It’s a pleasure to review work of colleagues seriously grappling with the contemporary world order.  Back in March I reviewed Bruce Jones’s examination of the global order at the point just prior to the publication of his new book – Still Our To Lead. Since that time a number of other close colleagues have had a chance to weigh in on his world view and I thought I’d double back to look at their perspectives and revisit my own.

Let me direct attention first to my CFR colleague, Stewart Patrick and his blog post on the book.  Stewart is the Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations.  I guess it is a smaller world than I think sometimes. We know each other and work and argue over policy ideas concerning global governance.

Patrick enjoys, in particular I think, Jones’s push back on declinist views, and the view of the G-zero world, that  often accompany a view of US decline in global leadership.  Jones has a telling reason for doing this.  Jones suggests that a significant influence on the future relationship of the United States and the large emerging market countries is what he calls the “shadow of the future”.  Jones is concerned that if these countries make decisions about their future trade and strategic ties based on future opportunities then declinism is not likely to provide attraction for these rising powers.  As Jones says:

… if you believe that the United States is in terminal decline and that China is becoming  a dominant power, there is a logic in positioning  yourself to take advantage of the shift – or at least not to be caught out by it.

Jones paints a far more optimistic picture than the g-zero folk or that the declinists provide.  And in the ‘big picture’ sense both of us (Patrick and myself) acknowledge and agree with Jones.     But Patrick and I  also argue that where there is a gap it is over how Jones suggests the US will implement leadership in such a fluid and fuzzy global order.  As Patrick argues:

There is a gap in this book, it is the incomplete treatment of how power translates into leadership.  Jones shows that the United States dominates  on multiple measures of material power. … Leadership, after all, implies “followers.”  Jones offers little policy guidance on how the United States might better deploy its resources to shape the incentives of countries that are on the fence about following its lead.  Nor does he fully explore the implications of what Susan Strange called US “structural power” – that is, the ability of the United States to get its way not merely by deploying incentives in one-on-one bargaining situations but indeed by determining the very context in which other countries must operate.  … The question the book never answers is whether – given its controversial national security policies, corrosive domestic politics, and role in the global financial crisis – the bloom is now off the rose.

But I am less concerned than is Patrick about America’s evident domestic political deadlock, though it is difficult politically and it can obviously impede economic growth and domestic environmental sustainability. And in the end I am less concerned about the structural configuration – the distribution of power among the great powers.

But I am concerned over the diplomatic initiatives and the potential for the US being dragged into conflict from the rogue behavior of others.  Jones sees that among the various advantages held by the United States in a global order in flux (he even acknowledged this in pointing to unfolding events as he finished the book in the Ukraine and the South China Sea) there are two in particular:

But in doing this, the United States retains two extraordinary assets and advantages. Two are foremost: a phalanx of allies, and a global presence.

And the Jones narrative is very good at identifying the many allies and friends available to the US in the seeking and achieving greater collaborative results in global governance.   But alliances are double-edged and both sides of alliance efforts must be cultivated. Alliances can assist in deterring the unwanted behavior of another great power. President Obama’s trip to East Asia recently paid much attention to allies and assuaging worries by Japan especially that the United States could be counted on in the defense of Japan especially in the East China Sea.  Dealing with China’s assertive behavior in either the South China or the East China Sea is important.  A steady American presence can likely to stabilize these flash points.  But the United States needs to be just as vigilant, though likely far more in private,  when it comes to aggressive or reckless behavior by these same allies.  Deterring the rising regional power is important; restraining one’s allies is equally important and nuance may not be the strong suit in US foreign policy.  Bilateral ties may be required but multilateral agreement is as important, or even more important.  Thus, pushing a binding code of conduct with ASEAN and China is an important aspect of regional politics.  Pushing broader Japan-China commitments – the trilateral free trade arrangement (China-Japan-Korea) for instance – is equally important.  The US cannot resolve the sovereignty issues there in Asia, or indeed elsewhere.  One must look for non-sovereignty issues to further collaborative relations.

The focus of US multilateral leadership is then far less on the structural and far more on behavioral/diplomatic.  As I mentioned in my earlier post:

US leadership is a part of the equation; but it is just part. In the end the answer is less structural and more behavioral.  It is less about power and its distribution, more about the influence equation.  It demands greater effort to overcome the collective action problem in global politics and it requires greater success in the exercise of coalitional action.  Great power relations in such a multiverse concert are very complicated.

If there is difficulty it is in the lack of multilateral nuance to US diplomacy.  It is full steam ahead; no pull back.  Intervene; no don’t.  It is surely not ‘leading from behind’ but it is indeed ‘leading among’.  Here again Jones is right.  And equally vital is strategically understanding the influence equation of others.  Not all rising powers are alike, however.  China is not like the others – Brazil, India and Russia.  While Jones is right that war is not ordained between rising and status quo leaders, historically there are far more instances where the two have come to blows rather than managing the transition peacefully.  The China-US relationship is the most important bilateral relationship bar none. And great attention needs to be paid to it.