Category Archives: Global Governance for G20/G8

China Cannot Rise Peacefully

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The title in this blog post is the declared bottom line from John Mearsheimer’s recent speech (given in Australia in August 2010) and the article from the China Journal of International Politics, (Vol 3, 2010, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”).  Now I promise to get off this US-China relationship thing soon but I couldn’t leave without evaluating John’s speech and recent article.

For those who don’t know John, he is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.  He is an IR celebrity – a rather hard thing to do.  He is well known for developing what is called, “Offensive Realism,”  an international relations approach that asserts that all states in an anarchic international system seek power and dominance in the international system.  This is not classic realism but realism that sees nations seeking hegemony more from uncertainty than defensive actions.  Offensive realism in contrast is realism on steroids.

So John looks at the current situation and sees US-China relations through this offensive realism lens:

Thus, the core question that any leader has to ask him or herself is this: what is the best way to maximize my country’s security in a world where another state might have significant offensive military capability as well as offensive intentions, and where there is no higher body I can turn to for help if that other state threatens my country?  This question—more than any other—will motivate American as well as Chinese leaders in the years ahead, as it has in the past.  … The best way for any state to ensure its survival is to be much more powerful than all the other states in the system, because the weaker states are unlikely to attack it for fear they will be soundly defeated. No country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare strike the United States because it is so powerful relative to all its neighbors. To be more specific, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the hegemon in the system, because its survival then would almost be guaranteed.

John is a mild-mannered –  and a thoroughly likable colleague (actually I went to graduate school at Cornell with him) – who is seriously committed to international relations. So while I can, and do, disagree with him frequently – I always take him seriously.  But as you can see from the quotes above, offensive realism is anything but mild-mannered.

For John the actions of China will be not unlike the United States.  The emergence of the United States as a great power is defined by the US’s achieving regional hegemony.  It is the only great power, according to John, to have done so, and having done so it has dedicated itself to not facing another hegemon.  In John’s world of great powers – best expressed in: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (NY: Norton, 2001)  – a rising power like China will imitate a previous great power – the United States.

It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on the warpath and conquer other countries in the region, although that is always a possibility. Instead, it is more likely that Beijing will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the way the United States makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back.

China will seek hegemony in Asia – pushing out the United States as the United States pushed out the Europeans in the Western Hemisphere to establish regional hegemony.  China will then claim regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  The struggle will not be identical to but also not unlike the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

For John the world is a world of great powers, not identical to the past but not that different either.  And the significant differences that describe global relations today fade into insignificance in the face of great power dynamics.  As it was; so will it be. Even the dynamics of globalization so dramatic over the last decades fade away and are assessed as insignificant:

My view is that economic interdependence does not have a significant effect on geopolitics one way or the other. After all, the major European powers were all highly interdependent and prospering in 1914 when First World War broke out.

And though the interdependence that John acknowledges was present in the twentieth century, I think most would recognize as significantly different in scale and influence taking into account financial, trade and investment trends.  These trends describe a tight global economic system far beyond the world understood in 1914.  And China is so much more integrated into the world economy than earlier rising powers.  Is conflict impossible? Of course not.  But the dismissal of the global economic context by John is not realistic.

I remain convinced that US-China relations are best described as “yi di, yi you” ( 亦敌 亦友) – “Both Friend and Foe” (see recent posts including “Jumping to Conclusions“).  China and the United States will have to work through periods of rivalry and periods of partnership. Those periods of rivalry could be quite tense but the periods of partnership in global leadership are likely to be quite restorative.

The picture narrated by John Mearsheimer is tragic –  possible  but not likely.  We do not have to conclude as he does:

Indeed, it is downright depressing. I wish that I could tell a more optimistic story about the prospects for peace in the Asia-Pacific region. But the fact is that international politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of good will canameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. And there is little doubt that there is one on the horizon.

The Global Declinist Position

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Harvard’s Niall – pronounced like Neal –  Ferguson is an absolutely prolific writer and a creator of some of the more colorful contemporary metaphors for the evolving world.  A good friend was kind enough to forward me a piece that Niall had penned in the WSJ – “In China’s Orbit“.  The principal thesis of the article is – as the subtext promotes – “After 500 years of Western predominance the world is tilting back to the East.”

