The Trump Battering of the Order

Posted on February 21, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

As much destruction, it seems, as this second Trump administration can engineer! And fast! One can’t avoid ‘reeling’ from the current Trump administration actions and plans. And yet we are only 30 days into the second Trump administration. It is truly amazing!

The real dilemma for me – and for many others – is the inability to determine whether there is method in Trump’s foreign policy actions; or, whether it is just madness that leads to few good outcomes. Read through all the experts and you come away completely confused . Some do see method, maybe somewhat accidentally, perhaps, but nevertheless some positive direction – whether with respect to: trade, Ukraine, Gaza, relations with the allies, especially Europe and Japan, or adversaries – be it Russia or China. But it is very hard to uncover any consistency of approach and any likelihood of valuable or even redeemable outcomes.

Let’s take Tom Friedman. In a NYTimes piece entitled: “Why Trump’s Bullying Is Going to Backfire” he writes:

And if all of this is just Trump bluffing to get other countries to give us the same access that we give them, I am OK with it. But Trump has never been clear: Some days he says his tariffs are to raise revenue, other days to force everyone to invest in America, other days to keep out fentanyl.

As the Beatles sang, I’d love to see the plan. As in: Here’s how we think the global economy operates today. Therefore, to strengthen America, here is where we think we need to cut spending, impose tariffs and invest — and that is why we are doing X, Y and Z.

That would be real leadership. Instead, Trump is threatening to impose tariffs on rivals and allies alike, without any satisfactory explanation of why one is being tariffed and the other not, and regardless of how such tariffs might hurt U.S. industry and consumers. It’s a total mess. As the Ford Motor chief executive Jim Farley courageously (compared to other chief executives) pointed out, “Let’s be real honest: Long term, a 25 percent tariff across the Mexico and Canada borders would blow a hole in the U.S. industry that we’ve never seen.”

So, either Trump wants to blow that hole, or he’s bluffing, or he is clueless. If it is the latter, Trump is going to get a crash course in the hard realities of the global economy as it really is — not how he imagines it.

And quite rightly Friedman points out that today’s global trade complex is nothing like the past where the conception was: one manufactured and exported X while importing from another, Y. As Friedman describes what he nd others see as the world of global trade today:

My favorite tutor in these matters is the Oxford University economist Eric Beinhocker, who got my attention when we were talking the other day with the following simple statement: “No country in the world alone can make an iPhone.”

Think about that sentence for a moment: There is no single country or company on earth that has all the knowledge or parts or manufacturing prowess or raw materials that go into that device in your pocket called an iPhone. Apple says it assembles its iPhone and computers and watches with the help of “thousands of businesses and millions of people in more than 50 countries and regions” who contribute “their skills, talents and efforts to help build, deliver, repair and recycle our products.

We are talking about a massive network ecosystem that is needed to make that phone so cool, so smart and so cheap.”

The big difference between the era we are in now, as opposed to the one Trump thinks he’s living in, is that today it’s no longer “the economy, stupid.” That was the Bill Clinton era. Today, “it’s the ecosystems, stupid.”

Or turn to regional conflicts, Ukraine for instance. Here is the reaction to recent statements and Trump actions as described by Nicholas Kristof. In a piece titled, “With Trump’s Prostration to Putin, Expect a More Dangerous World”from the NYTimes on February 19th Kristof writes:

I’m not sure most Americans appreciate the monumental damage President Trump is doing to the post-World War II order that is the wellspring of American global leadership and affluence.

He’s shattering it. He’s making the world more dangerous. He’s siding with an alleged war criminal, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, and poisoning relations with longtime U.S. allies. The trans-Atlantic alliance is unraveling.

When I was a young reporter, we referred to countries like Poland and Romania as Soviet satellites; now Trump is doing Putin’s bidding and seems determined to put the United States in the Russian orbit.

The Trump administration has lately sided with Moscow on one issue after another: Ukraine must cede territory, can’t join NATO and should hold new elections just as Russia insists. (Meanwhile, there’s no call for Russia to hold elections.) Trump even suggested that Russia should be readmitted to the Group of 7.

In a falsehood-filled rant on Truth Social on Wednesday, Trump went further. He denounced Ukraine’s elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, as a “dictator” who had squandered money and had “better move fast or he is not going to have a country left.” Trump’s post had the tone of statements from the Kremlin.

