To Jaw-Jaw is Always Better than to War-War

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You know I think that we – the global media and so-called global governance experts and even officials – sometimes forget the value of former Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s statement (identified in the title) expressed at the White House in 1954.

So I acknowledge it before trying to assess the deliverable from the Third S&ED, the “US-China Comprehensive Framework for Promoting Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth and Economic Cooperation” (Framework) – I won’t even try an acronym for this one.  But the Framework is the the document signed by US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner and China’s Vice Premier Wang Qishan.

Yes, there is much in the way of diplomatic words and commitments.  In other words – “blah, blah, blah”.  But two things of significance stand out.  The first is how in the Framework China and the US ackknowledge that the two are highly interdependent.  Among several paragraphs here is one that stands out.

Each country recognizes that the health and continued growth of the other’s economy is indispensible to its own prosperity.

And they express an understanding in addition that the two have a significant impact on the global economy:

As the two largest economies in the world, economic outcomes and policy actions in the United States and China have a significant impact on the health of the global economy.  The United States and China recognize and take into account the impact  their policies have on the global economy, and cooperate to strengthen the international trade and financial institutions that support global growth and stability.

These paragraphs and others underline how Chinese leaders – at least the economic ones – recognize that  “interdependence” – not unilateral action is the dynamic of economic policy action.  It suggests that leaders have an understanding that national interest may be at the heart of their actions but that national interest alone will be insufficient to secure economic growth and prosperity.

In reaction to my friends then – yes I mean Arthur Stein and in particular Richard Rosecrance, who fret over the parallels between the German- British relationship after 1905 and the current US-China relationship – I think the difference is significant.

The second aspect of the Framework that stands out is the recognition of the importance of the G20 complex in giving a setting to deal with the global economy.

6. The two countries reiterate their support for the G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth and reaffirm their commitments to improve the living standards of our citizens through strong economic economic and jobs growth, and to use the full range of policies to strengthen the global recovery and to reduce excessive external imbalances and maintain current account imbalances at sustainable levels.  The United States and China affirm active support for the mutual assessment process of the G-20.

15. China and the United States commit to deepen their cooperation to ensure financial sector stability and strengthened financial sector regulation and supervision, both bilaterally and in the G-20, the Financial Stability Board, and international standard-setting bodies.

17. The two countries pledge to strengthen communication and coordination and to support a bigger role for the G-20 in international economic and financial affairs.

The paragraphs above reveal that the two powers are prepared to work within the multilateral policy framework being hammered out by the IMF, the G20 finance ministers and in the Framework Working Group and additionally the two at least in this document avoid the excessive reliance on bilateral discussions.  This is important in part because a bilateral economic discussions have been pitched, on the one side, to a critique of Federal Reserve policy of quantitative easing and on the other on currency manipulation of the renminbi.  That discussion is partial and also rather toxic – unhelpful in actually dealing with the global imbalances that generate instability and volatility in the global economy.

My advice to my colleagues – especially in the media – who are so quick to declare these discussions a waste of time and unproductive – remember our friend  Churchill and the value of “jaw-jaw”.

Fear of Clapping with One Hand

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Today, Monday and tomorrow the so-called G-2 are meeting in Washington.  This is the third round of the US-China Security and Economic Dialogue (S&ED).  Led by Timothy Geithner Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the US side and Vice Premier Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo on the Chinese side, this meeting, as with others, is designed with the hope and intent for these two powers to engage on issues of concern to both.

The S&ED has come to involve numerous officials from each country – a major encounter of Chinese (20 agencies) and American (16 agencies) officials.  Notwithstanding the large – possibly overlarge – array of officials and regulators, past meeting have produced little in the way of concrete results.  But the hope remains that this immediate gathering will advance discussions on critical issues – currency, debt, human rights, Korea and Iran.

Let’s see tomorrow.

 

Is it America or is it the Liberal World Order That is Passing

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[Editor’s note:  I’d like to thank Arthur Stein, UCLA and Richard Rosecrance, Harvard for the early discussions we held on the issues raised in this blog post.  They are not responsible for any of the opinions expressed here. ASA]

Pronouncements of American decline miss the real transformation under way today. What is occurring is not American decline but a dynamic process in which other states are catching up and growing more connected.

The above excerpt is the opening to the concluding section of John Ikenberry’s precis – his article in the recent May/June edition of Foreign Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World:  Internationalism After America”  of his most recent book, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order.

