You know I think that we – the global media and so-called global governance experts and even officials – sometimes forget the value of former Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s statement (identified in the title) expressed at the White House in 1954.

So I acknowledge it before trying to assess the deliverable from the Third S&ED, the “US-China Comprehensive Framework for Promoting Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth and Economic Cooperation” (Framework) – I won’t even try an acronym for this one.  But the Framework is the the document signed by US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner and China’s Vice Premier Wang Qishan.

Yes, there is much in the way of diplomatic words and commitments.  In other words – “blah, blah, blah”.  But two things of significance stand out.  The first is how in the Framework China and the US ackknowledge that the two are highly interdependent.  Among several paragraphs here is one that stands out.

Each country recognizes that the health and continued growth of the other’s economy is indispensible to its own prosperity.

And they express an understanding in addition that the two have a significant impact on the global economy:

As the two largest economies in the world, economic outcomes and policy actions in the United States and China have a significant impact on the health of the global economy.  The United States and China recognize and take into account the impact  their policies have on the global economy, and cooperate to strengthen the international trade and financial institutions that support global growth and stability.

These paragraphs and others underline how Chinese leaders – at least the economic ones – recognize that  “interdependence” – not unilateral action is the dynamic of economic policy action.  It suggests that leaders have an understanding that national interest may be at the heart of their actions but that national interest alone will be insufficient to secure economic growth and prosperity.

In reaction to my friends then – yes I mean Arthur Stein and in particular Richard Rosecrance, who fret over the parallels between the German- British relationship after 1905 and the current US-China relationship – I think the difference is significant.

The second aspect of the Framework that stands out is the recognition of the importance of the G20 complex in giving a setting to deal with the global economy.

6. The two countries reiterate their support for the G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth and reaffirm their commitments to improve the living standards of our citizens through strong economic economic and jobs growth, and to use the full range of policies to strengthen the global recovery and to reduce excessive external imbalances and maintain current account imbalances at sustainable levels.  The United States and China affirm active support for the mutual assessment process of the G-20.

15. China and the United States commit to deepen their cooperation to ensure financial sector stability and strengthened financial sector regulation and supervision, both bilaterally and in the G-20, the Financial Stability Board, and international standard-setting bodies.

17. The two countries pledge to strengthen communication and coordination and to support a bigger role for the G-20 in international economic and financial affairs.

The paragraphs above reveal that the two powers are prepared to work within the multilateral policy framework being hammered out by the IMF, the G20 finance ministers and in the Framework Working Group and additionally the two at least in this document avoid the excessive reliance on bilateral discussions.  This is important in part because a bilateral economic discussions have been pitched, on the one side, to a critique of Federal Reserve policy of quantitative easing and on the other on currency manipulation of the renminbi.  That discussion is partial and also rather toxic – unhelpful in actually dealing with the global imbalances that generate instability and volatility in the global economy.

My advice to my colleagues – especially in the media – who are so quick to declare these discussions a waste of time and unproductive – remember our friend  Churchill and the value of “jaw-jaw”.

Today, Monday and tomorrow the so-called G-2 are meeting in Washington.  This is the third round of the US-China Security and Economic Dialogue (S&ED).  Led by Timothy Geithner Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the US side and Vice Premier Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo on the Chinese side, this meeting, as with others, is designed with the hope and intent for these two powers to engage on issues of concern to both.

The S&ED has come to involve numerous officials from each country – a major encounter of Chinese (20 agencies) and American (16 agencies) officials.  Notwithstanding the large – possibly overlarge – array of officials and regulators, past meeting have produced little in the way of concrete results.  But the hope remains that this immediate gathering will advance discussions on critical issues – currency, debt, human rights, Korea and Iran.

Let’s see tomorrow.

[Editor:  It is with great pleasure I welcome Dick Rosecrance to Rising BRICSAM and to post his comment on the previous blog post “Not Required to Choose” – A Strategy for US-China Relations.    Hopefully there will be other opportunities where Dick will have an interest in commenting on other posts.]

Historians and diplomatists know that Bismarck’s ability to keep conflict between Russia and Austria within limits was to give somewhat inconsistent commitments to them both. Under certain circumstances he would side with Vienna, on other conditions with St Petersburg. It was this uncertainty that restrained them both. By 1914, all German pretences of evenhandedness had  been given up in favor of the Blank Cheque to Austria. But many argue that Bismarck’s inconsistent links could not long have been sustained in any case. Sooner or later the German leader would have had to decide which was the primary ally. London also moved to clarify its “inconsistent” policy toward France and Germany when Edward Grey succeeded Lansdowne in 1906, embracing France and pushing Germany away. Thus the question is not that a studied policy of ambiguity is not a good strategy, it is how long it can be maintained.

