“Pivots” and Great Powers – From One Side

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The ASEAN meetings last week – and especially the debate – or non-debate as it turned out over territorial challenges in the South China Sea, raised again the question of the US-China relations.  Secretary Clinton expressed publicly again the US position that the territorial disputes among ASEAN members and China needed to be addressed in a “multilateral setting” while China was equally firm that the matter should not even be on the agenda for the ASEAN Ministerial. Though discussed openly by various ASEAN members, the ASEAN ministers were not able to issue a joint communique at the conclusion of the meeting  – the first time in 45 years that such a failure had occurred.

The US-China relationship is the key to stability or instability in the region – and indeed beyond.  As I was thinking about this key bilateral relationship I eyed – and was impressed with – an analysis of China’s strategic concerns in the NYT by Minghao Zhao on July 12 (“The Predicaments of Chinese Power”).  Aside from the evident quality of the article, I was struck by the fact that Minghao Zhao is a research fellow at the China Center for Contemporary World Studies apparently a think-tank of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC.  So the NYT is not a usual place for a researcher of his sort to place an op-ed piece.  I will get to this article and the implications for China’s strategic policy but I thought I’d start with the US position.

Now the Obama Administration has signaled – since at least the Honolulu APEC Leaders Summit last year – that with the winding down of US efforts first in Iraq and now Afghanistan – that the United States was back in Asia.  The United States was rebalancing (various terms have been used – the most notable “pivot”)  its strategic efforts from the Middle East  to Asia.  As an example of this rhetorical shift, assess these words from President Obama before the  Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011:

For the United States, this reflects a broader shift.  After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.  In just a few weeks, after nearly nine years, the last American troops will leave Iraq and our war there will be over.  In Afghanistan, we’ve begun a transition — a responsible transition — so Afghans can take responsibility for their future and so coalition forces can begin to draw down.  And with partners like Australia, we’ve struck major blows against al Qaeda and put that terrorist organization on the path to defeat, including delivering justice to Osama bin Laden.

This rebalancing has become know as America’s Asian or Pacific “pivot” – though it is interesting that in the various speeches and press conferences that Obama gave at the time around November 2011 he never referenced the term “pivot”.  But the media has picked it up from others including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who used it in her “America’s Pacific Century” article in November 2011.  At the conclusion she wrote:

This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over the past two-and–a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.

More recently Robert Merry, the editor of the well-known National Interest, writing a book review for the New York Times’s David Sanger’s newest book Confront and Conceal (in last week’s, July 15, 2012) New York Times “Book Review” Section provided a cogent assessment of Sanger’s – and I suspect his own –  “temperature-taking” of the US-China relationship:

With regard to China, Sanger sees a possible “Thucydides trap” (Sanger earlier made clear that he is taking the term from Graham Allison the former Dean of the Kennedy School) – a reference to the the Greek historian’s narrative of the clash born of Sparta’s fear of Athens’s growing military might.  “We are seeing similar themes today,” he writes, adding that what some perceive as mounting nationalistic fervor in China could lead Beijing to underestimate the American response to Chinese adventures in the South China Sea.

So let’s focus briefly on the “Thucydides trap” and the “pivot” in US strategic policy.  As to the Thucydides Trap, Sanger has the best assessment.  In his NYT January 22, 2011 piece “Superpower and Upstart: Sometimes It Ends Well”  this what Sanger wrote:

Or ask Thucydides the Athenian historian whose tome on the Peloponnesian War has ruined many a college freshman’s weekend.  The line they had to remember for the test was his conclusion: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” … Both Mr Hu and President Obama seemed desperate to avoid what Graham Allison of Harvard University has labeled “the Thucydides Trap” – that deadly combination of calculation and emotion that, over the years, can turn healthy rivalry into antagonism or worse.

The so-called pivot has raised concerns that in fact the US actions may feed the Thucydides trap.  Part of the issue is of course that in the face of a growing fiscal crisis with budgetary cuts likely to be enacted after the election – no matter who wins – that this presentation of a US pivot to Asia is overreach.  While Chinese behavior might be constrained and even constructive in the near future, this would only be likely if Chinese leaders were persuaded that the US had a coherent Asia strategy that is viewed as credible and widely accepted.  That is hardly yet the case.  Indeed many in China have commented on what appears the growing crisis in the US and the decline in the US.  This rather pessimistic view of US leadership and the pivot in policy leads the perception that the Obama administration is long on rhetoric but no strategic policy is likely to be forthcoming.  In fact the rhetoric has fed the view by many in China that US policy remains committed to dominance and a continuing effort to pospone the day of China’s successful rise.  As Ken Lieberthal in his insightful piece in Foreign Policy argued, the pivot impacted in the following way:

In sum, the president’s Asia-wide strategy and some of the rhetoric accompanying it played directly into the perception of many Chinese that all American actions are a conspiracy to hold down or actually disrupt China’s rise.

