Tag Archives: multilateralism

G20 Collaborative Actions: With or Without the US

Posted on by
Reply

The common refrain by those examining the multilateral  institutions and organizations seeking greater collaboration at the global level are: ‘legitimacy’ and ‘effectiveness’. Now the fact is these characteristics apply to the national and subnational levels as well, but they are a consistent refrain at the international level, especially in light of the geopolitical tensions in the international system. 

A number of my colleagues have recently focused on what I consider the key global informal governance institution, the G20. These colleagues focus on both critical characteristics with somewhat different views. First there is Danny Bradlow and Robert Wade. Danny Bradlow is a Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria and Senior G20 Advisor to South African Institute of International Affairs. Robert H. Wade, is co-author on this piece, and is a Professor of Global Political Economy, London School of Economics. Both have participated in various CWD events. In a piece in Global Policy entitled, “How to Fix the Representation Problem of the G20” the co-authors described briefly the G20. Some of that is worth repeating: 

“The G20 is an informal gathering, which claims to be “the premier forum for international economic cooperation”. It was established at finance minister’s level in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, and upgraded to summit level, with the same membership,  in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The summit is held annually, under the leadership of a rotating presidency.”

 

“The membership comprises 19 of the “weightiest” national economies plus the European Union and the African Union. The 19 national economies include  the G7 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada), Australia, plus China, India,  Indonesia, Republic of Korea,  Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina.   The group, which includes about 10% of the states in the world, accounts for 67% of the world’s population, 85% of global GDP, and 75% of global trade.” 

 

It is in size and the weight of membership the most formidable of what I call the Informals which includes at least  the G7, the BRICS+ and the G20. When it then comes to an evaluation of this key Informal the authors suggest: 

“The G20 has had a mixed record.  It has an intense work programme  focused on addressing many of the most significant international economic, financial, environmental and social challenges. The consistency in G20 membership has proven to be an advantage because it helps foster a sense of familiarity and understanding at the technical level among the permanent members, which is helpful in times of crisis and in dealing with complex problems.”

 

“But its exclusivity and informal status has limited its ability to address these challenges. This is particularly  because in many cases an effective response requires agreement and action by all states.” 

 

“Over time, as tensions in international relations have grown, the shortcomings in the structure of the G20 have become more evident. Despite its economic weight, the G20 has a basic legitimacy problem.  It is a self-selected group whose members, except for the African Union and the European Union, represent only themselves. 

What these authors then suggest, in light of their view that legitimacy is lacking is to adopt a model being used, in this case, at the Financial Stability Board, the FSB: 

“It has established six Regional Consultative Groups (RCGs), one each for the Americas, Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan region. The objective is to expand and formalize the FSB’s outreach activities beyond the G20 membership and better reflect the global character of the financial system.”

They conclude their examination with this perspective: 

“Applying the FSB model to the G20 would allow the current members of the G20 membership to continue, while obliging them to establish a consultation process with regional neighbours, thereby creating a limited form of representation for all the world’s states. It would also establish a limited form of G20 accountability towards the international community.”

It is evident that these authors believe the problem for the G20 is a lack of wide representation and apparently the need to enlarge G20 representation. Yet it is somewhat surprising that these two colleagues target representation. I’ve always been of the view that you go with the members you have and seek to move ‘the policy dials’. Whether it is multilateral or minilateral or plurilateral, in an ideal world we would probably enlarge representation but we have learned all too unhappily that universal representation is not necessarily a solution to effective policy action. 

Two other colleagues seem less inclined to see representation as the most serious impediment to advancing G20 policymaking. Indeed these co-authors underscore the critical value of the G20. So, my CWD colleague and lead co-leader, Colin Bradfrord, a Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Global Economy and Development Program at Brookings and his colleague, Brahima Sangafowa Coulibaly who is vice president and director of the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings have joined together to examine the G20 role in, “Strengthening Cooperation for a Changing World:  The Evolving Role of the G20 in Global Economic Governance”, a special brief for Brookings and in fact Brookings held a session with a number of esteemed panelists in Washington at the margins of the ‘Spring Meetings’ to examine the G20. As they argue in their Executive Summary:

“While there are areas for improvement, a review of the G20’s evolution highlights a remarkable transformation. From an ad hoc response to the GFC [GlobalFinancial Crisis], it has evolved into a central pillar of international cooperation—shaping global trajectories across finance, economics, technology, health, climate, and society. After 18 years of experience, involving tens of thousands of politicians, policymakers, and societal leaders throughout each year, the G20 has demonstrated that it is indeed “fit for purpose” at this crucial moment of competing perspectives on the global future.

 

“Indeed, the world is undergoing one of the most profound transformations in global economic relations and facing the greatest test of international governance since World War II. In this context, the G20 has proven to be an indispensable platform—not only through its annual leaders’ summits but also through its multilayered, yearlong process involving ministers, sherpas, senior officials, and civil society leaders across a wide range of sectors. Its ability to convene nations with vastly different cultures, interests, and perspectives—and to keep them at the table despite tensions, rivalries, or even war—is one of its greatest strengths. The G20 serves as a vital arena where global governance plays out in real time amid deep uncertainty and geopolitical strain.”

Are matters perfect, of course not. And the authors are alert to point to the limitations: 

“Despite its past success, there is room to enhance the G20’s effectiveness and impact. Key areas for improvement include strengthening personal dynamics among leaders; enhancing continuity and sustained engagement; improving public communication and domestic outreach; and restoring public confidence in leadership and markets. To bolster its credibility, the G20 should also revisit practices from its most effective years—particularly the use of action-oriented communiqués with clear timelines.”

Critically on the plus side the G20 has a significant element of inclusiveness – at least politically. Not only do you have all the members of the G7 but you also have all the original BRICS members, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Critical in my mind, and it seems to be as well for the co-authors, the G20 includes many key actors from the Global South:

“Third, around the same time, the rise of large, dynamic emerging market economies (EMEs) dramatically altered the global economic landscape, reducing the long-standing dominance of the West—namely the United States and Europe—and ushering in a more pluralistic world. This shift integrated key non-Western powers, such as China and Russia along with influential voices from the Global South, into global economic decisionmaking, injecting realism along with tensions into the global governance system.”

In addition, and to aid continuity from year-to-year for the G20 in the face of  passing of the presidency to the next G20 member, the co-authors point to the Troika: 

“Each annual summit marks a formal transition between presidencies, but continuity is ensured through a “troika” system, comprising the past, current, and incoming hosts. At the outset of a presidency, the host country announces its priorities, which are then integrated with ongoing legacy issues. Together, these form the foundation of the annual work plan, which is refined during the first sherpa and deputies’ meetings— typically held in December and January—and officially endorsed at the first finance ministers’ meeting. This process sets the structure for and establishes working groups and ministerial responsibilities.” 

Is it perfect, no. Indeed in the recommendations section the co-authors suggest adding more members to enhance continuity. But the co-authors pay attention to the structure, what I’ve referred to as the ‘Iceberg Theory’ of the G20. The Iceberg is the significant structure of political and administrative actors carrying on the year to year work, maintaining a critical element of continuity,  to move policy actions forward: 

“This expansive framework highlights the G20’s evolution into a dynamic platform for global governance with broad consultations that extend well beyond its core membership. G20 summits are not simply a two-day gathering of world leaders; they are the culmination of a yearlong process involving a wide array of ministerial meetings, working groups, and civil society dialogues aimed at steering the global economy and addressing 21st century challenges.[In fact the significant structure of Ministerials, Working Groups and Task Forces can be reviewed here at the Global Summitry Project (GSP) website].  

Is it  enough? Well, here you have to be a bit cautious. Overall, the representation and structure of today’s G20 seems adequate but with respect to ‘effectiveness’ – collective concerted collaboration – there is still a distance to go. Very much so. The co-authors in fact also urge the following: 

  • “Strengthen personal dynamics among leaders
  •  Enhance continuity and sustain engagement
  • Improve public communication and domestic engagement
  • Restore public confidence in leadership and markets”

All of that would be useful but collective determined policymaking – advancing action on climate change and climate financing, debt management and relief, global development and many more subjects – remain seemingly unreachable at the moment. 

