Category Archives: Brazil

The Conclusion of the BRICS+ Summit: What are the Informals for?

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Well the BRICS+ Summit is over. Some thoughts on the just concluded Summit as well as reactions to continuing Trump tariffs.

So the BRICS+ wrapped up earlier in the week. And it’s fair to ask – so what? But before we get to that, it’s impossible to avoid the all too apparent craziness of the Trump tariffs. It appears that Trump has chosen to resort to letters to various trading partners announcing new tariffs, failing significant advances in so many tariff negotiations. As pointed out by Ishaan Tharoor the foreign affairs columnist and anchor of Today’s WorldView at WAPO:

“President Donald Trump threatened to impose tariffs of between 25 percent and 40 percent on imports from 14 countries, including Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Bangladesh, unless they address his concerns over perceived bilateral trade imbalances.”

After the Rio de Janeiro Declaration became public on Sunday, Trump turned his ire on at least the BRICS+ members. As Trump wrote at Truth Social:

““Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy,””

Trump then repeated and widened his tariff threat the following day. As described by Anusha Rathi, Editorial Fellow at Foreign Policy:

“Trump on Tuesday also reiterated his threat to impose 10 percent tariffs on BRICS member nations, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and five other countries, accusing them of being “anti-American” and of trying to destroy the U.S. dollar. At the end of the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro over the weekend, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said the world doesn’t need an “emperor,” referring to Trump’s threat.””

Meanwhile, the Trump tariff demands roll on. As described at CNN by John Liu and Matt Egan:

“President Donald Trump said at least seven countries can expect tariff letters on Wednesday morning, as he ramped up pressure on nations to strike deals with the United States by saying his new August 1 deadline would not be extended.”

 

“The announcement came as Trump vowed to slap a 10% levy on imports from the BRICS group of emerging economies, revealed plans for a 50% tariff on copper imports and threatened a massive 200% import tax on pharmaceuticals, renewing uncertainty for the global economy and markets – which have already experienced months of volatility.”

 

““A minimum of seven” tariff notices will be sent out to American trade partners Wednesday morning, Trump said on Truth Social Tuesday, adding that “an additional number of countries” would receive letters in the afternoon. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told CNBC earlier on Tuesday that 15 to 20 letters are expected to be sent over the next two days.””

At least today, Trump writes on Truth Social platform it will all happen by August 1st:

“Trump said on Tuesday that there will be no further extension of the deadline. “All money will be due and payable starting AUGUST 1, 2025 – No extensions will be granted,” he posted on Truth Social. That marked a shift in tone from his comments the previous day that the August 1 date was “firm” but also “not 100% firm.””

But then as we have seen in the past a deadline is not necessarily a deadline to Donald Trump.

Turning to the BRICS+ Informal, What are we to make of the gathering and the role the members see for this Informal? Its origins are as early as the G20 leaders summit. And as we noted in the earlier Substack Post, “Finding Success for the BRICS+” we have seen a significant enlargement of the Informal with at least 10 members, maybe 11 – it is unclear whether Saudi Arabia accepts membership, and now additionally, 10 partners.

Commenting on the Kazan Summit hosted by Russia in 2024, Alexandra Sitenko at IPS recently wrote:

“Last year’s BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, was clearly aimed at demonstrating the growing political and economic influence of the group of states. This was evident, among other things, in the admission of new full members and the discussion about setting up alternative international payment and trading platforms.”

There was a view coming out of the Russian Kazan Summit, according to Christopher Sabitini at Chatham House, just prior to the BRICS+ that the leadership of BRICS+, namely China and Russia, that the significant expansion could serve to make it [the BRICS] anti-western:

“The risk was the body would be turned into an anti-American forum, doing the bidding of China and Russia. For many, the later 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, hosted by Vladimir Putin, reinforced the perception that the bloc had become a platform to challenge the Western order – even as democratic Indonesia joined the group.”

Expectations for the Brazilian Summit were always somewhat guarded. Importantly, leaders from the two major powers, Russia and China had chosen to forego attendance this year in Brazil: Putin because of an outstanding international arrest warrant for Russian actions in the Ukraine conflict and China’s, Xi Jinping not so obviously though it was thought he’d met with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil twice in the recent past.

