As Global Summits go, and besides the leader-led summits, G7 and the G20, there is nothing with greater presence, and possible impact in international relations, than the BRICS. As noted by Ndzendze, Bhaso, Siphamandia Zondo (2023) in their recent article in The Conversation on the state of the BRICS: 

What began in 2001 as an acronym for four of the fastest growing states, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), is projected to account for 45% of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms by 2030. It has evolved into a political formation as well.

It is the political impact that is most interesting and, I would say, somewhat puzzling. For the BRICS club – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – all are members of the G20.  Like the G20, and for that matter the earlier created G7, the BRICS represent a ‘leaders club’ that is a leader-led global summit that has an annual meeting of those leaders – the centerpiece of the year-long hosting by one member or another. In some respects the BRICS are unique in what the group is not. That is, unlike the G7, the BRICS members have no  evident ideological dimension – neither democratic nor autocratic. Instead it appears to see itself as focused on opposition to US hegemony in the current global order and they appear to demand a greater development focus and attention to the Global South. Again, as pointed out by Bhaso and Zondo: 

Crucial to this was these countries’ decision to form their own club in 2009, instead of joining an expanded G7 as envisioned by former Goldman Sachs CEO Jim O’Neill, who coined the term “Bric”. Internal cohesion on key issues has emerged and continues to be refined, despite challenges. … Ever since, the grouping has taken on a more pointedly political tone, particularly on the need to reform global institutions, in addition to its original economic raison d’etre. 

Now, it is not that there haven’t been efforts to enlarge these informal leader-led institutions  – to draw in the systemically important Global South players – China, India, Brazil – and other regional powers, Turkey and Indonesia for instance.  Obviously, the G20 is the evident case. Still, it would seem that the BRICS members resisted absorption in the G20, indeed, just at the G7 members – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and the U.S., and also the EU, failed to wind up the G7 and ‘live’ in an enlarged G20 after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008. Though there has been constant academic and expert discussion over absorption, enlargement and continuing separation, there continues to be both a G20 and a G7 a G20 and a BRICS. Again my SOAS colleagues focussing on the BRICS suggest: 

Some may even bring destabilising dynamics for the current composition of the formation. This matters because it tells us that the envisioned change in the global order is likely to be much slower. Simply put, while some states are opposed to western hegemony, they do not yet agree among themselves on what the new alternative should be.

So the G7 continues and currently, as a result of the Biden Administration, emphasizes their democratic bona fides  adding several other democratic invitees in the most recent G7 Hiroshima Summit: Australia, Brazil, South Korea, Australia and India. 

As for the BRICS, there is a push by at least China and Russia to add other Global South players. By some estimates there are as many as 40 countries interested, to one degree or another, to enter as BRICS members with some 13 countries apparently formally applying, though other South African sources suggest 22 countries are formally applying to become the newest members of BRICS.  According to other sources, there could at least be acceptance of at least 5 new members at the upcoming South Africa BRICS summit: 

According to Business Standard, an Indian publication, five countries could be inducted as new BRICS members, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Argentina, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia.

Why, then, this dramatic interest in joining the BRICS? And what is the likelihood for enlargement? Let’s look at the latter issue first. It would seem as though the current BRICS members are split over the idea of enlargement. There is real interest on the part of both Russia and China to expand membership while India and Brazil appear to resist expansion. According to The Economist: 

The brics founders are divided on the prospect of expansion. China and Russia want new members. The criteria and procedures for expansion were on the agenda of last year’s summit. New members, especially stridently anti-American candidates such as Iran, would increase China’s influence and make the brics more of an anti-American accord. Mr Putin sees a bigger brics as a way of offsetting the Western alliance against Russia. But for the same reasons, expansion is less palatable to Brazil and India. They do not want the club to be more China-centric, nor do they want it to become an overt rival to the West, with which they have better relations than do China or Russia. The summit in Johannesburg can hardly avoid debating expansion. Which view prevails will determine the future shape of the bloc.

It would appear, then, that geopolitical competition is driving the interest in enlargement by current members, Russia and China. A more formative anti-western club would appear to be behind the thinking of both. And this is, notwithstanding that at least two of the likely newest members, Saudi Arabia and Argentina are already members of the G20. Now, that may say more about the G20 and who leads, and what can be achieved, or not at the G20, but it definitely appears to be a ‘head scratcher’. But these assessments do tend to refocus our attention on the achievements, or not, of the current leader-led summits.

The answer(s) may well be there. We will look there next Post. 

This Post originally appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter’: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/puzzling-over-a-brics-enlargement?sd=pf

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