One of the dilemma’s for prolific writers such as Ferguson is that they tend to run right into their own earlier position.  Thus in Niall’s case he and a colleague create “Chimerica” the fusion of the the Chinese and American economies  – one export and surplus, the other consumption and deficit – and then in the midst of the meltdown declare it dead.  The problem is that the declaration may yet remain premature.

In this article, the problem presented by his analysis may be that the facts fail to reflect – at least for the time being – this narrative.  Niall suggests that China’s strategy is what he parodies are the Four “Mores”.  By this Niall means: “consume more, import more, invest abroad more and innovate more”.  And while there are elements of this in current Chinese policy, it is not such a clear cut strategy nor outcome.  And certainly it not yet east versus west  as described by Niall – “What we are living through now is the end of 500 years of Western predominance.  This time the Eastern challenger is for real, both economically and geopolitically.”

First on the 4 Mores there remain questions over each element. The fact is China has not really achieved it’s rise on the back of consuming.  Indeed the problem for China is that it remains addicted (see my recent blog post The ‘Drug’ of External Trade)  to exporting and achieving the shift to domestic consumption will not come easily or quickly.  As for more importing, well there is no question that to fuel the manufacturing machine – owned by the way by a variety of folk including the lao wai （老外）  the foreigners, there is significant importation of resources including energy.  But there is a rising chorus of complaint from a number of these countries – (having just returned from Brazil – it is one) that China is only interested in natural resources.  And such disquiet of course spills over from  resources to investments especially by Chinese State-owned enterprises – owned by the government (so much for privatization) – being made in many of these countries.  As for innovation, the final one of the 4 Mores, there is not yet strong evidence of an innovation society.    I might add – since Niall quotes a Chinese Rear Admiral – that the investment strategy justifies, apparently,  ambitious plans for naval expansion and ties it to recent official statements – not public – that raised the temperature on the South China Sea.  But if we want to look at naval strength there is a very long way to go before others – read that the United States – need to start worrying about naval challenges.

The reality is China has made enormous strides and has drawn a greater number of folk out of poverty than any other country in history.  But the development of newly emerging large market countries is not confined to Asia.  And I’m not prepared to conclude that the current primus inter pares – the United States – is now a spent force.  The reality is Asia is rising but the United States is a part of that rising.  It is present in alliances and the US has committed significant military forces in Asia.  As a power that backs on the Pacific it contends along with others in the emergence of this vast region.  So yes, Niall is right in his conclusion –  China is not the master but is no longer the apprentice. But that’s a far cry from some of the more excited assertions about China.

Constructing New Leadership

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An area of obvious difference between the Brazilian and American experts in Rio de Janeiro at Cebri was the question of leadership actions by the rising states.  Much like the Obama Administration, many US experts urged that Brazil  – as other rising powers – needed to step up and take greater responsibility for global governance.  The Brazilians were skeptical of the variously expressed views by US experts that Brazil needed to accept a “pay-to-play” approach to leadership.  Like the US Administration many of these experts urged that Brazil  needed to take responsibility first – to shoulder the burden of leadership – and receive leadership benefits subsequently.  As David Shorr, the Program Officer of the Stanley Foundation, co-host of the Brazil meetings, suggested in the “Discussion Summary” “… the United States has not been totally convincing in making the case for urgent action and the un-sustainability of the status quo.” – Yes I know I haven’t done a full review of the Stanley Foundation-Cebri conference, notwithstanding an earlier promise – and it won’t be done here. But I will tackle it – really.

In struggling to construct a new global governance leadership in the  contemporary circumstances there is no more frustrating calculation than understanding the nature of the relationship between the US and China.  Here is the quintessential traditional power-rising power  conundrum.  This is the power transition in ‘spades’. How should China and the United States interact and to do so in a way to move forward on some of the growing challenges to global governance?

In Sunday’s NYT (November 28, 2010) Helene Cooper in “Asking China to Act Like the U.S.” explores the complex nature of the US-China relationship.  As Cooper suggests, the critical question “turns on a question that is, at its heart, an impossible conundrum: How to get Beijing to make moves that its leaders don’t think are good for their country?” What is evident is that increasingly in the China-US relationship, but also more generally in the rising power relationships, the US is apparently asking the new and diverse leadership circle to take actions that fail to be in conformity with their national interests.