The general conclusion from the gathering and the joint Declaration is that Lula was able to stay away largely from geopolitical issues. As my colleague Oliver Stuenkel, an Associate Professor at the School of International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo, Brazil wrote in FP on the conclusion of the Summit:

“This year’s BRICS leaders’ summit was relatively subdued compared with recent meetings of the bloc, which underwent a rapid expansion and recently added several new members. But the event, held on Sunday and Monday in Rio de Janeiro, still managed to attract U.S. President Donald Trump’s ire.”

 

“In an attempt to avoid tariff threats from Trump, host Brazil emphasized issues such as economic development and climate rather than more contentious topics, such as the use of local currencies in intra-BRICS trade.””

 

“The 16,000-word summit declaration released on Sunday was in large part boilerplate. Just like previous BRICS documents, it contained a strong defense of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. It detailed technical matters involving ties between people, bureaucracies, businesses, and civil society in BRICS member countries. The declaration also called for inclusive artificial intelligence governance that respects the regulatory needs and autonomy of the global south.”

 

“On Sunday night, however, Trump posted on Truth Social threatening an additional 10 percent tariff on any country “aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS.” The brief post did not clarify whether the threat extended only to the bloc’s members or whether its partner countries should also be on notice. The statement was particularly alarming for those BRICS countries and partners, such as China, India, and Indonesia, attempting to negotiate trade deals with Washington ahead of July 9, Trump’s initial deadline for imposing sweeping tariffs. (The White House announced on Monday that it would delay implementing those tariffs until Aug. 1 to give countries more time to negotiate.)”

Even in the face of such ‘trash talk’ from Trump, Brazil went out of its way to tamp down the tension as noted again, in the FP piece by Oliver Stuenkel. Such an effort was evident in a statement from Celso Amorim, a Brazilian diplomat who served previously as Minister of Foreign Affairs and also Minister of Defence:

“Amorim immediately sought to de-escalate: Trump’s “threats only show the need for an organization like the BRICS, which has the capacity to react, to meet and reach conclusions. … [BRICS] didn’t threaten the U.S. with anything.” A South African trade ministry spokesperson told Reuters that the country was not anti-American and remained interested in negotiating a trade deal with the United States.”

Back to Alexandra Sitenko at IPS, she concludes:

“The summit in Rio shows that the group is more economically relevant and politically present than ever before. As a platform for the Global South, BRICS could contribute to a rethink of global governance in the medium term. In this regard, the Rio summit was a step towards a multipolar, non-confrontational world order.”

At the Brics Brasil, Maiva D’Auria, suggested that members remained committed to development:

“At the Summit, BRICS member countries reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and to defending international law, including the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter. The document also calls for the increased participation of developing countries, particularly those in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, in global decision-making processes and structures.”

It might be; but it might not be given the diversity of views held by this expanded membership. One thing I can say though is to the extent the BRICS and now the BRICS+ club was, and is, committed to development there is less than meets the eye. While Lula celebrated the tenth anniversary of the New Development Bank (NDB) with the presence of Dilma Rousseff, former Brazilian President, and currently the President of the NDB

Again from Brics Brasil, Mayara Souto writes:

“Lula underscored the significance of the New Development Bank (NDB) in the international debate on reforming global financial institutions, a thematic priority under the BRICS Finance track. He remarked that “our Bank is not merely a major institution serving emerging economies; it stands as evidence that a reformed financial architecture and a more equitable development model are possible.””

“NDB’s commitment to allocate 40% of its funding to sustainable development projects is aligned with the Climate Financing Declaration to be adopted at the BRICS Summit.”

The goals are of course praiseworthy and raising funds for climate change financing and global development are critical but the members probably can’t escape the need for ‘first mover action’ by the members and partners themselves to show real commitment in the face of the ‘Days of Trump’.

Image Credit: Brics Brasil

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-conclusion-of-the-brics-summit

 

 

 

 

Threatening a ‘Single International Community’

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Who would think that the threat to the global order could emanate from global summitry leadership. But that appears to be a real possibility. Let me explain.