And now, with the completion of the South Africa year we come to the end of the first cycle of G20 countries. That means that the United States is scheduled to return to hosting in 2026. The Trump administration’s distaste for multilateral actions including debt support, climate change, global development are all too evident. While there was talk in fact of the Trump administration deciding not to take up leadership for 2026, that may not be what the Trump administration is deciding to do at the moment. I wonder which is better however: with, or without, the US? I’m not sure. Some see the Summit collapsing without US involvement. But US hosting, with a Trump administration, may collapse forward movement in key global governance policies. There is at the moment no definitive answer. But there will be more to come on this.  

Credit Image: Bahrain

This Post originally appeared asa Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/g20-collaborative-actions-with-or

The Latest Post from Alan’s Newsletter – ‘The Spiral of Disorder’ – Building then Destroying Trust – Let’s Continue

Posted on by
Reply

 

 

President Donald Trump speaks to supporters at a rally Saturday, Oct. 17, 2020, in Janesville. Angela Major/WPR

“At 9:37 a.m. Wednesday, the president was still bullish on his policy, posting on Truth Social: “THIS IS A GREAT TIME TO BUY!!!” “But in the end, it was the markets that got him to reverse course.” 

And what brought it about, notwithstanding Trump’s assertion he knows what he’s doing: 

 

“The economic turmoil, particularly a rapid rise in government bond yields, caused Mr. Trump to blink on Wednesday afternoon and pause his “reciprocal” tariffs for most countries for the next 90 days, according to four people with direct knowledge of the president’s decision.”

It is turmoil and it accompanies Trump as we’ve seen both in his first four years and now, I think, in a ramped up version in his second. 

The behavior does not change. Now what is this all about? I think David Brooks, a contributor for the PBS NewsHour and an opinion columnist for the NYTimes pinpointed Trump’s underlying motivation and his behavior. As Brooks recently suggested in a piece in The Atlantic, titled, “I Should have Seen this Coming”: 

“If there is an underlying philosophy driving Trump, it is this: Morality is for suckers.The strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must. This is the logic of bullies everywhere. And if there is a consistent strategy, it is this: Day after day, the administration works to create a world where ruthless people can thrive. That means destroying any institution or arrangement that might check the strongman’s power. The rule of law, domestic or international, restrains power, so it must be eviscerated. Inspectors general, judge advocate general officers, oversight mechanisms, and watchdog agencies are a potential restraint on power, so they must be fired or neutered. The truth itself is a restraint on power, so it must be abandoned. Lying becomes the language of the state.” 

 

“Trump’s first term was a precondition for his second. His first term gradually eroded norms and acclimatized America to a new sort of regime. This laid the groundwork for his second term, in which he’s making the globe a playground for gangsters.”

 

“We used to live in a world where ideologies clashed, but ideologies don’t seem to matter anymore. The strongman understanding of power is on the march. Power is like money: the more the better. Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the rest of the world’s authoritarians are forming an axis of ruthlessness before our eyes. Trumpism has become a form of nihilism that is devouring everything in its path.” 

An axis of ruthlessness. Wow! The impact on trade – with the tariff madness is all too apparent. But it is an attack as well  on the alliances and partnerships in the global order that likely brings the most long term damage to the stability of the global  order and these attacks have been ongoing since the first Trump administration. 

This weakening to multilateralism is not just to be laid at the feet of President Trump, however. Some time ago Stewart Patrick, now of the Carnegie Endowment (CEIP) pointed out the faltering of multilateralism. As he wrote in the Oxford journal, Global Summitry, [ a reveal, I was editor at the time] in 2015, he cast back to Obama as he then was, a junior US Senator prior to his first term as President. Obama wrote in 2007 criticizing Bush at that time for the failure to promote greater multilateral action:

“This vision of a multilateral renaissance was premised on the conviction that a new global age had dawned. The core purpose of statecraft was no longer restraining geopolitical rivalry but managing shared dilemmas of interdependence.” 

 

“This broad congruence of interest created unprecedented opportunities for cooperation. But success was not preordained. It required a new international bargain: established powers would grant emerging ones a place at the global head table, and rising powers would accept greater responsibilities for advancing the common good. The administration assumed the United States could engineer global institutional reform on this basis.” 

 

“That confidence proved unfounded. The Obama years show just how resistant formal international organizations are to fundamental change. Two of the most obvious cases are the UN Security Council, whose permanent membership still reflects the world of 1945, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has failed to implement governance reforms that members painstakingly negotiated in 2010. The sources of these logjams are legion. Three of the most important are clashing big power preferences, generic institutional inertia, and inconsistent U.S. leadership (Stein 2008).”

 The weakening of multilateralism accelerated, it seems to me, with Trump, that erosion only slowed somewhat with the Biden years, but now seemingly has returned with a vengeance under Trump 2.0. As Ivo Daalder has pointed to in his recent piece on NATO in FA , titled, “NATO Without America: How Europe Can Run an Alliance Designed for U.S. Control”: 

“Given Trump’s low regard for the alliance and its collective defense commitment, it would be no surprise if his administration decided to withdraw from NATO . In late 2023, Congress passed a law prohibiting the president from doing this without congressional assent—a bill that, ironically, was cosponsored by then Senator Marco Rubio, who is now Trump’s secretary of state.”

 

“Even if he doesn’t withdraw from the alliance, Trump has already seriously undermined it. NATO’s Article 5 collective-defense provision—which says that an attack on any alliance member will be considered an attack on all—derives its credibility less from the formal treaty than from a belief among the members that they are all prepared to come to one another’s defense. In practice, this has meant that the United States, with its vast military, would step up to protect any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump’s words and actions since retaking office—including his direct threats against Canada and Greenland, both of which are part of NATO—have eroded these assumptions.” 

The challenge to NATO’s collective defence with Trump’s uncertainty toward collective action is evident. And many of what I call the Formals, the UN, in particular the UN Security Council and its specialized agencies, the International Financial Institutions, or IFIs, and more are hobbled by the rising geopolitical tensions – the US, Russia and China and the decline in willingness of these and more powers to collaborate. 

Yet as noted above, the weakening in multilateral collaboration has been evident for some time. My colleague, Stewart, reflected on this, and noted the rise of informal institutions. As he then wrote:

“If one focuses solely on formal international organizations, these blockages are grounds for despair. But that pessimistic view obscures a more complicated and promising picture of multilateral cooperation. For what sets the current global era apart is not the absence of international institutions but their astonishing diversity. Faced with resistance to sweeping, transformational change within more encompassing global bodies, U.S. and foreign policy-makers have generated and then exploited a messier form of multilateralism (Haass 2010).” 

 

“Formal organizations persist, but governments increasingly participate in a bewildering array of flexible networks whose membership varies based on situational interests, shared values, or relevant capabilities. States may continue to negotiate and collaborate within conventional bodies like the United Nations or the Bretton Woods institutions. But extensive policy coordination also occurs within parallel frameworks that are ad hoc and temporary rather than formal and permanent.” 

And Stewart noted that another colleague, Miles Kahler had even earlier, much earlier, identified the emergence of what he referred to as ‘minilateralism’ in an article in International Organization ( IO) , titled : “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers” As Stewart wrote: 

“These institutions are often “minilateral” (Kahler 1992) rather than universal; voluntary rather than legally binding; disaggregated rather than comprehensive; trans-governmental rather than just intergovernmental; regional rather than global; multi-level and multi-stakeholder rather than state-centric; and “bottom-up” rather than “top-down.”” 

And as I and others have noted, a number of what I call Informals have arisen since the 1970s. First there was the G7 and then in 1999 the G20 as a finance and central bank gathering becoming a G20 leaders-led annual gathering in 2008. Finally, there was the creation of the BRICs in 2006 – Brazil, Russia, India, China with a leader-led gathering in 2009 and the addition of South Africa in 2011. I mention these separately since these Informals are more institutionalized and far less ad hoc than many minilaterals. They are hybrids between the formal and the informal institutions.

The real question though is whether these leader-led informals can counter the destructive geopolitical tensions that now dominate global order relations? These tensions are brought home by the current difficulties between the G20 host, South Africa and the Trump administration. Two senior officials, namely Secretary of State Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have failed recently to join their first ministerial gatherings during South Africa hosting. And questions have arisen as to whether Trump will join the G20 leaders summit gathering this year in South Africa. 

The question raised is: can this Informal work to advance the current global governance agenda, without the US? Or, in fact is this the only way possible for this key Informal to move forward. And, if it is the only way, will leaders minus the US be willing to press forward on critical global governance issues? Which then is the more fruitful path for global collaboration?

All of this is critical and bears close attention, now, and going forward. We will follow closely and report frequently. 