It may well be that a final evaluation of Ikenberry’s examination of the evolving global governance system will require a close reading of the book.  But for the moment let me assume that this FA is a relevant summary of the Liberal Leviathan’s thesis.

The question that John poses is whether we are witnessing  just the decline of the United States – or I suppose slightly more correctly the ‘rise of the rest’ – or, in fact, we are also witnessing the decline of the liberal world order promoted most fiercely by the United States. If the latter is true then the global order will not only look less American but less liberal. As the newly emerging states become more central to the world order, they will bring a more illiberal – less open, less rules-based and less democratic – world order.  As John identifies this:

Rather, the struggle will be between those who want to renew and expand today’s system of multilateral governance arrangements and those who want to move to a less cooperative order built on spheres of influence.

The global governance system of the future will be more fragmented, less multilateral and more mercantilist.  But John argues that this is not the future of the international order.  And he suggests this more illberal outcome is not necessarily in our future by  distinguishing and separating the current multilateral order from the United States.  So while the global governance system has been built by the United States and supported by its traditional allies, liberal internationalism, “openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism” will continue to exist without the United States as the hegemon. While the US, according to John, will not rule in the way it has in the decades since World War II, it will still be able to lead – and presumably it will do so.  And the reason for this is:  the rising powers – the Chinas, Brazils and Indias – are also wed to the global governance order of liberal internationalism.

For John the current global order is built on two ordering principles – the first  built on the evolution of states and the principles of state sovereignty and and norms of more or less collaborative great power relations.  And the second is built on the liberal order of a open, rules-based and and democratic international order.  Indeed the building of the state system was necessary for the building of the second – the liberal order.

Now international relations specialist have long debated whether a hegemon – the UK in the 19th century and the United States in the second half of the twentieth century – is a necessary element for maintaining a liberal order.  With John’s identified bifurcation, we need to determine whether the evolving international system of great powers is able to maintain a stable international order and to promote a liberal order.

John is certainly right that there is no strong evidence that the current Chinese leadership – the exemplar of the newly arrived rising states – rejects either element of the order – that is collaborative great power relations and as well a liberal order of open trade and a rules-based system.  But not having rejected the order as it currently exists is not the same thing as saying the Chinese leadership accepts and is prepared promote these norms and mechanisms of the global order.  And it it is possible that China might accept one principle – say great power stability – and yet fail to promote the other – the liberal order.  John acknowledges that stability is required for a liberal order.  But could it be that the evolving system may promote stability and great power accomodation – of a rather classic form – without necessarily promoting or even maintaining the current liberal order.

Where is the Chinese leadership?  There is no question that China has benefited dramatically from both elements of the order – international stability and openness – but China’s emergence as a great power and the perception – and I emphasize perception of US decline – may have led some of China’s current leaders to reassess China’s place in the global order and reflect on how it must act or indeed how others – especially the United States – must act.  Further, the perception of decline worryingly may have “infected” the next generation of leadership that will assume leadership in another year.

Let me look briefly at the second element of the current order – its Liberal nature.  Certainly China has become deeply integrated in the international economy – and that the degree of integration contrasts vividly with other rising powers of earlier decades.  But many suggest that China has dramatically benefited from advantages not employed by others.  China’s export trade policy has driven its economic growth – and it has been a boon to US multinational corporations as well, might I say – but the imbalances generated in the system are creating volatility and instability.  And it would appear the leadership – notwithstanding all the statements of a turn to a more domestic consumption-based model – is unwilling to abandon the export growth model that brought it such rapid economic growth.  Remember the leadership believes that it is essential to maintain high growth to avoid social unrest.

And as for democracy, the Party appears to determined to maintain one-party rule notwithstanding that the rule of law and democratic practices are the foundation of modernity.  While democracy may be the ideal there appears to be no appetite for it among the current leadership and there is nothing to suggest that the coming new generation of leadership is in any degree more enticed by the ideal notwithstanding the rise of a middle class in China. As a punctuation mark it is clear that China does not accept humanitarian intervention the newest aspect internationally of the liberal world order.

And as for multilateralism and the acceptance of restraint and collaborative great power relations, the signs are there but unilateralism and regional dominance have not disappeared from Chinese policy.  Just when you think the Chinese have accepted collaborative great power relations and multilateralism, there are the behaviors, or lack of behaviors, over Korea, the South China Seas and military – to – military relations with the US.

