“Pivots” and Great Powers – Both Sides Now





I could not resist – and a big thanks to Joni Mitchell and Judy Collins for the reference to their famous tune.  I f you recognize the reference – well you know …

In 2009 I think  – the draft of this book chapter was done in 2008 – Zhang Yunling of CASS – “Mr. APEC” in China –  and myself wrote a chapter on the regional dimension in the US-China relationship in an edited volume by Gu Guoliang and Richard Rosecrance called Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the US-China Relationship.   Zhang Yunling and I tried to capture the US-China relationship this way at the time:

China’s strategy is based on three principles: first, China recognizes the United States as a superpower; indeed the current sole superpower; second , China will cooperate with the United States in as many areas as possible; and third it would seem China will continue to increase its strength, including military strength, and raise its status both regionally and globally.  From China’s perspective, as long as the United States recognizes and takes into account China’s interests, China is unlikely to challenge the overall US leadership. In the final analysis, the most significant question for China is, how can it balance its support for democracy, domestically and externally, with the defense of sovereignty whether Taiwan, Central Asia or the Asia-Pacific generally?

Well, that was then and this is now!  It would not appear to me that these constitute the bedrock “rules” that define this most important bilateral relationship.  But let’s take a look at the rules and where the relationship is today.

The context has changed a great deal since the full onset of the global financial crisis of 2008.  It appears that the “Chinese foreign policy elite” – I am not sure exactly who these people are – but there is a view from western experts – I know these folks far better – that there is a from Beijing the view that the US is in decline and that it is losing its hegemonic status.  Furthermore, and more ominously, as a result in  part of the US Administration’s “Asian pivot”, these same China experts have a heightened suspicion that the US is unwilling to adjust to its relative decline and China’s rise.  As Brooking’s Kenneth Lieberthal recently described it at ForeignPolicy.com:

In Chinese eyes, the United States has always been concerned primarily with protecting its own global dominance – which perforce means doing everything it can to retard or disrupt China’s rise.  That America lost its stride in the global financial crisis and the weak recovery since then while China in 2010 became the world’s second-largest economy has only increased Beijing’s concerns about Washington’s determination postpone the day when China inevitably surpasses the United States to become the world’s most powerful country.

So it would seem that China has drawn back from the view that the US is the only superpower. Instead many China experts now suggest that China is a global power as presumably is the United States.  Quite honestly I haven’t s clue what a “global power” is – and I suspect it is simply a way for Chinese experts to assert that China is a superpower – without having to actually proclaim it.  There is little question that both states are great powers – lord knows no one would question each being in the G20 etc., but then including India also makes sense. Clearly India is not yet a “global power”.  It seems to me to be disingenuous to manufacture this new category – especially if you compare the two by military or economic metrics – it ain’t so.  I think too many experts distort time lines.  It more than a decade, possibly two, before China’s economy will match the US so let’s not conflate that future with the present.  And as for the military and strategic partnerships – not even close.

Though it is true that the US and China have sought to cooperate in a number of critical areas – especially in the global economy, notably China’s leaders urging collective effort to resolve the eurozone crisis and to avoid grater turbulence – in other areas there is no collaborative spirit.  Most puzzling is China’s determination to support Russia to the bitter end on Syria.  It is unnecessary and with little that would suggest that there is a Chinese interest in playing “poodle to Putin”.

More contentious are the growing demands and “police” encounters in the South China Sea between China a number of Asian countries.  China has asserted a broad territorial claim that encompasses much of the South China Sea.  In addition there are territorial clashes between China and the Japan in the East China Sea. Many in Washington have declared a new China assertiveness threatening regional stability.  The US has meanwhile – without declaring sides on the territorial claims, has insisted on freedom of navigation and a multilateral approach to resolving the territorial demands.  China has in turn rejected this approach – and at least for now has insisted that these territorial claims should be settled by the contending parties only – bilaterally in other words.

The new assertiveness has enabled many in Washington to focus on the growing military modernization in China’s armed services and calls to meet such military challenges.  The point here is that the so-called new assertiveness has drawn close attention to China’s military threats and the consequences of the growing military modernization.