If, and it is a big if still,  were China’s leaders to conclude that US policy in Asia was a direct challenge to China’s rise and designed only to contain China, then it does seem to set up that poisonous brew that can indeed turn “healthy rivalry” into growing antagonism and even confrontation in Asia.  This would be very bad.

So where is Chinese leadership on its relationship with the United States?  I’ll be back with that shortly.

 

 

Image Credit: circleofblue.org – President Hu and President Obama 2011

 

 

 

 

The Current Heart of China “Assertiveness” and the United States “Pivot”

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This past week ASEAN ministerial meetings popped up repeatedly in Cambodia’s capital Phnom Penh.  These meetings served as diplomatic and political backdrop to the growing clash of interests in the seas east, west and south of China.

ASEAN has been a central player in Asian diplomatic and economic affairs since its formation in the late 1960s.  But on its face this is not necessarily more than a important regional organization.  Now, however, at least since 2008, one of the key ASEAN players, Indonesia, has also become a member of the G20 Leaders Summit.  The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) a security dialogue forum has reached out to include key players in Asia – most notably China and the United States.  And the growing territorial claims especially, but not only, in the South China Sea have drawn in these key players to the security dialogue.  Given that there is no larger security organizational setting where not just regional powers but also the great powers engage here, the ASEAN meetings do appear to fit into the global summitry galaxy of institutions.

Much attention has been paid to the continuing tension that has hung over this region now for several years with contending territorial claims to the South China Sea by China, and various ASEAN and members including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei and for good measure Taiwan.  There have also been clashes between Japan and China over the East China Sea.  The maritime area is a key for the global transport of goods and vital energy resources.  Over half the world’s total trade transit through the area.  And  there have been increasing signs of resource riches – especially oil and gas – in the area as well.

The clash of interests was very much in evidence at, or surrounding the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh early in the week followed by the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting.  The ARF is one of the few diplomatic settings for security dialogue in Asia.  This year’s ARF meeting – the 19th –  includes not only ASEAN Foreign Ministers but dialogue countries including – Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union , India, Japan, North Korea, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, East Timor, United States and Sri Lanka – 26 countries plus the EU in all.

Both meetings have highlighted the tensions between ASEAN and its allies and China. The United States has used these meetings to display rhetorical support for ASEAN countries without necessarily supporting any of the specific claims of these ASEAN countries.  The US efforts would appear to be an effort since at least 2010 to insinuate itself in East and Southeast Asia – and draw closer to various ASEAN states especially Vietnam and the Philippines.

In the South China Sea the ASEAN FM have been pushing to engage China in a long standing effort to resolve conflicts between the various states.  On Monday the FM sought to complete wording for a document to set out a Code of Conduct.  The Philippines have pressed for wording that would include measures to resolve territorial disputes and to raise the conflict in the Scarborough Shoal between the Philippines and China.

Manila appears to be leading the ASEAN push to persuade China to accept a Code of Conduct (COC) that would go some way to resolve the territorial disputes themselves. There has been a ten-year effort to complete a code of conduct which most ASEAN leaders have see as a legally binding document that would govern the behavior in the various seas and “establish protocols for resolving future disputes peacefully”. (see the WSJ “Beijing Defends Sea Claims as Clinton Visits Region” by Patrick Barta July 11, 2012)

China has been unwilling to discuss such a document signalling instead that it would be prepared only to discuss a more limited code aimed at “building trust and deepening cooperation” but not one that settles the territorial disputes, which it insist would be better negotiated with each country separately.  In the current diplomatic settings China has urged that officials leave discussions off the agenda.

For China, the collective ASEAN effort to promote a binding  COC has posed unwelcome interference in what Beijing has described not as territorial disputes between China and ASEAN but only disputes with some ASEAN states.  China has insisted that resolution of these conflicts be undertaken bilaterally.