For some time now at CWD and the Global Summitry project (GSP) we have identified that sustaining global order requires the maintenance, even strengthening of a ‘single international community’. Stability cannot be sustained without such a community. Fragmentation hinders collaboration. But that single international community is being challenged today. The current wars in Europe and in the Middle East undermine a single international community.  Rising geopolitical tensions between the leading powers, China and the United States, especially, erode it. Fragmentation then undermines stability of the order and diminishes, or eliminates,  opportunities for advancing global governance.  As described in the WPR Daily Review:

These tensions were underlined recently by statements from the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula, now the host for this year’s G20. In an opinion piece he published in the Washington Post in January Lula described the impact of geopolitics and nationalism on global governance efforts:

The world is experiencing a contradictory moment today. Global challenges require commitment and cooperation among nations. We have never been so connected. At the same time, we are finding it increasingly difficult to dialogue, respect differences and carry out joint actions. Societies are taken over by individualism and nations are distancing themselves from each other, making it difficult to promote peace and face complex problems: the climate crisis; food and energy insecurity; geopolitical tensions and wars; the growth of hate speech and xenophobia.

Such a statement seems to suggest that Lula really gets it. Only a single international community can maintain a stable global order. But that may not be true. In fact Lula’s recent statements may be undermining such a goal. Why such statements are unclear. Some have suggested that he is determined to promote a different global order no longer dominated by the US and the West more broadly. Others focus on his imperatives in current domestic politics. Whatever. Nevertheless his recent comments over the War in Gaza may make it difficult to promote collective efforts in this critical Informal – the G20. One need only reference Lula’s view of Israel’s action in Gaza expressed by him in remarks at the African Union Summit Conference in Addis Ababa and reported in the NYTimes:

What is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people has no parallel in other historical moments,” Lula told reporters during the 37th African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. But, he then added, “it did exist when Hitler decided to kill the Jews.

And now as a result of these remarks his global summitry leadership efforts – and here I am focusing on his G20 efforts as the President – are being called into question. Rather than trying to knit the order together he apparently seems willing to fracture it.

Such a rupture of the international community is possible notwithstanding a promising start as G20 host. Indeed at the time of the transfer of hosting to Brazil, Lula set out important developmental priorities in a speech at the closing of the India G20 Summit. There he declared:

We are living in a world where wealth is concentrated. In which millions of people still go hungry. In which governance institutions still reflect the reality of the middle of the last century.

We will only be able to tackle all these problems if we address inequality.

Income inequality; inequality in access to healthcare, education and food; gender, race and representation inequality is behind all these anomalies.

If we want to make a difference, we must place the reduction of inequalities at the center of the international agenda.

Thus, Brazil’s G20 presidency will have three priorities:

(i) social inclusion and the fight against hunger;

(ii) energy transition and sustainable development in its three aspects (social, economic and environmental); and

(iii) reform of global governance institutions

All these priorities are contained in Brazil’s G20 presidency motto: “Building a fair world and a sustainable planet”

In advancing these priorities Lula announced  that Brazil would establish two G20 Task Forces (TF) for the Brazil hosting year. These TFs will unite the Finance and Sherpa tracks in a concerted effort to advance global governance policy. The two are: the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, and  the Global Mobilization against Climate Change.

And in addition in the Concept Note Brazil also committed to the  following:

Seeking to close this gap, Brazil plans to launch a G20 Initiative on Bioeconomy with the objective of deepening the international debate on the subject and of identifying potential avenues for cooperation in the area. The Initiative would be structured into three axes: (i) research, development, and innovation for bioeconomy; (ii) sustainable use of biodiversity for bioeconomy; and (iii) bioeconomy as an enabler for sustainable development. As a final result,  the Initiative would be expected to produce a set of “High Level Principles on Bioeconomy.

All these priorities and institutional efforts require concerted collective action. Yet today all these promises seem to be in question over Lula’s statements on the current geopolitical crises, notwithstanding Lula’s injunction in his speech at the closing of the India G20 Summit that:

Thirdly, we cannot allow geopolitical issues to hijack G20 bodies’ discussion agendas. A divided G20 does not interest us. We can only tackle present day challenges through joint action.

Lula needs to heed his own words or he will find that his G20 leadership is undermined by his own words. Such words put at risk his determined collective priorities in the G20. They divide the international community putting at risk ‘a single international community’.

Image Credit : Brazil

This Post was first published at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/threatening-a-single-international?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

Brazil’s G20 Hosting Year – 2024

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So the G20 Host – this year Brazil – is beginning to crank it up by announcing many G20 meetings now planned over the coming summit cycle. And we  are fortunate that the current leader of Brazil is not Jair Bolsanaro, no fan of the G20. Instead, we have the return to the Brazilian presidency, after a significant hiatus, of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula. That is important. Even though Lula can go a bit ‘over the deep end’ on the Global South,  he is committed to addressing climate change as well as critical global development subjects such as ending poverty, enhancing education and gender equality.

