Category Archives: US

Defining the Key Relationship

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With the state visit by Hu Jintao to the United States scheduled for this month, experts ad former officials are ‘coming out of the woodwork’ to give their evaluation of the US-China relationship and to declare what is necessary from the meeting of the leaders of these two key powers.

One of those experts and former officials is Zbigniew Brzezinski – formerly a national security adviser in the Carter administration.  In an op-ed in the NYT on Monday, Brzezinski in “How to Stay Friends with China” sets out his perspective.  What Brzezinski wants is a “joint charter”.  What he hopes this will lead to is to:

… set in motion a process for defining common political, economic and social goals.  It should acknowledge frankly the reality of some disagreements as well as register a shared determination to seek ways of narrowing the ranges of such disagreements.  It should also take note of potential threats to security in areas of mutual concern, and commit both sides to enhanced consultations and collaboration in coping with them.

For him the hope is that this joint declaration will:

… provide the framework not only for avoiding what under some circumstances could become a hostile rivalry but also for expanding a realistic collaboration between the United States and China.

It is an odd request – or maybe I’m just too far from diplomacy. But why spend effort on setting a broad declarative statement.  I t would seem to me that making some progress on key issues – bilateral to be sure – but also likely to have clear implications for multilateral policy – seems to me to be a far more useful effort and far less likely to be condemned for rhetorical overkill.

As I’ve expressed in earlier blogs starting with “Jumping to Conclusions“,  is that US-China relations swings from being a fried to being a foe.  What will advance global governance is for the US and China to take steps in global economic imbalances or climate change which points the way to a more collaborative policy that can foundation for collaborative multilateral policy.

Such steps move the yardsticks in global governance. Declarations are little more than rhetoric – and potentially wrong.

China Cannot Rise Peacefully

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The title in this blog post is the declared bottom line from John Mearsheimer’s recent speech (given in Australia in August 2010) and the article from the China Journal of International Politics, (Vol 3, 2010, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”).  Now I promise to get off this US-China relationship thing soon but I couldn’t leave without evaluating John’s speech and recent article.

For those who don’t know John, he is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.  He is an IR celebrity – a rather hard thing to do.  He is well known for developing what is called, “Offensive Realism,”  an international relations approach that asserts that all states in an anarchic international system seek power and dominance in the international system.  This is not classic realism but realism that sees nations seeking hegemony more from uncertainty than defensive actions.  Offensive realism in contrast is realism on steroids.

So John looks at the current situation and sees US-China relations through this offensive realism lens:

Thus, the core question that any leader has to ask him or herself is this: what is the best way to maximize my country’s security in a world where another state might have significant offensive military capability as well as offensive intentions, and where there is no higher body I can turn to for help if that other state threatens my country?  This question—more than any other—will motivate American as well as Chinese leaders in the years ahead, as it has in the past.  … The best way for any state to ensure its survival is to be much more powerful than all the other states in the system, because the weaker states are unlikely to attack it for fear they will be soundly defeated. No country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare strike the United States because it is so powerful relative to all its neighbors. To be more specific, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the hegemon in the system, because its survival then would almost be guaranteed.

John is a mild-mannered –  and a thoroughly likable colleague (actually I went to graduate school at Cornell with him) – who is seriously committed to international relations. So while I can, and do, disagree with him frequently – I always take him seriously.  But as you can see from the quotes above, offensive realism is anything but mild-mannered.

For John the actions of China will be not unlike the United States.  The emergence of the United States as a great power is defined by the US’s achieving regional hegemony.  It is the only great power, according to John, to have done so, and having done so it has dedicated itself to not facing another hegemon.  In John’s world of great powers – best expressed in: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (NY: Norton, 2001)  – a rising power like China will imitate a previous great power – the United States.

It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on the warpath and conquer other countries in the region, although that is always a possibility. Instead, it is more likely that Beijing will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the way the United States makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back.