Since the 2010 ARF meeting the United States Secretary of State has made it clear that the United States supports a multilateral solution and insists on the freedom of the seas:

Issues such as freedom of navigation and lawful exploitation of maritime resources often involve a wide region, and approaching them strictly bilaterally could be a recipe for confusion and even confrontation.

The Chinese position has remained adamant in the run-up to the ARF that US and various ASEAN positions were “deliberate hype” and intended to interfere with relations between China and ASEAN.   The Foreign Ministry continued to insist that the issue be left off the ARF agenda.

Meanwhile in the East China Sea tension rose significantly after two Chinese patrol vessels entered waters claimed by Japan. This incident followed an announcement that the Japanese government was considering buying the Senkaku Islands (referred to by the Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands).  Though the announcement was part of a complicated negotiation by the current Noda government caused by strong domestic political interests, the announcement and tensions quickly engaged both Japan and China.

A full blown diplomatic row at the ARF was only avoided when the ASEAN countries failed to reach agreement on the language of the COC.  But the tensions and potential conflict remain.

China has certainly not backed away from the its diplomatic positions.  And as the most recent East China Sea incident with Japan suggest is prepared to exert measured “military” action to underpin its assertion of interests.  Meanwhile has expressed a view that inserts itself into the regional conflict – and likely garners ASEAN country support – but at a low immediate cost while not directly challenging China – yet.

For the moment US-China engagement retains the “upper hand”.  But the position could well sour were military action – even though likely of a rather limited sort and unlikely to be between the US and China – were to occur.

Miscalculations and mistakes happen.

Image Credit: Stratfor 2009

Building – and Not Building – in Asia for Global Transition

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While much of the attention in global summitry has been on the informal G20 “high table”, not unreasonably, there has been architectural action elsewhere in global summitry that warrants examination.

For “IR  wonks” – needless to say I am one – the focus since the 2008 global financial crisis has been on global transformation.  The US is declining – at least relatively – so the argument goes.  The unquestioned US hegemonic leader since the end of World War II – is increasingly debated and  many have suggested that the end of its global leadership.  As a result there has been a spate of articles that suggest a new architectural configuration – see Charlie Kupchan’s in “No One’s World” or Ian Bremmer’s  “Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Loser in a G-Zero World” And the defense from oa number of US policymakers of ‘Leading from Behind” has done little to maintain confidence in continuing US hegemonic leadership.

The attention has passed to others – most particularly on the newly rising states -especially on China. The rise of the BRICS leaves analysts focused on the power transformation notwithstanding that even the rising powers have shown signs of economic unrest including economic slowdown.

But what has gone largely unnoticed by the IR cognoscenti has been the building “from below” of a number of what traditionally have been called regional alliances – I shall come back to to defining exactly what a regional alliance is or is not.  Now it is true that there has been some attention paid to the negotiation of the TPP – or TransPacific Partnership.  Now the original 9 members (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United States)  represent a rather “motley crew” of Asia and Pacific states – driven primarily by the United States.  Noticeably the members negotiating this “21st century trade arrangement” include not a single major Asian economy – notwithstanding that Japan has expressed some interest in joining the negotiations.  On that one don’t hold your breathe.  Even with the addition presumably of Mexico and Canada – it remains a US creation targeting China.  If any of the big four – China, Indonesia, Japan or Korea – were to join then we would be looking at a far more significant trade and even political-economic entity.  Then we’d look at the relationship more closely.

Barring that, however, there is already something worth take serious note of in Asia. This is the Japan-China-Republic of Korea (ROK) Trilateral Summit.  This summit is an outgrowth of the APT or ASEAN plus three – the three again being China, Japan and ROK.  Now the three released a joint statement in May from their fifth summit.  Yup the first having occurred in 2008.  So the “Big Three” having been holding summits since 2008 but a “thick” transgovernmental network of ministerial meetings have been going on much longer – trade and investment ministers, finance officials, agriculture officials, disaster relief officials more recently.  In September last year the  Big Three established a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul.  And the Big Three recently congratulated themselves on signing an investment agreement  (The Trilateral Agreement for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment) and they have agreed to launch an FTA negotiation with in the year.  Also the Big Three have paid close attention and have urged the strengthening of the Chiang Mai Initiatives Multilateralization (CMIM) – suggesting that the Initiative be doubled in size and enlarging the IMF de-linked portion and also introducing a crisis prevention function. The Big Three have also welcomed the start of the surveillance activities of the ASEAN + 3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO).

