, these blockages are grounds for despair. But that pessimistic view obscures a more complicated and promising picture of multilateral cooperation. For what sets the current global era apart is not the absence of international institutions but their astonishing diversity. Faced with resistance to sweeping, transformational change within more encompassing global bodies, U.S. and foreign policy-makers have generated and then exploited a messier form of multilateralism (Haass 2010).” 

 

“Formal organizations persist, but governments increasingly participate in a bewildering array of flexible networks whose membership varies based on situational interests, shared values, or relevant capabilities. States may continue to negotiate and collaborate within conventional bodies like the United Nations or the Bretton Woods institutions. But extensive policy coordination also occurs within parallel frameworks that are ad hoc and temporary rather than formal and permanent.” 

And Stewart noted that another colleague, Miles Kahler had even earlier, much earlier, identified the emergence of what he referred to as ‘minilateralism’ in an article in International Organization ( IO) , titled : “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers” As Stewart wrote: 

“These institutions are often “minilateral” (Kahler 1992) rather than universal; voluntary rather than legally binding; disaggregated rather than comprehensive; trans-governmental rather than just intergovernmental; regional rather than global; multi-level and multi-stakeholder rather than state-centric; and “bottom-up” rather than “top-down.”” 

And as I and others have noted, a number of what I call Informals have arisen since the 1970s. First there was the G7 and then in 1999 the G20 as a finance and central bank gathering becoming a G20 leaders-led annual gathering in 2008. Finally, there was the creation of the BRICs in 2006 – Brazil, Russia, India, China with a leader-led gathering in 2009 and the addition of South Africa in 2011. I mention these separately since these Informals are more institutionalized and far less ad hoc than many minilaterals. They are hybrids between the formal and the informal institutions.

The real question though is whether these leader-led informals can counter the destructive geopolitical tensions that now dominate global order relations? These tensions are brought home by the current difficulties between the G20 host, South Africa and the Trump administration. Two senior officials, namely Secretary of State Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have failed recently to join their first ministerial gatherings during South Africa hosting. And questions have arisen as to whether Trump will join the G20 leaders summit gathering this year in South Africa. 

The question raised is: can this Informal work to advance the current global governance agenda, without the US? Or, in fact is this the only way possible for this key Informal to move forward. And, if it is the only way, will leaders minus the US be willing to press forward on critical global governance issues? Which then is the more fruitful path for global collaboration?

All of this is critical and bears close attention, now, and going forward. We will follow closely and report frequently. 

Image Credit: WPR 

This Post originally appeared at Alan’s Newsletter https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-spiral-of-disorder-building-then-aed

 

‘The Spiral of Disorder’ – Building then Destroying Trust – Let’s Start with Tariffs

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It is mind-boggling to watch this second term of Trump, or Trump 2.0. First the flood of ‘executive orders’, though apparently they are technically not really  ‘orders’. And now the long awaited ‘Liberation Day’ announcement of tariffs including Trump’s incoherent ‘reciprocal tariffs’, though, in fact, it is no liberation. As The Economist described the Rose Garden event: 

Speaking in the Rose Garden of the White House, the president announced new “reciprocal” tariffs on almost all America’s trading partners. There will be levies of 34% on China, 27% on India, 24% on Japan and 20% on the European Union. Many small economies face swingeing rates; all targets face a tariff of at least 10%. Including existing duties, the total levy on China will now be 65%. Canada and Mexico were spared additional tariffs, and the new levies will not be added to industry-specific measures, such as a 25% tariff on cars, or a promised tariff on semiconductors. But America’s overall tariff rate will soar above its Depression-era level back to the 19th century.”

As Glenn Kessler in WAPO describes these Trump Liberation Day tariffs: 

Trump’s speech announcing a huge increase in tariffs on American trading partners was riddled with falsehoods and misleading statements on trade that he has made for years. But now they are determining policy that will increase the costs of goods for many Americans.

But as The Economist pointed out about this tariff announcement: 

Almost everything Mr Trump said this week—on history, economics and the technicalities of trade—was utterly deluded. His reading of history is upside down. He has long glorified the high-tariff, low-income-tax era of the late-19th century. In fact, the best scholarship shows that tariffs impeded the economy back then. He has now added the bizarre claim that lifting tariffs caused the Depression of the 1930s and that the Smoot-Hawley tariffs were too late to rescue the situation. The reality is that tariffs made the Depression much worse, just as they will harm all economies today. It was the painstaking rounds of trade talks in the subsequent 80 years that lowered tariffs and helped increase prosperity.

Take a look at the tariffs imposed by Trump as described in Upshot at the NYTimes: 

New tariffs for select trading partners

Country New

tariff

 Share of

U.S. imports

 Goods trade

balance
E.U. +20% 18.5% –$241 bil.
China +34% 13.4% –$292 bil.
Japan +24% 4.5% –$69 bil.
Vietnam +46% 4.2% –$123 bil.
South Korea +26% 4.0% –$66 bil.
Taiwan +32% 3.6% –$74 bil.
India +27% 2.7% –$46 bil.
Switzerland +32% 1.9% –$39 bil.
Thailand +37% 1.9% –$46 bil.
Malaysia +24% 1.6% –$25 bil.

