Category Archives: Global Governance for G20/G8

The Missing Mechanisms – Examining the Current Summitry Cycle: Rome G20 and Glasgow COP26

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So many summits recently: from the Rome G20 Summit, to the Glasgow COP26 Summit, to APEC, and finally the East Asia Summit. It is the crescendo of the annual summitry cycle. And, this year, 2021, was particularly noteworthy. In this summit cycle we had in person leaders gatherings at the Rome G20 Summit, immediately followed by the 5-year COP ‘check-in’ with many G20 leaders flying off directly to the Glasgow Summit following the Rome G20 Summit. It is not a surprise given the importance of these summits that colleagues have been attracted to assessing the advances, or the limitations of these gatherings and then more generally to examine the overall effectiveness they present of multilateral leadership.  One of the key assessments, not surprisingly, is to determine whether these summits, and therefore the multilateralism underpinning them can meet the rising global governance challenges facing the international system. Prime Minister Draghi who chaired the recently concluded G20 Rome Summit had this to say about multilateralism, and inferentially the G20:

“Multilateralism is the best answer to the problems we face today. In many ways it is the only possible answer,”  he said in his opening comments on Saturday. 

 

From the pandemic, to climate change, to fair and equitable taxation, going it all alone is simply not an option. We must do all we can to overcome our differences”.

Yet the judgements from the experts have generally been measured, even rather downbeat, over the current G20 and COP26 and other summitry efforts. Broadly there is recognition of some material advances in the global governance agenda, especially concerning climate change efforts but the fundamental – and many would argue the urgent and necessary collective actions – seem to elude global summitry policy making. And, most agree that more global order needs are just out of reach. Here, my colleague Yves Tiberghien in East Asia Forum (EAF)  had this to say about the G20 and the critical multilateral efforts:

The G20 is currently unable to function as the incubator for the reform of global governance institutions that the world needs to manage global markets and pressing systemic risks. It is proving unable to manage the great frictions between established and emerging powers.

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The Current Narrative of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Policy: “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

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When it comes to China’s current foreign policy, phrases such as “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy” (WWD) and “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) frequently appear. The name WWD originates from a Chinese film series, “Wolf Warrior”, which depicts a patriotic solider battling foreign powers and mercenaries. Nowadays, many refer to China’s increasingly strong statements and assertive diplomatic declarations as WWD.

On the other hand, BRI refers to global infrastructure development projects led by China to promote international cooperation, multilateralism, and trade. It may appear that these two sets of foreign policy approaches rather conflict. However, the phrase “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind” (人类命运共同体), a part of the official narrative of China’s foreign policy may have led to both of these contrasting approaches. What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”? How does this phrase explain trends in China’s recent foreign policies including WWD and also BRI?

What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

By literal translation, the above phrase means “A Community of Shared Fate for Mankind” (SF) rather than, as it is often expressed in English, “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. SF suggests a global order described by China’s President Xi Jinping encompassing the shared rights and responsibility of each nation in terms of “politics, security, economy, culture, and environment” in a globalized world. In President Xi’s words SF is: “to build A Community of Shared Future for Mankind [to] construct a beautiful and clean world with long lasting peace, general security, mutual prosperity, openness, and inclusivity”. At a United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting in July, 2020, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that China will push to build SF by promoting multilateralism in accordance with international laws and “… denounce global hegemony and protectionism”. These and other  remarks by China’s leaders demonstrate, it would seem, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition to achieve greater global influence, and that China is prepared to work with all nations to build a SF. Indeed, not all nations may be agreeable with the ideology of SF. It is inevitable that the CCP will face some frictions when it tries to expand the influence of SF in the world. Therefore, the CCP may have to use a tailored approach in its foreign policies to push its SF agenda.

SF as an Umbrella term for China’s Foreign Policy

President Xi has publicly made statements such as “[the CCP] will reference history and create the future. It must continuously push and construct A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. Under this guidance, top Chinese officials have made clear that China’s foreign policy will revolve around SF. China’s approach to global order, then,  promotes politically correct topics such as climate change, global disparity, and it also opposes terrorism and hegemony. Although it encourages cross-cultural exchange, it makes no explicit mention of protecting the rights of marginalized communities. The vague language in the SF permits CCP officials greater flexibility in deciding what kind of matters are consistent with the SF and therefore align with President Xi’s agenda.