The focus on finance and economics mark this summit as an important element in global summitry.  Though a regional gathering these three states have strong global influence and the gathering represents a significant – if unheralded part – of global summitry.

So while this trilateral relationship builds a stronger economic relationship, what of the security dimension?  Until now the key multilateral setting has been the 6-Party talks.  Some of seen the 6-Party gathering as the first glimmering of at least closer east asian security relations – especially in light of the failure of Australia’s APc – or Asia-Pacific Community started by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.  But the 6-Party gathering has been stalled for some time due to strong conflict driven from the US- North Korea (DPRK) stalemate over the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs.

Meanwhile, the ROK and Japan sought to enhance bilateral security relations in building a wider security architecture.  But creating these relations have foundered just recently over the continuing sensitivity between Japan and Korea, especially for the Korean population – retaining long memory of Japan’s colonization of Korea in the 20th century.  This sensitivity led the current Korean administration to carry out discussions secretly.  The secret effort negotiated and approved a pact to share confidential military data concerning the DPRK – a step to a closer relationship urged by Washington.  The public and the Korean Parliament were only advised of this limited step on the presumed date of signing and as a result a top Korean foreign policy expert, Kim Tae-hyo was forced to resign.

Thus building and not-building a new architecture in Asia.

Image Credit:  Third Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit – Korea.net

“So Easy” – Trashing Today’s Multilateralism

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After a hurried return flight to Toronto, via San Francisco, I was trying to gather my thoughts and reflections on this last G20 Summit  in Los Cabos.  But before I could get there before I was “assaulted” by a piece from David Rothkopf currently the CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy – “For Multilateralism, Is This the Dark Moment Before the Dawn?”  This piece is the latest and clearest instance of what I call “opinionation” – or in other words  – opinion without much knowledge or data.  Not that I am  suggesting that David does not know about multilateralism.  Far from it (I guess I am saying he should know better).

Indeed David was a major official in the Clinton Administration in Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Policy and Development.  And he has been significantly involved in the beltway foreign policy crowd.  Furthermore David wrote his weekly column from Rio de Janeiro as he awaits  the Rio+20.

So what is the analysis about?  David is not just examining the success/effectiveness of the “high table” of global summitry – the G20 Leaders Summit; he is  reflecting on a wider swath of global summitry architecture though he employs the older term “multilateralism”.  He starts out commenting on the Rio+20, which Rothkopf is attending.  He says: “I am now attending, an event that is likely to be both one of the largest and least consequential in the history of the United Nations.”

But he then takes aim on global summitry more generally:

Our problem is not that the biggest powers are incapable of action to address current problems.  It’s that just when the promise of a new post – Cold War, post single power era of collaboration among nations seemed to be greatest, many of the big powers have revealed themselves to be unwilling to assume the responsibilities of true global leadership – of motivating, cajoling, inspiring, intimidating, confronting or blocking actions by other powers.  It’s not so much that we are in a G-Zero world [a term adopted and adapted from Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group] as it is the most of our leaders are zeroes.

And having identified “leaders” as the operative agent of failure he then frames the G20 Summit’s outcome this way:

One sign of this [this is the failure of President Obama] is the G-20 meeting in Los Cabos this week, which has an official agenda that is almost laughably remote from the big issue sof the day.  In the past year, the group has played a much smaller role than was envisioned at the height of the financial crisis – a reality that will be underscored as the reactive, last-minute agenda to address Europe’s continuing crisis dominates the meeting, mostly through a flurry of bilateral leader conversations on the perimeter of the official event.There will be strong language, lectures to Europeans and pushback from them, signs of the deepening tensions between the United States and Russia,  … and then will shift the main venue for  addressing the global economic crisis back to the G-7, the European Union itself, and the other fora that have supplanted the unwieldy G-20 over the past three years.

While David attacks all current multilateral settings he concludes with the position that things will get so bad that ultimately “Multilateralism will ultimately flourish not because it is more equitable but because we cannot solve global problems without it.”

Well I certainly agree with the final conclusion, I am not sure when that dire turning point will come.  Furthermore I think the evidence he draws on fails to see adequately the current multilateral efforts in tackling the challenges. Multilateralism is hard, messy and often achingly incremental.  But let me suggest that the evidence leads to a different evaluation than that proffered by David.

