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Finding Success for the BRICS+

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Just in time for the July 4th break here is the latest from Alan’s Newsletter. For my American friends – ‘A Good Fourth of July’

So the summits just seem to keep rolling along. Unlike the most recent summits, the G7 and NATO, the more immediate ones are without leaders and the most disruptive one of those – US President, Donald Trump.

Just concluded in Seville Spain is the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4). As noted by SDSN, The UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) which operates under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, and designed to mobilize a network to drive action on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change this summit gathering is designed to:

“This landmark convening offers a critical opportunity for Member States to advance crucial reforms to the Global Financial Architecture (GFA), the system of public and private finance that channels the world’s savings into investment.”

As described by IISD, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), an independent think tank:

“There are four categories of public goods that must be addressed in Sevilla. First, the UN member states must adequately finance the UN system itself.”

“Second, UN member states must increase their official financing of the Sustainable Development Goals in the lead-up to 2030, including debt relief as needed to create the fiscal space to achieve the SDGs.”

 

“These countries have delayed critical increases in International Monetary Fund quotas and Special Drawing Rights allocations.”

 

“Third, UN member states must increase their financing of the global commons, including the biodiversity of the world’s tropical rainforests, the marine life of the oceans, and the protection of the atmosphere, freshwater, soils, coastlines, wetlands, and other ecosystems from transboundary pollution and global-scale degradation.”

 

“Fourth, UN member states must agree on critical reforms of the international financial markets to ensure that world saving flows to the countries with the highest investment returns and the highest growth prospects – which are the poorer countries in the world. This is not the case today.”

What these objectives tell us at a glance is that the ‘system’ is still operating with blinders on when it comes to multilateralism and the prospect of policy advances through multilateral institutions. Today’s ‘system’ is not your classic multilateral system given we are in the midst of Trump 2.0. Indeed, these days it is more likely that Trump will withdraw US funds altogether as opposed to meeting the all too evident funding crisis for various UN agencies including the UN itself.

Meanwhile, we are already closing in on the next leader-led summit, the BRICS+ set to take place in Brazil and led by its president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula, for July 6th-7th. The BRICS has a longstanding and high profile emerging around the same time as the leader-led G7 Summit. The BRICS was seen in some ways as the – not G7 – meaning not made up of western allied leaders. As described by Mariel Ferragamo in a Background note at CFR:

“Established in 2009, BRICS was founded on the premise that international institutions were overly dominated by Western powers and had ceased to serve developing countries. The bloc has sought to coordinate its members’ economic and diplomatic policies, found new financial institutions, and reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar.”

The original membership was made up of: Brazil, Russia, India, China, hence the BRIC to become by 2011 the BRICS adding as a full member South Africa. The BRICS remained static until 2024 but then enlarged with:

  • Egypt.
  • Ethiopia
  • Iran
  • UAE
  • Saudi Arabia, though it has not fully adopted membership;
  • and in 2025, Indonesia

Argentina was also invited to become a full member but according to the CFR Backgrounder, “President Javier Milei pledged to turn the country in a pro-West direction, saying that it would not “ally with communists.”

Meanwhile, the BRICS created an additional category – this ‘partners’. The partners now include:

  • Belarus
  • Bolivia
  • Cuba
  • Kazakhstan
  • Malaysia
  • Thailand
  • Uganda
  • Uzbekistan,
  • Nigeria and in June
  • Vietnam

Partner countries are invited to BRICS summits and other meetings, but their participation may be limited or contingent on consensus among full members.

There then are the current members and additionally the partners. But the question: what is the leadership role of the BRICS+? This remains unclear. As described by Feliciano Guimarães, international relations professor at the University of São Paulo (USP), and academic director at the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) he argues, in Valor International, … “the expansion of BRICS demands more diplomatic skill from Brazil to ensure that defense and security disputes don’t derail the bloc’s cooperation and global governance reform agenda.”