Where then do the two great powers need to go? Here are some actions that the two can adopt that are likely to lower the temperature on the competition, lead to a new set of rules and can be accomplished largely without the other:

  • Both take a deep breath and limit the degree of hedging each proposes for the other.  Hedging focuses on worst case and frequently results in outcomes  each is concerned to hedge against;
  • The US de-emphasize rhetorically the Asian pivot; work more quietly with ASEAN allies to generate a Code of Conduct acceptable to both sides;
  • China turn down the volume on the South and East China Seas and at least in the case of the South China Seas propose concretely joint development agreements with the parties – Vietnam, Philippines, and others.  These agreements enable the parties to side step the territorial claims for the present; and
  • China needs to rethink its Syria position in the UN and consider abstention as opposed to veto.

I was fortunate enough early in the week to hear former Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister speak on the Rise of China.  If you take a look at the NewStatesman.com the article entitled “The West Isn’t Ready for the Rise of China”, the piece fairly reflects his remarks at the Munk School of Global Affairs.  I thought I’d just provide a quick sense of the approach that Rudd brings to this critical relationship:

So, what then is to be done?  Is it possible for the west (and, for that matter, the rest) to embrace a central organizing principle as we engage China over the future of the international order?  I believe it is.  But it will require collective intellectual effort, diplomatic co-ordination, sustained political will and most critically, continued, open and candid engagement with the Chinese political elite.  So, what might the core elements of such an engagement look lie?

I will turn to Rudd’s perspective.  This should allow me to describe the new rules of collaboration required for the US-China relationship.

For this particular “thought exercise”, I will try and describe what are the rules of behavior that can ensure that the competitiveness and rivalry can be contained – that rivalry and competition do not escalate to heightened and sustained rivalry – and then even to conflict.


Image Credit: abc.net.au

“Pivots” and Great Powers – From the Other Side




In my earlier post – of close to the same name – I mentioned that it was Minghao Zhao’s earlier NYT op-ed, dated July 12th, “The Predicaments of Chinese Power,” that got me thinking again about the US-China relationship.

Now as I pointed out in this earlier blog post,  Zhao is currently a research fellow at the China Center for Contemporary World Studies, the think tank for the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.  I learned subsequently from my colleagues in China that he graduated from Peking University (Beida) with an MA and is also the Executive Editor of the China International Strategy Review a publication from the School of International Studies (SIS) at Beida.

Okay what did Minghao Zhao have to say?  Well like any good international relations specialist, Zhao focuses a lot on power and the various forms it takes in the global governance system.  Summarizing Zhao,  he suggests the following:

  • It remains a controversial issue as to what China’s grand strategy is, or should be;
  • When we measure China’s power we find that it is powerful on some measures – population, global trade, gross domestic product but is woefully inadequate on per capita GDP and near the bottom on the human development index;
  • Looking at the employment of power and influence, China has a long way to go, say in comparison to the US, whether it is hard power or especially “soft power”;
  • China is, as described by Zhao, “

… still unfamiliar with these new power games. The complex web of national security threats facing China underscores  the need for greater efforts to integrate the strategic tools of diplomacy, defense and development.  What is more, China has not yet found a way to utilize “civil power” in achieving sustainable diplomatic successes.

  • China still has a way to go to find a strategy that will reassure other countries – read that as its near neighbors – especially in the South China Sea and also the greater powers – Japan, Korea and especially the United States.  China has also not learned – here I am not sure China is the only great power that suffers from this, read that as the United States – to practice multilateralism where the powers share responsibility in deciding and acting.  Indeed Zhao summarizes well this gap between between its power and its intentions:

While the Chinese truly believe in their declared peaceful intentions, they have yet to convince others especially the United States  and Asian neighbors.  China needs to boost its participation in multilateral forums and readjust its approach to stress the sincerity of its commitment to peaceful development.

  • Finally – and here I suspect Zhao draws his conclusion from having observed the United States over the past few decades – China needs to restrain itself.  If I can summarize here the world needs to take a “deep breath” and avoid adopting a pose of exaggerated fear given China’s rise and the growing power China has, and is acquiring.  At the same time China’s leaders need to restrain themselves when it comes to the territorial disputes that now plague China on its maritime borders and to constrain the nationalist impulses that pulse through the China blogosphere and presumably more broadly in Chinese society.

