A Notable Passing

Posted on March 9, 2024 by Joint Post: Arthur A Stein and Alan Alexandroff

A passing of significant note. Our mentor – Richard Rosecrance – passed away in his 93rd year. He was our mentor but also one to many others, indeed to generations of graduate students – at UC Berkeley, Cornell, UCLA, and the Kennedy School at Harvard. While the last few years left him less able to exercise his academic wit and mastery, he was a guiding light in international relations for years.

Dick was an unmatched researcher. Just some of his books underscore how prolific and varied his work:

Action and Reaction in World Politics (1963)
Defence of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (1967)
The Future of the International Strategic System (editor, 1972)
The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (1986)
America’s Economic Resurgence: A Bold New Strategy (1990)
The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (co-editor, 1993)
The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena (co-editor, 1999);
The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (1999)
The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations (editor, 2001).
No More States?: Globalization, National Self-Determination, and Terrorism (co-editor, 2006)
Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the US-China Relationship (co-editor, 2009)
History and Neorealism (co-editor, 2010)
The Resurgence of the West: How a Transatlantic Union Can Prevent War and Restore the United States and Europe (2013)
The Next Great War?: The Roots of World War I and the Risk of U.S.-China Conflict (co-editor, 2015)
International Politics: How History Modifies Theory (co-author, 2018)

This partial list embodies seminal contributions to the fields of security, foreign policy, and international political economy. These works emphasize the roles of both domestic and international forces, reflect an interest in history and the forces for change in world politics. They also reveal an interest in applying social science to develop strategies for dealing with these challenges. Understanding the implications of modernization and the potential to produce greater prosperity and avoid war and chaos was a major focus of his career. He was a student of world affairs who thought about the implications of current events and what puzzles they posed to our conventional understanding.

The above list also encapsulates a productive career that extended for more than five decades into his mid-80s and includes two books and four edited volumes produced following his retirement from full-time teaching.

The wide-ranging set of his writings constitutes only part of his impact on the field. Dick encouraged and empowered his students. He would point out lacunae and understudied portions of the field, but he was equally interested in his students’ views of the burning questions that animated them. He relished hearing and discussing contrasting views and supported students working on approaches that differed from his own. Among his students are prominent realists, liberal internationalists, and constructivists. In his support of his students and his interest in the work of younger scholars, Dick was one to send the elevator back down.

His interest in and his examination of international relations extended over his long life. We were honored to be his students and colleagues and to be with him in the classroom.

We mourn his passing. We miss his wit, wisdom, intellectual prodding, and encouragement.

Image Credit: Belfer Center

This Joint Post with Arthur A Stein originally appeared at the Substack, Alan’s Newsletter

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/a-notable-passing?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

The Impact of the UN Summit of the Future (SOTF)

Posted on March 1, 2024 by Alan Alexandroff

The Global Summit Project (GSP), as I’ve written in the past, has targeted as one of its main research interests, the national and international actions to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is therefore not a big surprise that I was attracted to my good colleague, Stewart Patrick’s webinar initiative examining the Summit of the Future (SOTF) in the context of global governance. The SOTF, as much of the immediate UN efforts is concerned, in part, with achieving the SDGs. Stewart is the director of the Carnegie Endowment’s (CEIP) Global Order and Institutions Program. Bravely he brought together for a CEIP webinar conversation – “Is This the Moment to Renew Global Governance? Prospects for the UN Summit of the Future” – Guy Ryder, UN Under-Secretary-General for Policy, Jake Sherman, Minister Counselor, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and Minh-Thu Pham, Nonresident Scholar, CEIP. Stewart acted as moderator for this session.

This webinar is well worth listening to. We have folks who have real insights into UN reform and into achieving the SDGs. We will see, I suspect, over the coming months a growing number of presentations and events concerned with SOTF. The SOTF is the second UN summit and like the first will be held at the UNGA opening week in September. And also like the first, Heads of State and Government will be in attendance for this second of the ‘Two Summits’.

The first – the SDG Summit called member leaders to attend at the UN to review the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This first Summit, encouraged by the UN Secretary General,

… carried out a comprehensive review of the state of the SDGs, responded to the impact of multiple and interlocking crises facing the world, and provided high-level political guidance on transformative and accelerated actions leading up to the 2030 deadline for achieving the SDGs.

The SDG Summit was chaired by the President of the General Assembly. The evidence to date reveals, unfortunately, that this most important of global efforts is way off track and notwithstanding the urging from all to accelerate the effort to achieve the SDGs, it will be a very difficult uphill battle to achieve the goals.

The second of the Two Summits is the Summit of the Future. According to the UN and the Secretary General:

The Summit of the Future is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

The Summit of the Future has already produced a draft – the zero draft – of the final Summit document – the “Pact for the Future”. An extensive document, the Pact for the Future covers five areas:

Sustainable development and financing for development
International peace and security
Science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation
Youth and future generations
Transforming global governance

Indeed it is an extensive document and well worth spending some time on. But a review reveals somewhat oddly that the document covers not just UN areas of focus but extends beyond them. This includes, for instance, reforms to international financial architecture, institutions not part of the UN system including the World Bank, the IMF and the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). The Document does not back away from calling for reform of these institutions as well as those in the UN system – most notably reforming the Security Council:

To enhance our cooperation, we need a multilateral system that is fit for the future, ready to address the political, economic, environmental and technological changes in the world, and with the agility to adapt to an uncertain future. We know that multilateral institutions – especially the Security Council and the international financial architecture – have struggled to address the scale of the challenges they face and live up to the world’s expectations of them. Too often, international commitments that are made, remain unfulfilled. …

We reaffirm our declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations [that was 2020], and we commit to accelerating our pursuit of the 12 commitments contained therein, including through the measures outlined in this Pact. We further re-affirm the importance of the multilateral system, with the United Nations at its centre. We recognize that the multilateral system must keep pace with a changing world. To that end, we commit to concrete steps to reinvigorate this system, fill critical gaps in global governance, and accelerate efforts to keep our past promises and agreements. Through this Pact for the Future, we commit to build a multilateral system that delivers for everyone, everywhere. We commit to concrete action in five broad areas, as follows.

