Tag Archives: Trump 2.0

NATO – the Continuing Course of ‘Trump-driven Summitry’

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So the ‘24 hour’ summit parade – or should I say the Trump performance spectacle – continues. We saw his 24 hour star performance at the G7 Summit at Kananaskis – kept in line by Canada’s new prime minister Mark Carney; and now we played the audience to the 24 hour NATO summit choreographed by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.

And now to his ‘star performance’ in the Hague at the NATO Summit. The event as we found out was finely tuned by the Secretary-General Mark Rutte including ending it after just 1 day to avoid, I presume, having Trump loudly leave the gathering early. Now in no way do I want to be dismissive of Rutte’s really excellent framing for the meeting. The marshalling of support was clearly described by our friends at the NYTimes:

“Mr. Rutte is skilled at handling Mr. Trump and has no embarrassment about flattering him. In an unusually unctuous message that Mr. Trump released on Tuesday, Mr. Rutte praised him for making Europe “pay in a BIG way” on increased military spending and for his “decisive action in Iran, that was truly extraordinary, and something no one else dared to do.””

 

“To try to ensure a smooth summit, Mr. Rutte said: “Donald, you have driven us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe, and the world,” getting allies to commit to spending 5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. “You will achieve something NO American president in decades could get done,” Mr. Rutte added. NATO officials confirmed that the message, which Mr. Trump posted on social media, was authentic.”

The self congratulation was all about the commitment to raise defense spending demanded by Trump. And to be fair, objectively Trump’s insistence on greater defense spending efforts by NATO members was long overdue, especially in the light of continuing Russian actions against Ukraine and worries by Eastern European countries close to Russia. But even the agreement to move to 5 percent of GDP had a ‘sleight of hand’ at play as pointed to by the The Economist:

“The solution was two-fold. One trick was to stretch the timeline for meeting the target. Many states had pushed for 2032, with steady annual increases to get there. Others, though, under greater fiscal pressure—and not just Spain—pushed for 2035. In the end, regrettably, the laggards won, though allies are supposed to submit annual plans showing a “credible, incremental path” to the target, and will be subject to a bigger review in 2029.”

 

“The problem is that Russia is rebuilding its armed forces faster than previously thought. It had been assumed that it would take Russia seven years after any ceasefire in Ukraine to reconstitute its forces to the level needed for a confrontation with NATO. “The general assessment now should be five years,” one senior NATO official told The Economist. “Let’s not kid ourselves,” complains Dovile Sakaliene, Lithuania’s defence minister, suggesting that Russia could attack before the new spending turned up. “2035 is after the [next] war.””

Well kinda pandering but otherwise NATO leaders would likely have faced a growling and very unhappy Trump. The victim here, though, Ukraine. The Hague Summit Declaration is all of 5 paragraphs. And buried in paragraph 3 is the following:

“Allies reaffirm their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine, whose security contributes to ours, and, to this end, will include direct contributions towards Ukraine’s defence and its defence industry when calculating Allies’ defence spending.”

So, no clear condemnation of Russian aggression, no heartfelt declaration of support and determination to provide weapons needed by Ukraine, no upping sanctions but rather a tie in to the overall agreed spending increase by all NATO nations – skip Spain – to 5 percent of GDP. Wow. Steven Erlanger, the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, at the NYTimes underscored the muting of Ukrainian support:

“But it [the Declaration] makes no mention of NATO’s promise of eventual membership to Ukraine and Georgia, as previous summit communiqués have done. Past commitments, Mr. Rutte has explained with some exasperation, are considered settled and do not need to be repeated.”

So, Trump has succeeded in contorting – or at least reshaping – the Nato Summit to mirror and match his, Trump’s interests and quite frankly that is it. As pointed out in WPR:

“That solicitousness is in some ways understandable. During his first term, Trump made no effort to hide his disdain and even hostility toward the alliance, which he has portrayed as a way for wealthy European states to freeride on U.S. defense spending, with little to no benefit to Washington. Moreover, Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on his commitment to Article 5. And when it comes to the principal threat now facing the alliance’s European members—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—Trump has adopted many of Moscow’s talking points, while curtailing U.S. support for Kyiv.”