Show 50 more rows +

Sources: White House, Observatory of Economic Complexity Notes: Trade balance and import share figures based on 2024 trade data.” 

And Mr Trump’s grasp of the technicalities was pathetic. He suggested that the new tariffs were based on an assessment of a country’s tariffs against America, plus currency manipulation and other supposed distortions, such as value-added tax. But it looks as if officials set the tariffs using a formula that takes America’s bilateral trade deficit as a share of goods imported from each country and halves it—which is almost as random as taxing you on the number of vowels in your name.

Anthony DeBarros, the data news manager at the WSJ, describes it this way: 

The White House’s new tariffs were pegged to amounts it said other countries impose on the U.S. In many cases, those amounts appear to match a basic formula: the size of a country’s goods-trade imbalance with the U.S., divided by how much America imports from that nation.

 

The chart President Trump read from in the Rose Garden [image above] listed tariffs charged on imports from the U.S. as “including currency manipulation and trade barriers.” The numbers don’t necessarily match what foreign countries charge against imports from the U.S.

 

For example, Chinese tariffs against the U.S. were about 23% overall as of last month, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

 

But dividing the U.S.’s  2024 goods-trade deficit with China, of about $295 billion, by the amount the U.S. imported from China results in the 67% tariff value presented by the White House.

 

$295bn ÷ $439bn=67%

 

The math works out that way for at least 71 of the 184 nations, plus the European Union, included in Wednesday’s announcement. In most of those cases, the U.S. is charging a new tariff of roughly half the rate it calculated.

 

And indeed Trump’s chart that he showed with applied tariffs, identifies China with 34% tariffs being applied. 

As for many others, DeBarros points out: 

For the remaining nations, including all those where the U.S. has a trade surplus, the tariff charged on imports from the U.S. was listed as 10%. In these instances, the U.S. set a 10% reciprocal tariff.

And The Economist even offers a solution starting with constraining the desire to hit back. Instead it offers the following alternative response: 

Instead, governments should focus on increasing trade flows among themselves, especially in the services that power the 21st-century economy. With a share of final demand for imports of only 15%, America does not dominate global trade the way it does global finance or military spending. Even if it halted imports entirely, on current trends 100 of its trading partners would have recovered all their lost exports within just five years, calculates Global Trade Alert, a think-tank. The EU, the 12 members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), South Korea and small open economies like Norway account for 34% of global demand for imports.

As many point out, however, China’s distorted trade policy needs to be addressed. China has committed too many harmful trade policies as identified by  The Economist: 

Building a trading system with China is desirable, but will be viable only if it rebalances its economy towards domestic demand to ease worries about dumping. Also, China could be required to transfer technology and invest in production in Europe in exchange for lower tariffs.

As Alan Beattie writes in his FT column: 

There can be no logic-washing of Donald Trump’s tariffs. This isn’t part of a carefully-designed industrial policy or a cunning strategy to induce compliance among trading partners or a choreographed appearance of chaos to scare other governments into obedience. It’s wildly destructive stupidity, and the generations of American, and particularly Republican politicians, who allowed things to slide to this point are collectively to blame.

The message is: on those facing the  Trump craziness, don’t commit the errors of Trump 2.0. Act smarter. Maintaining and deepening global integration should remain the goal and endpoint, notwithstanding Trump. 

As The Economist  concludes: 

If this seems gruelling and slow, that is because integration always is. Throwing up barriers is easier and faster. There is no avoiding the havoc Mr Trump has wrought, but that does not mean his foolishness is destined to triumph.

The message is clear – don’t do what Trump has done. Hopefully, in the longer term major trading partners, friends and foes, will grasp the logic of greater trade with each other and leave the Trump trade strategy by the wayside.  

In the short term, however, it is not likely. I can’t say that is very surprising. Retaliating in the short term is just too attractive  – standing up to the bully.  And, indeed, China has already responded with trade retaliation. As Keith Bradsher and David Pierson report in the NYTimes, the day after Trump Liberation Day:

China has struck back at President Trump.

 

In a rapid fire series of policy announcements from Beijing on Friday evening, including 34 percent across-the-board tariffs, China showed that it has no intention of backing down in the trade war that Mr. Trump began this week with his own steep tariffs on imports from around the world.

 

China’s Finance Ministry said it will match Mr. Trump’s plan for 34 percent tariffs on goods from China with its own 34 percent tariff on imports from the United States.

 

Separately, China’s Ministry of Commerce said it was adding 11 American companies to its list of “unreliable entities,” essentially barring them from doing business in China or with Chinese companies. The ministry imposed a licensing system to restrict exports of seven rare earth elements that are mined and processed almost exclusively in China and are used in everything from electric cars to smart bombs.”

Hurtful and ‘Trump-like’. 