The discussion with Stewart in this webinar over the Summit of the Future is animated by very knowledgeable folk from the UN and near it. But a review of the Document reveals, it seems to me, and not so obviously discussed in the webinar, that the SOTF zero draft focuses on the ‘What’. What needs to be reformed, what needs to be added to the UN and the multilateral system? But what is missing is the ‘How’. It is not the first examination – with strong detail, to discuss the reform and updating of the UN system and indeed beyond that to the international financial architecture. But like earlier documents before it and with serious discussions about this Document what is missing is the ‘How’. How do you in the context of heightened geopolitical tensions, and particular national interests, implement reforms? How do you accommodate the often reasonable demands of the Global South? In the world of 4-Cs – cooperation, collaboration, coordination and commitment – there is little evidence acknowledging ‘commitment’, as opposed to need for cooperation, because in fact it is scarce. In the end national governments are the key to achieving the SDGs and meeting necessary reforms of policies and institutions; and as best I can see and understand this critical element is hard to find.

I can understand the Secretary General urging the organization and the members forward but are we closer to reform of the Security Council after years of discussion? I am afraid we are not there yet and the Pact for the Future cannot hide it.

Threatening a ‘Single International Community’

Posted on February 25, 2024 by Alan Alexandroff

Who would think that the threat to the global order could emanate from global summitry leadership. But that appears to be a real possibility. Let me explain.

For some time now at CWD and the Global Summitry project (GSP) we have identified that sustaining global order requires the maintenance, even strengthening of a ‘single international community’. Stability cannot be sustained without such a community. Fragmentation hinders collaboration. But that single international community is being challenged today. The current wars in Europe and in the Middle East undermine a single international community. Rising geopolitical tensions between the leading powers, China and the United States, especially, erode it. Fragmentation then undermines stability of the order and diminishes, or eliminates, opportunities for advancing global governance. As described in the WPR Daily Review:

These tensions were underlined recently by statements from the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula, now the host for this year’s G20. In an opinion piece he published in the Washington Post in January Lula described the impact of geopolitics and nationalism on global governance efforts:

The world is experiencing a contradictory moment today. Global challenges require commitment and cooperation among nations. We have never been so connected. At the same time, we are finding it increasingly difficult to dialogue, respect differences and carry out joint actions. Societies are taken over by individualism and nations are distancing themselves from each other, making it difficult to promote peace and face complex problems: the climate crisis; food and energy insecurity; geopolitical tensions and wars; the growth of hate speech and xenophobia.

Such a statement seems to suggest that Lula really gets it. Only a single international community can maintain a stable global order. But that may not be true. In fact Lula’s recent statements may be undermining such a goal. Why such statements are unclear. Some have suggested that he is determined to promote a different global order no longer dominated by the US and the West more broadly. Others focus on his imperatives in current domestic politics. Whatever. Nevertheless his recent comments over the War in Gaza may make it difficult to promote collective efforts in this critical Informal – the G20. One need only reference Lula’s view of Israel’s action in Gaza expressed by him in remarks at the African Union Summit Conference in Addis Ababa and reported in the NYTimes:

What is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people has no parallel in other historical moments,” Lula told reporters during the 37th African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. But, he then added, “it did exist when Hitler decided to kill the Jews.

And now as a result of these remarks his global summitry leadership efforts – and here I am focusing on his G20 efforts as the President – are being called into question. Rather than trying to knit the order together he apparently seems willing to fracture it.

Such a rupture of the international community is possible notwithstanding a promising start as G20 host. Indeed at the time of the transfer of hosting to Brazil, Lula set out important developmental priorities in a speech at the closing of the India G20 Summit. There he declared:

We are living in a world where wealth is concentrated. In which millions of people still go hungry. In which governance institutions still reflect the reality of the middle of the last century.

We will only be able to tackle all these problems if we address inequality.

Income inequality; inequality in access to healthcare, education and food; gender, race and representation inequality is behind all these anomalies.

If we want to make a difference, we must place the reduction of inequalities at the center of the international agenda.

Thus, Brazil’s G20 presidency will have three priorities:

(i) social inclusion and the fight against hunger;

(ii) energy transition and sustainable development in its three aspects (social, economic and environmental); and

(iii) reform of global governance institutions

All these priorities are contained in Brazil’s G20 presidency motto: “Building a fair world and a sustainable planet”

In advancing these priorities Lula announced that Brazil would establish two G20 Task Forces (TF) for the Brazil hosting year. These TFs will unite the Finance and Sherpa tracks in a concerted effort to advance global governance policy. The two are: the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty, and the Global Mobilization against Climate Change.