As our colleague describes it:

An exaggerated fear of China’s capacities and intentions can itself become a couse of conflict and lead to tragic results.  China’s entry into the world must be accompanied by a new dynamic of mutual accommodation with that world.

For  a number of years many China observers asserted that Chinese policy followed Deng Xiaoping’s historical dictum: 韬光养晦 – taoguang yanghui – concealing one’s capabilities; biding one’s time to have an achievement.  Though the phrase is not free of controversy over its meaning, most agree that at least in terms of strategic policy that China shouldn’t be overtly aggressive and take a forward and assertive policy stance.

Now there has been a Washington view since about 2010 that China’s restrained policy stance – or what I would suggest as a junior partner role – has come to end.  Because China is a global power – this is a phrase that Minghao Zhao adopts and is expressed by many experts though I think it is a highly problematic description of China currently – and there is a strong current of opinion in China that the United States is in decline, and in fact that China has been too defensive – that China could, and should, now be more assertive. Indeed because of this perceived new Chinese assertiveness, at least in the region, that US policymakers have articulated this Pacific or Asia pivot, as described in the earlier post.

So it seems we are now witnessing an emerging gyre of “action and push back” by the United States and China.  Is this the best way in fact to characterize the US-China interaction.  Well I don’t think we have reached this point but it is difficult to both assess China strategic policy – indeed almost everyone agrees that is near impossible to describe China’s grand strategy – and therefore to determine if the US-China is in some growing tit-for-tat strategic framework.  Certainly leaders from both countries assure each other – and the global public –  that the relationship is not of that sort and that their strategic policy continues to count on maintaining a positive engagement and collaborative policy.

So let’s examine more closely the relationship in the next few days.

Image Credit:  news.xinhuanet.com – The Central Committee of CPC

“Pivots” and Great Powers – From One Side


The ASEAN meetings last week – and especially the debate – or non-debate as it turned out over territorial challenges in the South China Sea, raised again the question of the US-China relations.  Secretary Clinton expressed publicly again the US position that the territorial disputes among ASEAN members and China needed to be addressed in a “multilateral setting” while China was equally firm that the matter should not even be on the agenda for the ASEAN Ministerial. Though discussed openly by various ASEAN members, the ASEAN ministers were not able to issue a joint communique at the conclusion of the meeting  – the first time in 45 years that such a failure had occurred.

The US-China relationship is the key to stability or instability in the region – and indeed beyond.  As I was thinking about this key bilateral relationship I eyed – and was impressed with – an analysis of China’s strategic concerns in the NYT by Minghao Zhao on July 12 (“The Predicaments of Chinese Power”).  Aside from the evident quality of the article, I was struck by the fact that Minghao Zhao is a research fellow at the China Center for Contemporary World Studies apparently a think-tank of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.  So the NYT is not a usual place for a researcher of his sort to place an op-ed piece.  I will get to this article and the implications for China’s strategic policy but I thought I’d start with the US position.

Now the Obama Administration has signaled – since at least the Honolulu APEC Leaders Summit last year – that with the winding down of US efforts first in Iraq and now Afghanistan – that the United States was back in Asia.  The United States was rebalancing (various terms have been used – the most notable “pivot”)  its strategic efforts from the Middle East  to Asia.  As an example of this rhetorical shift, assess these words from President Obama before the  Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011:

For the United States, this reflects a broader shift.  After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.  In just a few weeks, after nearly nine years, the last American troops will leave Iraq and our war there will be over.  In Afghanistan, we’ve begun a transition — a responsible transition — so Afghans can take responsibility for their future and so coalition forces can begin to draw down.  And with partners like Australia, we’ve struck major blows against al Qaeda and put that terrorist organization on the path to defeat, including delivering justice to Osama bin Laden.

