Global governance is a major question surrounding the Rising BRICSAM at least as we see it at the BRICSAM Community Portal. It’s necessary to understand the organizational and institutional history of global organizations and institutions to appreciate fully the possible roles of BRICSAM. A useful article to aid such understanding comes from my old friend (and I do mean old since the friendship goes back to the world of Cornell undergraduate in the ‘Age of Revolution.’) Arthur A. Stein at UCLA. In his “Neoliberal Institutionalism” appearing in the forthcoming (in fact Amazon is telling me that it will be out in September) Oxford Handbook on International Relations (full cite below) undertakes an intellectual history of international organizations. Early on Art makes clear the evolution and path of the subfield of international organization. As he argues, “The original post-1945 focus was on international organizations, concrete entities with a physical presence – names, addresses, etc. …This rather narrow conceptualization was broadened with a focus on regimes, defined Continue reading →

A number of us were fortunate enough to join host Steve Paikin in his public affairs program, The Agenda with Steve Paikin discussing the ‘heady’ topic of international order. Steve by-the-way, for any of you conversant with the world of public intellectual inquiry is Canada’s answer to Charlie Rose (And I might add, just as cute). Anyway, with producer Daniel Kitts leading the charge, three of the chapter authors from Can the World be Governed? Possibilities for Effective Multilateralism joined Steve for an hour of discussion and debate on this topic. The group included Dick Rosecrance, Harvard University, Dan Drezner, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Patricia Goff from CIGI and Wilfrid Continue reading →

The op-ed by Robert Wright is a serious effort to articulate a liberal multilateralism for the US in the face of broad US and global scepticism over the Bush Doctrine. This piece, as some others including a number suggested by Wright, argues that the damage done by the Bush administration’s incompetence in Iraq, Iran, North Korea and elsewhere has undermined the global democratic reform ideal and, dare I say, liberal ideals more generally. Neo-conservatism’s blustery rhetoric and feeble and incompetent implementation has undermined liberal reform generally and encouraged many on the left and within the Democratic Party to suggest a “pox on all their houses” and a return to diengagement and even uninvolvement. It has sent many of us liberal interventionists scrambling to redefine American foreign policy reducing, presumably, the price to be paid for global engagement. But that may not be possible. A more effective policy may be all that can Continue reading →

As we say in the law, inobiter, Art has argued that “middle powers” though he adds “especially former great powers,” recognize that the distribution of power in the international system has changed but they are, “less willing to have the one with the marbles have more of a say.” Now I suspect that this reference is more focused on Britain and France rather than on Canada, but Canada in the classic IR literature has been identified as a middle power and the GIR Workshop now has Gordon Smith’s draft on Canada and the new multilateralism.

Gordon’s draft can be found at the GIR Workshop “Library” and in the file “Draft Papers.” I am sure that Gordon would appreciate any comments you might have on the draft. I certainly don’t want to preempt comments but let me Continue reading →

Somewhat surprisingly Art has chosen, in part,  to assert a structural explanation to the New Multilateralism – shades I guess of Grand Startegy.  He suggests that part of the “new” is: “historical institutions are dealing with a quite different distribution of power and any new instiutional arrangement will be constructed in the shadow of hegemony (I use this formulation to get across that it is not simply the current distribution of power, but also expectations about the future distribution of power that matter for institutional design today).”

Not surprisingly, Bob accepts the change in the distribution of material power but then asserts that the change in the distribution of power, presumably, currently or in respect to possible expectations for future distributions of power, do not necessarily give rise  to  a new multilateralism as an -ism.

First I don’t see why its structure as opposed to behavior most notably the behavior of the current Administration that explains the difficulties in collective action whether from a security or from a political economy framing rather than the change in the material distribution of power.

And here I turn to one of our colleagues John Ikenberry and a relatively recent contribution he made entitled “Grand Strategy as Order Building” at the America Abroad blog at TPM Cafe (see Links on the left frame).  For John one of the problems in current US foreign policy is that it  insuffuciently recognizes the need as hegemon even in, maybe because of the post September 11th world, to as the hegemon, “…to support support global rules and institutions, provide public goods, and bring countries together to solve problems.  In this sense, I am a American hegemonist to be sure – that believes that the world does not need to fall back to a more traditional balance of power system. But my point is that too remain the leading state the United States has to believe in enlightened ways that will keep it at the center of the global system.”  John argues that the US is likely to remain the hegemon, “[b]ut America’s relative power advantages will decline over the long term.”  In addition he argues that the US is not automatically indispensible.  If the US, according to John, “neglects its liberal hegemonic duties,” and fails to provide the enlightened behaviors then the US will find itself increasingly at odds with other states and these states will find ways to oppose and to work around the US.  For John then assuming the correctness of the above – the contingent indispensability of the US and its relative decline (obviously this will vary according to different dimensions of security, economy etc.) then the way is clear, and its behavioral – “the United States should be investing today in the rules and institutions of the global order – making itself indispensable and laying the ground work for a world where other global powers lurk.”  Thus for John grand strategy is the US,  “…wielding its power to craft consensual and legitimate mechanisms of international governance.”