I was fortunate last week to participate in a session examining Brazil’s hosting year in the broader context of ‘Rethinking the Future of Multilateralism’. This session was a continuation of the ongoing effort by the Global Solutions Initiative (GSI) to examine the Informals, particularly in this case, the G20. GSI presents, among other things, the Global Solutions Summit that goes off annually in Berlin on numerous global governance subjects. At this recent virtual GSI session a very helpful presentation was provided by Feliciano Guimaraes of CEBRI. CEBRI along with FUNAG and IPEA – all Brazilian think tanks, are all part of the official T20 Organizing Committee for the Brazil hosting year. Back to that in a moment.

What has Brazil ‘put out’ as the priorities of the Brazilian hosting? It appears these are its priorities:

  • Social inclusion  and the fight against hunger
  • Energy transition and sustainable development
  • Reform of global governance institutions

Now a big ‘shout out’ to the first two priorities. These are demanding goals but linked to Brazilian international policy efforts. But the third is a bit of a warning. Institutional reform – whether of the UN or the IFIs – the IMF and the World Bank – are perennial subjects.  Over the recent years, if not before, it has become all too apparent that reform in the current geopolitical context is not possible. Look at the recent HLPF Summit – the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, held by the UN last September. Lots of talk but …  And now we are accelerating toward the Summit of the Future, this coming September 2024. Again great hope:

The Summit of the Future is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

Valiant goals, but the will and collaborative energy is not there I’m afraid.

But back to the efforts of Brazil as host of the G20. It is evident that the administration and structure of the G20 has broadened and deepened over the years. Take a look at its current development of the structure and policy process as we have set it out recently at the Global Summitry Project website. Today, there are well developed Sherpa and Finance Tracks as pointed to by Feliciano Guimaraes. And as he further points to Brazil’s efforts, it is making advances to, as he points out, “to establish a close dialogue with the G20 Sherpa and Finance tracks with a view to increasing the incidence of T20 recommendations.”   Further, there are many Working Groups and Task Forces developing policy proposals. And as Feliciano points out there is a Brazilian emphasis on the Engagement Groups as well with the hope that:

The G20 Social Summit – Social guarantees civil society’s participation and contribution in discussions and policy formulations related to the G20 Summit.

It encompasses the activities of 12 Engagement Groups, in addition to initiatives and events coordinated between the sherpa and finance tracks and non-governmental actors, as well as initiatives from G20 countries’ societies.

A key highlight of this engagement is the upcoming Social Summit, scheduled to take place from November 15 to 17, 2024, on the eve of the G20 Leaders’ Summit, set for November 18 and 19, both hosted in Rio de Janeiro.

During the G20 Social Summit, civil society representatives will present their proposals, marking a significant opportunity for their voices to shape the agenda.

Feliciano emphasizes, in addition to the civil society participation largely presumably through the C20, the importance of the T20. As he sees it:

 … the G20’s “ideas bank,” gathering and disseminating analyses by think tanks involved in global issues, alongside insights from high-level experts. It aims then to influence the negotiations and the final declarations made by the G20.

But Feliciano is not so swept up in the G20 summitry process that he fails to see the challenges posed by this hosting year. He sets out the challenges that Brazil faces:

•Having financial resources to organize hundreds of meetings (government + philanthropy + business);

•Generating credible and impactful ideas/processes/proposals (less is more);

•Managing the G7-BRICS rivalry (G7 – G20) – being a bridge-builder;

•Being more global and less local (cannot mimic Modi’s India);

•Avoiding contamination from the Ukraine War (Indian challenge);

•Managing the growing rivalry between the USA and China in working groups and the summit;

•Being able to propose and innovate – themes, ideas, and processes (depends on organized civil society); and

•Improving the inclusion of new actors in the processes (W20, C20, and L20).