Among others, Cooper turns to some of the realists – possibly neo-realists – in the Washington circle.  And you won’t be surprised these folks are hardly supportive of the current Administration.  One of the identified critics is David Rothkopf a former US official in trade and a former managing director of Kissinger Associates – and now a strategic consultant in the Washington beltway.  For Rothkopf the problem is clear – and so is the answer for that matter.  As Rothkopf sees it this Administration is, as he says, “…still struggling with a post-unilateralist hangover.”  Rothkopf concludes:

… the United States is heading into a future in which countries like China, with independent sources of power, are not reliant on or easily influenced by the United States, and so are pursuing their own national interests.

Given this, what does Rothkopf and others offer up – good old fashioned balance of power? So whether its dealing with global imbalances and exchange rate regimes or the problems of North Korea and nuclear proliferation, it would seem that Rothkopf urges a return to the past.  As he says:

… the United States must first determine the areas where China won’t bend, and work with Beijing to find compromises so that America is not in the impossible situation of trying to tell China to act against its own national interests.  … We have moved from the cold war era of bipolar reality through the brief bubble of sole superpower unilateral fantasy into a world of a new multipowered system which requires old-fashioned balance-of-power diplomacy.

Why “Washington” is appealing to the nineteenth and twentieth century tools of international relations – which seldom worked then – and are even more unlikely to work in the complex contemporary global governance world – is hard to understand.  It is familiar but promoting renewed rivalry and competition with the China’s and Brazil’ of the world hardly seem the way to fashion a new leadership.  And I don’t think it will.

What will?  I promise – really – to examine and answer this conundrum in an upcoming blog post.

Whose Irresponsible Stakeholder?

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My good colleague from the the Council on Foreign Relations, Stewart Patrick has recently examined the dynamics of global governance in his Foreign Affairs article, “Irresponsible Stakeholders?  The Difficulty of Integrating Rising  Powers” that appears in this November/December issue of the journal.  Now, I always thought that it was slightly patronizing for the United States to call on -in the first instance – China  to become a responsible stakeholder.  So, I find it even more patronizing to call the large emerging market countries the former G5 (Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Mexico) I assume “irresponsible stakeholders” though at least he use a question mark.  I mean really who defines responsible or for that matter irresponsible.  I suspect you can guess.

In any case leaving aside the characterization, Stewart explores the dynamics and architecture of the new global governance order – yes, I use the dreaded ‘global governance’ phrase as opposed to the apparently more acceptable – “multilateralism”.  For Stewart the objective of this US administration and presumably the follow on ones is:

Over the next ten years and beyond, the United States will have to accommodate new powers in reformed structures of global governance while safeguarding the Western liberal order it helped create and defend.

The fear for Stewart, and others, is that the global governance will become increasingly chaotic and that the rising powers will – not possessing the same norms and rules of the current global  governance leadership e.g. the G7 – become the new rule makers as opposed to the old rule takers.  Furthermore the United States will be required to alter its role in the world – leave behind hegemony for a far more multilateral/multi-partner (the current phraseology of the Secretary of State)  role.  The fear for Stewart, and indeed his boss Richard Haass CFR President, is that power will become increasingly diffused and lead to a rather dark scenario: “What if the new global order leads to an era of multipolarity without multilateralism?”

So what impact will the diffusion of power have in this situation?  The principal concern is that such a diffusion will exacerbate the strategic rivalry between the traditional powers and the rising powers.  While these powers may agree on certain policies they may not cooperate on others.  And such rivalry could complicate global governance. To that I say – well yes that will occur but that strategic rivalry will not simply polarize rising and traditional states.  I mean look at the most recent efforts to create a framework for global imbalances in the global economy.  At the G20 Seoul summit there certainly was contention between the US and China.  But the most outspoken critic of US proposals and in the case of the Federal Reserve – actions –  was Germany  – a traditional power and long time ally of the the United States.  And for good measure India was rather positive to the US suggestions and options.