And in addition in the Concept Note Brazil also committed to the following:

Seeking to close this gap, Brazil plans to launch a G20 Initiative on Bioeconomy with the objective of deepening the international debate on the subject and of identifying potential avenues for cooperation in the area. The Initiative would be structured into three axes: (i) research, development, and innovation for bioeconomy; (ii) sustainable use of biodiversity for bioeconomy; and (iii) bioeconomy as an enabler for sustainable development. As a final result, the Initiative would be expected to produce a set of “High Level Principles on Bioeconomy.

All these priorities and institutional efforts require concerted collective action. Yet today all these promises seem to be in question over Lula’s statements on the current geopolitical crises, notwithstanding Lula’s injunction in his speech at the closing of the India G20 Summit that:

Thirdly, we cannot allow geopolitical issues to hijack G20 bodies’ discussion agendas. A divided G20 does not interest us. We can only tackle present day challenges through joint action.

Lula needs to heed his own words or he will find that his G20 leadership is undermined by his own words. Such words put at risk his determined collective priorities in the G20. They divide the international community putting at risk ‘a single international community’.

Image Credit : Brazil

This Post was first published at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/threatening-a-single-international?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

Looking for Success of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the Halfway Point

Posted on February 19, 2024 by Alan Alexandroff

As I mentioned in past Posts here at Alan’s Newsletter, one particular research focus for the Global Summitry Project (GSP) is the effort to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs). You can see some of the activity at the GSP website and specifically at: “Strengthening Global Governance Activity and Reaching the SDG Goals”. A word of nomenclature here. The UN often refers to these goals as Agenda 2030. As part of this research focus, we have been building a Special Issue of the e-journal Global Summitry on achieving the SDGs. I have not gone as fast as I’d like and ferreting out folks interested in the SDGs has proven to be somewhat more difficult than I originally assumed.

But there are folks out there for sure. And, indeed, I came across ‘one good soul’, Peter Singer and his Substack, Global Health Insights. Now, I am no global health expert but Peter has dedicated much attention in his Substack to the subject and has focused on the achievement of the SDGs as being part of his focus on the global effort to eliminate disease, end poverty and bring a global improvement in health care.

As it turns out there is a long trail of serious effort on his part to examine the improvement in global health but not surprisingly he, like many others, have expressed recently a not unreasonable hint of dismay in the overall effort to achieve the SDGs. Here, then, is a relatively recent post in ‘Global Health Insights’, “Replace the SDGs with the GSDs” expressing the concern:

Halfway through Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) period, only 15% of the SDGs are on track. Universal Health Coverage, for example, is going at one-half the pace needed to reach the 2030 targets.

It is a sensitive time after all. First, the SDG Summit at this year’s opening of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has come and gone and notwithstanding the hortatory UN efforts, especially by the Secretary General, there does not seem to me at least to be any greater energy at the member level to dig in on the SDGs nor accelerate the pace of achieving the 17 goals. And as we look forward we see that a second UN summit is drawing closer – this the Summit of the Future. This Summit will occur at the next UNGA opening that is this coming September. Much effort is promised but I am unconvinced that finalizing the ‘Pact for the Future’ a major deliverable of the UNGA in September is likely to alter substantially the multilateral effort notwithstanding the UN view that the Pact and Summit will bring the following:

The result will be a world – and an international system – that is better prepared to manage the challenges we face now and in the future, for the sake of all humanity and for future generations. … The Summit of the Future will create the conditions in which implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development can more readily be achieved. It will do so by building on the outcome of the 2023 SDG Summit. In addition, it will result in improvements to international cooperation that enable us to solve problems together. We will be able to harness new opportunities for the benefit of all, not just the few, and manage the risks more effectively. Every proposal offered by the Secretary-General for consideration at the Summit of the Future will have demonstrable impacts on achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

Well, I hope so, but the encouragement from the UN in the end is not the answer. As Peter says: “The SDGs are gained or lost not in Geneva or New York but in countries.” That insight needs to be kept in mind by all of us. There has been much recent attention directed to serious efforts but at the local level – at the city level and the regional level as well at the non-state level – all detailing efforts to advance the SDGs. Ultimately, however, the primary effort and likely acceleration of the SDGs will in the end have to come from the national level if we are to see a closing of the gap between what has been achieved and what needs to be achieved to reach the goals. I suspect the attention to the substate and non-state level is sadly a result in part of the limited action – where it counts – at the national level. The US is but one unhappy example but there are many others.

So what does Peter Singer target. As he urges:

To speed up the SDGs, the world needs three things: implementation, implementation, implementation. In short, we need to replace the SDGs with the GSDs: Get Shit Done! (OK, I said ‘replace’, but I meant ‘refocus’ or ‘supplement’ the SDGs with the GSDs. And for diplomatic purposes, we can use the term ‘get stuff done.’)

More recently Peter has set out a way forward in this recent table:

You can also see that Peter turns the quantitative aspect of the SDGs into a positive and that strikes me as a crucial part of his approach. As he explains:

Measuring and managing impact using results-based strategy is an essential part of the GSD (Get Sh*t Done) approach to speeding up SDGs. To read more about this approach, please see here. … The trick in strategy is to focus as much on the “how” as the “what.” WHO’s strategy is built around five ‘Ps’: Promote, Provide, Protect, Power and Perform. The first three represent the ‘what’ (and correspond to the triple billion targets), the fourth and fifth represent the ‘how’, as shown below.