So there is a large question mark and not an explanation mark on Chinese policy and its support for a liberal order.  But the question of the passing of a liberal order is not just to be laid at the doorstep of China.  It is also a question mark  that now lies over US policy.  The continuing illiberalism over trade policy – the assertion continuously of a lack of a level playing field   – is a marked contrast in US foreign policy to earlier periods of liberal leadership.  The so-called “leading from behind” strategy – whatever that is – of the current US Administration leads to rising questions of US leadership – not just rule.  The chaos of domestic politics that undermines the prospect of the US dealing with its fiscal situation also raises concern that it will – and maybe cannot lead.

The saving element of this particular question – the maintenance of a liberal order, may come down to definition.  As one of my close colleagues Arthur Stein from UCLA asks “What is the liberal order?”  Maybe just as we have built a literature that examines the varieties of capitalism, so, according to Arthur, we must try and determine the varieties of liberalism that may still represent an international liberal order.   It may still be a liberal order notwithstanding more managed exchange rates and new rules on capital controls.  Or maybe not.

So the question of what is recognized as a liberal order may strongly influence whether we we are able to assess whether a liberal order can be maintained with or without the United States.  The likely reality is that the liberal order is not just built on US leadership but it surely includes US leadership.  It is a more open question whether we need China and others to sustain the liberal order.  But it too is a question that needs to be answered.

The liberal order – however defined – may survive China’s growing great power presence,  but I think it quite possible that without US participation not only will US leadership disappear but also the liberal order it built over the decades.  Then the remaining question will be, can we retain collaborative and accommodative great power relations.

 

 

The agenda for the renewal of the liberal international order should be driven by this same imperative: to reinforce the capacities of national governments to govern and
achieve their economic and security goals. … In this new age of international
order, the United States will not be able to rule. But it can still lead.

Lost in the Global South

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Your fearless Celebrity Blogger has a new book out on internet gambling entitled Internet Gambling Offshore: Caribbean Struggles over Casino Capitalism World of Celebrities (Palgrave Macmillan IPE series). The main idea of the  book is how Antigua- a state of 70,000 people – took on the US in a protracted fight at the World Trade Organization over the future of this ascendant cyber-business.  Without the resources of a big country Antigua demonstrated an unanticipated amount of creative diplomatic ingenuity taking on the US, harnessing the power of key (mostly American) entrepreneurs who saw internet gambling as a real start up opportunity.  In doing so Antigua gained both cult-status and notoriety.

Beyond the details of this fascinating study, the Antigua challenge raises the question whether in a world of accelerated globalization – and in many ways significant homogenization – can small states nevertheless produce recognized celebrity activists that can play on the global stage?

If speaking English is one necessary ingredient, then countries from the Anglophone Caribbean possess a built-in advantage. But there does not appear to be these days anything like a Bob Marley – a native of Jamaica – but a huge global celebrity.  As mentioned in earlier blog posts, the only one who can claim something close to a Marley status today is Wyclef Jean.  But Wyclef was raised in the US and has long lived there.  And this has influenced the career of Wyclef.

One explanation for the lack of celebrity from the global South is simply that celebrities from small countries – especially in the global South – fly under the radar. Cricket or football/soccer stars (or even ex stars, as exhibited by the number who are in the adverts especially for mobile phone companies!) can be huge in a Caribbean island but still hold no name recognition in North America.

Another explanation is that the hybrid nature of many of these celebrities in the  diaspora doesn’t translate into a fixed identity. Wyclef himself ran into this problem when he was barred from running for president in Haiti because he had not lived there for many years. But equally North American audiences don’t see Rihanna as being from Barbados, even though she was appointed as a Culture and Youth ambassador. Among Bajans, this appointment attracted equal degrees of cult status but also stigmatization.

The final explanation is a more commercial and economic one. Having ‘made it’, many stars from small – or for that matter big – countries in the global South are unwilling to divert themselves from material success. As we have seen from the past St Barts parties of the Gaddafi family many celebrities, including Beyoncé, Usher and Mariah Carey have little awareness of political events or personalities – as long as they get paid.