Alan Alexandroff has commended just a strategy to the United States in its relations with China. China is both a Friend and a Foe, so he would have us believe. He is of course right that the balance of interests has not yet moved definitively one way or the other. But how long can such an ambivalent tack endure?  Much depends on China’s strategy. So far, China has acted diplomatically to press forward on all fronts – territorial, economic and political. China has emphatically rejected G2; no agreement was reached on climate change policies; and the territorial sphere of interest line has been moved to the East, to encompass the Senkakus as well as Taiwan. The PLA and the PLAN have not responded to American inquiries about arms restraint and new carrier task forces.

Perhaps at some point and very much in China’s own interest, the Renminbi will be revalued to control inflation and also stimulate needed domestic consumption. Absent progress on other issues, however, that will not be enough to staunch criticism in the United States. Political reform has been placed on the back burner, the PLA seems almost to operate independently of the regime, and China’s mercantilist policies will continue to run up Chinese surpluses and American deficits.

There is emerging a tentative decision in Washington to stop currying favor with Beijing in favor of a more obvious linkage with allies: Japan, Korea, and the European Union. India will be sought as an ally.

In time perhaps a stiffening of this enlarged Western position can produce a change in Beijing. If not, the world will understand the reason. In short, a close tie with China cannot occur now. It can only occur later – if at all.

I was reminded again this weekend of the complexity of  international relations behavior with Henry Kissinger’s  rare review in the NYT book review section of Jonathan Steinberg’s Bismarck a Life.  Many observers have argued in the past that Kissinger pursued Bismarck in theory and practice throughout his academic and policy life.  So I suppose it isn’t all that strange.

In any instance, Kissinger uses this Steinberg book on Bismarck – which he describes as “the best study of its subject in the English language” – as an opportunity to reflect on Bismarck’s complex nineteenth century statecraft.

While attracted to the book review given the fame of the author, it was really a soft spot for Bismarck’s statecraft that drew me to the piece.  My thesis “many moons ago” The Logic of Diplomacy focused on Bismarck’s European diplomacy following the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 to his departure in 1890.  But it was not longing to reread the book – heaven forbid – but a far more current concern – that is the course of US-China relations.

I have on a number of recent occasions in China and here at this blog argued that the best characterization for US-China relations is:

While still insubstantial a phrase I remain comfortable with the characterization of the bilateral relationship as yi di, yi you’ (亦敌 亦友)－ both friend and foe (See my earlier confidence in this characterization in the blog post “China Cannot Rise Peacefully” on John  Mearsheimer.

But as my mentor, and long time colleague, Richard Rosecrance – currently at the Belfer Center at Harvard – has argued you have to describe what that means and he has suggested that ultimately there needs to be a choice.  And it was with those comments that I thought again about Bismarck.

The genius of Bismarck was to hold opposites together.  I am not thinking here of his revolutionary early career, forging a Germany – beating both Austria and France in quick but decisive conflicts – but in his diplomatic legerdemain in generating alliances with Germany at the center and antagonists especially Austria-Hungary and Russia circling around this new and newly created European “heavy weight”.  As Kissinger characterized Bismarck’s diplomatic efforts:

He sought to counter it [hostile coalitions] by involving Germany in a dizzying series of partly overlapping, partly conflicting alliances with the aim of giving the other great powers – except the irreconcilable France – a greater interest to work with Germany than to coalesce against it.

The point here is not some linear replication or adaptation of Bismarck – the tools of diplomacy – are no longer classic balance of power – though many colleagues can’t seem to forget classic balance of power – but instead to hold irreconcilables together.  Thus US diplomacy toward China must accept and acknowledge China’s competitiveness in a number of arenas while seeking to work with China in other areas – G20 global governance for instance and even regionally in Asia.  The US must be able to hold the “China Threat School” at bay or it is likely that perception of a security dilemma with China – as described by Harvard’s Alaister Ian Johnston in the recent blog post – Stability and Instability Once Again – Could it Be …? – will become a self fulfilling reality.

The concept I think is real enough.  The dilemma posed is that this Administration may not be able to hold irreconcilables together.  If the policy is a product of a unique diplomatic skill – as proved to be the case with Bismarck – then such behavior and policy – keeping China as both a friend and a foe – will prove equally impossible.  The future then will be riven with competition and even conflict.  Not a happy thought.