This rebalancing has become know as America’s Asian or Pacific “pivot” – though it is interesting that in the various speeches and press conferences that Obama gave at the time around November 2011 he never referenced the term “pivot”.  But the media has picked it up from others including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who used it in her “America’s Pacific Century” article in November 2011.  At the conclusion she wrote:

This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and–a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.

More recently Robert Merry, the editor of the well-known National Interest, writing a book review for the New York Times’s David Sanger’s newest book Confront and Conceal (in last week’s, July 15, 2012) New York Times “Book Review” Section provided a cogent assessment of Sanger’s – and I suspect his own –  “temperature-taking” of the US-China relationship:

With regard to China, Sanger sees a possible “Thucydides trap” (Sanger earlier made clear that he is taking the term from Graham Allison the former Dean of the Kennedy School) – a reference to the the Greek historian’s narrative of the clash born of Sparta’s fear of Athens’s growing military might.  “We are seeing similar themes today,” he writes, adding that what some perceive as mounting nationalistic fervor in China could lead Beijing to underestimate the American response to Chinese adventures in the South China Sea.

So let’s focus briefly on the “Thucydides trap” and the “pivot” in US strategic policy.  As to the Thucydides Trap, Sanger has the best assessment.  In his NYT January 22, 2011 piece “Superpower and Upstart: Sometimes It Ends Well”  this what Sanger wrote:

Or ask Thucydides the Athenian historian whose tome on the Peloponnesian War has ruined many a college freshman’s weekend.  The line they had to remember for the test was his conclusion: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” … Both Mr Hu and President Obama seemed desperate to avoid what Graham Allison of Harvard University has labeled “the Thucydides Trap” – that deadly combination of calculation and emotion that, over the years, can turn healthy rivalry into antagonism or worse.

The so-called pivot has raised concerns that in fact the US actions may feed the Thucydides trap.  Part of the issue is of course that in the face of a growing fiscal crisis with budgetary cuts likely to be enacted after the election – no matter who wins – that this presentation of a US pivot to Asia is overreach.  While Chinese behavior might be constrained and even constructive in the near future, this would only be likely if Chinese leaders were persuaded that the US had a coherent Asia strategy that is viewed as credible and widely accepted.  That is hardly yet the case.  Indeed many in China have commented on what appears the growing crisis in the US and the decline in the US.  This rather pessimistic view of US leadership and the pivot in policy leads the perception that the Obama administration is long on rhetoric but no strategic policy is likely to be forthcoming.  In fact the rhetoric has fed the view by many in China that US policy remains committed to dominance and a continuing effort to pospone the day of China’s successful rise.  As Ken Lieberthal in his insightful piece in Foreign Policy argued, the pivot impacted in the following way:

In sum, the president’s Asia-wide strategy and some of the rhetoric accompanying it played directly into the perception of many Chinese that all American actions are a conspiracy to hold down or actually disrupt China’s rise.

If, and it is a big if still,  were China’s leaders to conclude that US policy in Asia was a direct challenge to China’s rise and designed only to contain China, then it does seem to set up that poisonous brew that can indeed turn “healthy rivalry” into growing antagonism and even confrontation in Asia.  This would be very bad.

So where is Chinese leadership on its relationship with the United States?  I’ll be back with that shortly.



Image Credit: circleofblue.org – President Hu and President Obama 2011





The Current Heart of China “Assertiveness” and the United States “Pivot”



This past week ASEAN ministerial meetings popped up repeatedly in Cambodia’s capital Phnom Penh.  These meetings served as diplomatic and political backdrop to the growing clash of interests in the seas east, west and south of China.

ASEAN has been a central player in Asian diplomatic and economic affairs since its formation in the late 1960s.  But on its face this is not necessarily more than a important regional organization.  Now, however, at least since 2008, one of the key ASEAN players, Indonesia, has also become a member of the G20 Leaders Summit.  The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) a security dialogue forum has reached out to include key players in Asia – most notably China and the United States.  And the growing territorial claims especially, but not only, in the South China Sea have drawn in these key players to the security dialogue.  Given that there is no larger security organizational setting where not just regional powers but also the great powers engage here, the ASEAN meetings do appear to fit into the global summitry galaxy of institutions.