“Mr. Guimarães added that negotiations would already have been difficult without the Iran-Israel war, but that doesn’t mean the summit is doomed: “Yes, it’s gotten harder, but it’s unlikely Brazil will fail. Everyone—including Iran’s government—has an interest in Brazil’s success at this summit. Exposing President Lula to failure would be a major setback for BRICS.””

The membership expansion of the BRICS has left questions over the role of the group as you can read from Feliciano’s examination. What leadership role is possible for this diverse enlarged group, especially with major powers such as China and Russia and indeed also India? Can the BRICS group play a role in shaping global order relations as might the other contending global leaders summit, the G20? If so, how? Can the BRICS+ play a stabilizing role, or is it more likely to play a disruptive role in a heightened and possibly more fractious geopolitical environment?

For Brazil the current host, and its leader Lula, the role has become more fraught. As pointed out by Christopher Sabitini in his article for Chatham House titled, “Brazil’s BRICS agenda may be hard to accomplish after the Iran–Israel war”:

“But the Iran–Israel war – and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – will likely create dangerous distractions to an effective summit outcome along the lines that Brazil had hoped when it assumed the bloc’s presidency.”

On top of these conflicts, Lula, himself has suffered from poor numbers and rising discontent in the country as opposed to his much greater popularity in previous leadership episodes. As the Economist sees it:

“Originally, being a member had offered Brazil a platform from which to exert global influence. Now it makes Brazil look increasingly hostile to the West. The more China transforms the BRICS into an instrument of its foreign policy, and the more Russia uses the BRICS to legitimise its war in Ukraine, the harder it will be for Brazil to keep saying it is non-aligned,” says Matias Spektor of the Fundação Getulio Vargas, a university in São Paulo.”

 

“Brazil’s role at the heart of an expanded and more authoritarian-dominated BRICS is part of Lula’s increasingly incoherent foreign policy. He has made no effort to forge ties with the United States since Donald Trump took office in January. There is no record of the two men ever meeting in person, making Brazil the largest economy whose leader has not shaken hands with America’s president. Instead Lula courts China. He has met Xi Jinping, China’s president, twice in the past year.”

So where does this leave the BRICS+? Again, according to Christopher Sabitini at Chatham House:

“The risk was the body would be turned into an anti-American forum, doing the bidding of China and Russia. For many, the later 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, hosted by Vladimir Putin, reinforced the perception that the bloc had become a platform to challenge the Western order – even as democratic Indonesia joined the group.”

 

“Now comes the test: can a heterogenous BRICS+ grouping collectively and constructively promote Brazil’s brand of democratic multilateralism, respect for international law and measured reform of the international system? And can it serve as the fulcrum to facilitate the global rebalancing of economic, diplomatic, and normative power Brazil wants?”

 

“Much will hinge on whether the group can move beyond emptily opining on the Israel–US–Iran and Russia–Ukraine wars, to issues of more lasting, institutional consequence. Officially, Brazil is hoping to guide discussion toward concrete themes: the green energy transition, cooperation on vaccines, and expanding most-favoured nation status to all countries in the World Trade Organization.”

To add to Lula’s headaches, key leaders, namely Vladimir Putin, and far more surprisingly, Xi Jinping are not apparently going to attend the Summit. For Putin the international arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court is sufficient to keep him away. But the absence of Xi Jinping is more troubling as indeed this the first non-appearance at the BRICS for the Chinese leader. And Lula will have to deal with Iran and its determination to defend its position following the war with Israel and US bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites. As Christoper Sabitini suggests:

“Iran has announced that it will send a delegation, as will Russia. Their presence risks dragging the summit away from Brazil’s agenda towards issuing statements in defence of national sovereignty – a theme pointedly skirted before by BRICS member states when raised in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”

Nevertheless, Mihaela Papa, the director of research and principal research scientist at the MIT Center for International Studies, where she leads the BRICS Lab. and Walter Streeter of the Fletcher Forum see the BRICS+ this way:

“As the BRICS group prepares for its July 2025 summit in Brazil, a new map of global alignment is emerging—one driven not by military alliances or ideology, but by a push for new partnerships in pursuit of multilateralism, trade and development.”

