A ‘second wave’ of global analysis grips international relations inquiry. The first wave appeared after 1993 and could be characterized as the ‘Unipolar Moment.’ Analysts woke up and recognized that the comfortable world of Superpowers and bipolarity had evaporated and in its stead there stood the United States. Much of the analysis including from such luminaries as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former National Security Advisor (under Jimmy Carter) Zbigniew Brezinski sallied forth to declare the US hegomony as a brief moment with the system destined to revert to Continue reading →

Leslie Elliott Armijo, a visiting scholar at Portland State University has, as guest editor of Vol 31, Number 4 (Winter 2007) produced a very interesting volume for Asian Perspective.* A special issue on the BRICs, this volume and its individual author chapters on the BRICs are well worth spending some focused time. Let me at this moment just comment on Armijo’s opening piece, “The BRICs Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?” pp. 7-42.
As noted earlier, this search for a single analytic category is a key inquiry. Are we look at a group of countries that individually, partially, or collectively can or will be able to influence the course of international politics and global governanace? In summing up her examintaion, Armijo writes, “This article has asked whether the term “BRICs countries” is a viable analytical category. The four do not share domestic political institutions, international goals, or economic structures and challenges. If the category, nonetheless, provides insight, it must be because this set of countries holds similar implications for the larger system—the international political economy—within which it is embedded.”

For a good part of the chapter she examines – from three distinct perspctives – liberal economic, realist and liberal institutionalist – whether there is an analytic category – the BRICs. She brings useful quantitative examination and especially in the examination of power from a realist perspective, the review ranges beyond the usual national capabilites to more interesting FDI and foreign exchange measures. Nevertheless, the result is still a conclusion that what gives rise potentially to influence is not built on ‘power’ alone of the four.

Armijo concludes with an examination of liberal institutionalism and the consequence of ‘hard’ and ‘soft power’ and the use of organizations and institutions to shape and influence international relations. Driven by the liberal institutionalist logic, influnce is a product of, “not only what
material capabilities the BRICs possess, but also what they and their leaders want.” As a result she finds that the BRIC 4 are divided into to subcategories” those that are authoritarian – China and Russia, and those democratic – India and Brazil. While the former may well promote economic development and prosperity, might well tackle the environment, it would only be the latter that might have an interest in the future in promoting universal rights and democratic progress and possibly a developmental approach to address the wide economic divergences of the global economy. Though Armijo rejects the single analytic concept of the BRICs she remains attracted to examining how these 4 may well have an influence on future global governance.

* Asian Perspective is joint product of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, Seoul South Korea and the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University

For anyone looking at the large newly emerging developing countries, and there is a growing audience, the ‘who’ of the group is a major question. I suppose this shouldn’t be a big surprise. International relations experts almost always focus on the question of ‘definition.’ Here it is no different. So, when Goldman Sachs, as early as 2001, first turned the lens on these economies it created the BRICs – Brazil Russia India and China. Here at CIGI Distinguished Fellow, John Walley and his colleagues created BRICSAM – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, ASEAN and Mexico. Subsequently CIGI’s Andy Cooper raised a question: is Russia part of BRICSAM or rather the indusrialized developed club – the G7. Thus Cooper described it as the B(R)ICSAM. And the ‘slicing’ and ‘dicing’ goes on today. But of what importance is this?

Well in fact these different definitions reflect different understandings of power in international relations and the basis of global governance and global governance reform. It is therefore not unimportant to understand why there are differences. Let’s take the one that is generically most identified – the Goldman Sachs BRICs. A quick reading tells you Goldman Sachs is indeeed an economic organization. Here their definition is built on economic growth, GDP (however measured) and even per capita GDP. In this implicit model, these states are Rising BRICs because of their exploding growth. Unsaid – but apparent – this BRIC economic growth and economic power will translate into influence and leadership for these states in the effort to ‘control’ global and regional governance.