Now Dan Drezner in a piece from WPR suggests that Trump’s approach to allies in Europe may possibly incorporate a strategic logic:

Even Trump’s second-term threats directed at longstanding allies can be seen as an example of what Ketian Zhang has labeled “coerce to deter”: In bullying smaller states, Trump is trying to signal what the U.S. could do to great powers if provoked. I have previously expressed deep skepticism about whether this will work during Trump’s second term—but the possibility cannot be ruled out.

This optimistic view, if you want to call it that, was employed by Trump in the first term. As Dan argues:

Let’s start with the most optimistic scenario for the second Trump White House: that his application of the so-called madman theory works. According to this logic, which Rosanne McManus has critically examined, Trump’s norm-breaking and bullying tactics inject unpredictability into any kind of crisis-escalation calculus, ostensibly deterring other actors from challenging the United States.

However that is only one possible view as Dan suggests. Less optimistically Dan also suggests:

The other scenarios paint a bleaker picture for the United States. The second possibility is that the Trump administration’s weakening of the U.S. national security state will be interpreted as an invitation for more aggressive Russian and Chinese expansionism.

And there is even one further possibility as pointed to by Dan:

There is one final possibility, and it is the most disconcerting outcome for the U.S.: that neither Russia nor China decide to take any provocative action while Trump is president. This is not because he represents a formidable deterrent, but rather the opposite. In this scenario, Trump so weakens the United States’ standing in the world and is so keen to appease autocrats like Putin and Xi that their best option is let him do whatever he wants.

The motivation and consequences of Trump’s actions leave us bewildered. It is at the moment not possible to draw firm conclusions on the Trump approach or the outcomes from administration actions. But most analysts are greatly worried. One other area of concern draws immediate attention. That is Trump’s attachment to, and US policy toward, international institutions and the current global order. My good colleague, Patrick Stewart from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) has raised some real concerns in a recent CEIP Commentary titled, “The Death of the World America Made: Donald Trump’s war on multilateralism is misguided and dangerous”. He writes:

On February 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed a sweeping executive order with the potential to upend decades of American global engagement. The directive mandates a comprehensive review within 180 days of all current multilateral organizations of which the United States is a member and all international treaties to which it is party. The explicit purpose of this exercise is to determine whether such support should be withdrawn. …

Of far greater import is the order’s decree that the secretary of state shall review “all international organizations” of which the United States is a member and “all conventions and treaties” to which it is party, to determine whether these “are contrary to the interests of the United States and whether [they] can be reformed.” The secretary will then recommend to the president “whether the United States should withdraw” from those commitments. In principle, the directive could lead to a U.S. abrogation of thousands of treaties and a departure from hundreds of multilateral organizations.

It is even plausible that the Trump administration will conclude that an “America First” foreign policy requires pulling the United States out of the UN—and kicking the UN out of the United States. Both are long-standing objectives of conservative nationalists who contend, speciously, that the UN threatens American sovereignty.

Now there seems to be a debate among experts as to whether the Trump administration can actually do so; nevertheless as Stewart suggests:

As Trump’s first weeks in office have shown, this White House doesn’t do ambiguity—and there are many ways to wreck institutions without formally leaving them.

For my part I am equally worried about Trump’s actions with the Informals – the G7 and especially the G20. Particularly with regard to the latter, the hosting schedule for the G20 ends its first cycle with Brazil this year holding the Presidency and then the G20 returns to the beginning of the cycle with the United States scheduled to host in 2026. The G20 is critical in part because it draws together the significant advanced countries, like the US, Germany, France, Japan and now increasingly influential countries from the Global South such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and others. Already the Trump administration, because of its apparent dislike for South Africa’s ‘domestic policies and its theme focus for this year’s G20 Summit – Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability – has led Secretary of State Marco Rubio cancelling his appearance at the first Foreign Ministers gathering in South Africa as apparently has Scott Bessent, the Treasury Secretary for the first Finance Ministers gathering. As Rubio suggested in his cancelling his attendance, as reported in the Hill:

I will NOT attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg,” Rubio wrote in a Wednesday post on the social platform X. “South Africa is doing very bad things. Expropriating private property. Using G20 to promote ‘solidarity, equality, & sustainability.’ In other words: DEI and climate change.

Rubio added that his job is to “advance America’s national interests, not waste taxpayer money or coddle anti-Americanism.

Now the G20 has not operated very effectively as a so-called Steering Committee but it has displayed value as a Crisis Committee. Without it, I don’t know but I worry.