 

“Now, with Washington further retreating from key international institutions and U.S. tariffs unsettling global markets, BRICS has moved into the global spotlight, positioning itself as the new champion of multilateralism.”

“From its outset, BRICS has stood on two pillars: the determination to chart an independent course and the drive to invest in new international institutions.”

 

“BRICS already committed to deeper financial cooperation at the bloc’s 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, creating a cross-border settlement system and strengthening banking and financial markets infrastructure. The 2024 summit also tasked BRICS finance officials with considering and reporting on the use of local currencies, payment instruments and settlement platforms. These efforts, coupled with deeper engagement with BRICS+ countries and realignment of supply chains, further help reduce reliance on the dollar.”

Such a move away from the dollar has raised the ire of President Trump who has threatened serious tariffs if the BRICS threatens the US reserve currency position.

So what will constitute a measure of success for Brazil in its BRICS hosting? I asked my good colleague Gregory Chin at York University, and a close observer especially of the BRICS, New Development Bank – see his article in Global Policy, “Introduction – The evolution of New Development Bank (NDB): A decade plus in the making”. Now one aspect he mentioned will not occur: that is the attendance of leaders from key members Russia and China. But then he suggests:

“One substantive goal of the Brazilian authorities for their BRICS Presidency is to advance a shared intra-BRICS global climate agenda — the “BRICS Climate Leadership Agenda”, plus a “BRICS Leaders’ Framework Declaration on Climate Finance”. If a joint statement on each can emerge from the Rio Summit, and some actions ensue, it would constitute success for the summit.”

Well there then from my good colleague is a measure of BRICS+ Brazilian success. Let us see how it goes; and I will return to the BRICS+ after the Summit.

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/finding-success-for-the-brics

Image Credit: Ricardo Stuckert

The Changing Shape and Influence of the Informals

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The UN General Assembly’s High Level Week has come and gone. And so has the unique UN gathering – The ‘Summit of the Future’ with the passage of the long anticipated, ‘Pact for the Future’. So, it’s not surprising that those of us concerned with global governance, global order and global summitry have turned our attention to the – Informals and most evidently the upcoming two Summits – the G20 Summit hosted this year by Brazil and the BRICS+ Summit hosted by none other than Russia. As it turns out, the third key Informal, the G7 has already been held by Italy in Apulia on June 13-15th.

The Informals emerged in 1975 with the creation of the G6 then the G7 a year later. While the G7 enlarged to the G7/8 in 1998, with the inclusion of Russia, it returned to being the G7 in 2017 when Russia that had been suspended with its annexation of Crimea in 2014, abandoned the Informal for the G20. The G20 began in 1999 with finance ministers and central bankers. It evolved into a leaders summit with the global financial crisis in 2008. The G20 members in attendance at the first Leaders’ Summit called by George W. Bush were: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The BRICs called their first leaders gathering in Yekaterinburg Russia in 2009. It emerged as the BRICS with the addition of South Africa at the Sanya China meeting in 2011.  These three, the G7, the G20 and the BRICS have remained the key informal annual leaders’ summits. The question remains, however, how effective have these 3 Summits been? Have they been able to shape the global order and advance collective global governance leadership? In other words, have they been effective?

Let me first focus on the BRICS+. This year’s gathering is the first convening of the BRICS+, an enlarged BRICS group. This year’s Summit is significant for the current member enlargement but also for its hosting by Russia. Yes, this year the BRICS+ is hosted by Russia – a pariah for the West due to the Ukraine War. My colleague, Stewart Patrick, a senior fellow and director of the Global Order and Institutions Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) published a BRICS+ piece on September 9, titled, “BRICS Expansion, the G20, and the Future of World Order”. On the first point, enlargement, Stewart suggests:

Putin has also invited more than two dozen other countries that have applied for or are considering membership in the expanding club. The gathering is meant to send an unmistakable signal: Despite the West’s best efforts to isolate it, Russia has many friends around the world.