Image Credit: WPR 

This Post originally appeared at Alan’s Newsletter https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-spiral-of-disorder-building-then-aed

 

Informal global leadership can help steady the ship – from EAF November 26, 2024

Posted on by
Reply

Happy Thanksgiving Weekend – Enjoy!

This piece forst appeared at EAF – https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/11/26/informal-global-leadership-can-help-steady-the-ship/

“All evidence suggested that Brazil’s G20 Summit was going to bean exceptionally difficult summit for the United States and its departing President Joe Biden — and it proved to be so with the USPresident appearing as all too evidently a ‘lame duck’ and the shadow of Biden’s successor, Donald Trump, all too evident in leaders’ discussions.

It has been a busy period for the informal international forums(‘Informals’). The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) met inPeru on 15–16 November, followed immediately by the G20Leaders’ Summit in Brazil on 18–19 November. If these two summits were not enough, the BRICS+ Summit ran in Kazan,Russia on 22–24 October and the East Asia Summit also met inOctober. Leaders and their ministers have had significant opportunities to engage with other heads of government and state.

The question is whether these summits advanced globalgovernance policies or handled the current international context rifewith geopolitical tensions built on the back of conflicts in the Middle East and in Europe, US–China strategic competition and the growing populist and illiberal governments challenging the liberal order? The influence of Informals — especially the G20 but tovarying degrees the G7, BRICS, APEC and the many minilaterals such as the US–Japan–South Korea and China–Japan–South Korea trilateral frameworks — may grow in the increasingly fragmented global order.

The role of Informals has evolved before. Following the eruption of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, there was discussion among experts about whether the just created G20 Leaders’ Summit was a‘crisis committee’ or a ‘steering committee’. In either case, it was presumed to be a capable of generating collective efforts of these key countries. There was strong approval of the G20 efforts to tackle the financial crisis and most observers would agree that their collective efforts aided at the time in getting past the financial crisis.

There was a tendency, naturally, to hone in on the collective G20 leaders’ efforts in the years that followed. The G20 announced efforts to coordinate among its 19 countries and the European Union — and now the African Union — with statements of implementation and agreed coordinated efforts expressed in verylengthy leaders’ communiques or declarations. Yet there was limited implementation by national governments and the international organisations.

The hope was then that the annual gatherings of G20 leaders would allow leaders to finalise collective efforts to make globalisation work for all and to provide a setting where advances could be secured for critical global issues like institutional financial reform, debt management and climate financing. These meetings also sought to achieve collective agreement to press forward on theSustainable Development Goals unanimously approved at the United Nations in 2015. But little of any of this was concluded.

The annual leaders gatherings, especially the G20, have provided at least valuable opportunities for leaders to reach beyond the collective gathering and arrange highly helpful bilateral meetings.For example, the 2023 APEC Summit in San Francisco enabled Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden to meet on the margins. This bilateral meeting is widely recognised as stabilising US–China relations and reopening various lines of communication, including military-to-military communication that had been suspended following the visit to Taiwan by then speakerof the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi.

At the 2024 Peru APEC Summit, the two leaders met again. In thefading days of his presidency, Biden hoped to advance US–China relations. While the leaders were able to publicly express the hope for further cooperation, and there was agreement to maintain human control over nuclear weapons, the shadow of incumbent US president Donald Trump’s return clearly cooled the opportunities for further advancing efforts and left Xi warning over Taiwanese independence and other ‘red lines’.

Besides serving as the setting for leaders of the two leading powers to talk, the Peru APEC meeting also provided the setting for other leaders to hold critical meetings. One clear instance was Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and South Korean President YoonSuk-yeol. The two leaders held their second meeting in just over a month and enabled the two leaders to discuss the threat posed by recent North Korean efforts. They also pledged to continue ‘shuttle diplomacy’. Given the fraught relations between the two countries the meetings proved quite valuable.

The annual informals have created it seems numerous instances of leaders ‘huddling’ together, which has aided diplomacy. These diplomatic instances should not be underestimated, with the G20 representing two-thirds of the world’s global population and 85 percent of global GDP. Further, the G20 gathering in Brazil will have created space for various leader discussions on the eve of Trump’s return. Future gatherings at these summits may prove to be evenmore critical as opportunities to collaborate on trade, finance or climate in the face of Trumpian chaos will be difficult to come by otherwise.

While the Informals’ value for the global order it seems is largely inthe opportunity for leaders to connect and make diplomatic and security progress, the collective efforts of these gatherings cannot be completely dismissed. They may not support collective policy implementation as was once hoped but these summits do enable leaders — often the host country leaders — to amplify critical policy initiatives.

This has proven the case for the Brazil G20 Summit whereBrazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva used his G20 presidency to highlight the need for a global wealth tax on billionaires in a larger effort to support middle- and low-income countries. And the Declaration did at least create the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty. The Alliance is an initiative of Brazil that aims to create instruments to combat hunger and inequality at a global level. The Brazilian wealth tax on billionaires proposal could have raised hundreds of billions of dollars but such a commitment failed to make the Rio de Janeiro Declaration.Nevertheless, the collective expression in the Declaration and the Alliance that was created did hopefully provide a marker for the future.

The way Informals bring leaders together and foster collective diplomatic action will be increasingly important for upholding therules-based order, protecting international peace and spurring policy progress in an increasingly fragmented global order —especially with Trump’s return on the horizon.

Alan Alexandroff is Director of the Global Summitry Project and Co-Chair of the China-West Dialogue (CWD). When he teaches, he does so at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto.

 

Image Credit – G20

 

‘Once in a Generation’ – Well Maybe Not; But ‘Small Ball’ At Least

Posted on by
Reply

Well, the UN ‘Summit of the Future’ (SoTF) has come – and gone.  What does the appearance and passing of the SoTF, and the continuation of the UN General Assembly’s High-level Week tell us about the state of the UN and the condition of global multilateralism? If I may be so bold it is – “not good!” But there may be a thread or two that might lead to more effective multilateralism.  Still I suspect after the most recent Posts this immediate conclusion can hardly be a surprise. Reflecting on  the UN proceeding, Bloomberg reported:

The United Nations General Assembly’s annual meeting in New York is often mocked as a farce for the endless speeches and the traffic snarling the city. This year’s gathering feels more like tragedy.

The violence and chaos engulfing the globe put questions around the UN mandate — “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” — in stark relief.

Antonio Guterres is the first to admit that the secretary-general of the UN has no power, just a voice (emphasis added). It’s one he uses time and time again like a modern-day Cassandra to lament that the world is currently experiencing the most conflicts since the organization was founded in 1945. The past three years were the most violent in three decades, according to one think tank.

So the international context is not good. But looking specifically at the SoTF, let’s look at the result. On the positive side the UN passed, ultimately unanimously the ‘Pact for the Future’. Why I say ultimately is because the document’s final passage suffered from great power intrigue before the Pact of the Future was agreed to and passage concluded. As pointed out by IISD, the International Institute for Sustainable Development:

The Summit of the Future opened with some drama when the Russian Federation tabled its objection to several paragraphs in the outcome documents: the Pact for the Future, the Global Digital Compact, and Declaration on Future Generations

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin tabled Russian objections and, according to AlJazeera:

Vershinin also stressed that the pact could not be viewed as creating “new mandates and obligations” for states as it is “simply a declaration, and a very vague one.

In the face of these objections, interestingly, the Republic of Congo – representing Africa’s 54 nations – and Mexico, rejected the Russian amendments and preventing them from going through. With the loud opposition from members of the Global South to Russia’s objections, the  IISD reported:

… after months of negotiations, the Pact was adopted. UN General Assembly (UNGA) President Philémon Yang thanked the Co-Facilitators for steering a complex negotiating process and described the just-adopted Pact as a reflection of “our pledge” to lay the foundation for a sustainable, inclusive, and peaceful global order.

On the positive side, the final Pact appears to retain the Security Council reform initiative. Though the Action numbers have changed, it appears that the reform provision has been retained:

Action 40. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform as a matter of priority and without delay …

 

Encourage the submission of further models and the revision of already presented models by States and Groups of States for the structured dialogues with a view to developing a consolidated model in the future based on convergences on the five clusters, and the models presented by Member States.