I had hoped not only to examine the impact of Trump 2.0 tariff policy on the global economy but also focus on policy actions that have enhanced, or possibly sustained the multilateral institutions or, alternately, weakened the multilateral institutions. And to that we will move to.

Image Credit: BBC 

This Post originally appeared at my Substack Post, Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-spiral-of-disorder-building-then

Stopping the War; or Maybe Not Yet

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We’ve known for some time by examining history that it’s much easier to start a war than it is to stop one. And I suspect the Russia-Ukraine war will prove to be no different. A ceasefire may well be had but this will occur in spite of Trump’s loud insistence that a ceasefire be reached by both parties not because of it, and him. 

Let’s start though with the larger context – that is Trump as the initiator of the ceasefire efforts. I was interested in a sort of mea culpa moment expressed by colleague, Stephen Walt. Stephen is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University and is also a columnist at Foreign Policy (FP). In a recent piece in FP entitled, “What I Got Wrong About Trump’s Second Term”, he zeros in on the fact that it is Trump pushing the ceasefire effort. As he admits: 

“That said, there’s no question that I got some important things wrong.”

 

“I underestimated Trump’s hostility to our principal democratic allies. It was obvious that he thought our NATO partners were overly reliant on U.S. protection (a view shared by all recent U.S. presidents), but it’s now clear that he’s actively and deeply hostile to the democratic principles that these states embody and is openly encouraging illiberal forces within them. As I wrote a couple of weeks ago, the administration’s embrace of the European far right is an attempt to promote a form of regime change throughout Europe—in effect, to MAGA-fy it—and to destroy the European Union as a meaningful political institution. I was aware of Trump’s affinity for illiberal leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and I knew people like Steve Bannon were trying to build a transnational coalition of far-right movements, but I didn’t take those forces seriously enough. … although there was every reason to think that Trump would push for a peace deal and eventually reduce U.S. support for Ukraine, I did not expect him to embrace Russian President Vladimir Putin’s position with such enthusiasm, accuse Ukraine of starting the war, or openly attack Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in public. There may, in fact, be some strategic rationale for what Trump is doing—i.e., he may genuinely believe that the only way to stop the war and eventually drive a wedge between Russia and China is to give Putin everything he wants—but that doesn’t mean this approach will work as intended. It also ignores the long-term impact that this behavior will have on the United States’ standing and image. … Moreover, Trump isn’t breaking these rules because the United States is facing a grave national emergency (which would make it easier for other states to give Washington a temporary pass); he’s trying to blow up the whole order because he thinks the United States will be better off in a world where autocracy is ascendant and leaders do whatever they want. I freely admit that transforming the United States from a defender of international order to a malevolent rogue state was not on my bingo card.”

Well, indeed we were witness to Trump, along with his Vice Presidential puppet, J.D. Vance throwing Ukraine, or at least Volodymyr Zelenskyy ‘under the bus’. Now Zelenskyy  may not have handled that strangely open White House meeting with Trump and Vance quite as adroitly as he might have but he did come back with Ukraine accepting Trump’s ceasefire agreement. As Alexandra Sharp pointed out earlier in the week in a FP World Brief: 

“The United States agreed to immediately lift its pause on all military aid and intelligence-sharing to Kyiv on Tuesday following talks with senior Ukrainian officials in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In turn, Ukraine expressed willingness to enact a 30-day cease-fire with Russia and enter immediate negotiations to establish an “enduring and sustainable” end to the conflict—so long as Moscow agrees to do the same.” 

And as she pointed out, Zelenskyy wisely praised Trump’s efforts: 

“Zelensky praised Tuesday’s talks and expressed gratitude for the Trump administration, highlighting the ways that the United States’ plan addressed Kyiv’s initial suggestions. Trump also celebrated the Jeddah meeting, saying, “Hopefully President Putin will agree to that also and we can get this show on the road.” The Kremlin has not yet responded to the cease-fire proposal. But Trump said that he expects to speak with Putin this week, adding, “It takes two to tango.”” 

Now it seems that Putin has seen fit to walk a kinda tightrope on the US ceasefire proposal. An outright rejection would for sure lead Trump to in some manner condemn Putin, probably enhance sanctions on Russia,  and likely ‘throw a bone to Ukraine’ including presumably enhanced military support to pressure a change from Putin. So rather than face any of that immediately we have Putin expressing a kinda tepid yes in a recent press conference but adding a significant number of questions and qualifications. 

As the Italian think tank, ISPI pointed out in an insightful piece titled, ‘Putin and the ‘No’ to the Truce’: 

“Putin is not saying ‘no’ to Washington and Kiev’s ceasefire proposal, but he is not saying yes either. And he is laying out his own conditions , saying he needs “further clarification.” The Russian president, 48 hours into his wait since announcing his proposal for a month-long interim truce two days ago in Jeddah , said any ceasefire must lead to “a final solution” to the conflict that addresses its “root causes.”  “The idea itself is good and we support it unconditionally,” he said, “but there are issues that we need to discuss, and I think we need to discuss them with our American colleagues and partners,” adding that otherwise Ukrainian forces “will be given the opportunity to withdraw, regroup and rearm,” just as the Russian army advances into the Kursk region , the Russian salient captured by Kiev’s troops.”