Who knows if Trump will show up to the G20 Leaders Summit. And who knows what he will do if in fact he does show up to the Leaders’ Summit on November 22-23rd. Moreover, will the United States take on the hosting for 2026, especially if it has failed to participate in most gatherings. There is much to worry about. But we will follow it closely.

This Post first appeared asa Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/157647801/share-center

All comments and Subscriptions to Alan’s Newsletter are welcome.

BRICS Confusion is Rather Evident

Posted on August 26, 2023 by Alan Alexandroff

Well, though still in the weekend, I must admit this Post is a bit late, though still available, I hope, for an enjoyable weekend read.

So, I was not planning to target the BRICS South Africa gathering a second time in this Alan’s Newsletter Post, at least not quite this soon. However, the decisions taken, or not taken in some cases at this most recent BRICS Summit in Johannesburg South Africa was too ‘juicy’ to ignore. As pointed out by Rajiv Bhatia of India’s Gateway House now, more than ever the diplomatic balancing act for the new and enlarged BRICS presents an even more dramatic challenge for this Leaders’ Summit:

As BRICS heads into its 18th year, [the South Africa Leaders’ Summit is the 15th] its success and way forward will depend on the members’ ability to tackle the principal challenge of retaining its internal solidarity while balancing expansion and its impact and influence in the world.

And that central point – retaining its internal solidarity while balancing expansion – is hard to foresee. There is confusion over who was chosen to add and indeed whether they have agreed to join, and what conditions; there is confusion over the choices themselves; and there is confusion over what the enlargement is likely to mean for this Leaders’ Summit.

It is evident that the enlargement has added heft to an already significant leaders’ group. As Bhatia points out:

As a grouping of five nations, BRICS represents 27% of the world’s land area, 42% of the population, 16% of international trade, 27% of global GDP in nominal terms, and 32.5% in PPP terms.

Now the group, according to, Bhaso Ndzendze in The Conversation , is:

The enlarged grouping will account for 46.5% of the world population. Using IMF GDP data, we can deduce that it will account for about 30% of global GDP.

On a PPP basis apparently, it will represent 37 percent of global GDP according to James Kynge in the FT.

So, six countries were identified as joining the BRICS come January 2024: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran. JIm O’Neill, formerly of Goldman Sachs, who has been tagged for creating the BRICS acronym suggested this about the enlargement:

… I have questioned the organization’s purpose, beyond serving as a symbolic gesture. Now that the BRICS has announced that it will add six more countries – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – I pose the question again. The decision, after all, does not appear to have been decided on any clear objective, much less economic, criteria. Why, for example, was Indonesia not asked? Why Argentina and not Mexico, or Ethiopia and not Nigeria?

All good questions. Now the list, I would suggest, seems to reveal that China and Russia prevailed in the choices agreed to. Why, I suspect that is, is the BRICS enlargement includes Iran. As the NYTimes pointed out in its article on BRICS expansion:

The inclusion of Tehran — which has antagonistic relations with China’s chief rival, the United States — suggests that Chinese and Russian pressure had succeeded over the qualms of members like India, Brazil and South Africa, which maintain friendly ties with the West.

It is not unreasonable to suggest that adding Iran can only heighten the geopolitical tensions between the BRICS and others – most notably the G7, and most particularly the US with its many Iran sanctions.

Nevertheless, the hosts and commentators as quoted in the NYTimes again, tried to put the best face on it:

… South Africa, sought to put a hopeful spin on the enlargement decision in any case.

Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s representative in the BRICS negotiations, told reporters that the group needs to change with the times. “This is what BRICS is saying, let’s be more inclusive. BRICS is not anti-West,” he said.

And then of course there is the boosterism from the South Africa President, Cyril Ramaphosa as well (FP):

BRICS has embarked on a new chapter in its effort to build a world that is fair, a world that is just, a world that is also inclusive and prosperous,

As for Indonesia, an obvious choice for the BRICS to draw closer to ASEAN and Southeast Asia more broadly. Why was it not part of the enlargement group? It would seem that Indonesia has not yet decided whether it wants membership. It has not submitted, apparently, a letter of intent. Also, it appears, notwithstanding the announcement that the UAE, in fact, has not decided whether to accept the BRICS invitation, though I suppose in the end it will.