I shall return to Peter Singer’s approach in subsequent Posts but I wanted to at least get the big picture out. Achieving the SDGs is a demanding problem.

US-China Relations- How difficult is the relationship?

Posted on February 11, 2024 by Alan Alexandroff

This week I, and just about everybody else holding some interest in sport, or at least in innovative commercials were distracted by the events leading up to, and including, the 58th Super Bowl. Notwithstanding the quickening approach of this Super Bowl Sunday, however, I was drawn to an examination by a number of experts for the Brookings Institution of the US-China relationship.

So in this somewhat shortened Post, thanks to the Event, I thought I might pay a bit of attention to their useful views.

Graham Allison, one of the experts called on to respond to the question, pointed to the issue posed to the experts:

The invitation from Brookings’ debate organizers asked: “Is the U.S.-China relationship the most consequential bilateral relationship for the United States in the world?

He went on to lay out just why the bilateral relationship is so consequential:

My answer is: yes. If not China, who?

China is:

– one of only two nations that poses an existential threat to the United States.

– the only nation that poses a systemic threat to the U.S. position as the global leader, architect, and guardian of the post-World War II international order.

– the largest emitter of greenhouse gases—accounting for more emissions in 2022 than the United States and Europe combined.

– the second backbone of the world economy: the manufacturing workshop of the world, the No. 1 trading partner of most countries in the world (including the European Union and Japan), and the supplier of most critical items (including everything green and clean) in global supply chains.

– both a classic Thucydidean rival and America’s inseparable, conjoined Siamese twin.

The folks who commented included, as I noted above, Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor – Harvard, and additionally, John Cartin, Adjunct Professor, Walsh School of Foreign Service – Georgetown, Elizabeth Economy, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institutions and Susan Thornton, Senior Fellow – Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School, and nonresident fellow, the Brookings Thornton China Center.

It is, for sure, a significant question. After all, the state of the US-China relationship, largely without question, drives the geopolitics of current international relations. And the answers did not fail to satisfy. The assessments by these experts are all very revealing and if you have a moment the answers are worth a read. I say this notwithstanding that not all even saw the relationship as most consequential. In fact Elizabeth Economy promoted a somewhat contrary notion. As she argued:

There are many ways to describe the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. For example, the relationship is the world’s most complex, most challenging, or most competitive. However, the relationship is not “the most consequential in the world for America. Far more consequential is the United States’ relationship with its network of allies and partners in Asia, Europe, and North America. Unlike China, the United States’ allies and close partners share the same values, norms, and strategic objectives. … However, over the almost half-century since the normalization of the U.S.-China relationship, the bilateral relationship has never realized the potential Washington imagined. The two countries’ values, norms, and interests have increasingly diverged, and the ties that have bound them together have increasingly frayed.

In his response, Allison is unwilling to let the Economy argument pass and sets it out his views starkly:

In arguing against the significance of the U.S.-China relationship, both Economy and Cartin duck the reality of China’s existential threat. The brute fact is that China is one of only two nations in the world with nuclear arsenals that constitute genuine “existential” threats—meaning threatening existence.

While not unanimous, then, still I think most would underscore that the US-China bilateral relation is highly consequential. Having said that though, I was most taken with Susan Thornton’s response. Now admittedly I know Susan most of all the experts as she is a key figure in our own China-West Dialogue (CWD). But she argued and targeted exactly what I would have also zoned in on. Susan accepted that the relationship was indeed the most consequential but then targeted what I would have as well: the key to the relationship and its likely impact on the global order is the state of domestic affairs in the US. As Susan argued:

And just to be clear, relations with or actions taken by any other single country will have little consequence for Americans in the world compared to our own decisions and actions. Our fate lies in our own hands. … In short, America cannot escape “China impact.” China is big, capable, changing rapidly, and operating in all priority zones. Still, obsessing over what China does or might do is a mistake that will carry large opportunity costs for America that it cannot afford. China may be the most consequential “other country,” but we need to take responsibility for our own future, a future that will involve “China impact,” but that we can shape.

Absolutely. Couldn’t agree more. In the face of the real possibility of a return of Donald Trump as American President, most anything, and likely everything else pales in comparison to that reality and the real chaos likely to be generated by his return both for domestic and US foreign policy.

Image Credit: MIssouri State University

This Post originally appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/us-china-relations-how-consequential?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

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Are They All Middle Powers? Or, are there None!

Posted on February 4, 2024 by Alan Alexandroff

With a degree of valuable planning by my colleague Colin Bradford at the China-West Dialogue, or CWD, we convened our first virtual session of the current year. And we were very pleased that some thirty folk joined us from across the digital world – from Japan through Asia and Europe to Canada and the United States and on to Brazil. We hoped this session would be an opportunity to examine and critique “Asia’s Future at a crossroads: A Japanese strategy for peace and sustainable prosperity.” This very valuable Report was the outcome of years of work by the ‘Asia Future’ Research Group (Research Group) co-convened by Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus of Keio University and Mike Mochizuki of the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University.

The Research Group began meeting in 2018. In 2022 the Japanese government adopted a new “National Security Strategy” for the first time in a decade. And it was the evolved new Japanese foreign policy and security strategy that the Research Group critically reviewed.

The Research Group early on ‘revealed its hand’. As they declared:

What underlies the discussion and recommendations in this report is our serious concern that the new paradigm will leave Asia entangled and divided in the future.