And as for Article 5 – the collective security provision for the NATO members – the ‘heart’ of the alliance – with Trump at the helm I wouldn’t really want to put it to the test.

Indeed as the Economist somewhat startlingly described it relying on the words of Nato’s Mark Rutte:

“The tone was that of a parent congratulating a toddler. “Donald, you have driven us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe and the world,” wrote Mark Rutte, the secretary-general of NATO, in a text message to Donald Trump, America’s president. Europe is going to pay in a BIG way, as they should, and it will be your win.””

So what is the state of alliance relations following this seeming Trump ‘love fest’. Here is how WPR described the current state of alliance relations:

“Neither Trump’s calls for increased European defense spending nor European calls for increased strategic autonomy were anything new. But the sense of being under threat from both the east, in the form of Russian revanchism, and the west, in the form of U.S. retrenchment, for a moment seemed to create an urgency that was unprecedented.”

In the end Trump seemed satisfied by it all. Why wouldn’t he be. But a rather more insightful view was expressed by the President of the Czech Republic and recorded in the NYTimes:

“The president of the Czech Republic, Petr Pavel, a former general, put it well last week when he summarized his outlook for the summit.

 

On the one hand, he said, expectations for the summit are high, especially for new targets for military spending, but the goals are also limited because of the U.S. administration’s “approach.””

Great fanfare; much Trump performance; but far less than meets the eye.

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/nato-the-continuing-course-of-trump

Image Credit: France24

 

Faltering Multilateralism: Today, Let’s Start with Trade

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It would be hard to make this stuff up. When I was deep into trade policy issues in the late 80s and early 90’s before China’s accession to the WTO, I could not have imagined a President using these trade policies to enact such broad-based tariffs. And it seems like that is how the CIT – the Court of International Trade, sees Trump tariff efforts as well.

Now I was going to dive into a just recently released book by Brookings edited by my longstanding colleague, Lim Wonhyuk from South Korea (Korea) titled: “Unfinished Transformation: Domestic Politics and International Relations Since the Covid-19 Pandemic”. Wonhyuk is the editor and I have a chapter in the volume – “The possibilities for “Effective Multilateralism” in the Coming Global Order. There are a variety of pieces in the book from some rather notable folk including: Kent Calder, David Lampton, Zia Qureshi, Norman Ornstein and my good colleague, Homi Kharas. And I will return to the just released book though unfortunately there does not appear to be a current digital version at this time. But I cannot let this CIT decision pass without comment.

Yes, so, the CIT ruled just last evening (Wednesday) and according to the NYTimes and Tony Romm and Ana Swanson, this was the conclusion reached:

“The U.S. Court of International Trade said the president had overstepped his authority in imposing his “reciprocal” tariffs globally, as well as levies on Canada and Mexico.”

What the Court has declared as illegal then are the “worldwide and retaliatory tariffs,” in other words, the 10 percent tariffs on all trading partners and also the reciprocal tariffs that President Trump paused for 90 days in order to negotiate trade deals with a host of trade partners. What remains in place for the moment are tariffs on specific products, such as those that were placed on steel, aluminum and automobiles. As pointed out in the NYTimes piece:

“The ruling, by the U.S. Court of International Trade, delivered an early yet significant setback to Mr. Trump, undercutting his primary leverage as he looks to pressure other nations into striking trade deals more beneficial to the United States.”

Paul Krugman in his Substack today pointed out what many trade types had been thinking all along:

“The thing is, it has been obvious all along that Trump’s use of the 1977 International Economic Emergency Powers Act to justify Smoot-Hawley level tariffs was a massive abuse of power. I mean, since when are 4 percent unemployment and 2.5 percent inflation an emergency justifying the reversal of 90 years of policy? But I guess I just assumed that things like that didn’t matter anymore.”

How did it reach this point? Well, this is how the NYTimes reporters described it:

“But Mr. Trump adopted a novel interpretation of its powers as he announced, and then suspended, high levies on scores of countries in April. He also used the law to impose tariffs on products from Canada and Mexico in return for what he said was their role in sending fentanyl to the United States.”

