Paul Evans – Constructing Multilateralism in an Anti-Region

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In the recently released, “Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia,” edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider (see full citation below) Professor Paul Evans, the University of British Columbia and currently the co-CEO and Chairman of the Executive Committee for the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, has written an innovative chapter on the prospects for the 6-Party (6PT) talks evolving into a new permanent regional security arrangement for the still tense Northeast Asia region.

Overall Evans argues that while huge obstacles remain in turning this putative organization from a crisis specifc setting for resolving the North Korean nuclear proliferation question, conditions are positive for the creation of deeper copperation in Northeast Asia among the major powers. Notwithstanding all the caveats some ehanced possibilty for a regional security arrangement is a key to regional stability. A successful regional organization likely will include all the major pwers of the region – China, Russia, the United States and Japan – and then adding the two Koreas, Mongolia and possibly even Taiwan.

Evans describes a history of unsuccesful efforts to build a regional security organization. As he suggests this is an ‘anti-region’ because of the wide divergence of characteristics of the regional powers. Nevertheless, the 6PT is the latest and most ambitious effort to build, as he says, “an inclusive multilateral forum.” Evans suggests that the relatively positive conclusion he draws is built partly on a current assessment of relations among and between the regional powers including – China-Japan, China-US and the two Koreas. For Evans the prospect of creating such a framework is dependent on 3 critical factors: fear, opportunity and leadership. The first two are evident but the third is more problematic.

The Bush Administration as is generally known was, and probably still is, adverse to large multilateral institutions. But it was and is it clear that this Administration is not adverse to what I would call – “small multilateralism” – that is a limited focused governance organizations. In the context of the North Korean nuclear proliferation crisis, the Bush Administration has in fact insisted on a multilateral approach eschewing calls for bilateral North Korea-US discussions.

The other evident leadership change is China. The growing sophistication and multilateral diplomatic behavior of China in the region, but beyond the region as well, has led China to the point that it may well champion, according to Evans, a Northeast Asia Free Trade Agreement. The 6PT is yet another step to China’s growing regional governance leadership. Indeed the transformation of 6PT from a single issue security forum could see a “small multilateral” organization that might well tackle not just Korea’s nuclear proliferation but Korean unification, BMD, and even the reduction of tensions across the Taiwan Straits. Though such an outcome would be a material advance in regional governanace adding significantly to international regional stability the current Chinese leadership has not enunciated a policy of support for such an organizational transformation of the 6-Party talks. It remains unclear whether the current Chinese leadership believes that such a multilateral security forum with the United States included in particular is the best setting for resolving these regional security problems.

Then, how do we get from here to there?  It as this point the path seems to wander.  Evans suggests that the path to a firm Northeast Aisan security arrangement may well lead through confidence building initiatives erected on expanded ASEAN instruments such as an enlarged Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, or, as he describes it, some ASEAN style discussion and leadershiip forum including one where nontraditional security issues such as: transnational crime, piracy, illegal immigration or disaster relief, could be the on the agenda.  In the end he concludes, somewhat ironically as he recognizes, that the path to Northeast multilateralism is likely through non-Northeast Asian paths including ASEAN and the United States.

While the ending veers of slightly from the earlier trajectory, this chapter serves to encourage  thinking on the creation of this crucial regional  governanace organization.  It also raises implictly the changing nature of regionalism here in Northeast Asia and more generally across global regions.  I’ll come back to this critical definition shortly. For in the BRICSAM there is at least one identified regional organization.  And for the BRICSAM countries regional governanace is a key aspect of possible global governance coordination.

Oh yes, and the full citiation of the volume is: Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, eds.,  Corss Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia, (The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center: Stanford, CA, 2007) The book can be ordered through Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

We’re all Realists Now: Robert Wright and “Progressive Realism”

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The op-ed by Robert Wright is a serious effort to articulate a liberal multilateralism for the US in the face of broad US and global scepticism over the Bush Doctrine. This piece, as some others including a number suggested by Wright, argues that the damage done by the Bush administration’s incompetence in Iraq, Iran, North Korea and elsewhere has undermined the global democratic reform ideal and, dare I say, liberal ideals more generally. Neo-conservatism’s blustery rhetoric and feeble and incompetent implementation has undermined liberal reform generally and encouraged many on the left and within the Democratic Party to suggest a “pox on all their houses” and a return to diengagement and even uninvolvement. It has sent many of us liberal interventionists scrambling to redefine American foreign policy reducing, presumably, the price to be paid for global engagement. But that may not be possible. A more effective policy may be all that can Continue reading →

The “Big Picture” & The “Changed Distribution of Marbles” and Middle Powers, e.g. Canada: Reflections on the Draft Paper by Gordon Smith

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As we say in the law, inobiter, Art has argued that “middle powers” though he adds “especially former great powers,” recognize that the distribution of power in the international system has changed but they are, “less willing to have the one with the marbles have more of a say.” Now I suspect that this reference is more focused on Britain and France rather than on Canada, but Canada in the classic IR literature has been identified as a middle power and the GIR Workshop now has Gordon Smith’s draft on Canada and the new multilateralism.