China will seek hegemony in Asia – pushing out the United States as the United States pushed out the Europeans in the Western Hemisphere to establish regional hegemony.  China will then claim regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.  The struggle will not be identical to but also not unlike the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

For John the world is a world of great powers, not identical to the past but not that different either.  And the significant differences that describe global relations today fade into insignificance in the face of great power dynamics.  As it was; so will it be. Even the dynamics of globalization so dramatic over the last decades fade away and are assessed as insignificant:

My view is that economic interdependence does not have a significant effect on geopolitics one way or the other. After all, the major European powers were all highly interdependent and prospering in 1914 when First World War broke out.

And though the interdependence that John acknowledges was present in the twentieth century, I think most would recognize as significantly different in scale and influence taking into account financial, trade and investment trends.  These trends describe a tight global economic system far beyond the world understood in 1914.  And China is so much more integrated into the world economy than earlier rising powers.  Is conflict impossible? Of course not.  But the dismissal of the global economic context by John is not realistic.

I remain convinced that US-China relations are best described as “yi di, yi you” ( 亦敌 亦友) – “Both Friend and Foe” (see recent posts including “Jumping to Conclusions“).  China and the United States will have to work through periods of rivalry and periods of partnership. Those periods of rivalry could be quite tense but the periods of partnership in global leadership are likely to be quite restorative.

The picture narrated by John Mearsheimer is tragic –  possible  but not likely.  We do not have to conclude as he does:

Indeed, it is downright depressing. I wish that I could tell a more optimistic story about the prospects for peace in the Asia-Pacific region. But the fact is that international politics is a nasty and dangerous business and no amount of good will canameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. And there is little doubt that there is one on the horizon.

Jumping to Conclusions

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I am becoming slightly obsessed, I think, with the views from the commentariat on the US-China relationship.  So I am joining in on examining the ‘horse  race’ slightly after arguing, I think correctly that you need to avoid the kind of analysis that focuses on  – ‘who is ahead, who is behind’ in the US-China relationship – ‘who can dis the other’ – in the ongoing diplomatic discussions. It will yield little in understanding the state of US-China relations.But I will focus on one of these pieces because it underlines the inherent difficulty of analyzing the US-China relationship in trying to read that relationship from the latest diplomatic effort.

The latest article I found was again – surprise, surprise – by David Sanger at the NYT.  In this instance David co-wrote with Michel Wines (see, “North Korea Is a Sign of Chilled US-China Relations“).

Their negative framing comes early:

But in Beijing, both Chinese and America officials and analysts have another explanation: the long silence epitomizes the speed with which relations between Washington and Beijing have plunged into a freeze.  This year has witnessed the longest period of tension between the two capitals in a decade.  And if anything, both sides appear to be hardening their positions.

Then for good measure they quote Bonnie Glaser a China scholar from CSIS Washington and elsewhere with: “I don’t think this is easily repairable, and I think we’re going to have a fairly cold relationship over the next two years, and potentially longer.”

But wait a minute.   Just last spring we were all commenting on the positive turn in relations between the US and China with President Hu’s call to President Obama and then his attendance at the US nuclear security conference in Washington.

Ah but today’s ‘horse race’ is around the Korean Peninsula.  There things have not gone well.  China has been notably absent in condemning the North Koreans – the DPRK- for the attack on the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and a weak Chinese follow up.  Not surprisingly, I think, the Chinese have been reluctant to condemn their ally. For China given the strong PLA (military) support for the DPRK – the short term policy remains to encourage diplomacy and eschew any demarche and public disapproval of DPRK actions.  As the authors note: “…China’s strategy is to reassure the Koreans about their security, not lecture them about diplomatic obligations.” Indeed far down in the article the journalists are more pointed in acknowledging that Chinese leadership is having a difficult time – it always thus where leadership consensus is required – defining a policy direction.  As they say, “… the Chinese leadership is still debating how to balance its interest in propping up North Korea with their interest in preventing more incidents or another nuclear test, …”

But Sanger and Wines are not content to draw out the differences between the two on Korea, and suggest that this tense diplomatic relationship over Korea only reflects a part of the growing chill between the two.  As they argue: “But the lack of cooperation on North Korea only hints at the deterioration in the US-China relationship.” Well maybe it does and maybe it doesn’t.  For Wines and Sanger this unwillingness to condemn DPRK actions is more reflective of a decision – reached at the the time of the global financial crisis in 2008 – to oppose the US where “… Chinese officials have railed loudly and publicly against what they consider to be American efforts to smother their rightful emergence on the global stage.”