As I noted in the earlier blog post of about the same name as the above, I advised that I would use this blog post entry to review Alaister Iain Johnston’s article examining Yan Xuetong’s article,  “The Instability of Superficial Friendship”‘ in The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.3 (2010), pp. 263-292. Johnston’s article is:  “Stability and Instability in Sino-US Relations a Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory.” Vol. 4 (2011), pp. 5-29 and again it like the earlier piece is in the Chinese Journal of International Politics. (Just a slight digression – I did receive an e-mail from Iain noting that in fact the editors asked him if he might respond to the Yan Xuetong article.)

In any case Johnston tackles the “superficial friendship” hypothesis proposed by Yan Xuetong – that is an hypothesis that both US and Chinese leaders have excessive and failed expectations of the behavior of the other with leaders on both sides mistakenly believing that the relationship is more collaborative than their actions prove to be.  Disappointment engendered by the other’s less than expected collaborative behavior creates instability in the relationship.

In assessing the superficial friendship hypothesis, Johnston begins by trying to situate this “superficial relationship” characterization within a known literature – in this case within the psychological literature.  Doing so, as pointed out bu Johnston creates a ‘levels of analysis’ problem since Yan Xuetong’s examination is at the national leadership level and not at the more micro small group or individual leadership level.  At best, according to Johnston, the pattern of US-China relations – based on exuberance and disappointment – ill-fits the pattern of bilateral behavior.

Johnston additionally turns to what he calls the”impressive quantitative data-project that he [Yan Xuetong] and his colleagues have developed…” to evaluate the hypothesis.  As Johnston notes the events data reveals, according to Yan Xuetong, that the US-China relationship has become more unstable than before following the end of the Cold War  due to the cycle of exuberance and disappointment between the two powers.

Now Johnston in a rather persuasive and extended analysis of the events data – as they are currently constructed and characterized –  suggest that there are two problems:  first that some of the issues identified in the data set might well be coded differently; and secondly there are, in Johnston’s opinion, important issues between China and the US that do not find there way into the data set as currently constituted.  Not to get too social ‘sciencey’, Johnston concludes:  “In essence, the operationalization and measurement of the dependent variable becomes problematic.”  And for good measure Johnston notes the fitted trend – taking the data from 1989 to 2008 – increases over time and the annual absolute deviation declines – in other words, the US-China relations improve and volatility declines, which fails to correspond with the superficial friendship hypothesis.

Well if the superficial friendship hypothesis fails “to make the grade” – at least in its current form and with the current data set – where does Johnston turn to in the alternative.  In fact he offers the security dilemma theory – which as he later points out in a footnote – he had offered up some 10 years ago.  As Johnston points out security dilemmas are “endogenous social processes” and as the security dilemma gyre intensifies cooperative behaviors are discounted by the other side and at the same time each side amplifies the negative consequences of moves undertaken by the other.  As Johnston suggests such a dilemma leads to “each side [to take] politico-military steps to enhance its security in the face of this uncertainty. … The result is a spiral of insecurity and mutual construction of an adversary.”

As he nears the end of his analysis Johnston points to several pieces of evidence that he’d look for to confirm the presence of the security dilemma in the China-US relationship.  First, does an actor discount the cooperative behavior of the other side and amplify the conflictual behavior of the other?  Then Johnston suggests one needs to look to see that the two  increasingly ignore or deny interactivity in their relationship.  Evidence that Johnston suggests needs to be found is that each blames the other for changes in the relationship; while each believes that they are responsible for efforts to preserve the relationship.  And finally Johnston suggests that one would look for evidence that each has growing doubt that the other is content with the status quo and believes that the other is prepared to alter the power relationship.

Johnston does point to some evidence of these views from each but I don’t think – and I’m not sure Johnston – believes that the evidence to date is compelling.  And Johnston satisfies himself that it is difficult to determine when a full security dilemma has been initiated and in fact in this relationship such a point has yet to be determined.  And so while Johnston believes, apparently, that a security dilemma is emerging – though he acknowledges that the evidence is at best anecdotal.  Moreover he identifies four stabilizing elements in the current relationship that may have held back a full security dilemma between China and the United States.

And it seems to me that these four elements are most interesting and help to explain in fact why a full security dilemma framing of the relationship is not compelling.  First leaders on both sides appear to have a better understanding of each other’s interests than appears evident in the public discourse and there appears to be a capacity for self correction on both sides.  Secondly, Johnston suggests that deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, is suppressing what otherwise might be a full blown security dilemma.  Next, the ideological dimension of conflict between China and the US is rather muted – especially in contrast to the US-Soviet rivalry.  Finally, according to Johnston, the degree of economic integration and the mutual benefits for a variety of interests in both states has gone some significant way to impeding a full blown security dilemma.