 

“On Wednesday, the Court of International Trade, the primary federal legal body overseeing such matters, found that Mr. Trump’s tariffs “exceed any authority granted” to the president by the emergency powers law. Ruling in separate cases brought by states and businesses, a bipartisan panel of three judges essentially declared many, but not all, of Mr. Trump’s tariffs to have been issued illegally.”

 

“It was not clear precisely when and how the tariff collections would grind to a halt. The ruling gave the executive branch up to 10 days to complete the bureaucratic process of ending them. The Trump administration immediately filed its plans to appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”

At least for the moment the signature policy of this second Trump administration appears ‘cooked’. It will be interesting to see what Trump does next for it seems unlikely that Trump will give up on his most preferred policy – tariffs.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

This Post appeared originally at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/faltering-multilateralism-today-lets

 

Taming the ‘Bully and the Dragon’

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It is hard to deal with a ‘Bully’. Usually efforts, even reasonable ones of accommodation only lead generally to further demands – just ask Columbia University. That was why I was pleased to see Harvard University ‘dig in’ rather than try to accommodate the Trump administration. As Philip Stephens, contributing editor of the FT wrote in a recent piece on various allied responses to Trump’s tariff actions titled, ‘Placate or retaliate? Starmer and Carney are both right on Trump’:

“Canada’s Mark Carney has picked up the gauntlet. Britain’s Keir Starmer prefers to look the other way. Japan and South Korea lead the queue to strike a bilateral deal. … Kudos generally goes to those willing to stand up to “the bully”. Carney has transformed his Liberal party’s electoral prospects by relishing the fight. In Europe, Gaullism has gone mainstream. Emmanuel Macron’s call for Europe to break free of the Americans is echoed by chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz in Berlin.”

 

“None of this makes pandering to Trump look heroic, particularly when, with characteristic vulgarity, the president publicly mocks the softly spoken. Opinion polls suggest Europeans would prefer their leaders to join Carney in the ring. Appeasing Trump may simply encourage him. He clearly enjoys humiliating America’s old friends. The answer surely is to show him that Trumpism has costs. Didn’t we learn at school that the way to beat bullies is to fight back?”

So a round of applause for the Harvard folk. But there will continue to be hard times – note the request by Trump to the IRS to end Harvard’s tax-free status. What additionally is needed then to blunt Trump’s actions? What is needed is: collaboration and group support from other universities and then collective action in the courts. Bending the knee to Trump will not work. Nobody said it would be easy.

David Wallace-Wells has pointed out in the NYT what the actions of the Trump administration have led to the following actions by US partners:

“Last week Spain’s democratic-socialist government proudly announced plans to intensify relations with China, after Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that doing so would amount to “cutting your own throat.” President Emmanuel Macron of France urged European companies to stop investing in the United States, and the European Union as a whole, which is developing a retaliatory tariff response and plotting potential tax increases on American tech companies, announced it is sending a delegation to Beijing in July.

 

What comes next? Perhaps it shouldn’t be so hard to imagine, given the drift of what’s now called geoeconomics. Already, China commands global trade, and modeling from Bloomberg shows that, as constituted today, the tariffs will only add to the lead — pushing many more countries to work more with China and less with America. According to one model, 30 percent of American trading partners would fully recover from even total cessation of U.S. trade within one year; within five years, more than half would. This is why chaos is rarely the chosen strategy for a hegemon: Barring what Trump calls a “beautiful deal,” the biggest single beneficiary of the whole crusade may well end up being its intended target.”

So how do we deal with the dragon? Clearly there is ‘fire’ and a certain amount of ‘huffing and puffing’. But beyond the aggressiveness, think Taiwan, and even aggression – talk to the Philippines – about that, is there the prospect of securing a deal? And in the more immediate circumstances, is there the prospect of securing a bilateral trade arrangement, or even an enlarged one with China.

Let’s start with an assessment of what the Trump administration is up to. This is not an easy determination. What is the goal of the Trump administration? Kyla Scanlon, author of, the author of “In This Economy? How Money & Markets Really Work” wrote recently in the NYT:

“What is an overarching goal of these actions? Or, what is the purpose of Trumponomics?

In a word, reindustrialization.”