These challenges are formidable and limit ultimately the advances that Brazil can bring to the summit process. But he also sees opportunities for Brazil. And he sets these out as well:

•Strengthening Brazil’s role in discursive leadership;

•Rebuilding Brazil’s international prestige (G20 + COP30 in Belém);

•Advancing priority agendas – inequality, climate change, and global governance reform;

•Opportunity for strengthening coordination among BRICS+ with the sequence of troikas;

•Empowering organized civil society to participate in major international debates;

•Expanding the range of international topics within Brazilian society; and

•A significant showcase of Brazil’s political capacity to produce credible and feasible ideas/results.

There is opportunity; but we have seen the building of a large summitry machine that is unlikely to be able to make the kind of progress that hosts desire. Looking back over the years since the emergence of the Informals there has been a back and forward motion to these Informals. Leader frustration over the burdening of their efforts to act collectively without being hemmed in by bureaucracies led to attenuation by leaders from policy machinery only to have it grow again over the years to assist leaders in advancing global governance policies. The dilemma is, however, not over the administrative and policy assistance but the weakened state overall of multilateralism. The decision making remains at the leader level and there is little collective commitment. National policy dominates at the cost of collaborative policy making no matter what the structure and policy support.

This Post first appeared on my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/brazils-g20-hosting-year-2024

Feel free to comment and subscribe there.

Image Credit: portal.gov.br

 

The Inflation Tiger – Rising

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The announced inflation rate for China signaled again the emergence of inflation as a serious global economic issue.  At the moment it lies principally with large emerging market countries notably in China, India and Brazil.

The Chinese government has targeted 4 percent.  But China’s consumer prices rose at 5.4 percent on a year-on-year basis in March.  This level represents the biggest inflation jump since July 2008.

Meanwhile in India inflation rose at almost 9 percent in March after rising 8.3 percent in February.

Finally, in Brazil the consumer price benchmark rose to 6.44 percent, which is the fastest rate in 2 years.

These major emerging economies are responding with increases in interest rates.  Thus, China’s central bank announced recently its fourth increase in cash reserves for the large banks in China.  These banks must now set aside 20.5 percent  of their cash reserves representing an increase of half percent.  It is then hoped that banks in will reduce their loans to take account of the need to retain larger cash reserves.

Brazil raised its central bank rate to 12 percent representing a quarter point increase – this after two previous increases of a half percentage each.  This interest rate is the highest of any major economy.

All these emerging markets, and others, plus developing countries are experiencing significant increases in food prices as well as energy prices.  The interest rates and inflation rates appear to contrast with the traditional economies – the US core rate rose at 1.2 percent, though the CPI is at 2.7 percent and Europe with a 2.7 percent increase though this represents the highest rate in two years. This increase though significantly lower than the large emerging markets has prompted an interest rate rise by the European Central Bank.

The rising emerging market rates – have helped fuel the appreciation of their currency – the Real has risen some 40 percent since early 2009.  Yet this interest rate efforts  – to deal with inflation – have had the perverse effect of only further encouraging capita inflows precisely what the the Brazilian government, for example, has been trying to staunch since it only causes the currency to further appreciate.  China does not suffer from this vicious cycle only because its currency is managed – indeed presumably significantly undervalued – as argued by US officials and others.

Where does this leave the large emerging markets.  For China the rising inflation may encourage a more rapid appreciation of its currency. Wage and product price increases may likely follow and the virtual circle where China growth and lower pricing may come to an end.  China may well export inflation as well as goods.  India may do the same.

For Brazil there are strong voices urging that the Brazilians need to shift to their own form of managed currency (see Roberto Luis Troster’s  Feature of the Week at the Munk School Portal) to constrain the vicious cycle of inflation and interest rate hikes leading to further currency appreciation.

The Inflation Tiger is indeed dangerous.

Failing to Step Up

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One thing I know my Brazilian colleagues are waiting for is a public commitment by President Obama – while in Brazil – to support Brazilian membership to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).  Obama while in India gave strong vocal support to India’s bid for membership.  But it appears that he has yet to do so while on this current trip to Brazil.

Such a failure would not go unnoticed by Brazilian IR experts and policy makers.  And such a failure would not go unnoticed by IR experts more generally.  Why?  Simple.  The support for India would be support for a UNSC membership that would remain uniformly NWS – Nuclear Weapons States – while public support for Brazil would extend US support to a non-nuclear weapons state – NNWS.

It is therefore a public declaration that should come sooner rather than later.

