As I noted in the earlier blog post of about the same name as the above, I advised that I would use this blog post entry to review Alaister Iain Johnston’s article examining Yan Xuetong’s article, “The Instability of Superficial Friendship”‘ in The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.3 (2010), pp. 263-292. Johnston’s article is: “Stability and Instability in Sino-US Relations a Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory.” Vol. 4 (2011), pp. 5-29 and again it like the earlier piece is in the Chinese Journal of International Politics. (Just a slight digression – I did receive an e-mail from Iain noting that in fact the editors asked him if he might respond to the Yan Xuetong article.)
In any case Johnston tackles the “superficial friendship” hypothesis proposed by Yan Xuetong – that is an hypothesis that both US and Chinese leaders have excessive and failed expectations of the behavior of the other with leaders on both sides mistakenly believing that the relationship is more collaborative than their actions prove to be. Disappointment engendered by the other’s less than expected collaborative behavior creates instability in the relationship.
In assessing the superficial friendship hypothesis, Johnston begins by trying to situate this “superficial relationship” characterization within a known literature – in this case within the psychological literature. Doing so, as pointed out bu Johnston creates a ‘levels of analysis’ problem since Yan Xuetong’s examination is at the national leadership level and not at the more micro small group or individual leadership level. At best, according to Johnston, the pattern of US-China relations – based on exuberance and disappointment – ill-fits the pattern of bilateral behavior.
Johnston additionally turns to what he calls the”impressive quantitative data-project that he [Yan Xuetong] and his colleagues have developed…” to evaluate the hypothesis. As Johnston notes the events data reveals, according to Yan Xuetong, that the US-China relationship has become more unstable than before following the end of the Cold War due to the cycle of exuberance and disappointment between the two powers.
Now Johnston in a rather persuasive and extended analysis of the events data – as they are currently constructed and characterized – suggest that there are two problems: first that some of the issues identified in the data set might well be coded differently; and secondly there are, in Johnston’s opinion, important issues between China and the US that do not find there way into the data set as currently constituted. Not to get too social ‘sciencey’, Johnston concludes: “In essence, the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable becomes problematic.” And for good measure Johnston notes the fitted trend – taking the data from 1989 to 2008 – increases over time and the annual absolute deviation declines – in other words, the US-China relations improve and volatility declines, which fails to correspond with the superficial friendship hypothesis.
Well if the superficial friendship hypothesis fails “to make the grade” – at least in its current form and with the current data set – where does Johnston turn to in the alternative. In fact he offers the security dilemma theory – which as he later points out in a footnote – he had offered up some 10 years ago. As Johnston points out security dilemmas are “endogenous social processes” and as the security dilemma gyre intensifies cooperative behaviors are discounted by the other side and at the same time each side amplifies the negative consequences of moves undertaken by the other. As Johnston suggests such a dilemma leads to “each side [to take] politico-military steps to enhance its security in the face of this uncertainty. … The result is a spiral of insecurity and mutual construction of an adversary.”
As he nears the end of his analysis Johnston points to several pieces of evidence that he’d look for to confirm the presence of the security dilemma in the China-US relationship. First, does an actor discount the cooperative behavior of the other side and amplify the conflictual behavior of the other? Then Johnston suggests one needs to look to see that the two increasingly ignore or deny interactivity in their relationship. Evidence that Johnston suggests needs to be found is that each blames the other for changes in the relationship; while each believes that they are responsible for efforts to preserve the relationship. And finally Johnston suggests that one would look for evidence that each has growing doubt that the other is content with the status quo and believes that the other is prepared to alter the power relationship.
Johnston does point to some evidence of these views from each but I don’t think – and I’m not sure Johnston – believes that the evidence to date is compelling. And Johnston satisfies himself that it is difficult to determine when a full security dilemma has been initiated and in fact in this relationship such a point has yet to be determined. And so while Johnston believes, apparently, that a security dilemma is emerging – though he acknowledges that the evidence is at best anecdotal. Moreover he identifies four stabilizing elements in the current relationship that may have held back a full security dilemma between China and the United States.
And it seems to me that these four elements are most interesting and help to explain in fact why a full security dilemma framing of the relationship is not compelling. First leaders on both sides appear to have a better understanding of each other’s interests than appears evident in the public discourse and there appears to be a capacity for self correction on both sides. Secondly, Johnston suggests that deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, is suppressing what otherwise might be a full blown security dilemma. Next, the ideological dimension of conflict between China and the US is rather muted – especially in contrast to the US-Soviet rivalry. Finally, according to Johnston, the degree of economic integration and the mutual benefits for a variety of interests in both states has gone some significant way to impeding a full blown security dilemma.
While I suspect that these elements are not equally responsible for the recognized constraint, nonetheless they do contextualize significant difference between this great power relationship and others where a security dilemma might be the appropriate framing. Indeed I’ll speculate this far – that globalization and the integration of China into the global system has really situated this possible great power rivalry far apart from other historical cases. This is not the US-Soviet Union, nor is it Germany-Great Britain – and even US-Great Britain. Now this not to suggest that globalization makes rivalry or indeed conflict impossible, but it raises the costs and dampens the urges to follow a conflictual ‘power transition’ course of behavior.
While still insubstantial a phrase I remain comfortable with the characterization of the bilateral relationship as yi di, yi you’ (亦敌 亦友)－ both friend and foe (See my earlier confidence in this characterization in the blog post “China Cannot Rise Peacefully” on John Mearsheimer.
This post has gone on a bit – but the analyses of both Yan Xuetong and Alaister Iain Johnston are both compelling – and it is incumbent of me – to detail in the future what the behavior and motivation a “both friend and foe” characterization generates. For the moment, however, I remain comfortable that the relationship is not a classic rivalrous relationship as identified by both realist schools of thought – The “China Threat” school in Washington and the “China Can Just Say No” school in Beijing.