Gordon’s draft can be found at the GIR Workshop “Library” and in the file “Draft Papers.” I am sure that Gordon would appreciate any comments you might have on the draft. I certainly don’t want to preempt comments but let me Continue reading →

The “New” in New Multilateralism: A Reflection on Stein and Wolfe and adding Ikenberry

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Somewhat surprisingly Art has chosen, in part,  to assert a structural explanation to the New Multilateralism – shades I guess of Grand Startegy.  He suggests that part of the “new” is: “historical institutions are dealing with a quite different distribution of power and any new instiutional arrangement will be constructed in the shadow of hegemony (I use this formulation to get across that it is not simply the current distribution of power, but also expectations about the future distribution of power that matter for institutional design today).”

Not surprisingly, Bob accepts the change in the distribution of material power but then asserts that the change in the distribution of power, presumably, currently or in respect to possible expectations for future distributions of power, do not necessarily give rise  to  a new multilateralism as an -ism.

First I don’t see why its structure as opposed to behavior most notably the behavior of the current Administration that explains the difficulties in collective action whether from a security or from a political economy framing rather than the change in the material distribution of power.

And here I turn to one of our colleagues John Ikenberry and a relatively recent contribution he made entitled “Grand Strategy as Order Building” at the America Abroad blog at TPM Cafe (see Links on the left frame).  For John one of the problems in current US foreign policy is that it  insuffuciently recognizes the need as hegemon even in, maybe because of the post September 11th world, to as the hegemon, “…to support support global rules and institutions, provide public goods, and bring countries together to solve problems.  In this sense, I am a American hegemonist to be sure – that believes that the world does not need to fall back to a more traditional balance of power system. But my point is that too remain the leading state the United States has to believe in enlightened ways that will keep it at the center of the global system.”  John argues that the US is likely to remain the hegemon, “[b]ut America’s relative power advantages will decline over the long term.”  In addition he argues that the US is not automatically indispensible.  If the US, according to John, “neglects its liberal hegemonic duties,” and fails to provide the enlightened behaviors then the US will find itself increasingly at odds with other states and these states will find ways to oppose and to work around the US.  For John then assuming the correctness of the above – the contingent indispensability of the US and its relative decline (obviously this will vary according to different dimensions of security, economy etc.) then the way is clear, and its behavioral – “the United States should be investing today in the rules and institutions of the global order – making itself indispensable and laying the ground work for a world where other global powers lurk.”  Thus for John grand strategy is the US,  “…wielding its power to craft consensual and legitimate mechanisms of international governance.”

Thus it is structure with behavior and I would suggest Art can find a more fruitful way forward by his remembering his own words in September at CIGI.  There he talked about “effective multilateralism.”  He posed the question unanswered then but usefully needing some illumination now on how to form appropriate institutions.  At that earlier September meeting  Art raised the question whether it was possible to use old institutions, or was it necessary to formulate new institutions.  Furthermore he suggested that new institutions come in various possible forms – new formal but also new ad hoc.  And if ad hoc then are they closed or open,  can they be regional or should they be global and if global in which dimensions – security, economic, etc.

I suspect new multilateralism revolves around US behavior first and then instrumental choices next.

Multilateralism may be an Existential Reality but Unilateralism is Open to One and All – AAS

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The analytic question is whether there is an option of unilateralism versus multilateralism, and secondarily whether it is available to all states or is only the luxury of a hegemonic power such as the US.

I want to argue what may seem to be two contradictory points.  First,  there is a sense in which multilateralism is an existential reality.  And second, to the extant that unilateralism is an option, it is one available to all states and not just to a hegemonic US.

1) It is possible to argue that multilateralism is an existential reality.

This is akin to the argument made in the security literature that deterrence is an existential reality and not a doctrinal choice.  However much governments procure weapons and espouse doctrines to the contrary, deterrence is simply a fact of life, one which constrains nuclear states.

The same point can be made about multilateralism.  It is an existential reality.  Much as governments try to deny the reality, much as they try to go it alone, they are in the end constrained by the reality that little of any consequence can be accomplished without acting in conjunction with important others.  One can say that this lesson has even been learned by the Bush administration.  Blowing things up is something the US can accomplish on its own (though even there it needs others’ approval for the use of overseas bases and for overflight permissions), but little else.  In one domain after another, the US is looking for the support of others and has discovered this hard reality of international politics.