First on Rio+20. We have known for a long time that the universal model presented by the UN is an unworkable ineffective structural approach.  The legitimacy advocates claim that the universal model is the only mechanism – indeed I heard French President Hollande at his final press conference at Los Cabos advocating for the UN – I guess it is part of French Socialist equity.  And of course he was at a G20 Leaders Summit.  But there is no surprise with Rio+20 other than possibly there is likely to be an agreement at all.  Given that President Obama and his people were well aware of the results, it is no surprise that Obama and other leaders are taking a pass on this gathering.

But the existence of the G20 – the G7 before it – is no accident.  These informal multilateral institutions appeared exactly because of the failure of the universal treaty- defined institutions.  The legitimists will never go away – nor will their call for universal representation – but for effective multilateralism you will have to look elsewhere.

Now for the G20.  The critique by David of the Los Cabos meeting probably requires a longer answer than I’ll give here but let me suggest that a reading of the Los Cabos Declaration and the Action Plan suggest more forward work than David Rothkopf acknowledges.  The structure of global summitry is well beyond the Leaders getting together for less than 48 hours.  There is forward movement – assessments, plans, targets – by the G20 countries.  But it is not just the announcements by Leaders.  It is in the meetings, reports, and draft standards of the many tasked organizations.

But speaking of announcements – the statements by Leaders – especially China’s President Hu Jintao (see the written interview with Reforma) – his urging on the G20 to act collectively –  from a Chinese leader – suggests that the leadership takes the collective behavior seriously.  Are these perfect leaders. Nope.  Do they bend to domestic pressures more than they should – probably – whether it’s Merkel or Obama or whomever.  But they are definitely not zeroes.  Way too easy and rather flippant, David Rothkopf.

I buy the Leaders commitment from the Los Cabos Declaration:

Despite the challenges we all face domestically, we have agreed that multilateralism is of even greater importance in the current climate, and remains our best asset to resolve the global economy’s difficulties.

A huge success – no – but multilateralism – or global summitry – in action and the best means for overcoming the challenges – and it is happening now.

Image Credit: Seacoast Properties

In the Game but Wounded – The G20 at Los Cabos

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A slightly bitter gathering of G20 Leaders.  The tone was set yesterday when the Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, took a question from Toronto Sun Media reporter David Akin to push back against North American criticism of the eurozone’s inability to solve the economic crisis in Europe or to have North American funds to buttress the IMF intervention fund.

As we roll up to the release of the final communique this afternoon in Los Cabos several major news outlets have been quoting from the “leaked” draft communique.  In fact in a Chris Giles piece from the FT Giles suggested that the communique was finalized before the Leaders gathering.  Now we are aware of course that officials prepare the draft communique well in advance – often with bracketed phrases – but a finaled communique without last minute emendations as a result of leaders discussions – and indeed agreements/not agreements – would not be useful.  I am not assuming that it is any different at this leaders gathering.  Indeed other sources have suggested that the communique is being hammered out as I write this post.

The basic outline – which I doubt will change suggests that though leaders pledge support for European efforts  – “take all necessary policy measures to safeguard the single currency” – and to further express the need for growth agenda policies, subject to individual country circumstances – the communique may well lack specifics.  That would be an unfortunate turn.

These comuniques can be “freighted” with rhetorical phrases urging collective action of one sort or another, but success at the summit is determined by specific targets or policies that G20 countries commit to and are published.

On the positive side BRICS leaders at the margin of the G20 summit have agreed to add financial pledges to the IMF intervention fund.  The pledges could include $10 billion from India, Brazil and Russia and then $43 billion from China – a large amount though Japan is committing $60 billion to the fund.

Less positively is the description and details of the action plan for growth promised since Cannes Summit.  Though there is mention, at the moment, the details remain unclear.  Chris Giles has this to say:

G20 statements have pledged to take actions on growth and jobs based on individual countries following their own preferred paths for nearly two years, so the main interest will be in the precise commitments made by the large eurozone economies to restore the sovereign debt crisis.

So we wait now to see the final communique.