And as a result the Research Group urged :

Japan’s long-held emphasis on a multifaceted and multilayered approach to Asia policy continues to be a constructive way to address the new regional and international challenges that have emerged.

What a continuation of this Japanese foreign policy approach demanded, according to the Report, was:

… Japan should maintain and promote security cooperation with the United States; but at the same time, it should also exercise leadership to help mitigate the competition between the U.S. and China in Asia through constructive diplomacy, thereby reducing the danger of great power war in the region.

The Research Group urged that Japanese policy not be reshaped by the rise in US-China rivalry and the growing geopolitical tensions in the international system generally and in the Indo-Pacific specifically. Alas, that may prove to be quite difficult.

Back to the Report, however. I am not doing justice to the fullness of the Report in this Post and those of you interested in international dynamics and relations in the Indo-Pacific, especially, I do encourage you to take some time with the Report. It will be worth it.

But I wanted to shift my attention in this Post to some of the debate that emerged during our CWD gathering and discussion of the Report. What was interesting in that discussion – and recognizing that the group was not made up of Japanese researchers – many reacted to the Report’s identification of Japan as a ‘Middle Power’ – clearly an IR crowd. This debate over the identification and impact of middle powers in international relations was further aided by the provision from our colleague Amitav Acharya of a new article by Robertson and Carr on middle powers. It is apparent that there has been a long running discussion – and I do mean long running – by IR colleagues – you’ll not be surprised to hear, over what is a middle power and the impact of these powers have on shaping global relations.

Now middle power labels have long been carried by a number of states most notably, Canada and Australia. These are the so-called traditional middle powers. The middle power definition was applied early to states that possessed structurally – that is the requisite ‘material power’ and what could then be described as being in the middle. These powers possessed less than the major, or great powers, such as the United States, and now China, but more than those lesser powers. Unfortunately, an examination of the material powers status fails to bear this out as pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

For a start there is nothing ‘middle’ about the ranking of the middle powers. Canada and Australia, the classic middle powers, generally appear between 8th and 15th in various global lists of economic size or military capacity. This could not be classified as the ‘middle’ in a world of 143 states in 1960 and makes less sense in 2023 with 195 states.

Well, if the material power rankings don’t do it, and I think that is right, then for many the determination revolved about middle power behavior instead. As pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

The three core assumptions of middle power theory of states as international in focus, multilateral in method, and good citizens in conduct had clear analytical utility during periods of the 20th century, exemplified by a prominent practitioner–scholarly nexus during this period.

However, their analysis of some six contenders by the two authors, chosen by the two on “principles of consensus, hard cases, and breadth, our contemporary cases are, in alphabetical order, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey.” I’ll leave aside the obvious questions as whether all deserve in fact the middle power label, these states show, as analyzed by the authors, that the behavioral concepts are increasingly unable to capture the practices and actions of these states. As Robertson and Carr describe:

To be effective, middle-sized states must respond to, and evolve with the nature of the system they operate in. Conceptually therefore, the middle power concept ‘is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system’. … middle power theory no longer helps us distinguish or interpret these states. Changes in the international environment suggest this finding will endure. … As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’.

Assuming we can accurately describe in an international order those that are possibly middle powers then, the relations between and among state actors become critical in revealing middle powers. As a result in an order with US-China tensions and a growing willingness on the part of a growing number of states to act aggressively – read that Russia and Ukraine and Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah and indeed Iran as well then:

As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’. … As we enter a period that is marked by increased competition, a remembrance of the possibilities of middle power cooperation that produced initiatives such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Ottawa Treaty deserves to be made.

What then is revealed by all this? Well lots. But let me suggest at least one conclusion. And it is not about Japan or middle powers but the difficulty of drawing conclusions and outcomes in international behavior. A little like astronomy: ‘all are working on all’. Examining at a point in time and then drawing conclusions from that moment the character and behavior of the global order and then looking forward may be all but futile. Or, at least, it is very difficult and must be approached with great caution. Caution is indeed the watchword.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

This Post appeared originally at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Comments and free subscription is welcomed.

Brazil’s G20 Hosting Year – 2024

Posted on January 29, 2024 by Alan Alexandroff

So the G20 Host – this year Brazil – is beginning to crank it up by announcing many G20 meetings now planned over the coming summit cycle. And we are fortunate that the current leader of Brazil is not Jair Bolsanaro, no fan of the G20. Instead, we have the return to the Brazilian presidency, after a significant hiatus, of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula. That is important. Even though Lula can go a bit ‘over the deep end’ on the Global South, he is committed to addressing climate change as well as critical global development subjects such as ending poverty, enhancing education and gender equality.

I was fortunate last week to participate in a session examining Brazil’s hosting year in the broader context of ‘Rethinking the Future of Multilateralism’. This session was a continuation of the ongoing effort by the Global Solutions Initiative (GSI) to examine the Informals, particularly in this case, the G20. GSI presents, among other things, the Global Solutions Summit that goes off annually in Berlin on numerous global governance subjects. At this recent virtual GSI session a very helpful presentation was provided by Feliciano Guimaraes of CEBRI. CEBRI along with FUNAG and IPEA – all Brazilian think tanks, are all part of the official T20 Organizing Committee for the Brazil hosting year. Back to that in a moment.