Much attention has been paid to the continuing tension that has hung over this region now for several years with contending territorial claims to the South China Sea by China, and various ASEAN and members including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei and for good measure Taiwan.  There have also been clashes between Japan and China over the East China Sea.  The maritime area is a key for the global transport of goods and vital energy resources.  Over half the world’s total trade transit through the area.  And  there have been increasing signs of resource riches – especially oil and gas – in the area as well.

The clash of interests was very much in evidence at, or surrounding the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh early in the week followed by the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting.  The ARF is one of the few diplomatic settings for security dialogue in Asia.  This year’s ARF meeting – the 19th –  includes not only ASEAN Foreign Ministers but dialogue countries including – Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union , India, Japan, North Korea, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, East Timor, United States and Sri Lanka – 26 countries plus the EU in all.

Both meetings have highlighted the tensions between ASEAN and its allies and China. The United States has used these meetings to display rhetorical support for ASEAN countries without necessarily supporting any of the specific claims of these ASEAN countries.  The US efforts would appear to be an effort since at least 2010 to insinuate itself in East and Southeast Asia – and draw closer to various ASEAN states especially Vietnam and the Philippines.

In the South China Sea the ASEAN FM have been pushing to engage China in a long standing effort to resolve conflicts between the various states.  On Monday the FM sought to complete wording for a document to set out a Code of Conduct.  The Philippines have pressed for wording that would include measures to resolve territorial disputes and to raise the conflict in the Scarborough Shoal between the Philippines and China.

Manila appears to be leading the ASEAN push to persuade China to accept a Code of Conduct (COC) that would go some way to resolve the territorial disputes themselves. There has been a ten-year effort to complete a code of conduct which most ASEAN leaders have see as a legally binding document that would govern the behavior in the various seas and “establish protocols for resolving future disputes peacefully”. (see the WSJ “Beijing Defends Sea Claims as Clinton Visits Region” by Patrick Barta July 11, 2012)

China has been unwilling to discuss such a document signalling instead that it would be prepared only to discuss a more limited code aimed at “building trust and deepening cooperation” but not one that settles the territorial disputes, which it insist would be better negotiated with each country separately.  In the current diplomatic settings China has urged that officials leave discussions off the agenda.

For China, the collective ASEAN effort to promote a binding  COC has posed unwelcome interference in what Beijing has described not as territorial disputes between China and ASEAN but only disputes with some ASEAN states.  China has insisted that resolution of these conflicts be undertaken bilaterally.

Since the 2010 ARF meeting the United States Secretary of State has made it clear that the United States supports a multilateral solution and insists on the freedom of the seas:

Issues such as freedom of navigation and lawful exploitation of maritime resources often involve a wide region, and approaching them strictly bilaterally could be a recipe for confusion and even confrontation.

The Chinese position has remained adamant in the run-up to the ARF that US and various ASEAN positions were “deliberate hype” and intended to interfere with relations between China and ASEAN.   The Foreign Ministry continued to insist that the issue be left off the ARF agenda.

Meanwhile in the East China Sea tension rose significantly after two Chinese patrol vessels entered waters claimed by Japan. This incident followed an announcement that the Japanese government was considering buying the Senkaku Islands (referred to by the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands).  Though the announcement was part of a complicated negotiation by the current Noda government caused by strong domestic political interests, the announcement and tensions quickly engaged both Japan and China.

A full blown diplomatic row at the ARF was only avoided when the ASEAN countries failed to reach agreement on the language of the COC.  But the tensions and potential conflict remain.

China has certainly not backed away from the its diplomatic positions.  And as the most recent East China Sea incident with Japan suggest is prepared to exert measured “military” action to underpin its assertion of interests.  Meanwhile has expressed a view that inserts itself into the regional conflict – and likely garners ASEAN country support – but at a low immediate cost while not directly challenging China – yet.

For the moment US-China engagement retains the “upper hand”.  But the position could well sour were military action – even though likely of a rather limited sort and unlikely to be between the US and China – were to occur.

Miscalculations and mistakes happen.