While the US has not fully been able to adjust itself to a world without a hegemon, I see nothing in immediate US policy toward China that smacks of ‘hegemonism’ as the Chinese would say.  And while there is a ‘China can Just Say No” school of thought in Beijing there is no indication that this School of foreign policy thinking is now the accepted consensus in Zhongnanhai.

Their analysis of current US-China relations is – “Jumping to Conclusions”.  I have not altered my view that this key leadership relationship is one of, ” yi di, yi you” ( 亦敌 亦友) – “Both Friend and Foe”.  And in that complex relationship there will be rivalry and competition as well as partnership and collaboration. It can get nasty.  But it can be friendly as well.

The Tools of Influence

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Again this weekend David Sanger of the NYT has provided some real insight into the ways the US has implemented Barack Obama’s commitment as a candidate to restore “engagement” in US foreign policy.  While I have posed to you – the reader – that a key issue in clarifying the success – or not,  of global governance is an examination of current US leadership.  I am working through – as quickly as I can honestly –  Steven Weber (Berkeley) and Bruce Jentleson’s (Duke University)  recently released, “The End of Arrogance: America and the Global Competition of Ideas”.  I suspect further clues will emerge from that future post on this new book on US leadership.

But back to David Sanger.  Relying on WikiLeaks, David examines Obama Administration behavior and comes away suggesting:

Engage, yes, but wield a club as well – and try to counter the global doubts that he is willing to use. … Mr. Obama’s form of engagement is a complicated mixture of openness to negotiation, constantly escalating pressure and a series of deadlines, some explicit, some vague.

This article then describes the successes but also the failures in applying the Administration’s policy of engagement as just described above.  While successes have occurred – Russia policy most evidently – there are evident limits – Iran, North Korea and China.  The dilemma is that engagement is only part of the equation; another element is influence.  Fortunately, in this week’s “Week in Review”  is just full of insight in of all things United States foreign policy.

And particularly useful – that is in giving us some perspective on “influence” – is  Tom Friedman’s op-ed in his Sunday NYT piece, “The America Big Leak“.  What Tom points to – and to be fair he has been beating on this drum for some time- the US has little leverage – what I define as influence. The reason – oil.  What external trade is to China; oil and oil US consumption is to the United States.  It is all addiction.

For the United States, as described by Friedman:

When we [United States] import $28 billion a month in oil, we can’t say to the Saudis: “We know the guys who would come after you would be be much worse, but why do we have to choose between your misrule and corruption and their brutality and intolerance?” … We also lack leverage with the Chinese on North Korea, or with regard to the values of China’s currency, because we’re addicted to their credit. Geopolitics is all about leverage (emphasis added).  We cannot make ourselves safer abroad unless we change our behavior at home.  But  our politics never connects the two.

While it may not represent the entire picture, leverage or influence – the same are critical to leadership.  And the US needs to change the equation of influence starting currently  with cheap oil.

Less US dependence on oil would have a major impact on global governance leadership.  But it would not be the whole picture.  Beyond “influence” we need a clear behavioral strategy.  Stay tuned.

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Whose Irresponsible Stakeholder?

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My good colleague from the the Council on Foreign Relations, Stewart Patrick has recently examined the dynamics of global governance in his Foreign Affairs article, “Irresponsible Stakeholders?  The Difficulty of Integrating Rising  Powers” that appears in this November/December issue of the journal.  Now, I always thought that it was slightly patronizing for the United States to call on -in the first instance – China  to become a responsible stakeholder.  So, I find it even more patronizing to call the large emerging market countries the former G5 (Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Mexico) I assume “irresponsible stakeholders” though at least he use a question mark.  I mean really who defines responsible or for that matter irresponsible.  I suspect you can guess.

In any case leaving aside the characterization, Stewart explores the dynamics and architecture of the new global governance order – yes, I use the dreaded ‘global governance’ phrase as opposed to the apparently more acceptable – “multilateralism”.  For Stewart the objective of this US administration and presumably the follow on ones is:

Over the next ten years and beyond, the United States will have to accommodate new powers in reformed structures of global governance while safeguarding the Western liberal order it helped create and defend.