And then there is – Argentina. Argentina remains mired in a dreadful economic crisis. If in the end new members will be asked to contribute capital to the most important BRICS creation, in my opinion, the New Development Bank (NDB), Argentina is far more likely to ask for support than to be able to contribute support. In the end, I suspect it was Brazil and its current president, Lula that pressed for membership to be extended to Argentina.

As just noted, the most notable significant BRICS achievement, in my opinion, has been the creation of the NDB. There was some indication that the expanded members would all be required to contribute to the NDB. And that still may occur. Still, it is disappointing that not more was mentioned of the NDB by the current announcements.

There was, also, a fair bit of reporting, and loud statements prior to the conclusion of the Summit, that suggested the BRICS might well take steps to create some form of common currency, or steps at de-dollarization by the BRICS. But as was pointed out by Henry Poenisch in OMFIF:

A declaration released at the gathering in Johannesburg on 24 August made no mention of a common currency and instead focused on bilateral clearing – the second-best option. It stressed the importance of ‘encouraging the use of local currencies in international trade and financial transactions between Brics as well as between their trading partners.’

Yet, it seems to me the enhanced use of local currencies, except possibly the Chinese renminbi, is a rather questionable proposition. Using some of the local currencies available, and then holding the surplus for future use doesn’t seem a rather appealing course of action.

Finally, what most commentators failed to point to in their descriptions of the enlargement of the BRICS is that two of the six new members – Argentina and Saudi Arabia – are already members of the G20, as of course are all of the original BRICS. Rather than contemplating the consequence of the enlarged BRICS for global policy progress, it strikes me targeting the efforts, and today’s evident hardships in advancing global governance in the face of rising geopolitics by focusing attention on the G20 might well be a more fruitful avenue of inquiry if one was examining global summitry and the efforts to advance global governance. Looking again, at Jim O’Neill he turns, not reasonably, in this direction:

What the world really needs is a resurrected G20, which already includes all the same key players, plus others. It remains the best forum for addressing truly global issues such as economic growth, international trade, climate change, pandemic prevention, and so on. Though it now faces significant challenges, it still can reclaim the spirit of 2008-10, when it coordinated the international response to the global financial crisis. At some point, the US and China will have to overcome their differences and allow the G20 to return to its central position.

South Africa’s Place in an Economic Global Order

Posted on December 8, 2014 by Alan Alexandroff

Without question South Africa remains a vibrant, complicated and seemingly a growing troubled land. My colleagues from the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) one of the premiere think tanks in South Africa and the University of Pretoria, particularly the Department of Political Science there brought together some of their South African colleagues with experts from a number of countries for a conference (December 4^th-5^th) titled “Alliances Beyond BRICS: South Africa’s Role in Global Economic Governance”. Hats off to both Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, President of SAIIA and Maxi Schoeman Head of Political Science at the University of Pretoria and all their colleagues for a job well done.

Continue reading →

From Shanghai to Pretoria – From Where You Stand: Part II

Posted on December 7, 2013 by Alan Alexandroff

Shanghai was the first conference stop; but it wasn’t the last. For the first time the partners – the Munk School of Global Affairs and the Stanley Foundation – held a conference in Pretoria partnering with our friends at the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria. We were very fortunate to welcome friends from most of the key countries – Brazil, India, China and obviously South Africa. Unfortunately, our colleague from Russia was ultimately unable to make it.

Continue reading →

A Turbulent and Yet Vital Country

Posted on November 15, 2012 by Alan Alexandroff

It is very hard to capture the essence of a place in a short visit to a far away land. I am still trying to digest all that I saw and heard while in South Africa over the last couple of weeks. Although this trip was not my first visit, it was for me the most sustained time that I spent there. And I had the good fortune to spend time at the University of Pretoria with good colleagues and also with: a variety of folks from the diplomatic community; as well as officials from the government of South Africa.

For those of us interested in global summitry, South Africa is a significant new player in the global governance game. It is the first, and to this point only African state that participates consistently at the “high table” of G20 leaders. Moreover, and I’d say most critically, South Africa is a turbulent yet vibrant member of the democratic community in global summitry.

Today South Africa remains the largest national economy in Africa, though growth has been increasingly a question mark for this most southern nation in Africa. South Africa may be taken over by Nigeria in the not too distant future. While I was in Pretoria the government released two vital pieces of information. First, and due to its most recent census, South Africa had reached a population of some 50 million people. Second, as I mentioned in the previous blog post, “An Apparently Potent Flavor of the Month” South Africa has acknowledged that its official unemployment rate has climbed to 25.5 percent. Now that is a nasty piece of business but let’s not forget – and I was reminded about this in recent new reports – that Spain, yes Spain, part of the eurozone, has an official unemployment level about the same as South Africa. Definitely food for thought.