It is hard to see at times what is the end point for Trump and his minions: is it revenues, China decoupling, reshoring of manufacturing – all or none of the above. But for Scanlon it is evident – reindustrialization in the US and she goes on to say:

“To reindustrialize will require investment in people and machines — and a coherent strategy. Given the Trump administration’s aversion to collaboration and the internal contradictions of the factions within the administration, its reindustrialization drive appears disconnected from reality and destined to fail.”

She concludes that a successful strategy in the 21st century today, in her opinion, require the following from the US and its partners ultimately:

“Modern manufacturing is high-tech and requires different skills from those of the 20th century. The focus should be on advanced manufacturing sectors where America can lead through innovation, not just protectionism: pharmaceuticals, clean-energy technology, robotics and semiconductors.

 

Second, it would invest substantially in the foundations for industrial competitiveness like education, infrastructure, research and development (like the CHIPS Act) and work force training.

 

Third, a serious strategy would recognize that alliances matter. Rather than needlessly alienate partners like Canada, Mexico, Japan and the European Union, a sound approach would build cooperative frameworks that reduce dependence on geopolitical rivals while strengthening ties with allies. Selective decoupling would better serve America’s long-term interests.”

But what appears to be evident is that the Trump administration seems dramatically unwilling to work with partners and allies to enhance trade with them and to press China on what remains today a damaging economic policy from Beijing that increases production and exports as opposed to a more determined effort to improve domestic consumption. Yes, Xi Jinping and his associates have once again targeted energizing domestic consumption, but seeing is believing. We shall see.

What then is possible? Tom Friedman describes why it is highly unlikely that Trump will, or can, act in concert. As Friedman put in a recent NYT piece:

“So much crazy happens with the Trump administration every day that some downright weird but incredibly telling stuff gets lost in the noise. A recent example was the scene on April 8 at the White House where, in the middle of his raging trade war, our president decided it was the perfect time to sign an executive order to bolster coal mining.”

 

“It’s commendable that the president honors men and women who work with their hands. But when he singles out coal miners for praise while he tries to zero out development of clean-tech jobs from his budget — in 2023, the U.S. wind energy industry employed approximately 130,000 workers, while the solar industry employed 280,000 — it suggests that Trump is trapped in a right-wing woke ideology that doesn’t recognize green manufacturing jobs as “real” jobs. How is that going to make us stronger?”

 

“This whole Trump II administration is a cruel farce. Trump ran for another term not because he had any clue how to transform America for the 21st century. He ran in order to stay out of jail and to get revenge on those who, with real evidence, had tried to hold him accountable to the law. I doubt he has ever spent five minutes studying the work force of the future.”

 

“But this farce is about to touch every American. By attacking our closest allies — Canada, Mexico, Japan, South Korea and the European Union — and our biggest rival, China, at the same time he makes clear he favors Russia over Ukraine and prefers climate-destroying energy industries over future-oriented ones, the planet be damned, Trump is triggering a serious loss of global confidence in America.”

 

“The world is now seeing Trump’s America for exactly what it is becoming: a rogue state led by an impulsive strongman disconnected from the rule of law and other constitutional American principles and values.”

If indeed the US under a Trump administration is a rogue actor, and on too many days it does indeed look exactly like that. Put simply what is required and the answer may well be: coordination without the United States. And I’d add it begins with the Informals, most notably the G20.

There has been on and off talk that Trump will not attend the G20 Leaders’ Summit which will be held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on November 22-23rd. And senior US officials including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have failed to show up for at least early meetings. On the other hand, apparently, the United States has been active in the Troika – the gathering of the G20 members – the past host, the present one and future host – in assisting in carrying out a successful G20 Summit. As it turns out the United States is scheduled to take hosting in 2026. But the point is whether the US participates – if it doesn’t the UK would likely take the hosting in 2026 – and indeed possibly US absence might benefit the working of the G20 at the moment – a serious gathering like this may be critical in advancing needed global governance action.

Coordination without US participation – at least during Trump 2.0 – may be the necessary ingredient for advancing critical multilateral action. I will return to this soon.