It is there but we wait to see results. There appears to many at the UN to be a greater ‘majority’ to reform the Security Council, and how it works. Such reform seems to include a growing consensus to permanently add members to the Security Council. For some time now the US has lead the charge to include India, Germany , Brazil and Japan, though without a veto, and Ambassador Thomas-Greeleaf announced a US position urging two permanent seats for developing country members and a spot for a SIDS (Small Island Developing States) seat. Yet final agreement appears to be out of the reach for the members.

Now, interestingly there were a variety of insights provided by Richard Gown, currently the UN Director for the International Crisis Group, who was interviewed on the 25th by Ravi Agrawal, editor in chief of Foreign Policy. In this FP: Live session titled: “Can the United Nations Still be Effective?”, Gowan, who has long been involved with the UN, suggested that what was most interesting in the Pact was not Security Council reform but the effort to focus on digital governance and  the initiation of negotiations on AI in the Digital Compact, Annex I: Global Digital Compact:

“Objective 5. Enhance international governance of artificial intelligence for the benefit of humanity”

56. We therefore commit to:

(a) Establish, within the United Nations, a multidisciplinary Independent International Scientific Panel on AI with balanced geographic representation to promote scientific understanding through evidence-based impact, risk and opportunity assessments, drawing on existing national, regional and international initiatives and research networks (SDG 17);

(b) Initiate, within the United Nations, a Global Dialogue on AI Governance involving Governments and all relevant stakeholders which will take place in the margins of existing relevant United Nations conferences and meetings (SDG 17).

Gowan suggested in the interview that the effort here with AI might well bear fruit in years to come with rules on digital governance and AI. It will in his view be looked at retrospectively as the Pact for the Future provided the framework for critical digital governance success.

Gowan was also clear-eyed when it came to the UN and its capacity to constrain and resolve conflict. He was blunt that what he called ‘first order’ crises – Ukraine and Gaza currently, due to great power rivalries and political actions are currently out of the reach of the UN to achieve any level of success and ultimately political resolution. On the other hand, what he described as ‘second order’ conflicts – an example Sudan, where most great power rivalries are not at play, can be subject to UN collective peace efforts.

So it is evident that many of the conflict crises are outside effective UN efforts. Still, Gowan reminded us that ‘everyday multilateralism’ is at the heart of today’s UN efforts. While the UN today cannot end wars, it is critical in providing significant action and progress in mitigating the consequences of violence, pandemics, and natural and climate disasters. UN agencies may be the only major players in these circumstances.

Finally, Gowan pointed out where attention needed to be paid to these recent UN summit efforts. The declarations and pacts could be largely ignored; the statements and speeches by Heads of Government and State could equally be set aside and forgotten but the actual gathering of leaders could enable numerous bilateral and minilateral meetings at the margin of the formal meetings.  These highly informal discussions could be settings where positions could be staked out and possible positive steps could be agreed by leaders that later translated into real progress. It might be ‘small ball’ but it could ultimately lead to progress. The informality is evident and such in-person gatherings could easily be missed but quietly and ‘below the radar’ such quiet conversations could provide  real opportunity to resolve the all too difficult and seemingly intractable moments of violence. This is informal, very informal ‘multilateralism’. But progress may be possible.

Image Credit: IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute)

This Post first appeared at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/once-in-a-generation-well-maybe-not?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

The UN ‘Summit of the Future’ (SoTF) and the Enduring Weakness of Multilateralism

Posted on by
Reply

In last week’s Post, with part of the same title as this week’s Post at Alan’s Newsletter, I began an examination into the weakening of multilateralism in the current global order. It is a particularly appropriate time to look at the state of multilateralism, and particularly a focus on the classic ‘Formal’ institution, the United Nations.  This is a key week in the life of the UN.

The UN General Assembly is gathering, as pointed to by Nudhara Yusuf from Stimson described to:

So, UNGA79 really stands for the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, which begins on September 10th, 2024 … UNGA79 this time of year though, we’re referring to the wonderfully energized chaos that is about to descend onto 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Ave New York during UNGA High-Level week [emphasis added] when the general debate is opened. This will be on the 24th of September and run through the end of the week. Of course, the key thing on all our minds are the days right before that, with the Summit of the Future Action Days from 20-21 September and the Summit of the Future itself from 22-23 September.

The gathering of heads of government and state at the special UN session is to complete and agree on the following:

Its agreed outcomes of the Pact for the Future and annexed Declaration on Future Generations and Global Digital Compacts should be priority areas for Heads of States in their statements.

Colum Lynch at Devex, examined recent UN developments including the SDG Summit in 2023 and now, at the doorstep, the Summit for the Future in 2024:

The roots of the future summit date back to 2020, when world leaders marked the 75th anniversary of the U.N.’s founding, issuing a declaration asking [Secretary General Antonio] Guterres to outline his vision for a modern multilateralism to better “respond to current and future challenges.” The following year, Guterres issued Our Common Agenda, which maps out a course for the U.N. over the next 25 years.

 

Many of Guterres’ original proposals — for instance, the creation of a Futures Lab to measure the impact of policies over the long haul and the reform of the trusteeship council established to manage decolonization to advocate on behalf of future generations — were scaled back or scrapped altogether. And there remains persistent skepticism that a decades-long push for the expansion of the U.N. Security Council — to include emerging powers from Asia, Africa, and Latin America that have emerged since World War II — will succeed this time around.

Clearly reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is at the absolute heart of urgent reform of the multilateral system. This was made clear with the very recent announcement by the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenleaf  that added additional US proposed reforms:

  1. Create 2 permanent seats for Africa in the Council;
  2. A new elected seat for Small Island Developing States (SIDS); and
  3. Engaging in tech space negotiations in Council reform

The Pact for the Future, the key outcome document of the SoTF has now gone through 4 deeply negotiated revisions, with the 4th revision released just a few days ago (September 13th). In the first 3 revisions there was no agreed reform text and yet finally in this 4th revision we see at least the articulation of proposed ‘features of reform’ fo this key UN institution:

Action 41. We will reform the UN Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable.

 

69. In response to the growing urgency to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations’ abilities to maintain international peace and security as set out in the UN Charter, we agree on the following guiding principles identified in the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council (IGN) in accordance with decision 62/557 of the General Assembly as parameters for reform:

(a) Redress the historical injustice against Africa as a priority and, while treating Africa as a special case, improve the representation of the underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups, such as AsiaPacific and Latin America and the Caribbean.

(b) Enlarge the Security Council in order to be more representative of the current UN membership and reflective of the realities of the contemporary world and, taking into account our commitments of Sustainable Development Goal 16.8, increase representation of developing countries and small- and medium-sized states.

(c) Continue discussions on the issue of representation of cross-regional groups, taking into account that Small Island Developing States, Arab States, and others, such as the OIC, have been mentioned in the discussions of the IGN.

(d) Intensify efforts to find an agreement on the question of the categories of membership taking into account the discussions held in the IGN process.

(e) The total number of members of an enlarged Council should ensure a balance between its representativeness and effectiveness.

(f) The working methods should ensure the inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable functioning of an enlarged Council.  (g) The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use.

(h) As part of a comprehensive reform, the inclusion of a review clause should be considered to ensure that the Security Council continues over time to deliver on its mandate and remains fit for purpose.

As is evident this Action item, 41, does not describe actual agreed changes. For that one needs to turn to Action 42:

Action 42. We will strengthen our efforts in the framework of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform as a matter of priority and without delay.

 

70. We support the Member States driven nature of the reform of the Security Council, and will intensify efforts for the reform through the IGN in accordance with General Assembly Decision 62/557 and other relevant resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly, such as resolution 53/30. Building on the recent progress achieved in the IGN, including through more transparency and inclusivity and by enhancing its institutional memory, we decide to:

(a) Encourage the submission of further models and the revision of already presented models by States and Groups of States for the structured dialogues with a view to developing a consolidated model in the future based on convergences on the five clusters, and the models presented by Member States.

It is evident that this Action Item 42 is in UN-speak. I have had to rely on close colleagues much more schooled in the UN than I am. Indeed you can listen to valuable webinar on the subject: of “The UN Summit of the Future: What to Expect”, with several colleagues including Anne-Marie Slaughter CEO of New America and led by close Carnegie Endowment of International Peace (CEIP) colleague, Stewart Patrick. There I learned there will be an Intergovernmental Negotiation that would lead to a consolidated model of reform to ultimately be voted on. My colleagues believed that this was a significant step forward on reform. Looking at it I remain somewhat skeptical but will rely on my knowledgeable friends that something – that reform proposals – will advance at the UN and that reforms are in fact coming.