Thus it is structure with behavior and I would suggest Art can find a more fruitful way forward by his remembering his own words in September at CIGI.  There he talked about “effective multilateralism.”  He posed the question unanswered then but usefully needing some illumination now on how to form appropriate institutions.  At that earlier September meeting  Art raised the question whether it was possible to use old institutions, or was it necessary to formulate new institutions.  Furthermore he suggested that new institutions come in various possible forms – new formal but also new ad hoc.  And if ad hoc then are they closed or open,  can they be regional or should they be global and if global in which dimensions – security, economic, etc.

I suspect new multilateralism revolves around US behavior first and then instrumental choices next.

The analytic question is whether there is an option of unilateralism versus multilateralism, and secondarily whether it is available to all states or is only the luxury of a hegemonic power such as the US.

I want to argue what may seem to be two contradictory points.  First,  there is a sense in which multilateralism is an existential reality.  And second, to the extant that unilateralism is an option, it is one available to all states and not just to a hegemonic US.

1) It is possible to argue that multilateralism is an existential reality.

This is akin to the argument made in the security literature that deterrence is an existential reality and not a doctrinal choice.  However much governments procure weapons and espouse doctrines to the contrary, deterrence is simply a fact of life, one which constrains nuclear states.

The same point can be made about multilateralism.  It is an existential reality.  Much as governments try to deny the reality, much as they try to go it alone, they are in the end constrained by the reality that little of any consequence can be accomplished without acting in conjunction with important others.  One can say that this lesson has even been learned by the Bush administration.  Blowing things up is something the US can accomplish on its own (though even there it needs others’ approval for the use of overseas bases and for overflight permissions), but little else.  In one domain after another, the US is looking for the support of others and has discovered this hard reality of international politics.

2) Unilateralism is open to one and all.

On the other hand, states do have a choice, and the choice of going it alone, separate from its efficacy and advisability, is open to all.

Think of the list of particulars used against the current US administration as evidence of its unilateral proclivities and ask how many of these steps are open only to a hegemonic power.  Could Canada not decide to leave Kyoto?  Could Canada have decided not to join the ICC?  The consequences of joining or not may be different (both for the country and for all other countries), but the choice remains.

The same is true for the use of force.  Take the case of Australia.  It has militarily intervened twice in East Timor, once at the request of the international community and once at the request of the East Timorese government (I think I’ve got this right).  The point, however, is that Australia has the ability to intervene militarily in its region and in line with its interests, and can do so even if it does not obtain Security Council approval.

The issues for any middle power are capability and cost.  A state has the choice of acting on its own if it has the capability to do so and is willing to bear the cost.  Israel chose to attack the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981.  It had the ability and it was willing to pay the political costs of going ahead.

Unilateralism is more consequential the more powerful the state exercising it.  A middle power pursuing a unilateral course can be seen benignly as a free rider or malevolently as a system challenger.  But a hegemon pursuing unilateralism is likely upsetting the very possibility of a cooperative solution.

This post explores the relationship between domestic politics and a multilateral or unilateral foreign policy (and the pursuit of multilateral or unilateral solutions to problems).

One way to cut into this question is to ask whether political leaders are punished or rewarded for flouting the norms of the international community, or even for ignoring the outside world. Alternatively, we can ask whether leaders find it important to obtain international support for their foreign policy positions.

Arguments have been made for two diametrically opposed logics characterizing the relationship between the outside world and internal politics. On the one hand, the outside world is a source of legitimacy for both domestic and foreign policy. States want the recognition of others. Individual leaders go to summits with others as a way of establishing their political legitimacy. The acceptance of a government as an interlocuter by the outside world enhances internal legitimacy.
Unilateral policies are ones that either run the risk, or assure, the hostility of the outside world and thus run the risk Continue reading →