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Which Countries are Middle Powers – And Why are They Important to the Global Order? Part 1

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I had a debate very recently with my China-West Dialogue (CWD) colleague, Colin Bradford. In a memo we were working on for CWD, he described the two major trade agreements, CPTPP and RCEP. He then added:

 

These two trade agreements show that middle powers are able to take multilateral actions on their own that make an impact.(*)  

But which countries do we see achieving that? And behind that, why have analysts and policy makers become significantly more interested these middle powers in the Trump era recently past?

Counting the Middle Powers

The debate begins with the ‘Who’. Though Colin and I were generally agreed on the content of the article, we went around in circles over which countries we could, and should, identify as middle powers. Now, I was more than ready to forgive Colin his vague characterization of middle powers and then broad inclusion of the same – after all he is an economist – but soon thereafter I stumbled over a rather recent article by Bruce Jones, also of Brookings. and a well known international relations analyst. The article found in FA and titled, “Can Middle Powers Lead the World Out of the Pandemic? Because the United States and China Have Shown They Can’t” tackled the question of the current middle power membership. Given the subject matter of the article, Bruce was called upon to identify in some manner, the states that captured the current set of middle powers:

The concept of “middle powers” is imprecise and somewhat inchoate, but it generally refers to countries that are among the top 20 or so economies in the world, lack large-scale military power (or choose not to play a leading role in defense), and are energetic in diplomatic or multilateral affairs. These countries were seeking to fill part of the international leadership void even before the crisis, particularly when it came to buttressing the rickety multilateral system.

So, there we were. I had no difficulty acknowledging that the term was “imprecise and inchoate” but as for the rest of the features identified by Bruce, well, not so sure. Increasingly, I came to suspect that this was likely to be one of those classic international relations definitions – unclear and contested.

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The Evolving Role of Japan in the Liberal Order

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My podcast guest, Phillip Lipscy and were fortunate enough recently to attend a major conference on Japan’s leadership in the Liberal Order.  This conference was organized by my good friend and colleague, Professor Yves Tiberghien of the University of British Columbia and its Centre for Japanese Research Worksop. Many Japanese colleagues joined experts from North America to discuss the role of Japan in the Liberal Order, especially under the current Abe Government. It is clear that Japanese foreign policy has changed. But how much. One need only look at Japan’s major role in picking up the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after President Trump withdrew the United States from it.  The vigorous Japanese leadership efforts resulted in the conclusion of the TPP 11with all members other that the United States agreeing to the revised TPP. And Japan has hosted the G20. Nevertheless, the question remains why and how far has Japanese foreign policy changed. There seems to me to be a rather mixed Japanese leadership role but let’s join Phillip in getting his views of Japanese leadership in the Liberal Order. 

Phillip has recently joined the University of Toronto from Stanford University as an Associate Professor of Political Science at the UoT and is the new Chair in Japanese politics and global affairs and Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Japan at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy here at the the University of Toronto. Phillip has published extensively on Japanese politics and foreign policy.

So come join us as we discuss the role of Japan in the current Liberal Orde. This is Episode 17 of the Summit Dialogue Series at Global Summitry at iTunes or at SoundCloud. . 

 

Between Chaos and Leadership – The Instance of the G7 Gathering in Biarritz, France

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As leaders now exit from the G7 meeting in Biarritz France, it is worth reflecting on the state of the Liberal Order. Or, maybe more appropriately, and at least for the moment, its state of ‘Disorder’.

It has been a chaotic preceding week, even by Donald Trump standards, I think. Trump sharply raised his attack on various allies –  most particularly last week, Denmark. Attacks on allies have become rather routine, though exceedingly troubling. But this particular episode was to see the least – startling. In this case Trump suggested that the United Sates might want to purchase Greenland. When President Trump was met by a strong statement of rejection by Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, that called the President’s suggestion, “absurd”, the President called her statement ‘nasty’ and then turned around and postponed a state visit to one of America’s closest and most faithful allies. It led my colleague Thomas Wright of Brookings to conclude in an article in The Atlantic :

The cancellation of Trump’s visit to Denmark is part of a disturbing pattern. Trump regularly beats up on and abuses America’s closest democratic allies while being sycophantic to autocrats.