The reality is the United States will have to get used to the pulling and hauling required in building a dominant coalition.  No more – or at least little – hegemony.  The US will be required to do the heavy lifting required of a ‘first among equals’ only member of the international system.  And the multiple identities possessed by all powers of consequence here – and not just the rising powers – will have to be engaged.  The US doesn’t need strategic partners, but it will face shifting coalitions in the context of differing issue areas.  As Stewart writes:

In this complex international reality, fixed alliances and formal organizations may count for less than shifting coalitions of interest.

Stewart is probably correct in assuming that the US will be required to form “partnerships of convenience.”  But it doesn’t necessarily mean that the US must follow the path – expressed by Richard Haass – of a la carte multilateralism.  The US will have to possess a little more “stick- to-itness.”  Less noticeable frustration in various forum would be helpful.  For instance the G20 is likely the ‘proper’ institutional setting for reforming the global economy. Crafting agreement among these diverse interests in this forum is not easy.  This not hegemony or even ‘hegemony lite’.

But as my old heroes – Firesign Theatre – of yesteryear used to say  – believe it or not over the radio:

Living in the future is a little like having bees in your head.  But there they are.

U.S. Weakness; Chinese Ambivalence

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There’s a growing acknowledgment in global governance circles, that China represents a key player along with the United States – at least when it comes to the global economy.  It may not yet be a G2 but it is the key great power relationship in the global economy.  But there is more afoot here than just the emergence of the G2.

First, there was much punditry emanating from the Seoul summit concerning “Obama’s weakened position”.  Sewell Chan of the New York Times wrote a piece early in the morning following the G20 summit titled – “Summit Shows U.S. Can Still Set Agenda, if Not Get Action”.  For US media, in particular, the G20 summit showed the President’s growing limits, so they concluded,  from the President’s  Party losses in the midterm election. Aside from the questionable logic and causality it would seem that there was a fair degree of US agenda proposing yet limited summit progress.  But then if you stand back this grinding out of the collective process – as opposed to the US imposition of policy – is exactly what you would expect from a more multilateral global governance system.  It marks a fading of US hegemony for sure but the US administration has called for greater  collective responsibility and it appears to be exactly that – more evident.  But US media remains wedded, it seems, to multilateralism with an American face. They are bound to be disappointed.

And then there is the Chinese leadership.  China is in the game.  While China is not enthusiastic over developing a global imbalances framework and developing the mutual assessment process – MAP – China has entered into this global governance process.  But the slow progress in framework development does highlight China’s ambivalence over leadership.

Chen Dongxiao, the Vice President of the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS) at the recent Shanghai Conference (October 21st-23rd) (This was a meeting that brought together experts from all the Asian G20 countries plus experts from Singapore, Vietnam and the United States.  The meeting was developed with the active partnership of SIIS, CIGI, The Munk School of Global Affairs and the Stanley Foundation)  described well China’s persistent ambivalence. On the one hand China believes the G20 is “a step forward in terms of enhancing the legitimacy and efficacy of the current global governance architecture.”

However, and on the other hand, China remains protective over its sovereignty and its insists that it control domestic economic policy. As Chen Dongxiao says:

There is a tension between China’s desire for the G20 to be an effective body and its interest to preserve China’s independence over domestic affairs.  This is the reason for China’s ambivalence, for example, over the mutual assessment mechanism that the G20 powers agreed the IMF would initiate after the after the Pittsburgh summit.  China believes the mechanism should be consultative and instructive in nature, while others believe it should have more authority to intervene in order to help coordinate policies more effectively.

The road to greater stability and the amelioration of global imbalances will be a long hard road.

The ‘Sunshine Summit’

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Well you could almost hear the collective community sigh of relief in Korea as the G20 Leaders summit drew to an end.  President Lee  Myung-bak drew the curtain down on the Seoul summit and declared that  “for now, in conclusion, (the world) is out of the so-called currency war.”

Addressing his final remarks to the “citizens of Korea” but also “the citizens of the world”, President Lee painted an optimistic picture of the summit at its conclusion.  And on reflection he is probably right.  There was progress on the framework for global imbalances and the exchange rate policies.  There was agreement that the G20 countries “move toward more market-determined exchange rate systems,” and that the G20 would reduce excessive imbalances both surplus and deficit.  The G20 agreed that they would assess persistently large imbalances against indicative guidelines.

