Two summits completed and another off in the distance, but impacted by these just completed summits. A crowded summit schedule has begun.

The statements were voiced and the Leaders’ Communique issued by the G7 at Schloss Elmau to be followed by more speeches and statements and the issuing of the “Strategic Concept”  a once ever ten year statement by NATO at Madrid.

What have we learned from this G7 and the NATO gatherings? Let me first focus on the G7 Summit. Well, first it is relevant that we take into account the position expressed by one of the longstanding observers of the summit process, Sheffield’s Hugo Dobson. As he concluded, along with his colleague Greg Stiles in Global Policy , reflecting their review of the German G7 and in particular the Leaders’ Communique:

In summary, and despite what we have tried to do here, beware reading too much either positively or negatively into a single summit document. Rather, this communiqué should be placed in the context of a network of summits – most immediately the NATO Summit in Madrid later this week and looking further ahead to the Indonesian-hosted G20 Summit later this year.

And it is a summary and caution well worth heeding. Nevertheless, the tone is worth further comment. The G7 took the time and the Communique to underscore their self characterization as a democratic forum. In their Communique opening the G7 declared:

 As open democracies adhering to the rule of law, we are driven by shared values and bound by our commitment to the rules-based multilateral order and to universal human rights. As outlined in our Statement on support for Ukraine, standing in unity to support the government and people of Ukraine in their fight for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future, we will continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on President Putin’s regime for its unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, while stepping up our efforts to counter its adverse and harmful regional and global impacts, including with a view to helping secure global energy and food security as well as stabilising the economic recovery. 

 

Their self declaration as democracies reinforces the Biden Administration strategic global order emphasis that sees US foreign policy reinforcing their alliances and partnerships and framing the global order in democracy versus autocracy terms.

CFRs Stewart Patrick  in his most recent Internationalist  “The G7, NATO, and the Future of the West”, acknowledges the current bifurcated US framing and suggests the limitation of this approach for the US and for all of the G7 members:

President Joe Biden joins with his Group of Seven (G7) counterparts in Germany (June 26–28) and fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders in Spain (June 29–30), their overriding priority should be to signal the West’s determination to defend the rules-based international system againstMoscow’s aggression. This effort is more likely to resonate globally if it is framed as a defense of the UN Charter principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, rather than as a clash between the forces of autocracy and democracy.

And Patrick puts his ‘finger’ on the problem: the democracy versus autocracy framing pushes the Global South and even some of the democracies, or near democracies in the developing world – away. What Biden officials seem to thinks is glowing attractive in their foreign policy approach in international gatherings and summits is in fact quite the opposite? And it drives non-democracies, most notably China, but not only China, away. As Paola Subacchi in her recent opinion post in The Wire China argues cogently, and I suspect ‘spot on’:

But where does that leave countries with different values and principles? How can the global institutional architecture survive if countries limit open engagement only to those who view the world the same way they do?

If the West excludes a power like China from its multilateral arrangements, what can China do other than spearhead alternatives? … A better approach to China would be based on three key considerations. The first is that multilateralism is impossible without China. 

Rather than using the G7 to reach out to a wider plurilateral if not multilateral order, starting with for instance, the G20, the G7 seems engaged in an exercise to close itself off. It becomes a small club of member countries unwilling, and possibly incapable of building a serious collective effort to meet the challenges of global governance now being drowned out by the rising geopolitical frictions in today’s global order.

There is an alternative and it has been cogently articulated by my colleague, Colin Bradford. In an unpublished memorandum, “Strategic Move by Germany as Leader of the G7 to Ease Geopolitical Tensions” June 2022, Bradford writes:

The primary purpose of ramping up G7 investment, ambition and energy in the G20 is to signal to leaders and senior officials in China a fresh start, which triggers a shift in dynamics from the confrontational bilateral tensions between the U.S. and China to pluralize them into China-West relations in the context of the G20.

 

The secondary purpose of proactively increasing the G7 presence in the G20 now is to signal to Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa—who will host the G20 for the next four years—that the West is “showing up” in force to this series of summits in “the global south”.   For the first time in fourteen years of G20 summits (except for Argentina in 2018), the next four G20 summits will be held in countries below the equator.  It is extremely important that the West engage fully with the developing world as it undertakes this period of global leadership. …

 

The advantage to the United States of being an equal partner in this move is that it is a way to engage with China officially in a complex, multi-dimensional, multi-issue and multipolar context which enables a credible shift in behavior without fanfare, spotlights, and public scrutiny.  This is a move toward quiet, effective, professional diplomacy, without public pronouncement.  Its benefits are potentially significant without risking exposure if the initiative is not reciprocated or runs into greater policy conflicts than anticipated.

In another still unpublished document, “The G7 as Members of the G20: Challenges and Responsibilities” May 2022, Bradford adds:

The G7 needs to recognize that the G20 is unique in being a platform that enables dialogue and official interactions across major divides of East and West, North and South and across cultural, religious and societal differences which are significant and demand respect.   The G20 does not constitute represent the whole world nor constitute a democratic mechanism for giving voice and visibility for all nations.  But as it happens, it does represent diversity, complexity and difference in a far more inclusive way than does the G7.

 

… A joint decision now by all G7 members to ratchet up their presence and priorities in the G20 for the Indonesian and Indian G20 years this year and next and beyond, would signal a fresh effort by the West to engage with the rest of the world, including especially China, in professional working relationships to advance the global agenda, which requires intensity and unity.  There is evidence that China would welcome such a move and reciprocate, which would add to the impetus of strengthening a unified global approach to global problems.

… This set of actions is within reach of the G7.  Now is the moment, in the midst of war, to seize the initiative to make changes that can bring the world together to advance a global future worthy of humanity’s highest calling to meet the needs of all.

The reality is the Biden Administration, and now increasingly other leaders in the G7, focus on an approach that targets democratic alliances and partnerships. Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen is just one of the leading Administration figures focused on this enunciated democratic-autocratic divide. It was her statements that led Subacchi to express her dismay at the US summit approach. 

And the hard edge was undiminished in the NATO Summit . In the ‘Strategic Concept’ Russia not surprisingly was described as NATOs key threat:

The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation.

But for the first time in such a NATO document, NATO members directed their attention to China:

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up.

And though iNATO members modulated their China criticism with the following statement,

We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests. We will work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies.

the NATO approach only seemingly underscored the growing bifurcation in the global order. There is a need for key G7 members to reflect on the direction members have expressed. In that direction cold war and conflict lie.