2) Unilateralism is open to one and all.

On the other hand, states do have a choice, and the choice of going it alone, separate from its efficacy and advisability, is open to all.

Think of the list of particulars used against the current US administration as evidence of its unilateral proclivities and ask how many of these steps are open only to a hegemonic power.  Could Canada not decide to leave Kyoto?  Could Canada have decided not to join the ICC?  The consequences of joining or not may be different (both for the country and for all other countries), but the choice remains.

The same is true for the use of force.  Take the case of Australia.  It has militarily intervened twice in East Timor, once at the request of the international community and once at the request of the East Timorese government (I think I’ve got this right).  The point, however, is that Australia has the ability to intervene militarily in its region and in line with its interests, and can do so even if it does not obtain Security Council approval.

The issues for any middle power are capability and cost.  A state has the choice of acting on its own if it has the capability to do so and is willing to bear the cost.  Israel chose to attack the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981.  It had the ability and it was willing to pay the political costs of going ahead.

Unilateralism is more consequential the more powerful the state exercising it.  A middle power pursuing a unilateral course can be seen benignly as a free rider or malevolently as a system challenger.  But a hegemon pursuing unilateralism is likely upsetting the very possibility of a cooperative solution.

The Social Psychology of Small Groups and International Relations

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I attended a talk by a sociologist, Noah Friedkin (UCSB), discussing the structure of influence in networks and groups and his findings strike me as interesting for our discussion of multilateralism.

Friedkin has done experiments in which people are asked for some assessment and then get a chance to interact and then make a post-discussion assessment. A general finding in groups of 3 or more is that the second assessment almost invariably is within the bounds set by the initial assessment. Whether people modify their initial assessments or Continue reading →

Domestic Politics and Multilateralism/Unilateralism

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This post explores the relationship between domestic politics and a multilateral or unilateral foreign policy (and the pursuit of multilateral or unilateral solutions to problems).

One way to cut into this question is to ask whether political leaders are punished or rewarded for flouting the norms of the international community, or even for ignoring the outside world. Alternatively, we can ask whether leaders find it important to obtain international support for their foreign policy positions.

Arguments have been made for two diametrically opposed logics characterizing the relationship between the outside world and internal politics. On the one hand, the outside world is a source of legitimacy for both domestic and foreign policy. States want the recognition of others. Individual leaders go to summits with others as a way of establishing their political legitimacy. The acceptance of a government as an interlocuter by the outside world enhances internal legitimacy.
Unilateral policies are ones that either run the risk, or assure, the hostility of the outside world and thus run the risk Continue reading →

What is New in the New Multilateralism? A partial answer

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Bob Wolfe asks an important questions, what is new in the new multilateralism. One of his answers has to do with how the term is currently being used by different governments and different ends of the political spectrum. The tack I take here is to try to present an analytic answer which has to do with the altered international environment.

Multilateralism reflects a basic reality of international politics, the distribution of power. Modern multilateralism, consisting largely of the international institutions developed over the course of the last 150 years, has emerged in quite different settings. The first wave emerged during a multipolar age, when there were a number of great powers. The ability to fashion arrangements for such a setting was critical. Thus, the standard criticism that the League of Nations failed in part Continue reading →

The Legacy of Bretton Woods

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CIGI Conferenc, Waterloo, Ontario June 9-10 2006

The “par value” exchange rate system designed in 1944 ended long ago, but the legacy of Bretton Woods persists in the International Monetary Fund, particularly in its core surveillance function. From the beginning, political struggle has shaped its evolution. Its trajectory, especially after 1973, signaled a continuing attempt by the Fund’s most powerful member-states to find the golden mean in a globalizing economy between binding monetary rules and unbridled national discretion. Principled intentions and ambiguous consequences have been its hallmarks, ever since a process of formal multilateral consultations on exchange rate matters gave it birth. That it remains the subject of tough criticism, sharp debate, and regular reform efforts, even as memories of the original rules and purposes of the par value system fade, suggests the endurance of the normative quest begun at Bretton Woods. As my friend David Andrews argues in a book we are working on, the “binding agent” at Bretton Woods was an “overriding commitment to the establishment, and later the maintenance, of a cooperative international monetary order consistent with two goals: a maximum degree of national policy autonomy and a massive expansion of international trade.” The experience of competitive currency depreciation during the inter-war period had left the strong impression that such an order entailed the development of consensual rules to guide the re-opening of national payments systems and an institutional mechanism to monitor those rules and encourage monetary cooperation. In the first section of the first article in the IMF’s founding document, its member states agreed “to promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration.” Upon this base developed what would become the core mandate and mission of the Fund.