The fear for Stewart, and others, is that the global governance will become increasingly chaotic and that the rising powers will – not possessing the same norms and rules of the current global  governance leadership e.g. the G7 – become the new rule makers as opposed to the old rule takers.  Furthermore the United States will be required to alter its role in the world – leave behind hegemony for a far more multilateral/multi-partner (the current phraseology of the Secretary of State)  role.  The fear for Stewart, and indeed his boss Richard Haass CFR President, is that power will become increasingly diffused and lead to a rather dark scenario: “What if the new global order leads to an era of multipolarity without multilateralism?”

So what impact will the diffusion of power have in this situation?  The principal concern is that such a diffusion will exacerbate the strategic rivalry between the traditional powers and the rising powers.  While these powers may agree on certain policies they may not cooperate on others.  And such rivalry could complicate global governance. To that I say – well yes that will occur but that strategic rivalry will not simply polarize rising and traditional states.  I mean look at the most recent efforts to create a framework for global imbalances in the global economy.  At the G20 Seoul summit there certainly was contention between the US and China.  But the most outspoken critic of US proposals and in the case of the Federal Reserve – actions –  was Germany  – a traditional power and long time ally of the the United States.  And for good measure India was rather positive to the US suggestions and options.

The reality is the United States will have to get used to the pulling and hauling required in building a dominant coalition.  No more – or at least little – hegemony.  The US will be required to do the heavy lifting required of a ‘first among equals’ only member of the international system.  And the multiple identities possessed by all powers of consequence here – and not just the rising powers – will have to be engaged.  The US doesn’t need strategic partners, but it will face shifting coalitions in the context of differing issue areas.  As Stewart writes:

In this complex international reality, fixed alliances and formal organizations may count for less than shifting coalitions of interest.

Stewart is probably correct in assuming that the US will be required to form “partnerships of convenience.”  But it doesn’t necessarily mean that the US must follow the path – expressed by Richard Haass – of a la carte multilateralism.  The US will have to possess a little more “stick- to-itness.”  Less noticeable frustration in various forum would be helpful.  For instance the G20 is likely the ‘proper’ institutional setting for reforming the global economy. Crafting agreement among these diverse interests in this forum is not easy.  This not hegemony or even ‘hegemony lite’.

But as my old heroes – Firesign Theatre – of yesteryear used to say  – believe it or not over the radio:

Living in the future is a little like having bees in your head.  But there they are.

Extending Leadership and Global Governance through ‘Security & Economic Dialogue’

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 The completion of the US-China ‘Security and Economic Dialogue,’ (S&ED) marked an important step in the new US Administration’s policy of engagement with the large emerging market countries.  China begins that dialogue, but it will be continued with India in the near future.  While some may see this bilateral meeting as a nascent G2, in fact I suspect it will reflect ultimately more the US policy foundation for an enhanced Gx process.

President Obama chose in his opening remarks to ‘tick off’ the key global governance questions: climate change, sustainable energy use, stability and economic prosperity, the threat of nuclear proliferation, terrorism and international human rights:

 “Today, we look out on the horizon of a new century. And as we launch this dialogue, it is important for us to reflect upon the questions that will shape the 21st century. Will growth be stalled by events like our current crisis, or will we cooperate to create balanced and sustainable growth, lifting more people out of poverty and creating a broader prosperity? Will the need for energy breed competition and climate change, or will we build partnerships to produce clean power and to protect our planet? Will nuclear weapons spread unchecked, or will we forge a new consensus to use this power for only peaceful purposes? Will extremists be able to stir conflict and division, or will we unite on behalf of our shared security? Will nations and peoples define themselves solely by their differences, or can we find the common ground necessary to meet our common challenges, and to respect the dignity of every human being?

We cannot predict with certainty what the future will bring, but we can be certain about the issues that will define our times. And we also know this: the relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century (emphasis added), which makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world. That reality must underpin our partnership. That is the responsibility we bear.”