Finally, I couldn’t end without referencing my Substack colleague’s examination of the impact of the Summit of the Future. So Peter Singer at Global Health Insights recently posted a piece titled: “Will the Summit of the Future lead to a more results-based United Nations?” Peter examines all 60 action items and concludes:

On full display at the Summit is what’s wrong with the UN: a failure to execute on what’s already agreed.  In September, the only acronym the UN needs is GSD — Get Sh*t Done. (If you’re a diplomat, feel free to substitute “Stuff.”)

Peter is particularly frustrated over the failure of the Organization and its member states to advance the 2015 agreed Sustainable Development goals (SDGs), what the UN calls Agenda 2030:

The UN suffers from planning disease. Any successful real-world entity does 10% planning and 90% execution (and the planning is built on the results of execution).  In the UN, it’s the reverse.

Peter argues that the UN must first develop “better ways to translate data into results.” Then it must: “support countries to scale innovations that are already reaching millions to reach tens or even hundreds of millions of people.” And finally he urges:

It could look at countries that are performing well and those that are not and how the latter could be more like the former.  It could examine what the agency is doing to support countries to get on track, and how it could do it better, and how well it is working with other agencies to support countries.

I think the latter point is particularly critical because in the end in this case it is not so much the UN, and the UN agencies that are responsible  for achieving the SDGs but the Member countries that will make the SDGs happen – or not. And, unfortunately, it is the Member States that are only too evidently unwilling, or politically and administratively unable to make SDG progress. A too obvious example – the United States. This is a Member State where the SDGs never pass the lips of its leaders and their officials.

The questions surrounding the outcomes and implementation of the  SoTF lie as much, or more,  ‘at the feet’ of the national governments. It is not a heartwarming view. So, yes, we need to address the inadequacies of the international organizations. Reform and updating is required and little has occurred over the decades. But the heart of the system is states and their capacity and, or willingness to work together to achieve progress. As Sophie Eisentraut declared in her FP article, “Can the West Revive Multilateralism?”:

As world leaders descend on New York for the United Nations Summit of the Future this week, rules-based multilateralism is in a dismal state. Amid the international community’s failure to conclude a global pandemic treaty and the U.N. Security Council’s paralysis in the face of both Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict, it’s hard to recall the last success of multilateral cooperation.

Among governments, accusations of double standards and broken promises, from delivering COVID-19 vaccines to providing meaningful debt relief, are mounting. Against this backdrop, the summit looks like a desperate attempt to rebuild confidence—particularly among countries in the global south as they navigate a multilateral system that even the U.N. secretary-general describes as caught in “colossal global dysfunction.”

The ‘enduring weakness’ is ultimately laid at the feet of national governments. And from today’s perspective – and on the eve of the Summit of the Future – it is not a very pretty sight.

This Post originally appeared at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter. Comments are welcome as are free subscriptions

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/the-un-summit-of-the-future-and-the?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=trueImage Credit: YouTube

The Enduring Weakness of Multilateralism: An Aspect

Posted on by
Reply

Though it was heartening to see the Presidential debate this past week with a strong performance by Vice President Kamala Harris, it was disheartening to see that Donald Trump remains a major force in US politics and still a strong contender notwithstanding some of his wild statements and his conspiracy theory assertions. While the event highlighted the ‘weirdness’ of Donald J Trump, the candidate, the game is not yet won. We may yet see him reoccupy the White House. Such an outcome would threaten the alliance(s) system, global trade and continuing US presence in the current multilateral system driven by Trump’s transactional model of US foreign policy behavior.

Trump’s return would likely drive current US foreign policy ‘over the cliff’. But changes have been underway for some time and many of them are weakening the multilateral system built over many decades. Many foreign policy analysts have focused on the structural elements – notably the decline in the international measures of power of the United States and its impact as a result on the global order. I was struck by a letter titled, “Muster Global Majorities”  prepared by Mark Malloch-Brown. This is just one of nine requested by FP to greet a new US president. Now, Malloch-Brown was the former deputy secretary-general of the UN well aware of the multilateral system and he targeted the decline of the US:

But whoever prevails on Nov. 5—and congratulations, by the way—this will not change the much deeper shifts underway in the distribution of global power and values alignment that are now surfacing at the U.N. and its Bretton Woods cousins, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They have seen an approximate quadrupling of membership since their post-World War II founding; a more than tripling of global population; and a global GDP that is more than 10 times bigger.

 

But you must see there is a global shift underway, and the United States, more than ever, is not an unchallenged No. 1 but rather a precarious first among equals in a multilateral system and which in responding to wider intellectual and political change in the world resents any claim to monopoly leadership. As Shakespeare observed in his great play on succession and power, Henry IV, Part 2: “Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.”

Malloch-Brown in his letter, in fact, is pointing to two evident declines: the decline in power of the US in the context of the global system, the structural elements with the rise of China and with the emergence of a number of the Large Emerging Powers, the likes of India, Brazil, Indonesia and more.  But the decline is also evident from a diminishment in US leadership in the global order, the behavioral aspect of any analysis.

While there is a relative decline in the power dimensions for the United States, it is the decline in policy leadership that is in some ways most evident. Take trade. As Alan Beattie has written just recently in the FT article entitled, “Can Globalization Survive the US-China Rift”:

Multilateralism is weak. The US is undermining the WTO by citing a national security loophole to break rules at will. The EU won a case against Indonesia over its nickel export ban, but the WTO’s dysfunctional dispute settlement system has delayed compliance.

 

But this does not mean regional or geopolitical trading blocs will start setting the rules of trade instead. The US talks a good game about building alliances, but the political toxicity of trade deals in Washington stops it offering market access to incentivise countries to join. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the US’s main initiative in the Asia-Pacific, is widely regarded as all stick and no carrot.

Rather than a continued reliance on the multilateral rules and the WTO, the multilateral trade institution – of which the US is one of the primary creators –  responsible for managing trade and trade friction, the United States has chosen to neuter the global trade rules by collapsing the trade dispute mechanism of the WTO. The US has turned away as well from promoting freer trade and free trade agreements and has come to rely more and more on protectionism. As pointed out by Bob Davis in his FT piece, “How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Embrace Protectionism”, he described the US turn to protectionism:

… the president [Biden] made a decision that upended decades of Democratic White House rule. He ordered heavy new tariffs on Chinese imports of high-tech items and continued the massive tariffs he inherited from his Republican predecessor.

 

The significance of the moves—and the challenge that it presents to Biden’s successor—was obscured by the roller-coaster news cycle. But it bears noting: The Biden administration is the first since at least President John F. Kennedy’s time to fail to negotiate a major free trade deal, instead embracing tariffs. Even Trump, the self-proclaimed “Tariff Man,” concluded a significant free trade pact when he replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement with a U.S.-Mexico-Canada deal (USMCA), which toughened rules on auto imports but established liberal rules on digital trade. He also negotiated a smaller digital agreement with Japan.

 

The turnabout is emblematic of a broader change in the U.S. economic and political thinking that is unlikely to be reversed under either a President Trump or Harris. The era of hyperglobalization, which began around 1990 and saw global trade jump by 60 percent in 20 years as supply chains spread across the earth like spiderwebs, has come to an end. We are now in an era of growing protectionism, and as trade growth has stalled, the United States and many other advanced economies have hiked tariffs and begun subsidizing industries that they view as critical to their well-being.

The turnabout with an increasing reliance on tariffs and a more full throated rise of US protectionism in fact ties the US, that is US economic policy to its political-security policy and actions. Davis makes the pointed linkage today between the two for US policy action:

Peter Harrell, the White House’s former senior director for international economics, said the change marks a fundamental rethinking of U.S. trade policy. “We are in an era of geopolitical competition with China,” he said. “That means we aren’t going to accord China the same trading privileges and rights” accorded to allies—despite World Trade Organization requirements to treat members equally.

 

It boils down to the fact that the economic juice [from cutting tariffs] was not worth the political squeeze,” said Evan Medeiros, a Georgetown University China expert who had been an official on Obama’s National Security Council.

 

In the second part of its decision, the administration ramped up some tariffs to block Chinese imports in areas where the United States was spending billions of dollars on subsidies to create or strengthen a domestic industry.