Notwithstanding these constraints the reach of celebrity activism can extend to small countries. If Bono (and Bjork from another small island, Iceland) can combine to achieve a global reach, a hybrid identity, and an association with specific causes, there is no question that other celebrities whether from small island states or from the global South can reach cult status. If Bob Marley transformed musical culture there is hope for others to do the same whether from the global South or not.

How Wide Spread the “Bad Boy” Behavior – The Case of Charlie Sheen

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It is hard to ignore Charlie Sheen and his ‘bad boy’ tour even if his basic image is far removed from celebrity activism.

The nature of Charlie’s engagement contrasts rather markedly even with other members of the Sheen family. How could such an authentic and sustained celebrity activist such as Martin Sheen pass on so few of those characteristics to his son? Does this evident divergence of behavior signal a generational split making the issue more sociological rather than psychological?

Just as a reminder to those who do not follow this side of celebrity life so closely, Martin Sheen, Charlie’s father, has a long history of support for the disadvantaged –  from US Latino farm workers to under-paid hotel staff.  Martin Sheen also has lent support for a myriad environmental causes and he was an open opponent to the Iraqi war.

Charlie Sheen to his credit has supported various AIDS campaigns but is best known for his conspiracy-oriented views of 9/11, even going so far as to suggest that the Bush administration may have been responsible for the attacks.

So some fathers have to expect the unexpected in the way of their children’s public behavior!

On another theme, does “bad” celebrity activist behavior alter the public image of celebrities generally? If Charlie Sheen is constantly erratic, do we expect various aspects his “bad” behavior to be displayed by other celebrities?  Just to give one illustration, do we expect Madonna’s efforts to build schools through her foundation  in Malawi to end in disaster, or did we still expect a positive outcome?  Is it a good idea to use Ginger Spice as a UN goodwill ambassador or should we fear bad celebrity behavior?

Although a number of celebrities appear to be “disasters waiting to happen” others can surprise us. Bob Geldof has come a long way since his bad boy days with the Boomtown Rats. Sean Penn, best known for meeting Saddam Hussein in December 2002, has become deeply engaged – and apparently quite effective – in the Haiti relief efforts.

Is there hope for Charlie Sheen, then? Most probably not! This probably about personality.  But nothing in celebrity activism is clear-cut. Sean Penn invited Charlie Sheen to visit Haiti in March 2011, and Charlie responded by telling Access Hollywood: “I’m excited as hell because, you know, if I can bring the attention of the world down there, then clearly this tsunami keeps cresting.”

So who knows!

Meanwhile – The Beat Goes On

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My last blog post The Inflation Tiger Rising concerned the rising tide of inflation in the BRICS countries – and the government efforts in China and Brazil to rein inflation in.

This post examines the other side of that coin – the impact of the US dollar on global prices and interest rates. A recent article by Tom Lauricella at The Wall Street Journal (see “Dollar’s Decline Speed Up, With Risks for the US” (April 23, 2011) chronicles the decline of the US dollar.

The US dollar as we all know is the international reserve currency.  Most international transactions, and much of the key international pricing – oil for example – is done in US dollars.

The US dollar has declined 1 percent in the past week against a basket of of currencies, repeating a similar drop of the week before.  In the past week the dollar as measured by the ICE US dollar index hit its lowest point since the lowest point of the index on March 16, 2008 – the Index fell to 70.698 (the Index had begun in 1973 after the demise of the Bretton Woods System of fixed rates at 100.).  Just before the 2008 global financial crisis the dollar had lost some 40 percent of its value against the basket of 6 currencies including the Pound, Euro, Canadian dollar and Japanese Yen.  This low point in 2008 represented a a steady decline of six-years of the dollar’s value.  As noted above, the Index is approaching that low once again.

The US dollar depreciation is a product of a low and continuing interest rate policy and the the growth differentials with the emerging market countries.  The rising price of oil is also a product of the depreciating dollar adding to inflation fears in the US.  The inflation impulse in the BRICS could add another element in the decline of the dollar as well, of course, the fears of the US deficit and debt and the fears that US politics will make reaching a sensible deficit strategy almost impossible.

The declining US dollar has led China officials to allow a steady appreciation of the renminbi in the last few weeks.  While US officials have urged a significant appreciation in the renminbi,  it leads Chinese officials to be less needful of purchasing US dollar debt with China’s now outsized $3 trillion exchange surplus.

The vicious as opposed virtuous cycles of exchange remain.

