Category Archives: Liberal Order

Are They All Middle Powers? Or, are there None!

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With a degree of valuable planning by my colleague Colin Bradford  at the China-West Dialogue, or CWD, we convened our first virtual session of the current year. And we were very pleased that some thirty folk joined us from across the digital world  – from Japan through Asia and Europe to Canada and the United States and on to Brazil. We hoped this session would be an opportunity to examine and critique “Asia’s Future at a crossroads: A Japanese strategy for peace and sustainable prosperity.” This very valuable Report was the outcome of years of work by the ‘Asia Future’ Research Group (Research Group)  co-convened by Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus of Keio University and Mike Mochizuki of the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University.

The Research Group began meeting in 2018.  In 2022 the Japanese government adopted a new “National Security Strategy” for the first time in a decade. And it was the evolved new Japanese foreign policy and security strategy that the Research Group critically reviewed.

The Research Group early on ‘revealed its hand’. As they declared:

What underlies the discussion and recommendations in this report is our serious concern that the new paradigm will leave Asia entangled and divided in the future.

And as a result the Research Group urged :

Japan’s long-held emphasis on a multifaceted and multilayered approach to Asia policy continues to be a constructive way to address the new regional and international challenges that have emerged.

What a continuation of this Japanese foreign policy approach demanded, according to the Report, was:

… Japan should maintain and promote security cooperation with the United States; but at the same time, it should also exercise leadership to help mitigate the competition between the U.S. and China in Asia through constructive diplomacy, thereby reducing the danger of great power war in the region.

The Research Group urged that Japanese policy not be reshaped by the rise in US-China rivalry and the growing geopolitical tensions in the international system generally and in the Indo-Pacific specifically. Alas, that may prove to be quite difficult.

Back to the Report, however. I am not doing justice to the fullness of the Report in this Post and those of you interested in international dynamics and relations in the Indo-Pacific, especially, I do encourage you to take some time with the Report. It will be worth it.

But I wanted to shift my attention in this Post to some of the debate that emerged during our CWD gathering and discussion of the Report. What was interesting in that discussion – and recognizing that the group was not made up of Japanese researchers – many reacted to the Report’s identification of Japan as a ‘Middle Power’ – clearly an IR crowd. This debate over the identification and impact of middle powers in international relations was further aided by the provision from our colleague Amitav Acharya of a new article by Robertson and Carr on middle powers. It is apparent that there has been a long running discussion – and I do mean long running – by IR colleagues – you’ll not be surprised to hear, over what is a middle power and the impact of these powers have on shaping global relations.

Now middle power labels have long been carried by a number of states most notably, Canada and Australia. These are the so-called traditional middle powers. The middle power definition was applied early to states that possessed structurally – that is the requisite ‘material power’ and what could then be described as being in the middle. These powers possessed less than the major, or great powers, such as the United States, and now China,  but more than those lesser powers. Unfortunately, an examination of the material powers status fails to bear this out as pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

For a start there is nothing ‘middle’ about the ranking of the middle powers. Canada and Australia, the classic middle powers, generally appear between 8th and 15th in various global lists of economic size or military capacity. This could not be classified as the ‘middle’ in a world of 143 states in 1960 and makes less sense in 2023 with 195 states.

Well, if the material power rankings don’t do it, and I think that is right, then for many the determination revolved about middle power behavior instead. As pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

The three core assumptions of middle power theory of states as international in focus, multilateral in method, and good citizens in conduct had clear analytical utility during periods of the 20th century, exemplified by a prominent practitioner–scholarly nexus during this period.

However, their analysis of some six contenders by the two authors, chosen by the two on “principles of consensus, hard cases, and breadth, our contemporary cases are, in alphabetical order, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey.” I’ll leave aside the obvious questions as whether all deserve in fact the middle power label, these states show, as analyzed by the authors, that the behavioral concepts are increasingly unable to capture the practices and actions of these states. As Robertson and Carr describe:

To be effective, middle-sized states must respond to, and evolve with the nature of the system they operate in. Conceptually therefore, the middle power concept ‘is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system’. … middle power theory no longer helps us distinguish or interpret these states. Changes in the international environment suggest this finding will endure. … As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’.