Image Credit: Stratfor 2009

Building – and Not Building – in Asia for Global Transition


While much of the attention in global summitry has been on the informal G20 “high table”, not unreasonably, there has been architectural action elsewhere in global summitry that warrants examination.

For “IR  wonks” – needless to say I am one – the focus since the 2008 global financial crisis has been on global transformation.  The US is declining – at least relatively – so the argument goes.  The unquestioned US hegemonic leader since the end of World War II – is increasingly debated and  many have suggested that the end of its global leadership.  As a result there has been a spate of articles that suggest a new architectural configuration – see Charlie Kupchan’s in “No One’s World” or Ian Bremmer’s  “Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Loser in a G-Zero World” And the defense from oa number of US policymakers of ‘Leading from Behind” has done little to maintain confidence in continuing US hegemonic leadership.

The attention has passed to others – most particularly on the newly rising states -especially on China. The rise of the BRICS leaves analysts focused on the power transformation notwithstanding that even the rising powers have shown signs of economic unrest including economic slowdown.

But what has gone largely unnoticed by the IR cognoscenti has been the building “from below” of a number of what traditionally have been called regional alliances – I shall come back to to defining exactly what a regional alliance is or is not.  Now it is true that there has been some attention paid to the negotiation of the TPP – or TransPacific Partnership.  Now the original 9 members (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United States)  represent a rather “motley crew” of Asia and Pacific states – driven primarily by the United States.  Noticeably the members negotiating this “21st century trade arrangement” include not a single major Asian economy – notwithstanding that Japan has expressed some interest in joining the negotiations.  On that one don’t hold your breathe.  Even with the addition presumably of Mexico and Canada – it remains a US creation targeting China.  If any of the big four – China, Indonesia, Japan or Korea – were to join then we would be looking at a far more significant trade and even political-economic entity.  Then we’d look at the relationship more closely.

Barring that, however, there is already something worth take serious note of in Asia. This is the Japan-China-Republic of Korea (ROK) Trilateral Summit.  This summit is an outgrowth of the APT or ASEAN plus three – the three again being China, Japan and ROK.  Now the three released a joint statement in May from their fifth summit.  Yup the first having occurred in 2008.  So the “Big Three” having been holding summits since 2008 but a “thick” transgovernmental network of ministerial meetings have been going on much longer – trade and investment ministers, finance officials, agriculture officials, disaster relief officials more recently.  In September last year the  Big Three established a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul.  And the Big Three recently congratulated themselves on signing an investment agreement  (The Trilateral Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment) and they have agreed to launch an FTA negotiation with in the year.  Also the Big Three have paid close attention and have urged the strengthening of the Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilateralization (CMIM) – suggesting that the Initiative be doubled in size and enlarging the IMF de-linked portion and also introducing a crisis prevention function. The Big Three have also welcomed the start of the surveillance activities of the ASEAN + 3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO).

The focus on finance and economics mark this summit as an important element in global summitry.  Though a regional gathering these three states have strong global influence and the gathering represents a significant – if unheralded part – of global summitry.

So while this trilateral relationship builds a stronger economic relationship, what of the security dimension?  Until now the key multilateral setting has been the 6-Party talks.  Some of seen the 6-Party gathering as the first glimmering of at least closer east asian security relations – especially in light of the failure of Australia’s APc – or Asia-Pacific Community started by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.  But the 6-Party gathering has been stalled for some time due to strong conflict driven from the US- North Korea (DPRK) stalemate over the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs.

Meanwhile, the ROK and Japan sought to enhance bilateral security relations in building a wider security architecture.  But creating these relations have foundered just recently over the continuing sensitivity between Japan and Korea, especially for the Korean population – retaining long memory of Japan’s colonization of Korea in the 20th century.  This sensitivity led the current Korean administration to carry out discussions secretly.  The secret effort negotiated and approved a pact to share confidential military data concerning the DPRK – a step to a closer relationship urged by Washington.  The public and the Korean Parliament were only advised of this limited step on the presumed date of signing and as a result a top Korean foreign policy expert, Kim Tae-hyo was forced to resign.

Thus building and not-building a new architecture in Asia.

Image Credit:  Third Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit – Korea.net