There are short term and longer term issues to tackle.  The Joint Press release (Press Release) reveals a meeting long on commitments to collaborate but very short on practical policy achievements at this time.  While this is just the first meeting following the Obama-Hu Jintao bilateral discussions at the sidelines of the London G20 Leaders Summit, it would be fateful for these and other future bilateral encounters to fall to rhetorical diplomatic commitments.  Unfortunately these rhetorical commitments came to mark the Bush and Clinton era meetings.

Nevertheless, a notable commitment that was identified is the agreement to have the two militaries expand exchanges at all levels.  Among those exchanges the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Xu Caihou, will visit Washington this year to meet with Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates.  The two sides also declared as positive the results of the recent Ministry of National Defense – Defense Department Consultative Talks (DCT) in Beijing.

Clearly the global financial crisis is an immediate concern to both countries.  Of even greater concern to the Chinese is the continuing solvency of the US economy and concern that soaring deficits will erode the value of the US dollar to the detriment of China which holds such massive dollar reserves.  In fact China remains the largest holder of US Treasuries today.  The concerns expressed by the Chinese leaders echoed a continuing theme – China’s continuing doubts over the US reserve currency status in the global economy:  “As a major reserve currency-issuing country in the world, the US should properly balance and properly handle the impact of the dollar supply on the domestic economy and the world economy as a whole,” said Wang Qishan, China’s Vice Premier, at an event with Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner at the talks. Wang Qishan later expressed satisfaction over US assurances and in the Press Release the two countries committed to the following:

 

“First, the United States and China will respectively take measures to promote balanced and sustainable economic growth in our domestic economies to ensure a strong recovery from the international financial crisis; these include measures to increase savings in the United States and the contribution of consumption to GDP growth in China.”

Possibly most disappointing was the progress – of which there was little – in the climate change area.  Though the two countries signed and released the, “US-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and thre Environment (MOU) released July 28, 2009, concrete progress seemed to allude these two major carbon emitters.

Both countries resolve to pursue areas of cooperation where joint expertise, resources, research capacity and combined market size can accelerate progress towards mutual goals. These include, as set out in the NYT, article by Andrew Revkin, but are not limited to:

1) Energy conservation and energy efficiency
2) Renewable energy
3) Cleaner uses of coal, and carbon capture and storage
4) Sustainable transportation, including electric vehicles
5) Modernization of the electrical grid
6) Joint research and development of clean energy technologies
7) Clean air
8 ) Clean water
9) Natural resource conservation, e.g. protection of wetlands and nature reserves
10) Combating climate change and promoting low-carbon economic growth

But Chinese officials continued to insist that major steps must first be taken by the developed countries in order to make climate change progress possible.

So we have a promising dialogue.  However, more engagement is required.

“The Architecture of Global Cooperation”

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On Wednesday July 15th, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton gave a major speech at the Council for Foreign Relations – a major foreign policy think-tank in the United States.  It was an opportune moment for a major speech on the course of American foreign policy.  President Obama had just returned from his 4th major leadership Summit since assuming the Presidency.  And as I pointed out in a recent blog post, “Speaking of Architecture – A Concluding Obama Comment at  L’Aquila” – the President began to openly comment on the current global governance structure – in particular the Gx process – in his last news conference at the G8 L’Aquila Summit in Italy.  And, Hillary herself was preparing to undertake a trip to India – a major emerging great power in the G5 constellation of powers -China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico.

In her speech, Secretary Clinton, declared that the US was determined to build this, “Architecture of Global Cooperation,” which she stated required the US to, “devise the right policies and use the right tools.”  Now what is this “Architecture ofGlobal Cooperation.”  The speech provided some hints yet remains frustratingly vague.

Clinton signaled that the new American foreign policy is going to be made up of the following approaches:

  • updating and or creating new institutions for international cooperation with partners;
  • proceeding to engage those who disagree with the US – read that immediately as North Korea and Iran;
  • ‘development’ will be elevated to a major aspect of American foreign policy action;
  • the US will better integrate military and civilian action in conflict areas – read that as Iraq and Afghanistan;
  • better leveraging of key aspects of American power  – economic power and power generally – in the service of American foreign policy.

It is evident that this Administration is promoting a new multilateral action – one which they see as multipartner rather than multipolar.  Officials have begun to use this phrase – multipartner in many speeches.  As Clinton sees it the multipartner approach :

“… will lead by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multi-polar world and toward a multi-partner world.”