Assuming we can accurately describe in an international order those that are possibly middle powers then, the relations between and among state actors become critical in revealing middle powers. As a result in an order with US-China tensions and a growing willingness on the part of a growing number of states to act aggressively – read that Russia and Ukraine and Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah and indeed Iran as well then:

As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’. … As we enter a period that is marked by increased competition, a remembrance of the possibilities of middle power cooperation that produced initiatives such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Ottawa Treaty deserves to be made.

What then is revealed by all this? Well lots. But let me suggest at least one conclusion. And it is not about Japan or middle powers but the difficulty of drawing conclusions and outcomes in international behavior. A little like astronomy: ‘all are working on all’. Examining at a point in time and then drawing conclusions from that moment the character and behavior of the global order and then looking forward may be all but futile. Or, at least, it is very difficult and must be approached with great caution. Caution is indeed the watchword.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

This Post appeared originally at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Comments and free subscription is welcomed.

 

 

The Current Narrative of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Policy: “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

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When it comes to China’s current foreign policy, phrases such as “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy” (WWD) and “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) frequently appear. The name WWD originates from a Chinese film series, “Wolf Warrior”, which depicts a patriotic solider battling foreign powers and mercenaries. Nowadays, many refer to China’s increasingly strong statements and assertive diplomatic declarations as WWD.

On the other hand, BRI refers to global infrastructure development projects led by China to promote international cooperation, multilateralism, and trade. It may appear that these two sets of foreign policy approaches rather conflict. However, the phrase “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind” (人类命运共同体), a part of the official narrative of China’s foreign policy may have led to both of these contrasting approaches. What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”? How does this phrase explain trends in China’s recent foreign policies including WWD and also BRI?

What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

By literal translation, the above phrase means “A Community of Shared Fate for Mankind” (SF) rather than, as it is often expressed in English, “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. SF suggests a global order described by China’s President Xi Jinping encompassing the shared rights and responsibility of each nation in terms of “politics, security, economy, culture, and environment” in a globalized world. In President Xi’s words SF is: “to build A Community of Shared Future for Mankind [to] construct a beautiful and clean world with long lasting peace, general security, mutual prosperity, openness, and inclusivity”. At a United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting in July, 2020, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that China will push to build SF by promoting multilateralism in accordance with international laws and “… denounce global hegemony and protectionism”. These and other  remarks by China’s leaders demonstrate, it would seem, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition to achieve greater global influence, and that China is prepared to work with all nations to build a SF. Indeed, not all nations may be agreeable with the ideology of SF. It is inevitable that the CCP will face some frictions when it tries to expand the influence of SF in the world. Therefore, the CCP may have to use a tailored approach in its foreign policies to push its SF agenda.

SF as an Umbrella term for China’s Foreign Policy

President Xi has publicly made statements such as “[the CCP] will reference history and create the future. It must continuously push and construct A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. Under this guidance, top Chinese officials have made clear that China’s foreign policy will revolve around SF. China’s approach to global order, then,  promotes politically correct topics such as climate change, global disparity, and it also opposes terrorism and hegemony. Although it encourages cross-cultural exchange, it makes no explicit mention of protecting the rights of marginalized communities. The vague language in the SF permits CCP officials greater flexibility in deciding what kind of matters are consistent with the SF and therefore align with President Xi’s agenda.

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Which Countries are Middle Powers – And Why are They Important to the Global Order? Part 1

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I had a debate very recently with my China-West Dialogue (CWD) colleague, Colin Bradford. In a memo we were working on for CWD, he described the two major trade agreements, CPTPP and RCEP. He then added:

 

These two trade agreements show that middle powers are able to take multilateral actions on their own that make an impact.(*)  

But which countries do we see achieving that? And behind that, why have analysts and policy makers become significantly more interested these middle powers in the Trump era recently past?