 

Lightening Mood at G20 Leaders Summit Los Cabos

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The gloom so reminiscent of the collective mood of  officials and Leaders at Cannes seemed to lift this morning following the Greek election results.  Even the press conference from EU officials Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council and Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission seemed energetic and forward leaning.  The Greeks were urged  to move quickly to form a government and proceed forward on implementing what had previously been agreed to by earlier Greek authorities. Reference was made to the upcoming European Summit at the end of the month with the officials speaking of the plan to raise the levels of banking and institutional integration – as well as fiscal integration, in the Eurozone.

So the warmth of averting disaster filled the room and extended to the audience of journalists and other media types.  Only the Canadian Sun media reporter caused disquiet raising the ire of President Barroso with a critique of European actions by the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. This animated the generally downbeat European official, Barroso who responded angrily to the reporter’s question insisting that Europe did not need lessons from anyone and declaring that reform by democratic countries – all 27 of the EU – takes time.  And, while Europe had to take care of its internal imbalances others – read that as China and the US – had to take care of their external imbalances.

And that, it seems to me, was the unspoken problem left on the table by the European officials.  The G20 Leaders Summit has suffered from a breach in the timeline of results between the Leaders plans and goals and the incremental results from the tasking on medium-term reforms from the many international and transgovernmental regulatory networks and organizations – the ministers, working groups, IMF, FSB, IOSCO, etc.

But added to this timeline rupture there is now a second.  It is apparent that the EU officials are describing a timeline for reform that stretches out for months if not years.  I expect that global markets and non-European officials andLeaders  will not accept such a timeline – even in the name of democracy and democratic accountabilty.  It could get very fractious and turbulent.

Timeline ruptures are politically serious to the legitimacy and success of the G20 Leaders Summit.

All

Leaders and Outcomes in the Los Cabos G20 Summit

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So I am sitting here in the freezing cold of one of the press rooms at the G20 Summit. I could go outside, of course, and I certainly won’t be freezing any longer.

In any case enough of the weather report. On my trip down here – Toronto – San Francisco – Los Cabos, I kept mulling over in my mind Dan Drezner’s assertion of the role of leadership and change. It is not surprising that I would, I guess, given my somewhat wonkish existence and in particular given that I and my colleagues fly all over the world chasing various global summitry settings waiting for the conclusion of these assemblages.

Well Dan has repeted several times – most recently in his June 6th post “These aren’t the leaders your’re looking for …“that leadership can only be infuential at the margin, or as he stated:

… leadership matters on the margins – but power and purpose matter one whole hell of a lot more.

Well I am not quite sure what to make of it. (Of course I could go talk to him – but that would be no fun.) I suppose what Dan is suggesting that large strategic national policy is like a great ship of state moving on a pre-determined course where leadership has the capacity to only correct in minor ways the principal policy trajectory of the nation. In particular in the current circumstances of many of the G20 countries today, the arrangement of interests and political coaltions dramatically constrain today’s leadership.

So while leadership is not irrelevant, this apears not in any sense to reflect the ‘great man’ theory of leadership. Now I suppose the counter to this defined trajectory of national policy is the notion of the Titanic and the iceberg. Clearly the Titanic’s direction was set but an alert pilot or captain could have made a last minute correction that could have avoided the tragedy that continues to fascinate so many observers. And in that failed moment – at least for the Titanic – that small course correction – as frantic as it might have been at the wheel house – would have produced great change in the outcome.

So operating at the margin may be more consequential than I think Dan is implying. Leadership may in fact produce significant and major change even in the face of power and purpose. There is of course no guarantee that such action will occur. But don’t discount leadership even in the constrained circumstances that such leadership finds itself today in most G20 countries. Let’s watch the G20 gathering to see whether the leaders grasp and act on the fact of the approaching iceberg.

Approaching Los Cabos – Waiting for Godot

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[Editor: Apologies to all for the lengthy silence. But graduation of my older daughter took precedence.  And let me just say that Princeton University knows how to conduct a graduation. Believe me!]

Every rescue effort brings momentary relief to world markets.  Within days, however, the  good feeling drains away. Worry returns and leaders then describe and urge the next step to solve the crisis.  We move from Greece, to Spain and now to Italy and then back.  The Eurozone crisis continues – at a low boil – but a boil nonetheless.