This meeting in Russia will take place in Kazan the capital of Tatarstan. In addition to the original members – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, besides all the many invited guest there are the new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though it should be noted that Saudi Arabia has technically not accepted membership but will attend in any case. Now Stewart’s explanation for this expansion:

No doubt, BRICS expansion evinces a growing global dissatisfaction with and a determination to challenge the structural advantages that advanced market democracies continue to enjoy in a global order that was in many respects made by the West, for the West. Reducing those exorbitant privileges, including by creating alternative, parallel institutions, is the fundamental purpose of BRICS+.

And the prospects of further expansion is highly possible. According to Putin, as described by Stewart:

According to Putin, thirty-four countries have expressed an interest to join the club, “in one form or another.” Some two dozen countries have reportedly applied for membership, among them Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam. More may be waiting in the wings, like Indonesia, which applied and then withdrew its application a decade ago. The most recent applicant is Türkiye, a member of NATO—albeit one that seeks to keep its options open. The group, in other words, seems destined to expand.

So what are the goals and how effective has the current BRICS+ been. As noted above, the BRICS+ members loudly proclaim the need to add the Global South to the major multilateral institutions whether the UN, and especially the UN Security Council, or the major financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF.

At the extreme, according to my colleague Oliver Stuenkel and his co-author Alexander Gabuev in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, titled, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order”:

Putin summarized the agenda of Russia’s BRICS presidency in remarks in July as part of a “painful process” to overthrow the “classic colonialism” of the U.S.-led order, calling for an end to Washington’s “monopoly” on setting the rules of the road.

But the makeup today, and likely in the near future, has its limitations as described by Oliver and his co-author:

But despite its allure, the club must grapple with an internal fissure. Some of its members, chief among them China and Russia, want to position the grouping against the West and the global order crafted by the United States. The addition of Iran, an inveterate adversary of the United States, only deepens the sense that the group is now lining up on one side of a larger geopolitical battle. Other members, notably Brazil and India, do not share this ambition. Instead, they want to use BRICS to democratize and encourage the reform of the existing order, helping guide the world from the fading unipolarity of the post–Cold War era to a more genuine multipolarity in which countries can steer between U.S.-led and Chinese-led blocs.

There clearly are differences in the view of its members as to what this Informal is designed to accomplish. And evidently not all members are equal. In particular China exerts strong influence on the original members and it, along with Russia, have pushed for expansion notwithstanding Brazil and India’s reticence:

Brazil and India are therefore wary of the BRICS’ hardening orientation. Both were initially opposed to China’s push to expand the group, which Beijing first proposed in 2017 under the rubric of “BRICS Plus.” Brazil and India were keen to retain the club’s exclusivity, worried that adding more members to the bloc would dilute their own influence within it. In 2023, China stepped up its diplomatic campaign and pressured Brazil and India to support expansion, mostly by casting their resistance as tantamount to preventing the rise of other developing countries. Keen to preserve its own standing in the global South, India dropped its opposition, leaving Brazil no choice but to go along with expansion. Brazil did lobby against adding any overtly anti-Western countries—an endeavor that failed spectacularly when Iran was announced as one of the new members that year.

It appears that the BRICS+ has taken on what appears to be a growing anti-western tilt and in the extreme case an anti-US position. In particular Russia, given its experience of US and European sanctions since the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine has urged the toppling of the US dollar dominance according to Alexander and Oliver:

In this fight against the Western “monopoly,” Putin identified the most important campaign as the quest to weaken the dominion of the dollar over international financial transactions. This focus is a direct result of Russia’s experience with Western sanctions. Russia hopes that it can build a truly sanctions-proof payments system and financial infrastructure through BRICS, involving all member countries.