Image Credit: FT and Neil Hall/EPA

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/taming-the-bully-and-the-dragon

The Difficult Course of US-China Relations

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Many anticipated, and or feared, the flood of Executive Orders from the second Trump White House these past weeks. The barrage of Executive Orders follows a playbook conceived from a longtime Trump supporter Steve Bannon.  Bannon referred to it as ‘flood the zone’. Bannon served as the White House’s chief strategist for the first seven months of U.S. president Donald Trump’s first administration, before Trump discharged him. He remains a strong supporter of Trump actions. As Luke Braodwater of the NYTimes describes this Bannon approach:

… Bannon boasted of the ability to overwhelm Democrats and any media opposition through a determined effort to “flood the zone” with initiatives.

 

On Tuesday, just when Democrats thought they might come up for air, news broke that Mr. Trump had ordered a freeze on trillions of dollars in federal grants and loans, prompting a new round of outrage.

 

It is a little unclear how adept the Democrats are in parrying the ‘flood the zone’ approach but there does seem to be some awareness of the tactic: 

“It’s a little bit like drinking from a fire hose,” Representative Gerald E. Connolly of Virginia, the top Democrat on the Oversight Committee, said of the pace of Mr. Trump’s moves. But he said that speed is likely to cause sloppiness and mistakes.”

 

They’re going to stumble,” Mr. Connolly said. “They’re going to screw up, and we’re going to pounce when they do. In their haste to remake the federal government, they’re going to make big, big mistakes.”

 

And the evidence of at least Trump ‘screw ups’ emerged rapidly. The particular initiative that generated a significant amount of chaos was the issuance of the freeze on government spending. In fact the freeze memo was quickly withdrawn though not before a federal judge on Tuesday temporarily blocked a pause on federal funding while the Trump administration declared it would conduct an across-the-board review. Even more chaotically the new press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, a quite blustery press secretary it seems I might add, insisted, however, that the spending freeze in the Order wasn’t being rescinded despite the memo that appeared to rescinded the freeze. Dan Drezner at his Substack,  Drezner’s World, captured the craziness that has transpired recently with this flurry of executive orders, the freeze memo in particular: 

Here’s the thing, though: to paraphrase Mario Cuomo, you can campaign seriously but you have to govern literally. And the first week of Trump 2.0 highlights the problems when an entire administration fails to make this particular pivot. 

 

Needless to say, almost everything after “The American people elected Donald J. Trump to be President of the United States” is either factually or legally incorrect. Taken literally, it is a tsunami of bullshit.

 

Dan summed up this rather chaotic week for the Trump administration this  way: 

The White House and its co-partisans  tried to backfill and claim that everyone overreacted and should have understood what the president really, truly meant. But that dog won’t hunt. As the Manhattan Institute’s Brian Riedl — a pretty conservative dude — concluded, “the blame here lies entirely with the White House for releasing a terribly-written memo that did not include most of the guardrails they are now rushing to add as part of their next-day damage control. Perhaps the White House should try to get it right the first time.

 

If the Trump administration isn’t careful, they are going to blow their political inheritance and destroy the confidence of the American people. If they persist with “seriously but not literally” as a mode of governance, things will get real ugly real fast.

Now the chaos that broke out after the freeze memo kinda interfered with my effort to assess where Trump 2.0 was going with respect to US relations with China beginning with the Trump threat to impose 10 percent tariffs on China on account of fentanyl. Where is Trump 2.0 with respect to US-China relations? Well, interestingly Trump has not  played up the US-China relationship yet, though the imposition of tariffs on China might well signal a change. And while Trump has threatened tariffs we need to see if, and or when they happen, and the bluster against China that will accompany the tariff announcement. 

Meanwhile, Ryan Hass of Brookings has written a very interesting piece – “Can Trump seize the moment on China?” targeting the US-China relationship. He points to the very ‘heart’ of the competitiveness between the two leading powers:

This comprehensive approach [from China] to nurturing national economic competitiveness has generated eye-popping levels of industrial output. China is on pace to produce nearly 45% of global industrial output by 2030, according to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Outside of America’s industrial dominance in the wake of World War II, it is hard to find modern historical analogs to the levels of global concentration of output that are now occurring in China. 