Brazil and Global Leadership

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Now my excuse on waiting to blog on the Brazil meeting (November 21st-22nd, “Global Leadership: The Role of Brazil and the US and the Agenda for the 21st Century) referenced in my blog post “Constructing New Leadership“, was in anticipation of the finaling of the meeting’s consensus document. Well the document is now out and you can review it at the Stanley Foundation website.

The Conference in Rio de Janeiro hosted by CEBRI , the Brazilian Center for International Relations,  lasted a day with Brazilian and US experts – yes, your right,  once again I was the interloper in the crowd – in Rio de Janeiro hosted at Cebri offices and focused on global governance leadership questions.  It was both a lesson for me in Brazilian motivations, attitudes and behaviors toward the United States and Brazil’s role in international relations.

Brazil feels highly satisfied by its emergence as a rising power.  Brazilians have always seen themselves as a great power but their domestic political and financial conditions in particular always seemed to get in the road.  But they believe that – finally – they have made it.  As one Brazilian expert pointed out Brazil always saw itself as “Greece upside down”.  The Greeks always look back to a golden age; but Brazilians always look forward.  Brazilians now believe they have gotten their democratic politics right; they have emerged as a multicultural/multiracial society; and their economics and finances have overcome the limitations and manipulations of earlier decades.  They are proud of President  Lula – who leaves on January 1st extraordinarily popular – leaving the presidency  to his PT party successor, Dilma Rousseff.

Brazil was – as one of the Outreach 5 (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa) and was most vocal in questioning the legitimacy of the G8.  Now, of course, with the emergence of the G20 leaders club it sits at the heart of global governance leadership.  But there is no sense that Brazilian experts feel that it needs to shoulder greater leadership responsibility.  While it is possible, even likely, that President Lula took on an animated role discussing issues in Seoul (he didn’t show up in Toronto), his countrymen seem less inclined to claim a visible leadership role.  Evaluate the following from the Report:

A Brazilian participant helped explain why his foreign policy expert compatriots are hesitant about new global political responsibilities when he noted that Brazil’s basic outlook is to be generally satisfied with its strategic position and lack of immediate threats. Conversely, in other words, the United States has not been totally convincing as it argues for urgent action and the unsustainability of the status quo. Naturally, all participants hope their countries join each other and the rest of the world for enough international cooperation to promote the steady spread of peace and prosperity.

The lack of enthusiasm for seizing leadership was sharpened by the difficulties encountered by Brazil with Turkey when President Lula tried to mediate the proliferation issues between Iran and the P6 (the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany).   The rather harsh public dismissal by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of the compromise offered by Brazil and Turkey certainly embarrassed President Lula – and did nothing to encourage the President or Brazil to continue his efforts.

But international leadership remains in flux.  The greater diversity of leadership seen most evidently in the G20 suggests a more-concert-like structure for global governance.  But how to move from American hegemony to a diverse concert of powers that may not reflect like-mindedness is not clear at all. As the Report identifies:

The task of integrating newer pivotal powers into the multilateral order and adapting its structure, norms, and policy frameworks involves intertwined challenges. The international system must make room for the new players to assume a bigger role— which calls for traditional powers to welcome political leadership and policy ideas from new quarters, support adjustments to multilateral decision making, and address their own leadership shortfalls. In return, the emerging powers must give tangible content to their new stature by shouldering some of the burden of leadership, bolstering key international norms, and adding their impetus and influence to resolution of major global problems.

Constructing New Leadership

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An area of obvious difference between the Brazilian and American experts in Rio de Janeiro at Cebri was the question of leadership actions by the rising states.  Much like the Obama Administration, many US experts urged that Brazil  – as other rising powers – needed to step up and take greater responsibility for global governance.  The Brazilians were skeptical of the variously expressed views by US experts that Brazil needed to accept a “pay-to-play” approach to leadership.  Like the US Administration many of these experts urged that Brazil  needed to take responsibility first – to shoulder the burden of leadership – and receive leadership benefits subsequently.  As David Shorr, the Program Officer of the Stanley Foundation, co-host of the Brazil meetings, suggested in the “Discussion Summary” “… the United States has not been totally convincing in making the case for urgent action and the un-sustainability of the status quo.” – Yes I know I haven’t done a full review of the Stanley Foundation-Cebri conference, notwithstanding an earlier promise – and it won’t be done here. But I will tackle it – really.