Tariffs were quadrupled to 100 percent on Chinese electric vehicles this year, as [Lael] Brainard had advocated, doubled to 50 percent on Chinese semiconductors and solar cells, either this year or next, and tripled to 25 percent on EV batteries this year. Even low-tech Chinese syringes, which had previously been shipped duty-free, now face 50 percent tariffs as a spur to boost domestic production.

 

The primary reason for the U.S. turn to protectionism is the growing economic and military challenge from China. But it also reflects a profound change in ideology: The gains from trade—lower prices, overall improvements in living standards, greater competition—are no longer seen by many political leaders as worth the downsides in the loss of manufacturing jobs, dependence on imports from adversaries such as China and Russia, and political polarization. The Trump administration, packed with anti-free traders, gave a big push to this neo-protectionism; the Biden administration has confirmed and deepened the shift.

The bottom line is that geopolitical tensions, particularly the deep US-China competition, has undermined US commitment to a multilateral system that the US was a principal architect in creating and maintaining over many decades. This outcome to date is deeply troubling.

Image Credit: CNBC

The Troubles with Multilateralism: Two

Posted on by
Reply

So this week’s Post may be ‘a bit lighter’ than usual. But I have an excuse: there is a celebration afoot in the family this weekend – my younger daughter is getting married – much activity is planned. Still here is this week’s thinking on global order matters on ‘Alan’s Newsletter’.

Now, where were we?  Ah yes, focusing on diplomacy and the difficulties of multilateralism, especially among the Formals. Now Richard Gowan recently wrote a piece examining the UN, especially in the light of the upcoming September UN Summit of the Future. Richard oversees the International Crisis Group’s advocacy work at the United Nations, liaising with diplomats and UN officials in New York. Richard also is a Research Associate and Associate Director for Policy at the Center on International Cooperation at NYU.

As Richard describes it in his article, “Redefining the UN’s Prime Purpose” there is a growing sentiment to diminish the UN’s role in peace and security matters. This seems to go all the way to the top of the UN chain. As Richard writes:

Even some of the organization’s leaders appear to think that the UN may be wise to take a lower profile on security concerns and focus its energies elsewhere. … In 2021, he [Antonio Guterres] published a report on the future of multilateralism entitled ‘Our Common Agenda’… In 2023, Guterres released a fuller New Agenda for Peace. This contained a frank assessment of the poor state of international relations, and urged states to reinvest in diplomacy. It included interesting passages on the security challenges posed by AI, new biotechnologies, and other scientific advances. Yet the document struck a humble note, emphasizing that the UN’s ability to address many conflicts is limited and that international interventions often backfire. Instead, one of its themes is that states should invest more in their domestic conflict prevention efforts.

And the bottom line, according to Richard, is reducing the UN role:

In line with the Common Agenda, the Secretary General has portrayed the summit as an opportunity for presidents and prime ministers to launch new ideas about global governance. Diplomatic discussions about the summit – and a Pact for the Future that is meant to come out of it – have further highlighted the difficulties of talking about security at the UN.

This stepping away from conflict abatement efforts seems to extend through a significant number of UN Members and somewhat surprisingly, or maybe not, depending on your point of view, it appears to be expressed by Members of the Global South. Richard has in fact picked up on this thread of thinking from the Global South:

Many UN members from the so-called Global South have made it clear that the summit and pact should focus on the economic problems that they face today. Scores of developing countries are now carrying unsupportable debt burdens, and want the summit to help them unlock affordable financing.

Many of these UN members from the Global South – what used to be referred to in the past as the Third World, or the developing world, or even as the NAM, the ‘Nonaligned Movement’  have made it clear that the upcoming Summit of the Future and the Pact for the Future should focus on their economic problems, especially in the light of significant and growing debt but also in financing the green transition that they all face today.

The dilemma of course is, if the UN backs away from conflict suppression, then who, or what, can the global order rely on. It is evident that there is a hard limit on what the UN can do in the face of great power conflict for the moment but there are many conflicts where the UN is, and has played a role in limiting, and in some instances ending, conflict. The problem has been that the efforts are slow and too often barely effective and these peace efforts can extend for far too many years. So new approaches are called for and likely include stronger immediate pressure and serious diplomatic actions backed possibly by strong sanctions and in some limited cases early intervention. As Richard concludes:

Even if the UN’s narrowly defined security role is shrinking, multilateral cooperation is still essential to addressing the security of states and individuals in a wider sense. So it is possible that the UN will see its traditional mediation and peacekeeping roles shrink, while still contributing to making the world a safer place through other strands of work.

Reliance on more active diplomacy needs to be considered especially in  a world where there is a growing threat of conflict, violent conflicts such as Ukraine and the Gaza wars. But there also needs to be a shift in thinking how, and when, to turn to force is warranted. Dan Drezner from Drezner’s World, and Tufts, and other things, points to the weakness of diplomatic thinking and action. In the case he discusses this is on the part of one of the leading powers, the United States. As Dan in this Foreign Affairs article titled, “How Everything Became National Security: And National Security Became Everything” points to US thinking and action in foreign policy and how it has become dominated for far too long by an overweening national security mindset:

Consider the history of the National Security Strategy, the report on current threats that the president is supposed to deliver to Congress annually, although in practice it is usually released less often. A review of post-1990 reports reveals a steady expansion of qualifying concerns: energy security, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking, and terrorism, among many others.

 

In the 70 years since, the definition of national security has been stretched almost beyond recognition. New technologies have multiplied the vectors through which external forces can threaten the United States. Furthermore, because security issues command greater staffs and budgets, policy entrepreneurs have strong incentives to frame their interests as matters of national security. The forces that push issues into the national security queue are far more powerful than the forces that lead policymakers to exclude them. Nevertheless,even with this expansion, the United States has been blindsided by events: 9/11, the COVID-19 pandemic, the October 7 attacks. Simply having a longer list of threats hasn’t really helped prepare for the unexpected.

The need for strategic recalculation by the US and among the major powers is all too apparent today. What that recalculation is, and how to implement that, is a discussion for another day.

This Post was first posted at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/the-troubles-with-multilateralism?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

Comments are welcome as are the free subscriptions

Image Credit: Geneva Environment Network

The Trouble with Today’s Multilateralism: An Intro

Posted on by
Reply

 

So in this week’s Post I was all set to hone in on the struggles over reenergizing faltering multilateralism in the current global order. Today’s  troubles encompass the formal institutions – the Formals – from the UN, and many of its specialized agencies to the international financial ones – the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. And the troubles extend to the Informals, the G7, the G20 to the BRICS+ and more. The struggles over multilateralism are the flip side of the return, seemingly ever more strongly power politics – the wars in the Ukraine and Gaza, and geopolitics, especially the rise in bilateral tensions between China and the United States.

But before I could go there, I couldn’t ignore the just excellent article – recommended by my colleague, and China expert, John Gruetzner – in Foreign Affairs by Zongyuan Zoe Liu, titled, “China’s Real Economic Crisis: Why Beijing Won’t Give Up on a Failing Model”. This very good piece leaned strongly into the discussion I had raised in my previous Alan’s Newsletter Post, ‘China, Seemingly, Stays the Course’. The Post chronicled the disappointment expressed by analysts and experts in the West primarily but in a rather more modulated form in China as well. The disappointment according to these experts emerged over the failure in the Third Plenum to initiate significant economic reform in the Chinese domestic economy and a clear determination to tackle domestic consumption.

Liu gets it right:

The Chinese economy is stuck. … But there is a more enduring driver of the present stasis, one that runs deeper than Xi’s growing authoritarianism or the effects of a crashing property market: a decades-old economic strategy that privileges industrial production over all else, an approach that, over time, has resulted in enormous structural overcapacity.

 

Simply put, in many crucial economic sectors, China is producing far more output than it, or foreign markets, can sustainably absorb. As a result, the Chinese economy runs the risk of getting caught in a doom loop of falling prices, insolvency, factory closures, and, ultimately, job losses.

 

Since the mid-2010s, the problem has become a destabilizing force in international trade, as well. By creating a glut of supply in the global market for many goods, Chinese firms are pushing prices below the breakeven point for producers in other countries. In December 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that excess Chinese production was causing “unsustainable” trade imbalances and accused Beijing of engaging in unfair trade practices by offloading ever-greater quantities of Chinese products onto the European market at cutthroat prices.

 

Despite vehement denials by Beijing, Chinese industrial policy has for decades led to recurring cycles of overcapacity. At home, factories in government-designated priority sectors of the economy routinely sell products below cost in order to satisfy local and national political goals.