Then there was the continuing trade war with China. Just before Trump was to leave for Europe and the G7, China announced that it was prepared to  raise tariffs on $US75 billion worth of American-made goods, including crude oil, cars and farm products, if Mr. Trump was to carry through with plans to tax an additional $300 billion worth of imports from China. In an angry tweet  in response, President Trump declared: “Our great American companies are hereby ordered to immediately start looking for an alternative to China, including bringing our companies HOME and making your products in the USA.” Ordered! Yikes! After that Trump was ‘all over the map’ defending past statements such as ordering American companies to leave, then regretting the ratcheting up of tariffs only to have his officials suggest that he only wished he could raise the tariffs even higher. It could make one’s head spin.

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Did the Osaka G20 Bring Global Governance Progress – Part Two

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So, the Vision 20 principals, Colin Bradford, Brookings, Yves Tiberghien, University of British Columbia and myself, at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy thought it would be valuable to take a second gaze at the G20 Osaka Summit. This look, of course, occurring following the conclusion of the Summit.

There is little question that the G20 was dominated by the Donald Trump’s ‘reality TV show’ – the meeting and joking with Putin, the dramatic meeting over tariffs with Xi Jinping. And, finally, but certainly not least, the dramatic ‘handshake summit’ with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un at the DMZ. In the end, there was little bandwidth left for any coverage of the collective meetings of the G20, or examination of the Leaders’ Declaration. The Oska G20 reflects the shape – read that as the fragmenting – of the Global Order. But the V20 principals thought to try and draw some conclusions where we could on the state of the order in this chaotic ‘Age of Trump’.

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‘Soldiering On’ – A Few Reflections from the T20s Gathering in Buenos Aires

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It was, is, a trying time for the Argentinian leadership. A striking and current economic crisis haunts the Macri government.  The peso has depreciated dramatically; interest rates have been boosted to 60 percent; and the current efforts by the Macri government to return the Argentinian economy to health – a policy of gradualism – lies in tatters. The government valiantly has returned to the IMF – hated by so many Argentinians for the institution’s policy ‘support’ in the early aughts in a former debt crisis – for a major infusion of funds.  And, oh yes, then there is the hosting of the G20. This is a government that appears to be distracted – and reasonably so – by the domestic economic crisis they face.

It is hard for this government to commit the ‘bandwidth’ required for hosting the G20.  Hosting is not just the host’s efforts to prepare for the leaders’ summit: fashioning the agenda and reaching consensus over a number of policy initiatives. It requires examining past agendas and bringing forward those policy efforts that can be advanced in the current year. It is also the various officials’ meetings at the cabinet level and below. The host needs to advance task force reports from ministers and international institutions and it requires coordinating efforts and insights from today’s many engagement groups – B20, L20, W20, C20 and T20 to  name some. 

Where are we, then, in the continuing G20 and T20 efforts? Many hundreds of us have just recently attended in Buenos Aires for the final Argentinian T20.  The Argentinians put on a fabulous meeting.  Co-ordinated by co-hosts CARI (The Argentine Council for International Relations) and CIPPEC (Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth) these think tanks handed off a wide-ranging Communiqué to the Argentinian government – indeed a public presentation to President Macri.  This Communiqué was a product of 10 Task Forces that generated 80 Policy Briefs with as the Communiqué states “with evidence-based policy recommendations to address global challenges such as climate change, food security, multilateral and global inequality, among others.” The hope for the T20, expressed in the Communiqué is that “The Think 20 (T20) works to help the G20 find solutions to global challenges by putting forward concrete proposals that eschew sector-specific interests and are rooted in evidence-based research.”

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More Urgent than Ever – ‘Small Ball’ – A First Glance

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Now for a little catch up.  So, on Labor Day, I thought it would be useful to ‘rev our summitry engines’.  But the trend line, or lines, remain clear. First, Trump continues to dismantle various elements of the liberal international order.  Here an acute perspective from Philip Stephens of the FT in the  summer (August 2, 2018):

For all the present let’s-be-nice mood in the White House, Mr Trump is progressively dismantling the pillars of the US-led international order. One way or another the president has undermined the US commitments to climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, Nato, the EU and longstanding treaty relationships with Japan and South Korea. No one can be sure that tomorrow he will not tear up the North American Free Trade Agreement or pull US troops out of the Middle East. The credibility and trust on which US power was built is draining away. If the US does not respect an American-designed order why should anyone else?