 

“The preconditions set by Putin for a ceasefire essentially coincide with Moscow’s war objectives: recognition of Moscow’s annexation of four partially occupied southeastern regions ( Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk ) and the Crimean peninsula; Kiev’s commitment to never join NATO; and the organization of new elections that will lead to the replacement of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russia is also pushing for a NATO retreat, whose expansion to the east, according to the Kremlin’s narrative, would have ‘forced’ Moscow to order the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In fact – according to several observers – Putin’s interlocutory response is due to two needs: on the one hand, he does not want to be accused of obstructing the agreement to which Trump has formally adhered, on the other, he knows that at this moment the war is turning in his favor and he does not intend to give up without obtaining something in return .” 

Now it is the case that Zelenskyy has doubts about the ceasefire effort. First he is dealing with Russia but more pertinently Zelenskyy remains insistent that any agreement that follows the short ceasefire must provide security guarantees for Ukraine. But for the moment the focus is on Russia. And as Mary Ilyushina and Sammy Westfall of the Washington Post noted:

“Putin said Thursday he supports in principle the idea of a 30-day ceasefire — proposed by the United States and to which Ukraine has agreed — but noted that its implementation raises many questions, particularly regarding verification across a long front line. Such a tactic could allow Russia to engage in protracted negotiations without immediately rejecting an offer.” 

 

“Putin also said the 30-day reprieve could be used by Ukraine to regroup and rearm, hinting that he would seek to impose his own conditions on the framework of the pause, such as a halt to Western weapons supplies or a ban on mobilization.” 

Meanwhile, the G7 foreign ministers gathered in Canada and pressed Russia to accept the current ceasefire proposal. In the Statement issued at the end of the meeting the foreign ministers declared:  

“G7 members reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

 

They welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. G7 members applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

 

G7 members called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. They discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. G7 members underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.” 

In addition, UK Prime Minister Starmer added further pressure. As described in the NYTimes:

“On Saturday [March 15th], Mr. Starmer convened a video conference with 30 leaders, from Europe, NATO, Canada, Ukraine, Australia and New Zealand, to muster support for his coalition, which Britain is spearheading with France. He said military officials would meet again on Thursday to begin an “operational phase,” though he did not give details about the mission of the force, nor did he announce that any other countries had committed troops to it.

 

“I’ve indicated a willingness for the United Kingdom to play a leading role in this,” Mr. Starmer said at a news conference after the meeting. “If necessary, that would be troops on the ground and planes in the sky.”

And, finally, another piece of the European effort to support Ukraine appears to be falling in place. There now appears to be agreement on a new German government led by Friedrich Merz. As described in the NYTimes: 

“Friedrich Merz, the likely next chancellor of Germany, announced on Friday that he had secured the votes to allow for extensive new government spending, including for defense, clearing the way for a stunning turnabout in German strategic and fiscal policy before he even takes office.” 

 

“The measures would lift Germany’s hallowed limits on government borrowing as they apply to military spending. It would exempt all spending on defense above 1 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product from those limits, and it would define “defense” broadly to include intelligence spending, information security and more.

Effectively, that would allow Germany to spend as much as it can feasibly borrow to rebuild its military.” 

The ‘yes but no’ by Putin may not have long to live. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio made it clear following the foreign ministers meeting, as described in the FT that the administration would soon examine the state of the ceasefire proposal and the positions of the two parties:

“Rubio, who has previously indicated Kyiv would have to make territorial concessions, on Friday signalled Moscow would also have to do so. “I’ve never heard President Trump say that Russia has a right to take all of Ukraine and do whatever they want there,” he said. He added Trump’s national security team will convene this weekend after the president’s envoy Steve Witkoff returns from Moscow to examine the Russian position.”

Ending wars is not easy. And the end is not yet in sight, seemingly. Still, pressure appears to remain on. 

This Post first appeared on my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/stopping-the-war-or-maybe-not-yet

Image Credit: BBC

 

 

 

The Crooked G20/G7 path for the United States

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Well yes a bit late. And a bit shorter. Indeed I am anticipating rather shorter Posts, and possibly later than usual for the next couple of Posts as I am attending the Annual International Studies Association (ISA) meetings – the 66th – in Chicago. Lots of folks and many good panels and sessions on international politics international security and global governance.

Now, I was tempted to reflect on the ‘shit show’ that went down between President Zelenskyy and President Trump and Vice President Vance. But I think I’ll hold off. There will be lots of immediate reaction, and indeed there has been, and I am interested in seeing ‘how the dust settles’ on this grim encounter  before trying to assess the consequences for US-Ukraine, US, Ukraine-Europe, and US-Russia relations.