What has Brazil ‘put out’ as the priorities of the Brazilian hosting? It appears these are its priorities:

Social inclusion and the fight against hunger
Energy transition and sustainable development
Reform of global governance institutions

Now a big ‘shout out’ to the first two priorities. These are demanding goals but linked to Brazilian international policy efforts. But the third is a bit of a warning. Institutional reform – whether of the UN or the IFIs – the IMF and the World Bank – are perennial subjects. Over the recent years, if not before, it has become all too apparent that reform in the current geopolitical context is not possible. Look at the recent HLPF Summit – the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, held by the UN last September. Lots of talk but … And now we are accelerating toward the Summit of the Future, this coming September 2024. Again great hope:

The Summit of the Future is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

Valiant goals, but the will and collaborative energy is not there I’m afraid.

But back to the efforts of Brazil as host of the G20. It is evident that the administration and structure of the G20 has broadened and deepened over the years. Take a look at its current development of the structure and policy process as we have set it out recently at the Global Summitry Project website. Today, there are well developed Sherpa and Finance Tracks as pointed to by Feliciano Guimaraes. And as he further points to Brazil’s efforts, it is making advances to, as he points out, “to establish a close dialogue with the G20 Sherpa and Finance tracks with a view to increasing the incidence of T20 recommendations.” Further, there are many Working Groups and Task Forces developing policy proposals. And as Feliciano points out there is a Brazilian emphasis on the Engagement Groups as well with the hope that:

The G20 Social Summit – Social guarantees civil society’s participation and contribution in discussions and policy formulations related to the G20 Summit.

It encompasses the activities of 12 Engagement Groups, in addition to initiatives and events coordinated between the sherpa and finance tracks and non-governmental actors, as well as initiatives from G20 countries’ societies.

A key highlight of this engagement is the upcoming Social Summit, scheduled to take place from November 15 to 17, 2024, on the eve of the G20 Leaders’ Summit, set for November 18 and 19, both hosted in Rio de Janeiro.

During the G20 Social Summit, civil society representatives will present their proposals, marking a significant opportunity for their voices to shape the agenda.

Feliciano emphasizes, in addition to the civil society participation largely presumably through the C20, the importance of the T20. As he sees it:

… the G20’s “ideas bank,” gathering and disseminating analyses by think tanks involved in global issues, alongside insights from high-level experts. It aims then to influence the negotiations and the final declarations made by the G20.

But Feliciano is not so swept up in the G20 summitry process that he fails to see the challenges posed by this hosting year. He sets out the challenges that Brazil faces:

•Having financial resources to organize hundreds of meetings (government + philanthropy + business);

•Generating credible and impactful ideas/processes/proposals (less is more);

•Managing the G7-BRICS rivalry (G7 – G20) – being a bridge-builder;

•Being more global and less local (cannot mimic Modi’s India);

•Avoiding contamination from the Ukraine War (Indian challenge);

•Managing the growing rivalry between the USA and China in working groups and the summit;

•Being able to propose and innovate – themes, ideas, and processes (depends on organized civil society); and

•Improving the inclusion of new actors in the processes (W20, C20, and L20).

These challenges are formidable and limit ultimately the advances that Brazil can bring to the summit process. But he also sees opportunities for Brazil. And he sets these out as well:

•Strengthening Brazil’s role in discursive leadership;

•Rebuilding Brazil’s international prestige (G20 + COP30 in Belém);

•Advancing priority agendas – inequality, climate change, and global governance reform;

•Opportunity for strengthening coordination among BRICS+ with the sequence of troikas;

•Empowering organized civil society to participate in major international debates;

•Expanding the range of international topics within Brazilian society; and

•A significant showcase of Brazil’s political capacity to produce credible and feasible ideas/results.

There is opportunity; but we have seen the building of a large summitry machine that is unlikely to be able to make the kind of progress that hosts desire. Looking back over the years since the emergence of the Informals there has been a back and forward motion to these Informals. Leader frustration over the burdening of their efforts to act collectively without being hemmed in by bureaucracies led to attenuation by leaders from policy machinery only to have it grow again over the years to assist leaders in advancing global governance policies. The dilemma is, however, not over the administrative and policy assistance but the weakened state overall of multilateralism. The decision making remains at the leader level and there is little collective commitment. National policy dominates at the cost of collaborative policy making no matter what the structure and policy support.

This Post first appeared on my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/brazils-g20-hosting-year-2024

Feel free to comment and subscribe there.

Image Credit: portal.gov.br

Biden Trade Protectionism

Posted on January 20, 2024 by Alan Alexandroff

There is a continuing interest in capturing the state of the current global political economy and the global economic policymaking of the major states – the US, China, India, Brazil, Europe, Japan, Korea, and others. Not surprisingly the debate is most active in the US. Experts and officials alike are intent in describing current Biden Administration policy. Most recently some experts have been labeling the global economic framework as ‘post- neoliberalism’, defining it, apparently, in contradistinction to the previous dominant policy framework – ‘neoliberalism’. The dilemma of course is a definitional one as much as anything else – the terms are well known, their meaning not so much.

Recently, colleagues of mine have kicked off a discussion. One, Dan Drezner, from the Fletcher School and the Substack ‘Drezner’s World’ has waded into the policy mix, actually in an article from Reason titled, “The Post-Neoliberalism Moment”. As Dan early in the piece thought to frame first neoliberalism he suggested the following:

The term neoliberal has been stigmatized far more successfully than it has been defined. For our purposes, it refers to a set of policy ideas that became strongly associated with the so-called Washington Consensus: a mix of deregulation, trade liberalization, and macroeconomic prudence that the United States encouraged countries across the globe to embrace. These policies contributed to the hyperglobalization that defined the post–Cold War era from the fall of the Berlin Wall to Brexit.