In contrast, however, there are the folk at CIGI. Here exploding economic power is important but there is apparently, something else. Call it ‘diplomatic weight’ or ‘diplomatic leverage’ but in any case there is something that extends beyond just economic power and that allows a South Africa or Mexico to be identified as a member of the Rising BRICSAM. Certainly on the basis of economic power alone neither South Africa or Mexico would rank anywhere near the triumvirate as I call it – China, India and Brazil.

Recently Andy Cooper launched a BRICSAM inquiry entitled “Reaching out to BRICSAM: The Heiligendamm Process (HP) and Beyond.” This Project adds numerous definitions, which for the moment we’ll ignore. But this HP process was launched at the most recent G7/8 meetings in Germany. The HP process targeted the so-called O5 or what the countries themselves refer to as the G5 – China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. So, the G7/8 too appear to recognize the influence/power of the BRICSAM (all included in this global governanace initiative but for ASEAN of BRICSAM origin.) So in examining the O5 we have asked country authors to look at both economic weight, diplomatic leverage and the their willingness to exercise both. One thing international relations experts of the political science persuasion have long recognized about power is that power may only be potential but left unexercised or power can be actualized and thus the assessment of power can vary significantly from those that estimate the power of an entity. Global governanace influence and reform is not just about the economic power of the BRICs but the use and manner of the exercise of power of the BRICSAM. More on that later.

The opening of this blog is but a further step in our collective CIGI and Community effort to enlarge the BRICSAM Community. BRICSAM is a brand name in the same way that the BRICs has become a brand for Goldman Sachs. What many of us have noticed in the last few months especially is that BRICSAM is beginning to gain some traction.

Over the last year CIGI BRICSAM has begun to develop a number of BRICSAM streams of research and networking. For example, there have been notable efforts to build a China Program by original leader – CIGI Distinguished Fellow and UWO Professor, John Whalley (I anticipate a similiar India effort in the near future led by CIGI Distinguished Fellow, Ramesh Thakur). John has been joined by Professor Gregory Chin, CIGI Senior Fellow and Assistant Professor of York University (as we affectionately refer to him as – Zong yi). Gregory has been at the forefront of the CIGI effort to highlight China in our upcoming annual CIGI meetings – CIGI08 (more on that soon). In addition Greg is planning a workshop on April 26-27th on “China’s New Economic Diplomacy and Global Governance.” There China researchers from North America and Europe are going to tackle a variety of economic issue areas where China has become engaged and is influencing global governance organization as well as rules, norms and principles.

Another vibrant research stream is that led by CIGI Distinguished Fellow and Professor at Waterloo, Andy Cooper. When he Andy isn’t off interviewing celebraties for his work on Celebrity Diplomacy, he along with Tim Shaw, CIGI Senior Fellow and Professor at the University of the West Indies and Agata Antkiewicz, Senior Researcher, CIGI have been nurturing “Reaching Out to BRICSAM: The Heiligendamm Process and Beyond.” Just having completed a very successful meeting at Cancun, Mexico the research authors from Europe, Canada, the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and India are racing forward with a collective effort to explore the possibilities for G8 plus Outreach 5 collaboration and possibly expansion under the Heiligendamm process. Stay tuned for more on that.

So there is much activity from CIGI BRICSAM. And indeed RISING BRICSAM is being initiated by me to report, chronicle and comment on the variety of research and activities that are ongoing at CIGI. But as the CIGI Community Leader – affectionately referred to – by at least me – as the BRICSAM Czar there is much more. The research, information and commentary on BRICSAM or parts of BRICSAM is ever enlarging. Since the BRICSAM Community website is among other things a Community of interest on BRICSAM activity, it seemed like the perfect moment to bring to the Community insights, information and commentary on the actvity, research and analysis on the BRICSAM that is appearing around the globe. So that’s what we hope to do and why we launched RISING BRICSAM. We hope top comment of new research from the academy, think tanks and governments around the world. In addition we plan to add comment on work from more mainstream journals, magazines and from the web. And we hope that not only will you find the blog useful and informative but it will give you a place to comment on the flood of work emerging and to alert me to research and commentary on BRICSAM that you believe the Community would benefit from in the near future.