Now having constructed the framework the details need to be filled in here. The indicative guidelines have not been determined and in fact the G20 leaders tasked the Framework Working Group (FWG), with the technical support of the IMF and other international organizations, to develop the guidelines.  Later French President Sarkozy at his briefing indicated that the FWG would meet in Beijing in the spring.  Finally, the Declaration indicated that the guidelines would be initiated and undertaken under the French.

Many will conclude that the failure to provide a clear measure – reference the earlier discussion of 4 percent of current account surpluses or deficits – or to describe the range of indicators that would constitute the indicative guidelines is an evident fudging by the leaders of the effort to bring about rebalancing and a more stable financial and economic system.  But this is – dare I say – a work in progress – and collective progress was achieved.

Moreover, President Lee could take satisfaction from the Leaders Declaration that included growth-oriented development and financial safety net initiatives both new initiatives proposed by Korea.  In addition many of the earlier commitments began to reach successful resolution including IMF reforms as well as financial regulatory reform most especially Basel III.

For Koreans it was not unreasonable to regard this indeed as the ‘Sunshine Summit’.

Looking at the Round Table

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So the pace of the leaders’ summit is quickening. Sitting here at Media Center in the COEX complex with the many press – international and Korean – I am watching the leaders enter the room upstairs.  The President of Korea Lee Mung-bak has just opened the second session for leaders and they’ve go into closed session.

The second session this morning at 10 follows from the working dinner of leaders last night that ran from 18 to 21.  Presumably the session looked at the global imbalances including currency, current account surpluses and deficits, indicative guidelines, etc.  This is the make-it or break-it issue of this Seoul summit determining whether this becomes the ‘Sunshine summit’ – or not.

Sitting Patiently

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So we’re here at the Media Center for the G20 Seoul summit.  We wait patiently.  Leaders have arrived here at Seoul and are continuing to arrive all day.  The Leaders summit kicks off with a working dinner for leaders tonight (Thursday) – from 18:00 to 21:00 to be followed by apparently Sherpas and deputy finance ministers.

Korean officials have just briefed us that the wording is still in flux on the question of currency rates and imbalances – current account balances. The spokesperson did say that the wording may be different than the wording in the Finance Ministers statement coming out of Geyongju Korea (October 22-23).

“The Architecture of Global Cooperation”

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On Wednesday July 15th, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton gave a major speech at the Council for Foreign Relations – a major foreign policy think-tank in the United States.  It was an opportune moment for a major speech on the course of American foreign policy.  President Obama had just returned from his 4th major leadership Summit since assuming the Presidency.  And as I pointed out in a recent blog post, “Speaking of Architecture – A Concluding Obama Comment at  L’Aquila” – the President began to openly comment on the current global governance structure – in particular the Gx process – in his last news conference at the G8 L’Aquila Summit in Italy.  And, Hillary herself was preparing to undertake a trip to India – a major emerging great power in the G5 constellation of powers -China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico.

In her speech, Secretary Clinton, declared that the US was determined to build this, “Architecture of Global Cooperation,” which she stated required the US to, “devise the right policies and use the right tools.”  Now what is this “Architecture ofGlobal Cooperation.”  The speech provided some hints yet remains frustratingly vague.

Clinton signaled that the new American foreign policy is going to be made up of the following approaches:

  • updating and or creating new institutions for international cooperation with partners;
  • proceeding to engage those who disagree with the US – read that immediately as North Korea and Iran;
  • ‘development’ will be elevated to a major aspect of American foreign policy action;
  • the US will better integrate military and civilian action in conflict areas – read that as Iraq and Afghanistan;
  • better leveraging of key aspects of American power  – economic power and power generally – in the service of American foreign policy.

It is evident that this Administration is promoting a new multilateral action – one which they see as multipartner rather than multipolar.  Officials have begun to use this phrase – multipartner in many speeches.  As Clinton sees it the multipartner approach :

“… will lead by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multi-polar world and toward a multi-partner world.”