Dan made it clear, however, that this economic model no longer dominates:

In the 16 years since the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberalism has taken a rhetorical beating; New Yorker essayist Louis Menand characterized it as “a political swear word.” Until recently, no coherent alternative set of ideas had been put forward in mainstream circles—but that has been changing.

And what has been the replacement, well Dan suggests that its the politicians and officials that have been most active in leaving neoliberalism behind:

These ideas are being shaped by powerful officials. The primary difference between Biden and Trump in this area is that Trump’s opposition to globalization was based on gut instincts and implemented as such. The Biden administration has been more sophisticated. Policy principals ranging from U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai to National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan have been explicit in criticizing “oversimplified market efficiency” and proposing an alternative centered far more on resilience.

For elements of this policy transformation one need only look to recent Biden Administration policies including the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. As Dan concludes, the totality of these policy initiatives is: “all represent a pivot to industrial policy—a focus on domestic production.”

In constructing this post-neoliberalism model, folks argue that there is a necessary trade-off between resilience and efficiency. As Dan suggests: “A key assumption behind post-neoliberalism is that policy makers can implement the right policies in the right way to nudge markets in the right direction.”

Now another colleague of mine, Henry Farrell from Johns Hopkins, tries his hand at a definition in a recent Substack Post at his ‘Programmable Mutter’, titled, “If Post-Neoliberalism is in Trouble, We’re all in Trouble”. The Post partly responds to Dan, and further articulates Henry’s view of post-neoliberalism. As he describes it:

A key assumption behind post-neoliberalism is that policy makers can implement the right policies in the right way to nudge markets in the right direction. … I see post-neoliberalism less as a coherent alternative body of thought, than as the claim, variously articulated by a very loosely associated cluster of intellectuals and policy makers, that markets should not be the default solution. … More generally, post-neoliberalism isn’t and shouldn’t be a simple reverse image of the system that it has to remake. It can’t be, not least because it has to build in part on what is already there.

The dilemma, as I see it, for understanding any of these post-neoliberalism models, and also, though less intensely – neoliberalism, is pretty much all definitional. The base of the problem is not really understanding what ‘resilience’ and ‘efficiency’ really mean. And that in turn causes confusion over trying to then understand ‘globalization’. And that unfortunately builds vagueness into our understanding of these economic models especially over what we are to understand to be – post-neoliberalism.

But what isn’t so difficult to understand is the problem that has been created in this post-neoliberal period by current trade policy especially as seen in the United States. Layer it as much as you can but the Biden Administration policy is ‘protectionist’ and the Trump Administration, was, and will in all likelihood be, even more protectionist if Trump is returned to office in late 2024. As Inu Manak has written in a recent piece for the Hinrich Foundation in Australia – a foundation focused on global trade:

Trade has become toxic, not just on the campaign trail, but in the way that it is discussed by both Democrats and Republicans. “Traditional” US trade policy, which began to form its nearly century-old roots under the leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, has been described by US Trade Representative Katherine Tai as “trickle-down economics,” where “maximum tariff liberalization…contributed to the hollowing out of our industrial heartland. … The current US approach to trade, if it can be called an approach at all, risks weakening US influence abroad and economically disadvantaging Americans at home. It rests on the false belief that retrenchment of “traditional” US trade policy—by putting America First or catering to a select group of US workers and branding such efforts as “worker-centric trade policy”—will somehow restore the United States to a position of hegemonic dominance with no peer competitor.

The Biden Administration’s allergy to new trade policy initiatives can be seen in its Indo-Pacific economic strategy – the IPEF – the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. This framework is intended to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness for the fourteen countries negotiating the IPEF. The countries included are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam with the United States. The IPEF partners represent 40 percent of global GDP and 28 percent of global goods and services trade. Negotiations have proceeded well for three of the four pillars including supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy pillars but the Biden Administration has decided not to proceed in negotiating for fair and resilient trade. As William Reinsch at CSIS described the situation:

The commentariat is busy these days debating the future of the Biden administration’s trade policy in the wake of its effective abandonment of the trade pillar in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) negotiations. (The administration says the talks will continue, and I imagine they will, but I don’t see a conclusion, at least before the election.) The policy is clearly a failure at this point, …

As colleague Ryan Haas of the Brookings Institution, and a former US official – from 2013 to 2017, Hass served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff – underscored in his examination of trade policy in the Indo-Pacific:

These constraints will be most visible on trade. The absence of a credible trade and economic agenda for Asia has been the Biden administration’s greatest weakness. Political and national security imperatives will continue to drive the United States’ approach to trade. Do not expect any outbreak of creativity or boldness on trade by the Biden administration in 2024.

The Biden Administration failed to roll back the tariffs imposed by the Trump trade folk. It is a major failure of US trade policy and an expression of the Biden SAdministration’s trade protectionism. It bodes ill for growing the global economy and achieving productivity gains for the United States and others.

