Multilateralism, plurilateralism,  bipolarity, multipolarity, alliances and alignments have all become subjects of serious inquiry in policy and political communities. The discussion and questioning of various international governing arrangements has grown ever louder with the final year, as it turns out, of the Trump Presidency. And, now, also, with the successor to Trump, President-elect, Joe Biden.

The outgoing President scorned long standing alliances and alignments and trumpeted (no pun intended) ‘America First’ attacking these traditional relationships. He fawned over authoritarian leaders and spurned allied ones. Rather than multilateral trade action, he targeted Chinese trade practices imposing broad-based tariffs that brought costs to American producers and consumers. All these many actions seemed determined to undermine the rules-based order.

Meanwhile, Biden, in marked contrast to Trump, announced soon after his election, the return of US global order leadership. This seemed to reflect what colleague Thomas Wright (2020) described in The Atlantic as a ‘restorationist approach’ to American foreign policy.  President-elect Biden presenting his national security team on November 24th declared (2020):

And it’s a team that reflects the fact that America is back, ready to lead the world, not retreat from it. Once again, sit at the head of the table.

What arrangements do Biden and his team envisage – what relationships do they target? Will they seek to: revitalize alliances, encourage multilateralism, avoid rising bipolar tensions between the United States and China and tackle the many global governance challenges. Is the Biden foreign policy willing to relax relations and lower tensions with China and broadly take the steps that reestablish American leadership and to refocus on a multilateral rules-based order? 

Over the next few posts I hope to delve and deliver, with friends, the many forms of global order relations – multilateralism, plurilateralism, multipolarity, alliances, alignments and more. The hope is to reflect on the diversity of these arrangements, determine their individual and collective effectiveness and to examine these arrangements in the context of a new US Administration and its goals. And we hope to uncover those structures and arrangements most likely to stabilize the international system and further global governance efforts.

We start with an arrangement  that generates a fair degree of confusion. Multilateralism is the arrangement. In recent years the term and proposed structure have been thrown about quite liberally in all sorts of collaborative efforts. Multilateralism, it seems, has become synonymous with generic forms of international collaboration.

The most evident new configuration in the constellation of what we could identify as a multilateral arrangement is the somewhat confusingly named – the “Alliance for Multilateralism”. Is this an alliance; or is it a multilateral forum? Well … it is not really clear. The title notwithstanding, this initiative was launched by the foreign ministers of France, Jean-Yves Le Drian  and Germany’s Heiko Maas. . Why? They made it clear as they argued in an opinion piece on February 14, 2019,  in the  Süddeutsche Zeitung Munich prior to the formal launch. of the Alliance:

… we are placing our faith in multilateral cooperation and a rules-based world order. We firmly believe that a new commitment to multilateralism, an alliance for multilateralism, is more necessary than ever if we are to stabilize the rules-based world order, to uphold its principles and to adapt it to new challenges where necessary.

There is, in other words, a mixing of various international arrangements to enhance collaboration and achieve the strengthening of the global order.  The initial meeting of the Alliance for Multilateralism was held on April 2, 2019 in New York during the German UN Security Council Presidency. It was followed by a meeting on September 26^th, held during the High-Level Week at the UN General Assembly. The meeting was called by Germany and France and co-hosted by Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore and Ghana. Some 48 countries participated in this September gathering.

Their website gives us a sense of what the organizers intended with this arrangement:

The Alliance is not a formal institution, but a network allowing for the constitution of flexible issue-based coalitions formed around specific projects and policy outcomes. Engagement in a specific initiative does not entail automatic participation in other initiatives pursued in the framework of the Alliance. Participation in the Alliance remains open to all who share its vision.

As Maas urged in a speech in Japan in July 2018:

“Individually, each of us will continue to find it difficult to be a “rule maker” in a multipolar world. But this does not mean we want to content ourselves with the role of “rule takers”! If we pool our strengths – and we can do so to a greater extent than we have done in the past – perhaps we can become something like “rule shapers”, who design and drive an international order that the world urgently needs.” 

The initiative is organized around three goals according to the Alliance hosts. The Alliance aims to: renew the global commitment to stabilize the rules-based international order, uphold its principles; and adapt it where required. The goals, as declared by the Alliance (2020), are:

• to protect and preserve international norms, agreements and institutions that are under pressure or in peril;

• to pursue a more proactive agenda in policy areas that lack effective governance and where new challenges require collective action; and

• to advance reforms, without compromising on key principles and values, in order to make multilateral institutions and the global political and economic order more inclusive and effective in delivering tangible results to citizens around the world.

 

The Alliance also makes a point of identifying that their outreach extends to non-state actors as stakeholders and partners for the challenges the Alliance faces. The Alliance has held four meetings since its creation. These gatherings sought to promote, among other things:

• improved governance for the digital world. The Alliance bolstered support for the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace;

• implementation of international humanitarian law to protect the work of humanitarian workers and space for humanitarian action and support for the fight against impunity, at the opening of the session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on 24 February 2020; and

• support for the central role of the WHO in the management of Covid- 19.

So, what does the Alliance for Multilateralism reveal about multilateralism? Certainly, it underscores that these arrangements are about member collaboration. Here at the Alliance for Multilateralism it would seem that such collaboration is not mandatory for those identified as members. This seems rather odd that we have members choosing project participation. The issue focus appears to be a menu with members picking and choosing which to collaborate on with others. While the overarching goal is to enhance  the rules-based order, the association of members is declaratory but not mandatory. Can this be effective? Will the Alliance be able to maintain momentum over its projects?

Equally interesting, membership fails to include the United States. This evident US absence, of course, takes place in the Trump years and reflects an effort to construct a multilateral arrangement that fails to include leading powers. This arrangement raises the serious question: can we have collaborative global governance arrangements that are constructed and act without the leading powers.  Evidently in the face of the Trump Presidency the foreign ministers in Germany and France felt it could. Indeed had no choice. This is an issue worth considering further. And, we will.

Image Credit: Alliance for Multilateralism website: https://multilateralism.org/the-alliance/© Thomas Koehler/photothek.net