Now there continues to be some contention over whether in fact production is below cost but I I was pleased by Liu’s ‘recommendation’ that the two – the West and China – consider options other than just piling on the tariffs. Liu correctly points out the negative consequences of such trade policy:

A China that is increasingly cut off from Western markets will have less to lose in a potential confrontation with the West—and, therefore, less motivation to de-escalate. As long as China is tightly bound to the United States and Europe through the trade of high-value goods that are not easily substitutable, the West will be far more effective in deterring the country from taking destabilizing actions. China and the United States are strategic competitors, not enemies; nonetheless, when it comes to U.S.-Chinese trade relations, there is wisdom in the old saying “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.

That is why I have suggested negotiating – and one aspect in this case could be Voluntary Export Restraints or VERS. VERS are not super policy  actions – I get that  but they do encourage bilateral discussions rather than just unilateral penalties. As Liu suggest:

The U.S. government should discourage Beijing from building a wall that can sanction-proof the Chinese economy. To this end, the next administration should foster alliances, restore damaged multilateral institutions, and create new structures of interdependence that make isolation and self-sufficiency not only unattractive to China but also unattainable. A good place to start is by crafting more policies at the negotiation table, rather than merely imposing tariffs. … If the government [China] also implemented voluntary export controls, it could kill several birds with one stone: such a move would reduce trade and potentially even political tensions with the United States; it would force mature sectors to consolidate and become more sustainable; and it would help shift manufacturing capacity overseas, to serve target markets directly.

While working through the WTO might be preferable, and many analysts suggest such an approach for multilateral trade frictions, realistically that course of action is out of reach for the moment.

So there you are on the Third Plenum and global trade.  Let me at least turn to the original subject for this Post; let’s at least open the discussion on multilateralism and its problems. I was particularly attracted to a piece published recently by Pascal Lamy. Pascal Lamy (pascallamy.eu) is currently the Vice-President of the Paris Peace Forum, and coordinator of the Jacques Delors Institutes (Paris, Berlin, Brussels). Importantly, Pascal Lamy served two terms as Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) from September 2005 to September 2013. He is someone that is very familiar with critical aspects of the multilateral system. Recently his piece, ‘Reshaping the Global Order’ was published in a large edited volume by colleagues from the Center for China & Globalization, CCG,  Henry Huiyao Wang and Mabel Lu Miao, Enhancing Global Governance in a Fragmented World: Prospects, Issues, and the Role of China. Now Lamy sets out the critical structural issues that impair today’s multilateralism efforts. As he says:

The main long-term, structural factors at play can be summarized by sovereignty as a founding principle of an international order, by the obsolescence of the previous order, and by the US-China rivalry.

It is not surprising that he identifies ‘sovereignty’ as the first key to multilateralism’s problems:

Sovereignty has been, is, and will remain the main obstacle to building a fully fledged international order as long as it is accepted as the core principle of international law.

So many analysts acknowledge the burst in new actors in the international system: substate actors, regions and cities and also non-state actors like NGOs, large public and private corporations but all struggle against dominant state actors. National sovereignty dominates international relations and often leads to unilateral actions that undermines wider cooperation.

Then there is ‘obsolescence’.  This focuses around the elements of the system, especially the Formals that were put in place at the end of World War Two at a time when the Global South that has had such a recent impact on international relations existed primarily as colonies of the West:

Obsolescence has to do with the origins of the current global system, the architecture of which dates from arrangements made after the Second World War. The ‘universal’ nature of these arrangements is increasingly seen as a product of a past pattern of Western dominance at a time when new nation states are now reshuffling the old power distribution …

Lamy then targets the impact of the evolving international order:

All in all, the previous international order is being shaken by increasing North-South and East-West tensions and frustrations, and by a change in the balance between geoeconomics and geopolitics, the former losing the force it had gathered in recent decades, and the latter regaining its past dominance over world affairs. We are thus moving toward less of a rules-based system, and more toward the use of force. This context obliges us to consider new paths, tentative as they may be.

And finally Lamy underlines the rise of geopolitical tensions, especially between China and the United States, and the impact that these tensions have had on the current multilateral order:

The intensification of the US-China rivalry is the third main factor shaping the demise of the international order, as this rivalry increasingly pits the two main world superpowers against each other. Indeed, they now believe they have become dangerously vulnerable to each other—hence a change of view on both sides about globalization. Whereas the US and China previously celebrated the benefits of increased economic interdependence in fostering development and reducing poverty, they are now trying to address what today they consider as overdependence and have embarked on a decoupling journey which challenges the rest of the world with hard binary choices and which permeates international life in the form a sort of ‘cold war 2.0.’

So what is to be done? How can a multilateral system be revivified and made effective – bringing greater stability to the global order and energizing transnational global governance efforts?

That’s where we will start in the next Post.

Image Credit: Geneva Interdisciplinary Centre for Economics and Law

This Blog originally appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter – https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/the-trouble-with-todays-multilateralism?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

Free Subscriptions are welcome as are comments

 

What is Needed for MPD Success?

Posted on by
Reply

It is really not possible to begin this Substack Post without a quick glance at the first US Presidential debate of 2024. It was ugly. It was a tough night, especially for President Biden but I will let the political pundits to have their say.

Now to the  subject of this week’s Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter – a focus on Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) and the capacity of Middle Powers to drive global governance activities. We start with an examination first on multilateralism. There is a strong logic to this starting point given we are beginning by targeting the institutional apex of the international multilateral system – the UN and its agencies. This introduction is also understandable given that the UN will, this September, complete a UN summit cycle which I have referenced in past Substack Posts. This UN summit cycle commenced in 2023 with the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals) Summit and it will complete with the critical Summit of the Future (SoTF) this September in New York with the finalization and issuing of the Pact for the Future. In preparation for the UNGA 79th edition, and its opening gathering of Heads of State and Government for  the SoTF, and as described by IISD, the UNGA has elected its newest President:

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) has elected, by acclamation, Philemon Yang, former Prime Minister of Cameroon, to serve as President of its 79th session. His tenure will be guided by the theme, ‘Unity in diversity, for the advancement of peace, sustainable development and human dignity for everyone everywhere.’

And with the usual optimism and urgency the new President declared:

I am convinced that through dialogue, through consensus, talking together and looking to the future together, we can solve problems,” Yang said speaking to journalists following the elections.

Yang underscored the continuing multilateral wish:

Outlining the thrust of his Presidency in his vision and mission statement, Yang describes the UNGA as the highest, most representative deliberative body at the global level, which serves as “the lone forum where, based on sovereign equality, States in their diverse opinions meet to jointly seek solutions” through the free expression of diverse convictions, opinions, interests, and  approaches.

To preserve peace, promote sustainable development and protect the planet,” Yang underscores, “the international community should ensure that the objectives jointly set by Member States… are achieved.” According to his statement, the need to fast-track the measures to be taken by the UNGA to ensure the effective implementation of mutual commitments will be one of Yang’s priorities.

The collective effort is heartfelt without question but after the last several decades it has to be accepted as wishful thinking, nothing more. I don’t know how else to describe the effectiveness of the UN.

If formal institutional multilateral action has faltered in the growing international disorder: the rising tensions between the two great powers US and China, and recourse to aggression in the Russian war on Ukraine,  and the Hamas-Israel Gaza war, then where can the global order firm up international stability and advance collective efforts?  Where can the  global order save the planet and improve collective efforts in critical areas of global finance, cybersecurity and AI just to mention three critical subjects?

In our discussions and work at the China-West Dialogue (CWD) we have examined MPD with growing positive reflection and a nod to Middle Power action in the face of weakened multilateral progress. The CWD lead Co-Chair, Colin Bradford has pivoted to an examination of MPD. He does this in a recent article, “Toward a New Era in Global Relations: The Potential of  Middle Power Diplomacy” in the 2024 Global Solutions Summit edition of  Global Solutions Journal. Now almost without exception raising the MPD configuration immediately encourages a discussion over what is, and what is not, a Middle Power. We found that out in one of our recent CWD gatherings. As fun as that discussion can be there is no real conclusion to it and I would note that Colin has avoided that seemingly inevitable discussion by targeting the G20. As Colin points out, the G20 consists of the following:

The 9 EMPs [emerging market powers] along with the 9 AIC [advanced industrial countries] MPs constitute a significant and diverse number of Middle Powers that have the potential to change the global landscape, if and as they choose to exercise global leadership in ways that cut across traditional groups, incorporate contradictory viewpoints and focus hard on practical policy issues and avoid ideological polemics and geopolitical theatrics.