Now a quick examination of the pros and cons on the national ledger. Official statistics reveal that violent crime is on the decline, though what we here in North America at least call b&e is not. In fact on that front what the South Africans call “smash and grab” is seemingly an ever-present reality. Indeed, one of my colleagues at UP, or as it is affectionately known and called – Tuks – has suffered through three incidents in just a year. In fact this colleague was on the way to pick me up when an assailant put a brick through the car passenger window and lifted the bag and credit cards of my colleague. The more than pleasant guest facility that I was temporarily housed in had a high fence surrounding the entire facility where swiping a card was required to gain entry. Even more sadly the University, which was only about ten minutes walk from this same guest facility was completely surrounded by an equally high fence and there was absolutely no admittance without a card or by way of a thorough check and the guarded entries. It was to say the least unnerving.

On the wider civil society front there have been stormy and even violent labor strikes recently. The most notorious was the Marikana strike – mines near Rutenburg – where in August 47 people, mainly miners, where shot and killed by South African Police Services personnel. Strikes have not ended in the mining sector though they have abated, but there have been recent strikes by agricultural laborers that have led to hectares and hectares of vineyards being torched. Not pretty. The social unrest is real and disconcerting and it has allowed the most populist political elements to seek advantage. Also not pretty.

But on the positive side, I would suggest that the democratic impulse is a tangible and ever present sense in the country – among the elites and more importantly in the broader South African society. This is a vibrant democratic society. In response to the Marikana shootings, for example, the government struck a public commission of inquiry. Now it could be a “white wash” and possibly a serious effort of political deflection but the instinct and impulse is right – and it is evident that this is what the South African people expect.

On the democratic side, the real impediment to a deep and deepening democratic entrenchment is the continuing stranglehold on political life, and the national government, of the current ruling Tripartite Alliance – the amalgam of the African National Congress (ANC) the Communist Party of South Africa (SACP) and the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU). This ruling party, and government, is a consequence of the struggle against apartheid. But the alliance now impedes – my political science is about to shine through, sorry – the “circulation of elites” and the holding accountable of office holders in particular. Unfortunately, the stranglehold of the ANC alliance saps the prospect of democratic renewal and accountability. While the DA or Democratic Alliance opposition has made gains – even holding provincial government – it remains viewed by the black majority as a white party. The DA requires more change. Thus, South Africans have to rely on the interplay of factions, including reformist factions, within the ANC to renew democratic accountability and to punish cronyism and graft. It is not adequate. Extremist elements continue to call for a “second revolution” – threatening private property and in the end the rights of all citizens. A truly bad business and unlikely to encourage investment in the economy from within or from without.

Storm clouds or not the democratic presence in South African life is palatable and to be nourished. It was encouraging that colleagues saw the unique South African character. Notwithstanding the current Administration’s fantasies over the BRICS membership – and an unlikely South African leadership in it – colleagues and experts were alert to the leadership and partnership prospects in the India-Brazil-South Africa partnership – IBSA. South African leadership needs to see it as more than a development forum. The democratic values at the core of this alliance gives this organization the critical foundation for these emerging powers and potentially a values driven institution. And just within the G20 there are immediate partners – Turkey and Indonesia. This is the way forward for South African leadership in global influence. Let’s encourage it.

An Apparently Potent ‘Flavor of the Month’

Posted on November 6, 2012 by Alan Alexandroff

Well I have been absent – my bad. But I do have an explanation. I am currently in South Africa at the invitation of colleagues from the University of Pretoria – Tuks as it was once called – and between preparation for leaving for SA – and indeed arriving here – time ran short. But I am back now.

This should help to explain my absence. An hour after arriving I was whisked to Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg and the Jan Smuts House where the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) is now located. There experts examined, “Values in Global Economic Governance: Do India, Brazil, and South Africa Share a Common Vision?”

Hardly able to catch my breath, I was requested to join a gathering in the downtown the following day, where a panel was organized to discuss South Africa and its role in the G20. Entitled, “South Africa and the G20 – Challenges and Opportunities” this panel was put together by SAIIA again and in this event the featured speaker at the panel was the Deputy Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Daniel Mminele.