The Inflation Tiger – Rising

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The announced inflation rate for China signaled again the emergence of inflation as a serious global economic issue.  At the moment it lies principally with large emerging market countries notably in China, India and Brazil.

The Chinese government has targeted 4 percent.  But China’s consumer prices rose at 5.4 percent on a year-on-year basis in March.  This level represents the biggest inflation jump since July 2008.

Meanwhile in India inflation rose at almost 9 percent in March after rising 8.3 percent in February.

Finally, in Brazil the consumer price benchmark rose to 6.44 percent, which is the fastest rate in 2 years.

These major emerging economies are responding with increases in interest rates.  Thus, China’s central bank announced recently its fourth increase in cash reserves for the large banks in China.  These banks must now set aside 20.5 percent  of their cash reserves representing an increase of half percent.  It is then hoped that banks in will reduce their loans to take account of the need to retain larger cash reserves.

Brazil raised its central bank rate to 12 percent representing a quarter point increase – this after two previous increases of a half percentage each.  This interest rate is the highest of any major economy.

All these emerging markets, and others, plus developing countries are experiencing significant increases in food prices as well as energy prices.  The interest rates and inflation rates appear to contrast with the traditional economies – the US core rate rose at 1.2 percent, though the CPI is at 2.7 percent and Europe with a 2.7 percent increase though this represents the highest rate in two years. This increase though significantly lower than the large emerging markets has prompted an interest rate rise by the European Central Bank.

The rising emerging market rates – have helped fuel the appreciation of their currency – the Real has risen some 40 percent since early 2009.  Yet this interest rate efforts  – to deal with inflation – have had the perverse effect of only further encouraging capita inflows precisely what the the Brazilian government, for example, has been trying to staunch since it only causes the currency to further appreciate.  China does not suffer from this vicious cycle only because its currency is managed – indeed presumably significantly undervalued – as argued by US officials and others.

Where does this leave the large emerging markets.  For China the rising inflation may encourage a more rapid appreciation of its currency. Wage and product price increases may likely follow and the virtual circle where China growth and lower pricing may come to an end.  China may well export inflation as well as goods.  India may do the same.

For Brazil there are strong voices urging that the Brazilians need to shift to their own form of managed currency (see Roberto Luis Troster’s  Feature of the Week at the Munk School Portal) to constrain the vicious cycle of inflation and interest rate hikes leading to further currency appreciation.

The Inflation Tiger is indeed dangerous.

‘Step by Step’

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This post hearkens back to two earlier posts.  The first the Conference in Nanjing at the end of last month on the international monetary system, “A Seminar on Money”  bringing together finance ministers, bankers and experts.  The second was participation by a number of  global governance bloggers over the question of the effectiveness of the G2o, “Punching Below its Weight” and “It’s About “Effectiveness” Stupid“.

So here we are a step further.  The G20 finance ministers met just last Friday during the Spring Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington.  And at the end of the meeting the finance ministers and central bankers announced their agreement on the criteria for IMF scrutiny of countries.  The communique ending the meeting repeated that the G20 had agreed on a set of indicators to be used to assess persistent imbalances:

(i) public debt and fiscal deficits; and private savings rate and private debt;

(ii) and the external imbalances composed of the trade balance and net investment income flows and transfers whilst taking due consideration of exchange rates, fiscal, and monetary and other policies.

Now the bolded element is where the real compromise in the February G20 finance ministers efforts occurred.  The Chinese wanted no mention at all of exchange rates and had forced exchange rates off the table but the final communique brought them back in this manner.

With this Friday communique (April 15th) , G20 finance ministers agreed on indicative guidelines against which each of the indicators will be examined.  A number of modeling approaches was identified.  And it was then agreed that where at least two of the four approaches showed large imbalances those countries will be assessed in greater depth.  In carrying out the assessment, the communique indicated that, “we will take due account of the exchange rate and monetary policy frameworks of members” – read this as China and the United States.

And the finance ministers and central bankers agreed on a list of countries to receive special scrutiny from the IMF.  While the list was not published the measures chosen indicate that these countries will include: the United States, China, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and the EU.

Another incremental step – and that is all – but step by step the G20 is building a new framework to evaluate global imbalances and then seek, hopefully, to recommend changes to current macroeconomic policy.