But what has the BRICS accomplished beyond expressing distaste for the current global order leadership.

Stewart targets what he sees as the goals of the BRICS+ on the differences within:

On its face, BRICS+ is a formidable economic bloc,comprising half of the world’s population, 40 percent of its trade, and 40 percent of crude oil production and exports. The coalition can use this leverage not only to demand a more equitable international order but also to act on those ambitions, for instance by establishing a parallel energy trading system, deepening commercial links among members,creating an alternative system of development finance, reducing dollar dependence in foreign exchange transactions, and deepening technology cooperation in fields from AI to outer space. Expect BRICS+ to seek opportunities in each area.

Stewart also applauds various group actions:

Like the G7 and G20, the BRICS group has launched an expanding array of initiatives and partnerships across multiple issue areas, from energy to health to sustainable development. The result is an impressive and increasingly dense transnational latticework of networked minilateralism, with a heavy focus on South-South cooperation.

Yet the major collective BRICS efforts have been limited. In fact, we have two only: the New Development Bank (NDB) and a currency swap arrangement, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) which has remained unused notwithstanding all the discussions of an alternative to the US dollar. As to the NDB it has not had a major financing impact with many criticizing it for relying too much on private financing. For an insightful discussion of the BRICS please listen to the podcast I undertook with York University’s Gregory Chin, “Summit Dialogue, S2, Ep 7, An Interview with Gregory Chin on the BRICS+ and the New Development Bank”

Frankly the collective efforts have been at best works in progress with far more rhetorical expression than practical implementation. As Stewart remarks:

To date, BRICS has been more effective at signaling what it is against—namely,continued Western domination of the architecture of global governance—than what it stands for.

And Alexander and Oliver further note:

In this fight against the Western “monopoly,” Putin identified the most important campaign as the quest to weaken the dominion of the dollar over international financial transactions. This focus is a direct result of Russia’s experience with Western sanctions. Russia hopes that it can build a truly sanctions-proof payments system and financial infrastructure through BRICS, involving all member countries.

The talk of de-dollarization is rife but the dethroning of the dollar is nowhere to be seen at the moment. So that is a first look at the expanded BRICS.

What then is the current status of the G20? First it should be noted the G20 has enlarged as well with the addition of the African Union in 2023. A key strength of the G20, unlike the G7, is that the G20 includes advanced economic and Global South members. In principle this wider membership corrects for the skewed membership of the G7 where no significant Global South members are present. This evident avantage has however fallen to the tensions generated in a far more geopolitical tense international system. Stewart reflects on the impact of the rising geopolitical tensions:

Of particular concern is the future of the Group of 20 (G20). Even before BRICS expansion, it had become a microcosm of growing global rifts. A further hardening of these divisions would undercut the G20’s fundamental raison d’être: namely, to help bridge gulfs between—and leverage the capabilities of—important countries that are not inherently or necessarily like-minded.

 

Among the biggest uncertainties is what impact the BRICS+ will have on the role and functioning of the G20, which will hold its own summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18–19 under this year’s chair, Brazil.Since the G20’s elevation to the leader level in 2008, one of its ostensible comparative advantages has been that it provide a setting for flexible coalitions of consensus to emerge that transcend rigid blocs.

 

The expansion of BRICS certainly has the potential to exacerbate these dynamics, by splitting the G20 into opposed G7 and BRICS+ factions.

Though much anticipation was paid to the G20 broad membership, the geopolitical and now the ant-Western tensions reflected in the BRICS+ may hobble the very needed collective global governance efforts ascribed to the G20.

We will come back to the G20 as we approach the G20 Summit scheduled for November 18th and 19th, in Rio de Janeiro as we look to take the measure of G20 effectiveness.

Image Credit: LinkedIn

This Post was originally posted at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter: https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/the-changing-shape-and-influence?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true