Instead, I just want to underline the continuing disinterest-distaste the Trump administration appears to be paying to the South Africa Presidency of the G20. It began publicly, as noted in my previous post, with the decision by Secretary of State Marco Rubio to absent himself  from the first Foreign Ministers meeting under the South Africa presidency. As reported by Rob Rose and Sam Fleming of the FT, this was followed by the decision by Scott Bessent, the Secretary of the Treasury not to attend the first G20 Finance gathering. As they wrote:

“US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last week he would remain in Washington — a move that followed secretary of state Marco Rubio’s decision to not “waste taxpayer money or coddle anti-Americanism” by attending a G20 meeting of foreign ministers in South Africa last week.”

What then followed to was a determination by several other finance ministers to follow suit:

“Among the countries that are not expected to send their finance ministers to Cape Town are India, China, Brazil and Mexico, according to people familiar with the organisation of the meetings.”

As it turned out Japan’s finance minister also decided not to attend as well.

Rob Rose then followed up in a subsequent FT  piece that then described additionally that the finance ministers who did attend in Cape Town were  unable to issue a joint finance statement in part due to Trump’s decision to impose 25 percent tariffs on Europe:

“Trump said this week that he planned to impose 25 per cent tariffs on goods from the EU, saying the bloc’s goal was to “screw the United States”.”

 

“G20 finance ministers have been unable to agree a joint communique of their gathering in Cape Town, intensifying questions over the relevance of this body in an era of waning US support for multilateral forums.”

 

“A European official who attended the G20 meetings told the Financial Times that “harsh words” had been exchanged between European finance ministers and US officials in light of Trump’s threats.

 

““In many ways, the US was alone,” he said. “Its trade position was on everyone’s lips, with many of the discussions being about US tariffs and what is at stake for multilateralism. In general, the European countries are aligned that this protectionism is bad for the world.””

 

“In the chair’s summary of the talks, released at the summit’s close, the G20 said the discussions “reiterated the commitment to resisting protectionism”, and a commitment to a “multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization at its core”.”

The angry Trump words and actions have undermined already two very important ministerial gatherings and may well lead other US ministers to cancel their attendance as well. Such actions and words could sidetrack many G20 meetings and actions. And It is still unclear whether Trump will attend the Leaders’ Summit in November. While there is a significant downside to US absence, on the other hand Trump’s decision to attend also raises questions. If he chooses to attend then the question arises what that may be like. How destructive might he choose to be. GIven the meeting with  Trump and Zelenskyy just last week that could be a terror incident as well.

All that is nerve-racking enough. But we still need to see whether the US is willing to take hosting of the G20 for 2026. With South Africa, as I pointed out in a previous Substack Post, completing its G20 hosting by the end of the year, the G20 cycle restarts with the United States presumably taking the hosting for the year, having taken the first G20 Leaders’ Summit during the George W. Bush’s presidnecy in 2008. Would it be better for the G20 to turn down such hosting in the face of Trump’s current antagonism. How that could occur I’m not at all sure. Finally, this leaves one final question: will Trump play destroyer with his presence at the G7 which this year has Canada – the presumptive 51st state according to Trump, hosting the G7 this current year.

Image Credit: NBC News

This Post originally appearde at my Substack, Alan’s Post.

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-crooked-g20g7-path-for-the-united

 

 

The Trump Battering of the Order

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As much destruction, it seems, as this second Trump administration can engineer! And fast! One can’t avoid ‘reeling’ from the current Trump administration actions and plans. And yet we are only 30 days into the second Trump administration. It is truly amazing! 

The real dilemma for me – and for many others –  is the inability to determine whether there is method in Trump’s foreign policy actions; or, whether it is just madness that leads to few good outcomes. Read through  all the experts and you come away completely confused . Some do see method, maybe somewhat accidentally, perhaps, but nevertheless some positive direction – whether with respect to:  trade, Ukraine, Gaza, relations with the allies, especially Europe and Japan, or adversaries – be it Russia or China. But it is very hard to uncover any consistency of approach and any likelihood of valuable or even redeemable outcomes. 

Let’s take Tom Friedman. In a NYTimes piece entitled: “Why Trump’s Bullying Is Going to Backfire” he writes: 

And if all of this is just Trump bluffing to get other countries to give us the same access that we give them, I am OK with it. But Trump has never been clear: Some days he says his tariffs are to raise revenue, other days to force everyone to invest in America, other days to keep out fentanyl.

 

As the Beatles sang, I’d love to see the plan. As in: Here’s how we think the global economy operates today. Therefore, to strengthen America, here is where we think we need to cut spending, impose tariffs and invest — and that is why we are doing X, Y and Z.

 

That would be real leadership. Instead, Trump is threatening to impose tariffs on rivals and allies alike, without any satisfactory explanation of why one is being tariffed and the other not, and regardless of how such tariffs might hurt U.S. industry and consumers. It’s a total mess. As the Ford Motor chief executive Jim Farley courageously (compared to other chief executives) pointed out, “Let’s be real honest: Long term, a 25 percent tariff across the Mexico and Canada borders would blow a hole in the U.S. industry that we’ve never seen.”