From the start, then, Colin turns his MPD focus on the role of those Middle Powers in the G20 and more particularly the series of immediate G20 presidencies beginning with Indonesia in 2022, followed in 2023 by India, Brazil in 2024, and South Africa in 2025. As he writes:

The argument in this paper is that, as a result, 2024 could be a year of opportunity for advancing global governance in addressing global challenges by capitalizing on latent, underlying global political dynamics to tee up a new era in which global governance can advance, even as systemic competition continues between the US, China, and Europe. … The Brazilian and South African G20 presidencies during 2024 and 2025, with the US to follow in 2026, could become pivotal focal points for the transition to a new era in global relations in which middle-power diplomacy demonstrates the feasibility of advancing humanity’s quest for systemic sustainability, despite the necessary acceptance of geopolitical tensions as a reality.

What Colin then suggests is:

Middle Powers exist today and have agency and influence precisely because they are:

• Independently concerned with global threats and seek to play a role in addressing them rather than seeking a prominent role in international relations only as a projection of national strength and identity;

• Capable of self-interested contributions to global decision-making characterized by diversity of perspectives, competitive behaviors, and shifting coalitions of consensus rather than fixed allegiances based on normative values; and

• Basing their actions and behaviors in the international arena on national interests and pragmatic articulation rather than values which have resulted in ideological differences and confrontational tensions.”

And as he then concludes:

As these brief examples suggest, there could be a new global order based on secular interests, non-ideological formulations, and multiple sources of global leadership which interactively generate composite outcomes embodying contradictory but valid perspectives from different vantage points that move the world forward to addressing systemic global challenges in significant ways. This shift in the global political dynamic toward pluralism driven by middle power diplomacy does not inevitably lead to “a new global disorder”, but rather could become a more inclusive, integrated network of significant countries to drive global solutions, defining a new global order.

Middle power diplomacy is based on listening, learning, brokering, give and- get bargaining, inclusion, embracing diversity, being as comfortable with “difference” as with “like-mindedness,” understanding that “shifting coalitions of consensus” is better for global governance than fixed alliances and blocs, and adjusting pre-positioning by being open to enabling unexpected insights and different ways of seeing issues and opportunities to shift perceptions and change positions.

So Colin hones in on ‘pluralism’ and the impact of MIddle Power ‘coalitions of the willing’ in advancing global governance policies even in the face of geopolitical tensions. The diverse collective effort, it is presumed, can advance global governance policy.

This line of reasoning is underlined by Bob Carr and Gareth Evans, both former foreign ministers of Australia in an article titled, “Detente: Towards a balance of power between the USA and China”, identified by Colin and focused on Australian action in a competitive geopolitical environment. As these two former foreign ministers see it:

Lasting peace is always best achieved with others, not against them. Of course we have to prepare for worst-case scenarios, but it is in Australia’s interests to bring diplomacy back to centre stage, resist policies of containment and confrontation of China, and promote a political accord between the United States and China that could help ease tensions in the South China Sea and over Taiwan and the Korean peninsula.

Here then a further nuance of Middle Power action targeting Australia as an Indo-Pacific actor.  So it appears that there is a strong favoring of Middle Power action. It is a starting point but more needs to be fleshed out. While we can acknowledge pluralism and the construction of ‘coalitions of the willing’, where have we seen MPD in action especially in the face of great power interests that may not accord with the Middle Power goals. When does the dynamic of Middle Powers action draw together a coalition of the willing that ‘drives global solutions’? How does this dynamic gather and then advance policy? We need more on the mechanics of MPD.

More on that to come.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

 

Continuing the Middle Power Narrative

Posted on by
Reply

In early February CWD highlighted, and I described in the Post at Alan’s Newsletter, “Are They All Middle Powers? Or, Are There None!” this emerging Middle Power narrative:

We hoped this session would be an opportunity to examine and critique “Asia’s Future at a crossroads: A Japanese strategy for peace and sustainable prosperity.” This very valuable Report was the outcome of years of work by the ‘Asia Future’ Research Group (Research Group)  co-convened by Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus of Keio University and Mike Mochizuki of the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University. … The Research Group urged that Japanese policy not be reshaped by the rise in US-China rivalry and the growing geopolitical tensions in the international system generally and in the Indo-Pacific specifically. Alas, that may prove to be quite difficult.

The story of emerging Middle Powers is about to continue with a new Report, this by the Körber Foundation. As noted by Colin Bradford our lead co-chair at CWD in his invitation to CWD participants to join a coming session on March 28th:

Driven by demographic and economic factors and an increasingly self-confident presence on the world stage, emerging middle powers (such as Brazil, India and South Africa) are gaining international influence.

  • ​What foreign policy challenges do emerging middle powers face?  How do they position themselves vis-à-vis China and the war in Ukraine?    And, where do they find common ground with the West, particularly on reforming the international system?

The Report is, “Listening Beyond the Echo Chamber: Emerging Middle Powers Report 2024”. This Report, front and centre in our coming CWD session, presents an intriguing survey and various findings from the following:

The first Emerging Middle Powers Survey polled nearly 1,000 politicians, diplomats, journalists, researchers and private-sector representatives from

India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) as well as from Germany.

The CWD gathering has the good fortune of welcoming Julia Ganter, Programme Director Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative to introduce the Report to CWD. In addition we have remarks from:

  • Steven Gruzd, Head, African Governance and Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg,
  • Manjeet Kripalani, Executive Director, Gateway House Indian Council on Global Relations, Mumbai, and
  • Paulo Esteves, Researcher & fmr. Director, BRICS Policy Center, Rio de Janeiro

The Report identifies the purpose of this research initiative on the part of the Korber:

The aim of our Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative (KEMP) is to promote dialogue between Germany and emerging middle powers, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. With their growing political, economic and demographic weight they are key players for global problem solving and also form the G20 troika in 2024. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown that in Germany, among other places, geopolitical perspectives, foreign policy traditions, and national interests of emerging middle powers

are often not assessed in a realistic manner. To address this, the Körber initiative conducts an annual expert survey and facilitates various dialogue formats in cooperation with Gateway House India, the Brazilian BRICS Policy Centre and the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The initiative is valuable in part because it targets three quite important Middle Powers – India, Brazil and South Africa – all large democratic emerging market powers –  that formed IBSA with the Brasilia Declaration in 2003. While overshadowed by the BRICS and now BRICS+, IBSA remains a useful gathering of key EM powers. Moreover, India, last year, Brazil this year, and South Africa in 2025 will each host the G20 Summit. With the troika mechanism these three countries will be influencing the organization and policy initiatives of the G20.

Back to the current Körber Report. The Report opens with a rather surprising conclusion in its Executive Summary:

despite differences among the four countries, there is a common basis for more meaningful engagement and joint approaches for international reform.

The survey findings are varied and interesting.The broad conclusions:

respondents in India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) identify a different foreign policy challenge as most important for each country – climate change for Brazil, relations with China for India, the war in Ukraine and the Middle East for South Africa – as well as international trade for all three. These are global concerns and respondents in Germany share them.

The Report is particularly interesting in highlighting differences of view between IBSA experts and German ones.

These aspects divide [Germany] them from the IBSA respondents, who perceive international trade as a foreign policy challenge, prefer to mediate between Russia and Ukraine instead of supporting either, view the dollar’s dominance unfavourably and are optimistic about BRICS+. But even in IBSA, some are critical of the group’s expansion to include the likes of Iran.

Finally, the Report brings into focus  what Western interests, I suspect, need to understand and to advance more collaborative action:

Understanding the challenges of the West’s partners must begin with an examination of their specific concerns. Brazilian respondents most often cite climate change and the environment as the most challenging foreign policy issue for their country. Indian respondents see China, which their country has a ‘hot’ border with, as the biggest challenge. In South Africa, the most frequently cited issue is maintaining an autonomous foreign policy between the demands and pressures of different major powers, followed by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. … Taking their ideas seriously would show that the West is ready to include them as equals at the new global high table. Ultimately, this shift in thinking will transform the Western echo chamber into a symphony of voices.

The Report is very revealing and I suspect the CWD session will be lively and likely to advance our Middle Power thinking between and among the participants at the CWD.

More on that later I anticipate.

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Comments are welcome and feel free to subscribe to receive new posts and support my work.