Like an academic department comprised of tenured colleagues who do not necessarily all enjoy one another’s company but who soon come to realize that some minimal level of compromise is in their personal interest, the actual process of monetary collaboration in the Bretton Woods order depended on the existence, but not always the effectiveness, of an administrative entity. Like a department chair, the Fund’s own autonomy would be limited, both constitutionally and in evolving practice. It would, stand for certain principles. It would have privileged access to knowledge that could not always be fully shared. And it would have to be endowed with the legitimate authority to mediate and adjudicate, with the technical ability at best to forestall and at least to manage crises, and, in principle if not in always in practice, with the capacity to sanction. In a world of integrating markets and still-sovereign polities, the Fund’s delegated authority would have to be clear and universally applicable even if its actual power would remain ambiguous and variably applied. In this light, the historical discontinuity between what preceded the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement and subsequent practice remains sharp, sharper in a fundamental sense than the 1973 break in the par value exchange rate system.

Despite persistent external criticism concerning the scope, terms, and effectiveness of the Fund’s main role in the monetary system, member states have never moved to abolish it. To the contrary, formal reviews have been undertaken regularly since 1977, and the conclusion is nearly always the same: Fund surveillance remains central and should be enhanced and reformed.

Heightened attention both inside and outside the Fund has lately also been given to increasing the transparency of the surveillance process, heightening the candor of Fund advice, and (sometimes by the same critic in the same breath) encouraging humility among Fund management and staff. In truth, such ‘enhancements’ would typify the modest incrementalism that has characterized the evolution of Fund surveillance from the beginning. Member-states and critics always seem to want more from the Fund, what they mean by that is often contradictory, and no one is fully prepared to endow this or any other intergovernmental institution with the actual supranational power necessary to match the most ambitious aspirations for its legal authority.

Prominent voices have recently reiterated Keynes’ famous admonition that the Fund must be less in the business of banking and more in the business of “ruthless truth-telling,” that it had to become an “independent umpire” articulating and “policing” the “rules of the game.” Such advocacy is well-intended, even if ironic considering its source in key G7 central banks, but far from novel. The more serious challenge to Fund surveillance is the gathering erosion of normative solidarity represented by a proliferation of regional competitors and alternative forums with selective memberships and weak or non-existent secretariats.

After the emergence of the euro, European members understandably shifted their attention away from Washington toward Frankfurt, even as they demonstrated little interest in reducing their formal stakes in an IMF seeking ways to reform its internal governance. More recently, key East and Southeast Asian states indicated serious interest in constructing a regional system for voluntary consultations, technical assistance, and temporary financing. Parallel efforts in Africa and Latin America periodically gain and lose momentum. Ted Truman, in his new book on the subject, asks the key question: “Can the global monetary system function effectively with more than one set of understandings, conventions, and rules, for example about the trade-off between financing and adjustment or about the ultimate goals of capital account liberalization?”

At this moment, and hardly for the first time, the Fund seems to be going through an identity crisis. What should give us all pause to reflect is the following statement made last June at a BIS conference: “Under its rules, the IMF has responsibility for the exchange rate system and for preventing countries from using undervalued exchange rates to promote domestic employment objectives. Current policies in many Asian countries surely call for more effort by the IMF to enforce this rule. On the other hand, Asian countries are surely correct when they claim that the US national saving rate is a cause of imbalances. And US policymakers are correct when they claim that slow growth in Europe and Japan are part of the problem. Each is correct. That’s why a multilateral solution to put the world economy on a more stable path is both desirable and probably necessary.”

The speaker was none other than Allan Meltzer, the same conservative critic who wanted sharply to curtain the role of the

Fund just a few short years ago. The aspirations and the frustrations of Bretton Woods live on. QED.

Excerpted from: “IMF Surveillance and the Legacy of Bretton Woods,” in Bretton Woods Revisited, edited by David Andrews, under review.

– Louis Pauly, University of Toronto

Multilateralism and the Absence of Disapproval

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Multilateralism and unilateralism constitute attitudes towards the external world.  It is interesting to see how these fit with other characterizations.  Jeff Legro presented a paper at UCLA’s international relations workshop and he distinguished three types of states: trustees, hermits, and rebels.  Rebels are states interested in upending the established order (a revolutionary Soviet Union was one example).  Hermits are isolationists interested in separating themselves from the world (Tokugawa Japan, for example).   Trustees are states who are neither hermit nor rebels, but are integrated into the international community and upholders of the existing order.

How does Legro’s typology map onto the multilateralism/unilateralism dichotomy?  Hermits are certainly not multilateralists, but isolationism would not qualify as unilateralist if the latter presumes some degree of involvement in Continue reading →