 

So, either Trump wants to blow that hole, or he’s bluffing, or he is clueless. If it is the latter, Trump is going to get a crash course in the hard realities of the global economy as it really is — not how he imagines it.

And quite rightly Friedman points out that today’s global trade complex is nothing like the past where the conception was: one manufactured and exported  X while importing from another, Y. As Friedman describes what he nd others see as the world of global trade today: 

My favorite tutor in these matters is the Oxford University economist Eric Beinhocker, who got my attention when we were talking the other day with the following simple statement: “No country in the world alone can make an iPhone.”

 

Think about that sentence for a moment: There is no single country or company on earth that has all the knowledge or parts or manufacturing prowess or raw materials that go into that device in your pocket called an iPhone. Apple says it assembles its iPhone and computers and watches with the help of “thousands of businesses and millions of people in more than 50 countries and regions” who contribute “their skills, talents and efforts to help build, deliver, repair and recycle our products.

We are talking about a massive network ecosystem that is needed to make that phone so cool, so smart and so cheap.” 

The big difference between the era we are in now, as opposed to the one Trump thinks he’s living in, is that today it’s no longer “the economy, stupid.” That was the Bill Clinton era. Today, “it’s the ecosystems, stupid.”

Or turn to regional conflicts, Ukraine for instance. Here is the reaction to recent statements and Trump actions as described by Nicholas Kristof. In a piece titled, “With Trump’s Prostration to Putin, Expect a More Dangerous World”from the NYTimes on February 19th Kristof writes: 

I’m not sure most Americans appreciate the monumental damage President Trump is doing to the post-World War II order that is the wellspring of American global leadership and affluence.

 

He’s shattering it. He’s making the world more dangerous. He’s siding with an alleged war criminal, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, and poisoning relations with longtime U.S. allies. The trans-Atlantic alliance is unraveling. 

 

When I was a young reporter, we referred to countries like Poland and Romania as Soviet satellites; now Trump is doing Putin’s bidding and seems determined to put the United States in the Russian orbit. 

 

The Trump administration has lately sided with Moscow on one issue after another: Ukraine must cede territory, can’t join NATO and should hold new elections just as Russia insists. (Meanwhile, there’s no call for Russia to hold elections.) Trump even suggested that Russia should be readmitted to the Group of 7.

 

In a falsehood-filled rant on Truth Social on Wednesday, Trump went further. He denounced Ukraine’s elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, as a “dictator” who had squandered money and had “better move fast or he is not going to have a country left.” Trump’s post had the tone of statements from the Kremlin.

Now Dan Drezner in a piece from WPR suggests that Trump’s approach to allies in Europe may possibly incorporate a strategic logic: 

Even Trump’s second-term threats directed at longstanding allies can be seen as an example of what Ketian Zhang has labeled “coerce to deter”: In bullying smaller states, Trump is trying to signal what the U.S. could do to great powers if provoked. I have previously expressed deep skepticism about whether this will work during Trump’s second term—but the possibility cannot be ruled out.

This optimistic view, if you want to call it that, was employed by Trump in the first term. As Dan argues: 

Let’s start with the most optimistic scenario for the second Trump White House: that his application of the so-called madman theory works. According to this logic, which Rosanne McManus has critically examined, Trump’s norm-breaking and bullying tactics inject unpredictability into any kind of crisis-escalation calculus, ostensibly deterring other actors from challenging the United States.

However that is only one possible view as Dan suggests. Less optimistically Dan also suggests: 

The other scenarios paint a bleaker picture for the United States. The second possibility is that the Trump administration’s weakening of the U.S. national security state will be interpreted as an invitation for more aggressive Russian and Chinese expansionism. 

And there is even one further possibility as pointed to by Dan: 

There is one final possibility, and it is the most disconcerting outcome for the U.S.: that neither Russia nor China decide to take any provocative action while Trump is president. This is not because he represents a formidable deterrent, but rather the opposite. In this scenario, Trump so weakens the United States’ standing in the world and is so keen to appease autocrats like Putin and Xi that their best option is let him do whatever he wants.

The motivation and consequences of Trump’s actions leave us bewildered. It is at the moment not possible to draw firm conclusions on the Trump approach or the outcomes from administration actions. But most analysts are greatly worried. One other area of concern draws immediate attention. That is Trump’s attachment to, and US policy toward, international institutions and the current global order. My good colleague, Patrick Stewart from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) has raised some real concerns in a recent CEIP Commentary titled, “The Death of the World America Made: Donald Trump’s war on multilateralism is misguided and dangerous”. He writes: 

On February 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed a sweeping executive order with the potential to upend decades of American global engagement. The directive mandates a comprehensive review within 180 days of all current multilateral organizations of which the United States is a member and all international treaties to which it is party. The explicit purpose of this exercise is to determine whether such support should be withdrawn. … 

 

Of far greater import is the order’s decree that the secretary of state shall review “all international organizations” of which the United States is a member and “all conventions and treaties” to which it is party, to determine whether these “are contrary to the interests of the United States and whether [they] can be reformed.” The secretary will then recommend to the president “whether the United States should withdraw” from those commitments. In principle, the directive could lead to a U.S. abrogation of thousands of treaties and a departure from hundreds of multilateral organizations.