As significant time has passed on the Eurozone crisis, we are now faced with yet another G20 Leaders Summit in the midst of a Euro crisis.  In fact the Greece national elections will occur just before the convening of the Leaders Summit – shades of Cannes all over again.  And so the Los Cobos G20 Leaders Summit faces the fate that we experienced with the G20 in Cannes and the G8 in Camp David – a crisis in Europe that is likely to occupy and distract officials and G20 Leaders occupying, we presume, much of Leaders face time notwithstanding the agenda prescribed by the host country.

We are even more likely at the conclusion of this Summit – as opposed to earlier ones –  to receive a round of media condemnation for the distraction from the agenda, the lack of outcomes for the Summit and no doubt a round scolding for the Leaders’ inability to solve the crisis.

And at one level who can blame the media.  This slow motion Euro crisis results in each global summitry meeting “kicking the can down the road” on whatever agenda the host has prepared for the summit.  The problem is that the excuse wears thin after several Summits and it is unlikely that the media will be placated that the next G20 Summit is likely to be more productive – after so much delay – not to mention that the next Summit could be well be over a year away somewhere – and hosted in Russia.

To parry such “negativism” leaders and officials have begun to urge the G20 to not let the agenda to be set aside by the “hurly burly” of the European crisis.  Thus, for example, German officials have been urging a focus beyond Europe – now that of course is hardly a surprise since a crisis focus can only lead to greater pressure on Germany to take bolder action to end this seemingly “never-ending story”.  Thus Reuters reported that senior German officials urged that:

The euro zone will surely be a topic, but as Europeans we also want to talk about other themes related to the global economy that go beyond the euro zone, for example budget consolidation in the United States, currency flexibility in China and structural reforms in emerging markets. … We think when talking about global growth it is important to look beyond the euro zone, not to the discussion to Europe.

German officials also expect to see action – long promised – to provide for the strengthening of the global economy over the medium-to-longer term, but still not likely to provide concrete stimulus plans by the G20 Leaders.

Mexican President Calderon too has spoken out expressing his hope that this action plan will form an important deliverable for this Summit:

(The action plan) will not only include measures to confront and resolve the European crisis, which is ultimately an economic crisis, but will also put forward concrete measures on public policy in key areas in the realms of tax, finance and monetary policy, which will help to boost global growth in the long term.

Chinese officials have also spoken out for the need to tackle not just the European crisis but make progress on on financial reform and push forward on international financial governance reform.  Brazil has raised the spectre of even more conflict suggesting that it may cap its overall assistance to the IMF fund if there are not firmer efforts to address the quota and share issues – though Brazil is aware, as are the others, that the US Administration is not prepared to amend the IMF formula by way of legislative changes till after the November US election.

Forecasts are thus not bright for the Los Cabos gathering.  The transition of the G20 Summit to a permanent meeting targeted on more medium-term issues – whether financial regulatory reform or on macroeconomic issues – seems to have faltered.  It may be inevitable that leaders will be drawn to, or pushed, to deal with the issue of the moment.  But the inability to get out from under the European crisis over an extended period of time has eroded, or is eroding, a sense of  effectiveness of this Summit.  This is not good for global governance overall.

As my colleague Dan Drezner says –  “Am I missing something”.

Image Credit:  Government of Mexico

Getting to the “GUTS” of the G8 Leaders Summit

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[To all my US colleagues – a happy and safe Memorial Day holiday]

Two of my colleagues at the Brookings Institution and NYU – Thomas Wright and Bruce Jones – had occasion in the Argument section of Foreignpolicy.com – with the convening of the Camp David G8 Summit – to reflect on the state of the advanced economies.  Not surprisingly they were struck by this summit convening – especially in the light of the ascendancy of the G20 and the emergence of the BRICS.  As they said:

Friday’s G-8 summit at Camp David may seem something of an oddity – an archaic reminder of a time before the rise of the BRICs …

My colleagues then launched into a rather odd anti-declinist posture and then suggested that the West is not in decline but

Rather, the financial crisis has created a two-speed West.  Four large countries  – Germany , South Korea, Turkey and the United States – are actually increasing their international influence, while the others are stuck in a rut.

I have no difficulty in acknowledging that each of these identified four seems to have weathered the global financial crisis – some better than others – and that each in its own way has augmented its influence, though it would seem that Germany’s influence appears to be all negative – insisting on what it won’t do and others can’t.  But even with this odd assemblage, there appears to be at least two oddities about this GUTS list.  First of course neither South Korea (I did suggest pointedly to my colleague Bruce that Korean officials, at least,  hate the term South Korea – but leave that alone) nor Turkey are members of the old club.  Thus, if anything this new energy for the “West” – I am not at all sure what that now means when we talk of Korea and Turkey – comes from members that are intimate to the G20 – the new head table for global summitry  but not the old.  So I am puzzled.