Now the Secretary of State recognizes that not all countries will accept this approach and in some cases the coalition will remain a power coalition designed to constrain or deter adversaries.  But to the extent she can, she and the Administration will bring the right tools and policies in a principled but pragmatic approach to create a common-sense policy. Somehow, this vision seems an awful lot like working with ‘friend and foe’ to advance the global governance agenda.  Good to find the US willing to extend the cooperation agenda but unclear that the conflicts of interest – Russia, Iran, North Korea – are likely to remain unresolved.

What then of the architecture of global cooperation?  On the substance side it is evident that the Secretary of State opens the agenda up – she pointedly notes that the China-US bilateral – meeting later in the month in Washington is  both an economic and strategic security one with a key rising power. This is potentially a serious effort to engage the Chinese but a small suspicion remains that this is more of an inter agency battle with Treasury to reengage State in the economic arena.  We need to watch the meeting closely later this month.

Like President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, acknowledges that the global and regional institutions built most formidably after the World War II are no longer adequate and they must be, “transformed and reformed.”   And like Obama, Clinton suggests – repeating Obama – what is needed are institutions that:

“… combine the efficiency and capacity for action with inclusiveness from the U.N. to the World Bank, from the IMF to the G-8 and the G-20, from the OAS and the Summit of the Americas to the ASEAN and APEC, all these and other institutions have a role to play.  But their continued vitality and relevance depend on their legitimacy and representativeness and the ability of their members to act swiftly and responsibly when problems arise.”

But what is that?  It can’t be all these organizations – or can it? And if it is how does the agenda move forward?  And what of the critical dimensions – effectiveness, legitimacy and representativeness.  Yet other critical dimensions –  if leaders are to be believed – include also “equality and informality”.  The vessel of the “Architecture of Global Cooperation”  has been declared but the structure and contact remain maddeningly unclear.  The time to clarify is fast approaching.

‘G2’ and the Expectations Game

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While designed to build consensus among a broad group of countries, a significant aspect of the G20 has been a consolidated discussion between the leaders of China and the United States. US President, Barack Obama and China’s President, Hu Jintao have used these informal talks for relationship building.  These informal discussions have until now complemented the G20 leaders’ process. But if these US-China leaders’ talks take hold, it may also prove to be a principal rival to the G20 dialogue.

A new game of expectation-raising has begun to swirl over what has been dubbed the “G2” in anticipation of renewed strategic dialogue and the home-and-home state visits announced for 2009, with President Hu visiting Washington in late-summer and President Obama visiting Beijing in late-fall. While the US-China bilaterals will not lack for issues, indeed there are already a series of bilaterals between China-US officials, it remains to be seen how in-depth the two leaders will want to harmonize global economic strategies. Will these encounters survive expectations? Will the G2 serve as distraction to the G20 process?

China’s global status can hardly be ignored. While the economic fires rage on in New York, London and Tokyo, Beijing has demonstrated a cool confidence and continued growth. In the lead-up to the London Summit, People’s Bank of China Governor, Zhou Xiaochuan made very public declarations on the perils of over-reliance on a single currency for global reserves, advocating instead for a standardized, SDR-type currency valuation less prone to volatility. In London, Paola Subacchi of Chatham House commented that, “China graduated from regional to global power. It showed political and financial muscles and the appetite to be involved in the global dialogue – with also an interest in developing a closer relationship with Washington.”

A leading voice in support of an informal G2 “leadership conclave” has been C. Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute. As early as 2006, he advocated bilateral diplomacy to support China’s and America’s “joint responsibility” to ensure global financial stability. Recent events have revived proposals for such a format.  These advocates have stressed the need for the two countries to resolve currency disputes and jointly enforce IFI reforms.

In his analysis, CIGI Senior Fellow Gregory Chin suggests that failure or frustration in a divergent G20 process may feed a “Great Power withdrawal into the bilateral track to deal with matters of highest strategic importance. This could mean confining the multilateral track to implementing the decisions made by the Big 2.” This should not immediately be considered a negative outcome. While the G20 scores high on legitimacy, its efficiency and compliance have waned. Resolution of the multitude of issues on the US-China bilateral agenda alone (from trade to currency valuation to intellectual property) could ease gridlock in many international negotiations. However, expectations for a lean and authoritative G2 assume that the two leader countries can abstain from squabbles over human rights, the proverbial ‘third rail’ of US-China relations.