Operating on the Front Lines

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There is lot going on in the world of celebrity activism.  I hardly know where to start.  However one episode in the midst of the Libya crisis rises to the top of my celebrity blogger list. The Libyan “humanitarian intervention” helps to tease out a major puzzle about the engagement by celebrities in world affairs. The puzzle – how does the profile and projection of celebrities from the world of entertainment differ from the profile given to public intellectuals?

As I have noted in previous posts one of the fundamental shifts in celebrity activism has been on the level of intensity. As opposed to simply becoming the recognizable name and face spokespeople for particular causes, select celebrities have moved to the front lines. This trend stands out among the celebrities I have profiled up to now: Angelina Jolie, George Clooney, Mia Farrow and Bono and Bob Geldof. But this approach is evident for a wider celebrity group including Richard Gere, Bianca Jagger and others.

Adding to the intensity is the willingness of celebrities to make normative judgments of right and wrong in conflicts. Attempts to name and shame have become a tool in the repertoire of growing celebrity activism.

Given this contextual what then is to be made of the story of a well-known French public intellectual – Bernard Henry Lévy (or BHL to audiences in France and beyond) who recently conducted a secret mission for President Sarkzoy.  His mission – make contact with Libyan rebels. One way of interpreting this mission is to view it as an updated version celebrity diplomacy – the mobilization by states of public intellectuals for ‘ambassadorial’ roles.  This traditional celebrity diplomacy goes back to the 18th century with the appointment of Benjamin Franklin to represent the US at the court of France.

Another way of looking at the BHL episode is to relate it to a a competitive dynamic between public intellectuals and celebrity activists. As Bono, Angelina and George Clooney have grabbed attention for the intensity of engagement on select global issues, public intellectuals have been relegated to armchair experts. Worse for these public intellectuals there is the added dilemma that a good number of these experts clearly got it wrong on big issues.  The most notable “wrong view” was the support provided by many liberal as well as conservative public intellectuals for the 2003 Iraq invasion.

The BHL mission suggests, however, that public intellectuals can get out of their armchairs and operate on the front lines of international crises. Although a number of celebrity activists have made a impact by flirting with danger, including Princess Diana’s famous trip to the anti-personnel land mine fields of Angola, few narratives have the verve of BHL’s top-secret mission. How can you compete with a commandeered vegetable truck racing across the desert to rendezvous with the rebels fighting the Gaddafi regime (James Crabtree, ‘Philosophes sans frontieres as Plato battles Nato’, Financial Times, April 2/3, 2011).

The big question remaining, however, is whether this BHL intervention will represent a “high wire” solo act; or alternatively will secret mission become iconic leading to various  copycat actions by public intellectuals.

Can the US Steer in Turbulent Waters?

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As I read the posts of two friends and colleagues, I realize how much I miss our conversations.  This exchange serves as a poor substitute.  The current prod for discussion is Henry Kissinger’s review of a new biography of Bismarck and what can be learned about how the US can manage a difficult and mixed-motive relationship (one that contains elements of conflict as well as cooperation) with China.  In his post, Alan Alexandroff puts the challenge as one of holding “irreconcilables together.”  And he concludes,

“If the policy is a product of a unique diplomatic skill – as proved to be the case with Bismarck – then such behavior and policy – keeping China as both a friend and a foe – will prove equally impossible.  The future then will be riven with competition and even conflict.  Not a happy thought.”

Dick Rosecrance’s reply to the possibility of an ambivalent and inconsistent policy towards China is to argue that the requisite Chinese reciprocity has not been forthcoming and that the US is already shifting towards a policy of linking with allies in the hope that “a stiffening of this enlarged Western position can produce a change in Beijing.”

I want to make only one observation, and that is to ask whether the kind of policy Bismarck pursued is possible in a polity such as the US.  Kissinger himself discovered, as National Security Advisor and as Secretary of State, that such inconsistency was difficult to sustain in the US political system.  In his review, Kissinger quotes from Jonathan Steinberg’s biography, noting that Bismarck accomplished what he did “without commanding a single soldier, without dominating a vast parliamentary majority, without the support of a mass movement, without any previous experience in government and in the face of national revulsion at his name and his reputation.”  Moreover, he served for 28 years, first as minister president of Prussia and then as chancellor of Germany.  Neither such continuity in office, nor such an independent ability to craft policy exists in the US today.

On the other hand, without a coherent grand strategy, and given the shifts in recent administrations, the US has generated plenty of inconsistency and ambivalence in our treatment of China.