While I suspect that these elements are not equally responsible for the recognized constraint, nonetheless they do contextualize significant difference between this great power relationship and others where a security dilemma might be the appropriate framing.  Indeed I’ll speculate this far – that globalization and the integration of China into the global system has really situated this possible great power rivalry far apart from other historical cases.  This is not the US-Soviet Union, nor is it Germany-Great Britain – and even US-Great Britain.  Now this not to suggest that globalization makes rivalry or indeed conflict impossible, but it raises the costs and dampens the urges to follow a conflictual ‘power transition’ course of behavior.

While still insubstantial a phrase I remain comfortable with the characterization of the bilateral relationship as yi di, yi you’ (亦敌 亦友)－ both friend and foe (See my earlier confidence in this characterization in the blog post “China Cannot Rise Peacefully” on John  Mearsheimer.

This post has gone on a bit – but the analyses of both Yan Xuetong and Alaister Iain Johnston are both compelling – and it is incumbent of me – to detail in the future what the behavior and motivation a “both friend and foe” characterization generates.  For the moment, however,  I remain comfortable that the relationship is not a classic rivalrous relationship as identified by both realist schools of thought – The “China Threat” school in Washington and the  “China Can Just Say No” school in Beijing.

I was searching vain today for a blog post I’d supposedly done on Yan Xuetong’s analysis of the US-China relationship.  While I had reviewed the piece: “The Instability of Superficial Friendship”‘ in The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.3 (2010), pp. 263-292, I had not written a blog post on it.

Yan Xuetong, for those of you who don’t know him, is a very well known and prolific IR relations specialist in China.  Yan Xuetong is currently the Director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University and the chief editor of the above journal.  He is part of a generation of Chinese scholars that have undertaken some of their research abroad.  In Yan Xuetong’s case, he did his PhD at UC Berkeley receiving it in 1992.  Yan Xuetong is very clearly on the nationalist side and has expressed strong views on China’s core interests.

In my review of Yan Xuetong’s article I cast him as supporting the characterization of the US-China relationship as  – fei di fei you (非敌 非友) neither friend nor foe.  Now Yan Xuetong is in good company here and this characterization includes both US and other China experts.   Here I know I have blogged on this well known characterization – several times in fact – starting as early as “Jumping to Conclusions” and subsequently.  Now my own view is that a more appropriate characterization of  the US-China relationship is  – yi di, yi you’ (亦敌 亦友)－ both friend and foe.

But I digress.  So Yan Xuetong focused on a relationship that he described as unstable and a result of superficial friendship between these two great powers – one the declining hegemon and the other a – or “the” – rising power in the contemporary global system.  As I said at the time:

But Yan Xuetong extended the analysis [of neither friend nor foe] by concluding that there are four kinds of interests in this critical bilateral relationship: common interests, complementary ones, confrontational interests and conflicting ones.  For Yan Xuetong the difficulty in the current relationship between these two critical powers arises because policy makers insist on characterizing the US-China relationship as being more cooperative that in fact is the case. China and the US fail in their efforts to build a more collaborative and stable relationship because they fail to see that in fact they have more mutually unfavorable interests than mutually favorable ones.  Officials in both countries find it difficult to create stable relations because of the unrealistic expectations of mutual support each presumes of the other.  In fact, according to this scholar, this instability is of sort greater than one might find in a conflictual relationship.  For Yan Xuetong ‘superficial enmity’ is more stable and it “… also provides more chances for improvements in bilateral because the nations have more mutually favorable interests than they realize.” (Yan, 284).

So in this analysis, “enmity” is better than “friendship” – at least for now – a rather strange conclusion but perhaps a logical outcome of a difficult relationship and differing national interests.  Yan Xuetong urges both to lower expectations and to reduce unexpected conflict by accepting that the two great powers regard the other as a political competitor.  Further he suggests that that the two should enlarge their mutually favorable interests before they even consider developing durable cooperation.

There is no doubt that there are many experts who are willing – even eager – to accept the competitive perhaps rivalrous nature of the relationship.

The conclusion that superficial “enmity” is better and more stable than “friendship” – according to Yan Xuetong – has drawn the attention and raised serious questions by  another well known China IR scholar.  As a result, in the most recent volume of The Chinese Journal of International Politics,” Alastair Iain Johnston from Harvard has written, “Stability and Instability in Sino-US Relations a Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory.” Vol 4 (2011), pp. 5-29  Johnston both takes Yan Xuetong’s analysis very seriously and – in my opinion – does an effective job in raising questions over the approach and the conclusions identified in Yan Xuetong’s article.

In the next blog I will turn to the Johnston analysis  and see where we are now in understanding this key great power relationship.