 

It is even plausible that the Trump administration will conclude that an “America First” foreign policy requires pulling the United States out of the UN—and kicking the UN out of the United States. Both are long-standing objectives of conservative nationalists who contend, speciously, that the UN threatens American sovereignty.

Now there seems to be a debate among experts as to whether the Trump administration can actually do so; nevertheless as Stewart suggests: 

As Trump’s first weeks in office have shown, this White House doesn’t do ambiguity—and there are many ways to wreck institutions without formally leaving them.

For my part I am equally worried about Trump’s actions with the Informals – the G7 and especially the G20. Particularly with regard to the latter, the hosting schedule for the G20 ends its first cycle with Brazil this year holding the Presidency and then the G20 returns to the beginning of the cycle with the United States scheduled to host in 2026. The G20 is critical in part because it draws together the significant advanced countries, like the US, Germany, France, Japan and now increasingly influential countries from the Global South such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and others. Already the Trump administration, because of its apparent dislike for South Africa’s ‘domestic policies and its theme focus for this year’s G20 Summit  – Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability – has led Secretary of State Marco Rubio cancelling his appearance at the first Foreign Ministers gathering in South Africa as apparently has Scott Bessent, the Treasury Secretary for the first Finance Ministers gathering. As Rubio suggested in his cancelling his attendance, as reported in the Hill: 

I will NOT attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg,” Rubio wrote in a Wednesday post on the social platform X. “South Africa is doing very bad things. Expropriating private property. Using G20 to promote ‘solidarity, equality, & sustainability.’ In other words: DEI and climate change.

 

Rubio added that his job is to “advance America’s national interests, not waste taxpayer money or coddle anti-Americanism.

Now the G20 has not operated very effectively as  a so-called Steering Committee but it has displayed value as a Crisis Committee. Without it, I don’t know but I worry.  

Who knows if Trump will show up to the G20 Leaders Summit. And who knows what he will do if in fact he does show up to the Leaders’ Summit on November 22-23rd. Moreover, will the United States take on the hosting for 2026, especially if it has failed to participate in most gatherings. There is much to worry about. But we will follow it closely. 

This Post first appeared asa Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/157647801/share-center

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All Purpose Tools – with Destruction in Mind

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It was hard to swallow the various initiatives and proposals that flooded from the White House and indeed Trump’s lips this week. Where does one start – with Gaza and the crazy Trump ‘wacko’ notion of the ‘Riviera of the  Mediterranean’? Or, do we look at a somewhat lower decibel view – the threats and or actions by Trump when it comes to tariffs. Tariffs, these things you remember up until Trump as a policy instrument that  used to be about trade policy. Well, not any more according to Trump. 

It was dismaying and equally disheartening to listen to the various efforts by his advisors past and present to normalize the actions along with Republicans in Congress while the loyal opposition, the  Democrats, seem ‘rooted in their seats’ with what appears to be only minor ‘huffing and puffing’ against the many mania actions by the President. 

What seems most startling is his recent flood of actions – Executive Orders and Memos – take us back to Trump 1.0 – but worse. The Trump Gaza proposal seems to be – without question – the winner of the week though. As Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman of the NYTimes, point out:

While his announcement looked formal and thought-out — he read the plan from a sheet of paper — his administration had not done even the most basic planning to examine the feasibility of the idea, according to four people with knowledge of the discussions, who were not authorized to speak publicly. 

 

Inside the U.S. government, there had been no meetings with the State Department or Pentagon, as would normally occur for any serious foreign policy proposal, let alone one of such magnitude. There had been no working groups. The Defense Department had produced no estimates of the troop numbers required, or cost estimates, or even an outline of how it might work.

 

There was little beyond an idea inside the president’s head.

And as David Leonhardt, also of the NYTimes, noted: 

For all the early energy of his presidency — the flurry of executive orders, confirmations and firings — Trump has looked less disciplined this week than he did in the initial days after returning to office. The last few days have instead conjured the chaos of his first term, when his grand pronouncements often failed to change government policy. 

Back to the Gaza proposal, for  a moment.  It is worth noting Aaron David Miller’s view as set out recently in his FP in a piece titled, “Trump Makes Population Transfer an American Policy”. Miller has had a long connection with  the region. He was a former U.S. State Department Middle East analyst and importantly a negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations there. As he wrote: 

From my 27 years of working in the official U.S. Arab-Israeli diplomacy business, I can say President Donald Trump’s Gaza gambit goes above and beyond the craziest and most destructive proposal any administration has ever made (and there have been some strange ones). In one fell swoop, standing next to an Israeli leader who looked like the cat that just swallowed a dozen canaries, the president let loose on a scheme that is not just impractical but dangerous.