While certainly there are larger strategic factors at play, the success of a G2 would heavily depend on ability of the leaders themselves to get along and work constructively. Can the ever technocratic Hu find common ground with the always affable Obama? The new American President shows an understanding of the importance of the bilateral relationship. Following their first meeting, President Obama noted that, “I continue to believe that the relationship between China and the United States is not only important for the citizens of both our countries but will help to set the stage for how the world deals with a whole host of challenges in the years to come.”

Indications from inside China, however, seem to downplay any expectations of a G2. In the days before the London Summit, leading scholar Huang Ping of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) asserted that “the so-called G2 is both unrealistic and problematic to fit in with the traditional Chinese value of a harmonious world.” By pushing other regional and global developing economies out of key international decision-making, China could risk alienating its like-minded allies in the global South. Continued success of the G20 fits in much better with this approach, and Dr. Huang suggests that China should promote this larger steering group.

Whether formalized or not, a G2 appears to be inevitable, if in nothing but name only. As the two leaders meet, the US-China forum will be cast in this light with enormous scrutiny. ‘G2’ will become the favored term of pundits, perhaps to its detriment.

A major stumbling block for the G2 may end up being the two nations’ cultural differences in their fiscal behaviors. Arguably, the US propensity to spend and the Chinese need to save drove the world into crisis and offered recovery, respectively. However, this balance has proven unsustainable and the macro-economic structure must be fixed. Recovery relies on the two governments providing their citizens with the correct incentives towards long-term restorative fiscal behavior. Yet, to appear successful, a G2 will need instantaneous results.

In his column, “What the G2 Must Discuss Now that the G20 is Over” (7 April 2009), the Financial Times’ Martin Wolf suggests that while China’s desire to engage the US may be self-motivated – to stabilize its US currency reserve, deflect exchange rate reform, and rebalance spending-saving – it is a “necessary condition for serious discussion of global reforms.” If arranged properly, a collaborative G2 would have the potential to remove policy obstacles and pave the way for general agreement across the board. However, if used as another opportunity to name and shame each other, it could heighten tensions in an already delicate relationship.

The most likely outcome is a mediocre G2, one that cannot live-up to the overblown expectations. Here, enters again the G20, this time with a strong dose of modesty and a previously excluded group of leaders more committed than ever to be a part of the process. If however the G20 can forgo this chain of events by harnessing leadership from within and boosting national compliance and effectiveness, plurilateral consensus may trump dyadic centralism.

The ‘Pathway’ To a New Liberal Internationalism?

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The evolving international order and the role of American leadership in that order were taken up recently by G. John Ikenberry in our Global Institutional Reform Workshop (GIR).  John is Princeton University’s Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs and a leading proponent of liberal internationalism.  His After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restrain, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (2001) is a much-cited examination of the rise of liberal internationalism.

The GIR Workshop is a partnership in part between CIGI and Princeton University.  This past August (August 25-27, 2008) at Princeton we held the second biennial Princeton Summer Workshop.  John produced a most interesting paper, “The Three Faces of Liberal Internationalism.”  This, like many of the other presentations, (other chapters will be reviewed here at the Rising BRICSAM blog in the next few weeks) will be brought together, and in, the second Continue reading →

‘Entangling Alliances,’ Global Governance and US Sovereignty

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It has become rather commonplace for US ‘opposition’ to raise the early perspectives of American political leaders in discussing American foreign policy.  Yet such references to these early alliance warnings and the threat to US sovereignty have become overused and are often offered in an unreflective way.  Those who rely on these early cautions, often call on these nostrums abstractly and without any acknowledgment of the context in which they were expressed and the state of the United States at the time such figures as Thomas Jefferson expressed them.

So it is that the new opposition – read this as those who had influence in the last US Administration but appear to have little cache now –  have begun the campaign to limit US global governance leadership.  Two rather well Continue reading →