Ryan identifies from this massive industrial output advantage for China three risks. First there is the national security risk:

China’s factories and shipyards are on track to have production capacity for military equipment at a scale the United States and its partners could struggle to match. Already, according to Michael Beckley, China is embarking on the largest peacetime military buildup since World War II, producing ships, planes, and missiles five to six times as fast as the United States

Then, there is the risk to US social cohesion:

If America’s economy becomes too dramatically overweighted toward finance, technology, and services, it will leave a large portion of the population behind, resulting in a hollowed-out middle class and a yawning gap between winners and losers in the 21st-century American economy. Such a scenario would fracture the polity and create the seeds of social disorder.

Third, and relatedly, the overconcentration of industrial output in China would undermine America’s allies in Europe and Asia:

America’s long-term strategic interests would be ill-served if vehicle factories shutter across Europe and if Japan’s and South Korea’s industrial sectors are decimated by Chinese competitors. A core challenge for the Trump administration will be rebalancing global economic activity to ensure sustainable opportunities for growth in industrial output outside China.

Rebalancing is the key. But there also is the rub. It is very hard to see how with the current leadership of China, namely Xi Jinping, such a rebalancing is possible. The difficulties are underscored in an article by Zongyuan Zoe Liu in FA. This is an article published back in August entitled: “China’s Real Economic Crisis: Why Beijing Won’t Give Up on a Failing Model”. Zongyuan Zoe is currently the Maurice R. Greenberg Fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In the piece he wrote:

Despite vehement denials by Beijing, Chinese industrial policy has for decades led to recurring cycles of overcapacity.

 

Partly, this stems from a long tradition of economic planning that has given enormous emphasis to industrial production and infrastructure development while virtually ignoring household consumption. This oversight does not stem from ignorance or miscalculation; rather, it reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing economic vision.

 

As the party sees it, consumption is an individualistic distraction that threatens to divert resources away from China’s core economic strength: its industrial base.” According to party orthodoxy, China’s economic advantage derives from its low consumption and high savings rates, which generate capital that the state-controlled banking system can funnel into industrial enterprises.

And he then concludes: 

For the West, China’s overcapacity problem presents a long-term challenge that can’t be solved simply by erecting new trade barriers. For one thing, even if the United States and Europe were able to significantly limit the amount of Chinese goods reaching Western markets, it would not unravel the structural inefficiencies that have accumulated in China over decades of privileging industrial investment and production goals.

Overlay this industrial focus by China with an intense competitive urges by members of the Trump team, starting with Marco Rubio, if not Donald Trump himself. Here is Rubio in his confirmation opening remarks speaking about China: 

We welcomed the Chinese Communist Party into this global order. And they took advantage of all its benefits. But they ignored all its obligations and responsibilities. Instead, they have lied, cheated, hacked, and stolen their way to global superpower status, at our expense.

Hardly an attitude likely to generate serious considered negotiations between the US and China. And, then finally, add the necessary US approach to negotiations as seen and set out by Ryan Hass: 

Trump’s team holds a variety of viewpoints on how to maximize America’s leverage, or even on what objectives America should pursue in its competition with China. Left unaddressed, this variance in views risks leading to policy incoherence. To overcome this risk, Trump will need to set a firm direction, identify specific objectives, and put his advisors on notice that they will pay a cost for actions that undermine his goals. 

Look Trump’s transactional urges may surprise us all with movement on the US-China negotiating front but there is little, no, no way that Trump will undertake a more than reasonable approach as urged by Ryan. In fact Ryan describes what is likely to be the more telling direction and its consequences: 

Absent firm and decisive policy direction from the top, there is a risk of policy chaos, with different factions canceling each other out and little progress being achieved to address American concerns about Chinese behavior. In such a circumstance, the U.S.-China relationship likely would grow more fractious. If Beijing abandons the hope of resolving U.S.-China differences through diplomacy, it likely will double down on efforts to hedge risk, including by deepening its relationships with countries who share antagonisms against the United States. 

Based on what we have seen to date, I think we should ‘hunker down’ and anticipate a ‘risk of policy chaos’. More to come.

Image Credit: AP