Counting the Middle Powers

The debate begins with the ‘Who’. Though Colin and I were generally agreed on the content of the article, we went around in circles over which countries we could, and should, identify as middle powers. Now, I was more than ready to forgive Colin his vague characterization of middle powers and then broad inclusion of the same – after all he is an economist – but soon thereafter I stumbled over a rather recent article by Bruce Jones, also of Brookings. and a well known international relations analyst. The article found in FA and titled, “Can Middle Powers Lead the World Out of the Pandemic? Because the United States and China Have Shown They Can’t” tackled the question of the current middle power membership. Given the subject matter of the article, Bruce was called upon to identify in some manner, the states that captured the current set of middle powers:

The concept of “middle powers” is imprecise and somewhat inchoate, but it generally refers to countries that are among the top 20 or so economies in the world, lack large-scale military power (or choose not to play a leading role in defense), and are energetic in diplomatic or multilateral affairs. These countries were seeking to fill part of the international leadership void even before the crisis, particularly when it came to buttressing the rickety multilateral system.

So, there we were. I had no difficulty acknowledging that the term was “imprecise and inchoate” but as for the rest of the features identified by Bruce, well, not so sure. Increasingly, I came to suspect that this was likely to be one of those classic international relations definitions – unclear and contested.

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The Evolving Role of Japan in the Liberal Order

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My podcast guest, Phillip Lipscy and were fortunate enough recently to attend a major conference on Japan’s leadership in the Liberal Order.  This conference was organized by my good friend and colleague, Professor Yves Tiberghien of the University of British Columbia and its Centre for Japanese Research Worksop. Many Japanese colleagues joined experts from North America to discuss the role of Japan in the Liberal Order, especially under the current Abe Government. It is clear that Japanese foreign policy has changed. But how much. One need only look at Japan’s major role in picking up the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after President Trump withdrew the United States from it.  The vigorous Japanese leadership efforts resulted in the conclusion of the TPP 11with all members other that the United States agreeing to the revised TPP. And Japan has hosted the G20. Nevertheless, the question remains why and how far has Japanese foreign policy changed. There seems to me to be a rather mixed Japanese leadership role but let’s join Phillip in getting his views of Japanese leadership in the Liberal Order. 

Phillip has recently joined the University of Toronto from Stanford University as an Associate Professor of Political Science at the UoT and is the new Chair in Japanese politics and global affairs and Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Japan at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy here at the the University of Toronto. Phillip has published extensively on Japanese politics and foreign policy.

So come join us as we discuss the role of Japan in the current Liberal Orde. This is Episode 17 of the Summit Dialogue Series at Global Summitry at iTunes or at SoundCloud. . 

 

Between Chaos and Leadership – The Instance of the G7 Gathering in Biarritz, France

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As leaders now exit from the G7 meeting in Biarritz France, it is worth reflecting on the state of the Liberal Order. Or, maybe more appropriately, and at least for the moment, its state of ‘Disorder’.

It has been a chaotic preceding week, even by Donald Trump standards, I think. Trump sharply raised his attack on various allies –  most particularly last week, Denmark. Attacks on allies have become rather routine, though exceedingly troubling. But this particular episode was to see the least – startling. In this case Trump suggested that the United Sates might want to purchase Greenland. When President Trump was met by a strong statement of rejection by Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, that called the President’s suggestion, “absurd”, the President called her statement ‘nasty’ and then turned around and postponed a state visit to one of America’s closest and most faithful allies. It led my colleague Thomas Wright of Brookings to conclude in an article in The Atlantic :

The cancellation of Trump’s visit to Denmark is part of a disturbing pattern. Trump regularly beats up on and abuses America’s closest democratic allies while being sycophantic to autocrats.

Then there was the continuing trade war with China. Just before Trump was to leave for Europe and the G7, China announced that it was prepared to  raise tariffs on $US75 billion worth of American-made goods, including crude oil, cars and farm products, if Mr. Trump was to carry through with plans to tax an additional $300 billion worth of imports from China. In an angry tweet  in response, President Trump declared: “Our great American companies are hereby ordered to immediately start looking for an alternative to China, including bringing our companies HOME and making your products in the USA.” Ordered! Yikes! After that Trump was ‘all over the map’ defending past statements such as ordering American companies to leave, then regretting the ratcheting up of tariffs only to have his officials suggest that he only wished he could raise the tariffs even higher. It could make one’s head spin.

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