Secondly, why these four for identifying the new energy coursing through the West.  I would be hard pressed not to include Australia – who has seen sustained growth for some time and now a strong advocate – all right I’ll admit more of an advocate when led by Kevin Rudd – than with the current prime minister – for the G20.  In addition,  and here I would suggest a country that is part of the G7 and of the G20 – my own country Canada.   Strong growth in the OECD and a joiner if there ever was one.

If those two were acceptable we could have “CATS” or “CUTS”.   The point is a range of countries – vaguely identified as the ‘West” have had robust growth and have taken action to “uphold the international order”.  Is it a two-speed West?  I doubt it and it doesn’t detract from the core of the problem – the relative decline in the US economy and more critically US leadership.  Put more positively the rise of a multipower order and how to manage global collaboration in the face of the rise of GUTS, or CATS or CUTS or whatever.

Image Credit – The United States: Official logo for the Camp David G8 Summit

The False Promise of Like-Mindedness

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Observers of global summitry recognize how difficult it is “kill off” a summitry settings.  In 2009 when the United States was eager to promote the newly minted permanent “high table” of economic global governance – the G20 Leaders Summit – there were whispers – unnamed official sources –  that the US was encouraging the “fading away” of the G7/8.

Two problems with that scenario appeared.  First, a number of the “smaller” members of the club – Japan, Italy and Canada – clung to the decades-old G7.  They declared it more informal and intimate in contrast to the  stiffness and formality of the new club.  And the G7 was a setting where these less powerful members held greater sway.  Look at poor Japan.  In the G7 Japan was the only Asian country; but in the G20 Japan was but one of 6 (and yes I do include Australia in this Asian grouping).

The second problem was quick to appear as well.  Notwithstanding early Administration enthusiasm for the enlarged group that now included China, Brazil and India, it proveed to be very heavy lifting to move to consensus and agreement in the enlarged high table of global governance.  Look at the protracted discussion over global imbalances.  American officials began to back away from their earlier enthusiasm and determined regicide and began to suggest a rather more a la carte approach to global summitry – looking at the forum likely to achieve forward movement and to favor that gathering for the specific goal.

So the G7/8 didn’t go away and there was frequent reference to the warm like mindedness that the G7 at least represented.  Here was a club with similar norms and values that could focus on a goal and achieve forward progress in overcoming the collective action problem that plagues global governance.

Well, how’s that view holding up?  Not so well.  So, there we were with about as intimate and informal a setting as you could achieve – Camp David – and what we got was – very little.  And why.  Well, there was deep contention between Germany and the rest over the question of the resolution of the eurozone crisis.  The officials struggled long into the night but the Camp David Declaration failed to deliver.  No agenda – no targets – but strong rhetoric “Our imperative is to promote growth and jobs” and:

Against this background, we commit to take all necessary steps to strengthen and reinvigorate our economies and combat financial stress, recognizing that the right measures are not the same for each of us.

Read that as  – We agree to disagree over growth and austerity.   And as the Multilateralist, David Bosco, chronicled recently in his post “Can the Obama administration get the G8 back to basics?” the US sherpa, Michael Froman turned the agenda in to a grab bag of global governance issues:

But Froman then proceeded to outline an agenda that included a remarkable number of things under the sun, including Syria, Iran, Burma, Afghanistan, energy security, the Eurozone crisis, the Arab Spring, and food security. The scattershot agenda is a reminder of how much the forum has changed from its original economic focus.

So the “like-minded”  – what a number of the original G7 had pinpointed as a peculiarly relevant aspect of this gathering – failed to prove its value.  Sorry global summitry is hard! And whether states are democratic or not provides no guarantee of achieving success.  It remains unclear what the G7 forum, let alone the G8, is all about other than a caucus of states drawn from the larger G20. It might then make greater sense to hold this meeting at an extended meeting time of the G20 – two days plus – rather than one for the G20.  And eliminate the separate time for the G8.  Global Summitry is too precious to squander – like-mindedness or not.

Image Credit: Xinhua/AFP – G8 Summit