So to RISING BRICSAM.

In the recently released, “Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia,” edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider (see full citation below) Professor Paul Evans, the University of British Columbia and currently the co-CEO and Chairman of the Executive Committee for the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, has written an innovative chapter on the prospects for the 6-Party (6PT) talks evolving into a new permanent regional security arrangement for the still tense Northeast Asia region.

Overall Evans argues that while huge obstacles remain in turning this putative organization from a crisis specifc setting for resolving the North Korean nuclear proliferation question, conditions are positive for the creation of deeper copperation in Northeast Asia among the major powers. Notwithstanding all the caveats some ehanced possibilty for a regional security arrangement is a key to regional stability. A successful regional organization likely will include all the major pwers of the region – China, Russia, the United States and Japan – and then adding the two Koreas, Mongolia and possibly even Taiwan.

Evans describes a history of unsuccesful efforts to build a regional security organization. As he suggests this is an ‘anti-region’ because of the wide divergence of characteristics of the regional powers. Nevertheless, the 6PT is the latest and most ambitious effort to build, as he says, “an inclusive multilateral forum.” Evans suggests that the relatively positive conclusion he draws is built partly on a current assessment of relations among and between the regional powers including – China-Japan, China-US and the two Koreas. For Evans the prospect of creating such a framework is dependent on 3 critical factors: fear, opportunity and leadership. The first two are evident but the third is more problematic.

The Bush Administration as is generally known was, and probably still is, adverse to large multilateral institutions. But it was and is it clear that this Administration is not adverse to what I would call – “small multilateralism” – that is a limited focused governance organizations. In the context of the North Korean nuclear proliferation crisis, the Bush Administration has in fact insisted on a multilateral approach eschewing calls for bilateral North Korea-US discussions.

The other evident leadership change is China. The growing sophistication and multilateral diplomatic behavior of China in the region, but beyond the region as well, has led China to the point that it may well champion, according to Evans, a Northeast Asia Free Trade Agreement. The 6PT is yet another step to China’s growing regional governance leadership. Indeed the transformation of 6PT from a single issue security forum could see a “small multilateral” organization that might well tackle not just Korea’s nuclear proliferation but Korean unification, BMD, and even the reduction of tensions across the Taiwan Straits. Though such an outcome would be a material advance in regional governanace adding significantly to international regional stability the current Chinese leadership has not enunciated a policy of support for such an organizational transformation of the 6-Party talks. It remains unclear whether the current Chinese leadership believes that such a multilateral security forum with the United States included in particular is the best setting for resolving these regional security problems.

Then, how do we get from here to there?  It as this point the path seems to wander.  Evans suggests that the path to a firm Northeast Aisan security arrangement may well lead through confidence building initiatives erected on expanded ASEAN instruments such as an enlarged Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, or, as he describes it, some ASEAN style discussion and leadershiip forum including one where nontraditional security issues such as: transnational crime, piracy, illegal immigration or disaster relief, could be the on the agenda.  In the end he concludes, somewhat ironically as he recognizes, that the path to Northeast multilateralism is likely through non-Northeast Asian paths including ASEAN and the United States.

While the ending veers of slightly from the earlier trajectory, this chapter serves to encourage  thinking on the creation of this crucial regional  governanace organization.  It also raises implictly the changing nature of regionalism here in Northeast Asia and more generally across global regions.  I’ll come back to this critical definition shortly. For in the BRICSAM there is at least one identified regional organization.  And for the BRICSAM countries regional governanace is a key aspect of possible global governance coordination.

Oh yes, and the full citiation of the volume is: Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, eds.,  Corss Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia, (The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center: Stanford, CA, 2007) The book can be ordered through Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.