 

Trump has now harnessed U.S. prestige and credibility to propose an idea that will be perceived as forced transfer or worse; validated the all-too-dangerous fantasies of the Israel right; undermined key U.S. partners Egypt and Jordan; made his own goal of Israeli-Saudi normalization that much harder; and for good measure sent an unmistakable signal to authoritarians everywhere that they have the right to assert control over other people’s territory. 

Clearly, it is ‘stomach churning’ to many that have been involved in the long unsuccessful effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and more recently to end the Gaza war. Arab partners have uniformly rejected the Trump proposal for Gaza and Israeli support at least to the extent of organizing the Israeli military to aid voluntary evacuation as pointed out by Alexandra Sharp at FP: 

Such suggestions have sparked a flurry of behind-the-scenes diplomacy to stop the joint Israel-U.S. proposal. Both Jordan and Egypt have refused to accept displaced Gaza residents, with Jordanian King Abdullah II rejecting any efforts to annex the territory and Cairo stating that the plan “constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law, and infringes on the most basic rights of the Palestinian people.” Egyptian officials told Time magazine that such a plan could undermine the country’s peace treaty with Israel and harm the region’s stability.

 

Saudi Arabia also strongly rejected the proposal and vowed not to sign a normalization deal with Israel—a foreign-policy priority for the Trump administration—without the creation of a Palestinian state that includes Gaza.

In the face of the Gaza proposal, Trump’s recent tariff actions against Canada, Mexico and China, seem positively tame. Still, though, it was rather crazy stuff threatening 25 percent across the board tariffs on Canada and Mexico only to hold off for 30 days after discussions with Mexican and Canadian leaders and then applying 10 percent across the board tariffs against China. The ultimate outcomes remain unknown though it is startling that Trump’s actions to delay action comes after accepting, at least in the Canadian case, proposals that had been offered significantly earlier. And not unlike the Gaza proposal, it is hard to discern either the methods or the ultimate goal of Trump’s proposals and demands. Is there a method or a clear goal?   The question that faces allies and foes alike is: is there a method to the madness? Not surprisingly experts and opinion writers have in the past, and in the early days of this  second Trump Administration are trying to assess what objectives and outcomes is Trump attempting to achieve? And what diplomatic means is Trump employing to achieve those objectives. 

On the latter Aaron Blake has suggested that there are four possible explanations for this current Trump 2.0 approach. In a piece in the Washington Post (Wapo)  titled, “4 explanations for Trump’s shocking Gaza proposal”, Blake gives us the following possible explanations for the outburst from Trump on Gaza at the press conference with Benjamin Netanyahu. He suggests:

  1. It is a distraction – “And there’s no question that Trump, more than ever, is “flooding the zone” with bold (and often legally dubious) actions that challenge everyone to keep up.” 

  2. It is a negotiating ploy “This could be Trump threatening the unthinkable to force Middle Eastern countries to pursue a more sustainable peace. It would basically be: If you guys can’t figure it out, we’re coming in.” 

  3. He’s leaning into the madman theory even more – ““The idea is basically to make other countries believe you’re completely unpredictable and capable of anything, to keep them in line.”

  4. His sudden imperialist streak is very real – ““It’s possible all of this imperialistic talk is bluster. But it’s also possible that Trump feels freed up in his second term, after years of leveraging “America First” for political gain, to change it up and make the expansion of the United States (in areas he actually cares about) a key plank of his legacy.”

All have some validity. It is evident that the approaches vary from slightly ‘off kilter’ – the madman theory, to a strategic gambit – a negotiating ploy.   I don’t think it is possible to draw strong conclusions at this early Trump 2.0 stage. What we do know however, that particularly with respect to the Gaza proposal, he is on his own untethered to his advisers and key cabinet members. And in the case of the ‘Gaza bomb’ it had one added dramatic effect – it left Netanyahu completely off the hook from any sharp questioning from global media over immediate Gaza actions on the ceasefire, and beyond, the role of the Palestinian Authority, and the future of a “two state solution”. It was a significant timely encounter completely avoided.

With respect to Trump’s goals, assuming there are such animals, it is hard to ignore the fact that his actions seem intended to dismantle the order that the US built; to see the United States as demanding fealty to a leading power and the shape of relations the US is striving to build under Trump 2.0. Decades of building integrated markets in North America, and likely  beyond, are now threatened by Trump’s bellicose actions. Yet according to Bob Davis in FP in a piece titled, “Trump Has the Whole Global Trade System in His Sights”, this is Trump’s goal: 

But he has a bigger goal in mind for his second term with plans he is still cooking up. Trump seeks to remake global trade based on what he calls “reciprocity”—treating other countries, supposedly, in the same fashion as they treat the United States. China is not the target this time—or at least not the only one. He has his sights set on any country with which the U.S. has a large, persistent trade deficit, which in his mind means it is treating the U.S. “terribly.” Success would mean sharply reducing the trade deficit, no matter which country he hits or what other geopolitical goals it impedes.

Maybe he does, maybe he doesn’t have this goal in mind. He is swinging tariffs as an ‘all purpose tool’ with destruction in mind. We will be watching. 

Image Credit: France 24

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/156695312/share-center