Now the Secretary of State recognizes that not all countries will accept this approach and in some cases the coalition will remain a power coalition designed to constrain or deter adversaries.  But to the extent she can, she and the Administration will bring the right tools and policies in a principled but pragmatic approach to create a common-sense policy. Somehow, this vision seems an awful lot like working with ‘friend and foe’ to advance the global governance agenda.  Good to find the US willing to extend the cooperation agenda but unclear that the conflicts of interest – Russia, Iran, North Korea – are likely to remain unresolved.

What then of the architecture of global cooperation?  On the substance side it is evident that the Secretary of State opens the agenda up – she pointedly notes that the China-US bilateral – meeting later in the month in Washington is  both an economic and strategic security one with a key rising power. This is potentially a serious effort to engage the Chinese but a small suspicion remains that this is more of an inter agency battle with Treasury to reengage State in the economic arena.  We need to watch the meeting closely later this month.

Like President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, acknowledges that the global and regional institutions built most formidably after the World War II are no longer adequate and they must be, “transformed and reformed.”   And like Obama, Clinton suggests – repeating Obama – what is needed are institutions that:

“… combine the efficiency and capacity for action with inclusiveness from the U.N. to the World Bank, from the IMF to the G-8 and the G-20, from the OAS and the Summit of the Americas to the ASEAN and APEC, all these and other institutions have a role to play.  But their continued vitality and relevance depend on their legitimacy and representativeness and the ability of their members to act swiftly and responsibly when problems arise.”

But what is that?  It can’t be all these organizations – or can it? And if it is how does the agenda move forward?  And what of the critical dimensions – effectiveness, legitimacy and representativeness.  Yet other critical dimensions –  if leaders are to be believed – include also “equality and informality”.  The vessel of the “Architecture of Global Cooperation”  has been declared but the structure and contact remain maddeningly unclear.  The time to clarify is fast approaching.

Speaking of Architecture – A Concluding Obama Comment at L’Aquila

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One of the continuing issues of this G8 L’Aquila Summit is how, or if, the structure of the G8, G8+G5 and G20 process is about to be transformed. With the appearance in November last year of the G20 Leaders Summit followed by the London April G20 Leaders Summit and now with the announced September 25th Pittsburgh G20 Leaders Summit, experts and the media especially have been waiting for both the demise of the G8 and the presumed crowning of the G20 as the sole Gx forum for global leaders.

CIGI Colleagues – Andrew Cooper, Gregory Chin with the assistance of Andrew Schrumm and Chatham House colleagues Paola Subacchi with the assistance of Ruth Davis have just completed an excellent stay and fine reportage at the L’Aquila Summit at: “Tracking the G8 L’Aquila Summit” – a visit well worth taking.  But the question of architecture remains top-of the-mind question for global governance.

And it would appear to be a ‘decision not yet made’.  Notwithstanding the almost universal view that the G20 will emerge as the successor to the the now ‘illegitimate’ G8 process there remains ‘no decision.’

A number of threads remain.  The Heiligendamm Process – what was defined by the Germans as a structured dialogue – has been continued for two more years by the G8 plus G5 Leaders.  This process – now renamed the HAP (Heiligendamm L’Aquila Process) will continue a policy dialogue with a number of Working Groups with the leaders of the G8 + G5 (Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Mexico) announcing that they:

 

…. will review progress at the end of the first year on the basis of a substantive report to Leaders for guidance at the Summit in Muskoka in 2010. A concluding report will be presented at the French Summit in 2011. This Process, which is a policy dialogue aiming at strengthening mutual understanding in the spirit of the work already undertaken, will focus on areas of common interest to the Partners, be forward-looking and produce tangible results.

Quietly supported by the OECD Support Unit led by its director, Ulrich Benterbusch, this policy dialogue has provided a setting where these countries have worked to, “enhance trust and confidence among the dialogue partners as well as develop common understanding on global issues.” A final Report of the HDP was issued at this Summit.

But the ‘final’ architecture remains unclear.  It is evident that the Italians sought to extend the reach of the G8 core by including the G5 on day two (the Italians even added 1 – Egypt to this G5 group).  On day three an even wider network of leaders including many from Africa were included.  The Italians called this a ‘variable geometry’ calling together those countries – and their leaders – that could best address the problem – whether climate change, development or food safety.  But variable geometry or not, the core G8 remained.