In struggling to construct a new global governance leadership in the  contemporary circumstances there is no more frustrating calculation than understanding the nature of the relationship between the US and China.  Here is the quintessential traditional power-rising power  conundrum.  This is the power transition in ‘spades’. How should China and the United States interact and to do so in a way to move forward on some of the growing challenges to global governance?

In Sunday’s NYT (November 28, 2010) Helene Cooper in “Asking China to Act Like the U.S.” explores the complex nature of the US-China relationship.  As Cooper suggests, the critical question “turns on a question that is, at its heart, an impossible conundrum: How to get Beijing to make moves that its leaders don’t think are good for their country?” What is evident is that increasingly in the China-US relationship, but also more generally in the rising power relationships, the US is apparently asking the new and diverse leadership circle to take actions that fail to be in conformity with their national interests.

Among others, Cooper turns to some of the realists – possibly neo-realists – in the Washington circle.  And you won’t be surprised these folks are hardly supportive of the current Administration.  One of the identified critics is David Rothkopf a former US official in trade and a former managing director of Kissinger Associates – and now a strategic consultant in the Washington beltway.  For Rothkopf the problem is clear – and so is the answer for that matter.  As Rothkopf sees it this Administration is, as he says, “…still struggling with a post-unilateralist hangover.”  Rothkopf concludes:

… the United States is heading into a future in which countries like China, with independent sources of power, are not reliant on or easily influenced by the United States, and so are pursuing their own national interests.

Given this, what does Rothkopf and others offer up – good old fashioned balance of power? So whether its dealing with global imbalances and exchange rate regimes or the problems of North Korea and nuclear proliferation, it would seem that Rothkopf urges a return to the past.  As he says:

… the United States must first determine the areas where China won’t bend, and work with Beijing to find compromises so that America is not in the impossible situation of trying to tell China to act against its own national interests.  … We have moved from the cold war era of bipolar reality through the brief bubble of sole superpower unilateral fantasy into a world of a new multipowered system which requires old-fashioned balance-of-power diplomacy.

Why “Washington” is appealing to the nineteenth and twentieth century tools of international relations – which seldom worked then – and are even more unlikely to work in the complex contemporary global governance world – is hard to understand.  It is familiar but promoting renewed rivalry and competition with the China’s and Brazil’ of the world hardly seem the way to fashion a new leadership.  And I don’t think it will.

What will?  I promise – really – to examine and answer this conundrum in an upcoming blog post.

Moving to Sunnier – at least Warmer – Climes

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Barely back from the Seoul Summit, I have had the good fortune to do a little temperature taking _ and I don’t mean the outside temperature – here in Brazil.  With the auspices of Cebri (Brazilian Center for International Relations) – one of the few policy think tanks in Brazil – and the Stanley Foundation from the US, Adriana de Queiroz and David Shorr led a lively dialogue session on Brazil.  The dialogue sessions went from Sunday afternoon through Monday late afternoon and covered a lot of ground.

And that will be the subject of the next blog post.

BRICSAM and the G20: A Week Later

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The London G20 summit turned to be an unanticipated success. In the weeks and days before the event, signs were gloomy of any positive outcome. The French and Germans were saying ‘no’ to any major collective stimulus package. Gordon Brown as host was losing his personal bounce amidst increasingly pessimism about the UK economy. And even the Barack Obama phenomenon, as directed towards his trip to the London G20, appeared to be more about style than substance.

On the day, however, the G20 turned sunny like the actual weather in London. Although the tensions between the ‘Anglo-Saxon” stimulators and the Continental regulators were still played up the real agenda was playing out in other ways. As predicted by CIGI blogs in the past the trans-Atlantic tensions should increasingly be seen as the side show. The Continue reading →

Brazil’s new Vision: Imagining a Great Power?

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Brazil is thinking big.  I mean Big!  On December 19, 2008 President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva – Lula in other words, released a new national defense strategy. This document called for: upgrading Brazil’s military forces and for remaking the defense industry.  And – contentiously for the Brazilian public, it called for Brazil’s mandatory military service to be enforced on all Brazilian classes.

As noted by Alexei Barrionuevo’s New York Times piece: “The new strategic vision, more than a year in the making, calls for Brazil to invest more in military technology, including satellites, and to build nuclear-powered submarine fleet that would be used to protect territorial waters and Brazil’s deepwater oil platforms.  The proposal also calls Continue reading →