[Editor:  It is with great pleasure I welcome Dick Rosecrance to Rising BRICSAM and to post his comment on the previous blog post “Not Required to Choose” – A Strategy for US-China Relations.    Hopefully there will be other opportunities where Dick will have an interest in commenting on other posts.]

Historians and diplomatists know that Bismarck’s ability to keep conflict between Russia and Austria within limits was to give somewhat inconsistent commitments to them both. Under certain circumstances he would side with Vienna, on other conditions with St Petersburg. It was this uncertainty that restrained them both. By 1914, all German pretences of evenhandedness had  been given up in favor of the Blank Cheque to Austria. But many argue that Bismarck’s inconsistent links could not long have been sustained in any case. Sooner or later the German leader would have had to decide which was the primary ally. London also moved to clarify its “inconsistent” policy toward France and Germany when Edward Grey succeeded Lansdowne in 1906, embracing France and pushing Germany away. Thus the question is not that a studied policy of ambiguity is not a good strategy, it is how long it can be maintained.

Alan Alexandroff has commended just a strategy to the United States in its relations with China. China is both a Friend and a Foe, so he would have us believe. He is of course right that the balance of interests has not yet moved definitively one way or the other. But how long can such an ambivalent tack endure?  Much depends on China’s strategy. So far, China has acted diplomatically to press forward on all fronts – territorial, economic and political. China has emphatically rejected G2; no agreement was reached on climate change policies; and the territorial sphere of interest line has been moved to the East, to encompass the Senkakus as well as Taiwan. The PLA and the PLAN have not responded to American inquiries about arms restraint and new carrier task forces.

Perhaps at some point and very much in China’s own interest, the Renminbi will be revalued to control inflation and also stimulate needed domestic consumption. Absent progress on other issues, however, that will not be enough to staunch criticism in the United States. Political reform has been placed on the back burner, the PLA seems almost to operate independently of the regime, and China’s mercantilist policies will continue to run up Chinese surpluses and American deficits.

There is emerging a tentative decision in Washington to stop currying favor with Beijing in favor of a more obvious linkage with allies: Japan, Korea, and the European Union. India will be sought as an ally.

In time perhaps a stiffening of this enlarged Western position can produce a change in Beijing. If not, the world will understand the reason. In short, a close tie with China cannot occur now. It can only occur later – if at all.