A third day and ‘lo and behold’ – a third panel. Fortunately, this panel was organized by colleagues here at the Department of Political Sciences at Pretoria. Here again the organizers put together a panel on the G20 and the featured speaker on this occasion – Alan Hirsch the Director General of Policy Coordination and overseas economic policy implementation in the South African Presidency, in other words – South Africa’s Sherpa. The session entitled “The G20: Looking to the Future” included a number of officials from the diplomatic community including officials from the Russian and Mexican embassies as well as representative from the Open Society Foundation representing civil society.

So quite an opportunity to learn about the G20 and other global summitry institutions and how the informed and informing public here and select officials view current global summitry So what do I glean from all this conference activity?

Well South Africa continues to take its leading role in Africa seriously. But there are signs of concern. South Africa is struggling to raise economic growth. And there are projections that Nigeria will overtake South Africa in the size of its economy. Statistics from the government in the last few days reveal that unemployment has risen to 25.5 percent. And who knows what the real number is. Strikes are seemingly an ever-present phenomenon, especially in the mining sector. Though wage increases have been accepted, employers have begun a series of public announcements identifying plans to down size to cope with the wage increases. There are a series of government scandals over government provision of services from the delivery of textbooks to the public schools to the provision and tolling of new roads, and on. And there are growing doubts over the Zuma presidency. Where is the drive? The goals?

In the midst of this, there is excitement – in the global summitry community – over South Africa’s hosting of the BRICS Summit in March. This enthusiasm appears to have spread beyond officialdom to the media and public intellectuals and even beyond to the broader public. Why? It is not clear? Part of it appears to be that the Zuma presidency seems to view BRICS membership and hosting as a part of the Zuma legacy. While his predecessor highlighted South Africa’s involvement in the IBSA Summit – India, Brazil and South Africa – Zuma and his officials have turned their sites on the BRICS. Indeed The SAIIA conference at Jan Smuts House explored the future prospects for South Africa in IBSA – tied together by the commitment to democratic governance – as opposed to the BRICS – tied together by – well no one is quite sure. For the moment the public has been excited by the proposal to inaugurate a BRICS bank. There has been much discussion of exactly how to put together such an institution and to what end would such a bank be created for at least in concept as early as the next summit. South Africa has publicly announced that it would be willing to host the bank in South Africa – especially if the bank’s purpose was to fund infrastructure in Africa. There is much loose talk that the bank could represent an alternative to the “old” institutions of the World Bank. But that seems far-fetched and South African officials have been quick to tamp down such talk.

As many have suggested though the fascination here in South Africa with the BRICS appears to be that it represents an alternative club – without the traditional powers. No UK, France or United States. And including China. It appears to resonate with the anti-colonial rhetoric of many in global south. Interesting – but it is such an odd collection.

And the love affair with China is tempered here in South Africa by China’s actions. In Pretoria there is much frustration. China is completing a new and very large embassy here – in fact near the US embassy. Workers were transported in from abroad and apparently 80 percent of material procurement occurred from China. Reality beyond the rhetoric.

So there it is – enthusiasm for an alternative – but the hard reality of policy practices that may not secure favor. Let’s keep looking.

Africa’s Champion?

Posted on June 2, 2008 by Alan Alexandroff

South Africa is a central player in the O5. But is it a BRIC or the extension – B(R)ICSAM/BRICSAM? This a more difficult question. In CIGI Distinguished Fellow Andy Cooper’s Heiligendamm Process Project, we have been fortunate to have Brendan Vickers join us and prepare a chapter on South Africa (SA) entitled, “South Africa: Global Reformism, Global Apartheid and the Heiligendamm Process.” Brendan, by the way, is currently a senior researcher in the multilateral programme at the Institute for Global Dialogue in South Africa (IDG). Before his appointment to IDG, Brendan was Deputy Director responsible for International and Trade in the Office of the President of South Africa.

On economic leverage, it would appear that SA is simply too small to be part of BRICSAM. Currently, SA has a GDP (PPP) of only USD$467 billion which places it as the 25th largest economy in the world. As Brendan suggest, “… there is little objective economic rationale for the country’s inclusion into the O5, let alone an expanded G13.” Brendan characterizes SA as a middle-income developing country with many of the development problems that this brings. Indeed, as he points Continue reading →

Rising BRICSAM

'Breaking' Knowledge, Information and Commentary on Rising BRICSAM and Global Governance Summitry

Category Archives: South Africa