Next, and equally a trend line – my call for summit leaders to ‘hunker down’ and play ‘small ball’ now.  Why not big efforts to formulate and declare global governance initiatives in the face of the ‘Great Dismantler’. In the broad global governance picture preservation is critical.  There is a limit I suspect to acting without the U.S. Undertaking ‘multilateralism without the United States’ is critical but ‘poking the bear’, or eagle possibly more appropriately, is probably unhelpful, unnecessary, even possibly counterproductive.  Episodic multilateral efforts without the United States are emerging. CPTPP, or the TPP11, driven in particular by Prime Minister Abe is a singular example of this new multilateralism.  Equally, German efforts at the Hamburg G20 Summit to maintain climate change efforts led to the end of absolute G20 consensus and a climate change statement in the Leaders’ Declaration of just the G19. 

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A Necessary Move to ‘Small Ball’ for the G7 and the G20 – A First Glance

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I was speaking to some of my ‘global governance co-conspirators’ recently. We were struggling to describe and capture the consequences for global governance of American policy in this ‘Age of Trump’. 

The difficulties were on full display in Buenos Aires this week with the the G20 finance ministers and central bankers meeting.  The impact of the tit-for-tat tariffs initiated by the United States, but responded to many of the G20 members, was so apparent as described by Benedict Mander and Chris Giles from the FT.  The French Minister spoke for many I suspect when he said: “the EU would not negotiate trade with the US “with a gun to our head.” Tensions are apparent and not mollified by Treasury Secretary Mnuchin suggesting that the retaliatory tariffs are not impacting the United States.  G20 Progress is obviously difficult:

This tension is good for no one,” Marcello Estevão, deputy finance minister of Brazil, told a group of journalists on Sunday, betraying clear frustration at the failure to make progress in strengthening multilateralism in international trade.

The shift from anti-protectionist rhetoric and trade liberalization efforts on the part of the G20, to rising protectionist tariffs from the U.S. and responses from many of the G20
Hubert Fuchs, the Austrian finance minister, who attended representing the European Council, said: “Even the minister of the treasury of the US says that he’s in favour of fair and free trade, but the problem is that the US understands something different under fair and free trade”.

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‘America Alone’ – A ‘First Glance’

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My IR colleagues, and other IR experts are reeling from the actions of this President  at various summits – the G7 at Charlevoix and the Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore.  More than anything we now see the President’s actions in advancing the ‘America First’, I hate to call it this – but a so-called U.S. foreign policy strategy.

First our CFR colleague Stewart Patrick describing the personally offensive Presidential behavior in this post, “At G7 Summit, Trump Takes a Wrecking Ball to the West”  The Internationalist:

He is destined to be one of America’s most consequential foreign policy presidents. Fewer than seventeen months into his administration, Trump has already shaken the foundations of international order. He has abdicated U.S. global leadership, which he believes has bled the United States dry, and he has sidelined multilateral institutions (from NATO to the WTO), which he perceives constrain U.S. freedom of action. The G7 summit suggests he is just getting started. He seems prepared to abandon the transatlantic relationship, and even the concept of “the West,” as pillars of U.S. global engagement.

Increasingly, ‘America First’ now has t be understood as ‘America Alone.  Here is Patrick summing up: 

Under Trump, the United States is off the rails. Rather than debating the merits of his case maturely, the president vents at America’s closest allies. “We’re like the piggy bank that everybody’s robbing,” he cried over the weekend, while blastingTrudeau as “very dishonest and weak.”

 

Kori Schake, our Stanford colleague, who is currently deputy director-general of IISS in London summed up in the  Sunday NYTimes the view of Trump actions following his recent summit exercises:

Such reckless disregard for the security concerns of America’s allies, hostility to mutually beneficial trade and willful isolation of the United States is unprecedented. Yet this is the foreign policy of the Trump administration. Quite explicitly, the leader of the free world wants to destroy the alliances, trading relationships and international institutions that have characterized the American-led order for 70 years.

Where are we at this moment?  Here is Schake’s take:

The administration’s alternative vision for the international order is a bare-knuckled assertion of unilateral power that some call America First; more colorfully, a White House official characterized it to The Atlantic as the “We’re America, Bitch” doctrine. This aggressive disregard for the interests of like-minded countries, indifference to democracy and human rights and cultivation of dictators is the new world Mr. Trump is creating. He and his closest advisers would pull down the liberal order, with America at its helm, that remains the best guarantor of world peace humanity has ever known. We are entering a new, terrifying era.

Trump’s actions are a dramatic attack on the multilateral economic system and an equally direct and a punishing undermining of the global security system with its allies, and frankly its adversaries.  Nothing good will come of this.   

Image Credit: Doug Mills/The New York Times