The Trump attack on interdependence – particularly economic – has felt foolish and destructive but without question – relentless. What appeared to be a stalling out with Biden’s ill-disguised protectionism, has now turned into repeated blows against an open trading system and a collaborative global order.
MInouche Shafik, former president of Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and a member of the House of Lords referenced a well-known transformation in a recent piece in PS:
““The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.” This famous quote, often attributed to Antonio Gramsci, feels particularly pertinent today, as the international order that has defined the past century undergoes a profound shift.”
What is passing away? And what is emerging? Joe Nye, the very well known International relations maven has examined exactly that in another recent piece in PS. As he describes Trump policy actions:
“Globalization refers simply to interdependence at intercontinental distances. Trade among European countries reflects regional interdependence, whereas European trade with the US or China reflects globalization. By threatening China with tariffs, US President Donald Trump is trying to reduce the economic aspect of our global interdependence, which he blames for the loss of domestic industries and jobs.”
Can globalization be reversed? Nye argues it certainly has in the past. As he describes:
“But can economic globalization be reversed? It has happened before. The nineteenth century was marked by a rapid increase in both trade and migration, but it came to a screeching halt with the outbreak of World War I. Trade as a share of total world product did not recover to its 1914 levels until nearly 1970.”
It is striking how long it took for global economic interdependence to recover to levels that matched the late nineteenth century. But what is also interesting is how not long ago in fact there was much attention focused on an enhanced global order. Take a look at this piece published in 2001. This Introduction was written by one of the book’s principal contributors, and a close colleague, Arthur Stein. Arthur, today, is a Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at UCLA. Arthur has been a significant international relations force at UCLA for years now. He prepared the Introduction for the 2001 volume titled, “The New Great Power Coalition”. As an aside I played a minor role in the volume with a chapter on China’s entry into the WTO. Now, back to Arthur’s examination. There is no missing the cautious but still optimistic tone that Arthur conveys for this era following the real tensions of the Cold War and the emergence of US leadership. As he writes:
“In short, we believe that in this era following a global conflict, the prospects for global cooperation conflicts lie in the relations between the Great Powers. Constructing a Great Power concert would make possible the establishment of a cooperative world order and truly global international organizations.” …
“In more general terms, however, we conclude that the movement from unilateral to multilateral incentives, norms, and structures appears to be useful in enlisting members in an encompassing coalition. The world is now in the process of creating new high-prestige and selective clubs in the fields of economics, politics, and even the military. Once enough of these clubs in the fields overlap (regionally and functionally), they will form a linked structure that could combine into an encompassing coalition, with the latter representing the sustaining cooperation developed in separate regions and issue areas.”
Returning to Minouche Shafik this is what she sees as the new global order, one that others, as well, have suggested is emerging:
“The world today is very different. It is a multipolar world, with China, Russia, India, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, and the Gulf states challenging the old order, alongside other emerging powers demanding a greater voice in shaping the rules of the international system. Meanwhile, belief in “universal values” and the idea of an “international community” has waned, as many point to the hypocrisy of rich countries hoarding vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic and the response to the Ukraine war compared to the failures to act in response to humanitarian crises in Gaza, Sudan, and many other places.”
“We may be heading to a zero-order world in which rules are replaced by power – a very difficult environment for smaller countries. Or it may be a world of large regional blocs, with the United States dominating its hemisphere, China prevailing over East Asia, and Russia reasserting control over the countries of the former Soviet Union. Ideally, we can find our way to a new rules-based order that more accurately reflects our multipolar world.”
Regional blocs may be in order. Or, possibly the reassertion of a form of geopolitical and ideological blocs. That seems to be what is described by colleague, G. John Ikenberry. In an article in International Affairs, penned at the beginning of last year, entitled, “Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order”, John writes this about the emerging global order:
“Today, among the many impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the most consequential may be that it marks the moment—the tipping-point—when history reversed course, pushing the world back in the direction of geopolitical and ideological groupings.”
“Today, we might call these three groupings the global West, the global East, and the global South. One is led by the United States and Europe, the second by China and Russia, and the third by an amorphous grouping of non-western developing states, led by India, Brazil and others. Each ‘world’ offers grand narratives of what is at stake in the Ukraine conflict and how it fits into the larger problems and prospects for twenty-first century world order.”
“Each offers ideas and programmes for the reorganization and reform of global rules and institutions. Each has its own constructed history, its own list of grievances and accomplishments. Each has its leaders, projects and ideological visions.”
“These Three Worlds are not blocs, nor even coherent negotiating groups. They might best be seen as informal, constructed and evolving global factions, and not as fixed or formal political entities.”
“The Three Worlds are not best defined as poles so much as loose coalitions seeking to shape global rules and institutions. States in these three ‘worlds’ occupy different locations in the global system, creating shared interests and affinities that, taken together, shape patterns of interstate behaviour. The Three Worlds are defined in important respects by diplomacy— that is, by speeches, summit meetings and UN gatherings in which leaders advance their visions of world order. Each grouping has a loose political identity and a range of more-or-less consistent convictions about what constitutes a desirable and legitimate international order.”
I think it is difficult to know where we are at this moment, and more so where we are going. It is evident, however, that the world we have experienced over the last decades is being hammered out of existence especially by Trump 2.0. As David Wallace-Wells describes it in a NYTimes Opinion article, written just the other day:
“But each declaration of imperial desire is that mercurial kind of Trumpist speech act, in which a given utterance can be both meaningless and full of portent at the same time, self-disavowing even as it also demonstrates the president’s world-shaping power.”
“And whatever comes of Trump’s retrograde dreams of manifest destiny, the implicit challenge to the legacy geopolitical order is just as striking: If we want these things and these places, who is going to stop us?” …
“What comes next? New paradigms rarely arise fully formed. But if we spent the last four years watching Joe Biden’s ineffectual attempt to revive some rickety version of the moralistic postwar order, it is supremely clear what Donald Trump would like to replace that pretense with: the principle that global chaos opens up opportunity for great powers long hemmed in by convention and deference.”
“The MAGA riposte is, Let’s not be naïve and let’s not be suckers: We are all wolves on the world stage, and the game begins when we show our teeth.”
It would be valuable if new rules, principles, and norms emerged but at the moment what we can see is the dramatic impact of power on interstate relations. For the moment we are less driven by the emergence of order but by its opposite. But we will come back here at Alan’s Newsletter to examine – likely repeatedly – the shape of the global order as I think there may be surprises, possibly many surprises we have not anticipated given the immediate and dramatic attention to Trump.
The Post originally appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter
https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-many-possible-shapes-for-the
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