Evident or not, it’s not inevitable that the G8 will be subsumed by the G20.  It may just be the accidental consequence of the sequence of the current G8 Presidency but those who have recently held that annual rotating post have generally not been enthusiastic over the prospect of G8 enlargement.  Japan has favored the informality and influence of the smaller G8 and has been concerned that enlargement will inevitably include China ending Japan’s sole Asia representation role.  Italy has favored variable geometry but retaining the G8 core.  Canada has now assumed the Presidency of the G8 and has just initiated planning for the 2010 G8 Muskoka Summit. Canada too has been cool recently to expansion.  A loss of influence is inevitably arise for Canada and other ‘smaller’ G8 countries with the expansion of the G8 to a G13 or G20.

The key to architectural change is the United States.  It would seem that a clear statement from the Obama Administration favoring one structure or the other would likely influence members of the G8 – especially those less enthusiastic over expansion.  Early in the Administration’s life, it appeared that it would review and express a view on the current global governance architecture even as early as the G8.  But following the G20 London Summit, the Administration signaled that it’s priority for the G8 and the newly announced G20 Pittsburgh Summit was outcome and collective decisions and that the Administration would take no position on the future Gx process until after Pittsburgh.

Yet the tea leaves have been stirred – if only a little – in the concluding press conference by President Obama on Friday.  Take in what the President had to say to a question clearly focused on the Gx process and future architecture:

 

Q President, it seems that yesterday morning you had a very spirited and lively discussion within — with the G8-plus-5-plus-1, ignited by President Lula objection to the format, to the adequacy of the G8 as a forum. And, well, I would like — what was your argument in this discussion and whether or not you have the feeling that the days of the G8 are over? And a very — a second question, but very light, after six months wheeling and dealing with these international forums — G20, NATO, and G8 — do you find it more complicated or less complicated to deal with that than with the American Congress? (Laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the — on the second question it’s not even close. I mean, Congress is always tougher. But in terms of the issue of the Gasoline and what’s the appropriate international structure and framework, I have to tell you in the discussions I listened more than I spoke, although what I said privately was the same thing that I’ve said publicly, which is that there is no doubt that we have to update and refresh and renew the international institutions that were set up in a different time and place. Some — the United Nations — date back to post-World War II. Others, like the G8, are 30 years old.
And so there’s no sense that those institutions can adequately capture the enormous changes that have taken place during those intervening decades. What, exactly, is the right format is a question that I think will be debated.
One point I did make in the meeting is that what I’ve noticed is everybody wants the smallest possible group, smallest possible organization that includes them (emphasis added).  So if they’re the 21st-largest nation in the world, then they want the G21, and think it’s highly unfair if they’ve been cut out.
What’s also true is that part of the challenge here is revitalizing the United Nations, because a lot of energy is going into these various summits and these organizations in part because there’s a sense that when it comes to big, tough problems the U.N. General Assembly is not always working as effectively and rapidly as it needs to. So I’m a strong supporter of the U.N. — and I said so in this meeting — but it has to be reformed and revitalized, and this is something that I’ve said to the Secretary General.
One thing I think is absolutely true is, is that for us to think we can somehow deal with some of these global challenges in the absence of major powers — like China, India, and Brazil — seems to me wrongheaded (emphasis added). So they are going to have to be included in these conversations. To have entire continents like Africa or Latin America not adequately represented in these major international forums and decision-making bodies is not going to work.

So I think we’re in a transition period. We’re trying to find the right shape that combines the efficiency and capacity for action with inclusiveness. And my expectation is, is that over the next several years you’ll see an evolution and we’ll be able to find the right combination. (emphasis added)

The one thing I will be looking forward to is fewer summit meetings, because, as you said, I’ve only been in office six months now and there have been a lot of these. And I think that there’s a possibility of streamlining them and making them more effective. The United States obviously is an absolutely committed partner to concerted international action, but we need to I think make sure that they’re as productive as possible.

While the reference to UN revitalization comes as something as a surprise, and given the last effort to revise the governance structures in 2005, I would think even more frustrating – and unlikely – than the Gx reform process, it is evident that the President and the Administration is giving thought to the future shape of global governance.  Look for expansion – and possibly soon.