Image Credit: E-International Relations

This Post originally appeared at my Substack Post Alan’s Newsletter – https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/biden-trade-protectionism?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcome=true

The First Informal Falters

Posted on January 15, 2024 by Alan Alexandroff

Yup, a little late in the weekend it is. But then for some Monday is a holiday. Mea culpa, but I was deep into completing a draft chapter for a yet to appear volume – which, in fact is scheduled to be released by 2025. The publication year, by the way, is important. My chapter will be part of a planned edited volume by Edward Elgar Publishing. There will be many chapters, so I am told, that will review and analyze the G7. It will do so on the 50th anniversary of the initiation of the G7 Leaders Summit. Yup, Rambouillet, the acknowledged first G7 Leaders Summit – it was actually, the G6 – France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US at that moment in time – met in 1975. All the chapters, I suspect, will cover aspects of this ‘First Informal’, the G7, and, I suspect, the other Informals as well – that is the G20 and the BRICS.

Wow, the 50th anniversary of this First Informal! Certainly, I was interested in examining the role of the First Informal not to mention the Others.

Unfortunately, as you explore the Informals – indeed the promise of the Informals, you come face to face with the state of effectiveness of this leader-led summit. Has this multilateral instrument been effective? It is hard not to assess that the Informals have not met the hopes of those initiating and managing this and all of these informal institutions.

The emergence of the Informals reflected in part the fading power of the Formals – the institutions of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and some others – and the intent to advance collective global governance policymaking . A more cynical view would suggest that these major western powers – the US, UK, and Europeans, not to mention Japan, sought to resolve growing global economic problems in the 1970s impacting them and more broadly the global economy without interference of others in the global economy – newly emerging market economies and more broadly the Global South. As I wrote in the early paragraphs of the draft chapter:

“Beyond just a question of representation, however, there is the continuing question, quite crucial, of the effectiveness of all these Informals.” As I concluded: “… their structures and processes have not led to the desired policy leadership as was hoped by early leaders.

There are various explanations, I believe, in undermining the success of First Informal – and helping to explain the current weakness of it and all the Informals. These ‘forces’ are, I believe, hobbling global governance progress in the current global order. One element, of course, is the lack of broad representation – this is after all just the G7. But there is more. Recently the United States has focused the G7 on like-mindedness and beyond that, at least in a US view – expressed in part by the statement of Antony Blinken, the Secretary of State, that the G7 is:

… the steering committee of the world’s advanced democracies, demonstrating unprecedented unity of purpose and unity of action on the issues that are defining the 21st century.

This US “steering committee” focus on the G7 has arisen at the same time, or in part because of, the return of geopolitics, particularly the growing rivalry and competition between the US and China in international relations. While the US-China rivalry does create tensions in the G7, still these tensions are nothing like that in the G20 with the mix of developed and developing members and most obviously including the US and China and in fact the US and Russia.

The US-Russia tension speaks to the growing global disorder erupting with various regional conflicts. There is nothing more dramatic than in the past two years and more of the Russia-Ukraine war in the heart of Europe. Then there is a more recent but no less dramatic war between Hamas and Israel in the Mideast that is spreading regionally.

As described by the President and the CEO of the International Crisis Group (ICG), Ero Comfort and the ICG Executive Vice President, Richard Atwood (2024) in a recent FP post:

Worldwide, diplomatic efforts to end fighting are failing. More leaders are pursuing their ends militarily. More believe they can get away with it. … So, what is going wrong? The problem is not primarily about the practice of mediation or the diplomats involved. Rather, it lies in global politics. In a moment of flux, constraints on the use of force—even for conquest and ethnic cleansing—are crumbling.

And then there is uncertainty of US commitment to the multilateral order as we watch the possible return of a second Trump presidency. Even without that the current Biden Administration has too often exhibited a tepid commitment to a multilateral order.

All these forces have weakened the actions of the Informals and the broader multilateral initiatives. Multilateral weakness is a threat to the current global order and raises the prospects of growing harmful global disorder.

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter, a Substack Post – https://substack.com/@globalsummitryproject

Image Credit – Japan’s Office of the Prime Minister

As the Year Begins to Close

Posted on December 23, 2023 by Alan Alexandroff

So, as we enter the holiday season with Christmas just around the corner and as we close in on the end of the year, it is reasonable to reflect on the progress of some of the research areas we have targeted.

One focus area is the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), or what is referred to at the UN as Agenda 2030. This past September we saw the High Level Political Forum (HLPF) gather on September 18th and 19th during the UNGAs High-Level Week. The UN Secretary-General called the SDG Summit gathering the “centerpiece moment of 2023.” It took place at the midpoint of implementing the development agenda adopted by countries in 2015: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The HLPF meets under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, known as the SDG Summit . In 2023, the second SDG Summit took place (the first was in 2019) bringing together Heads of State and Government to review and renew efforts towards achieving the SDGs. The Summit culminated in the adoption of a political declaration to accelerate action to achieve the 17 goals. Now I have written before on the SDGs but the question is what conclusions can we draw from this second UNGA gathering.

The first and critical conclusion of the HLPF is that Agenda 2030 is in jeopardy. As the the political declaration announced:

8. The achievement of the SDGs is in peril. At the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda, we are alarmed that the progress on most of the SDGs is either moving much too slowly or has regressed below the 2015 baseline. Our world is currently facing numerous crises. Years of sustainable development gains are being reversed. Millions of people have fallen into poverty, hunger and malnutrition are becoming more prevalent, humanitarian needs are rising, and the impacts of climate change more pronounced. This has led to increased inequality exacerbated by weakened international solidarity and a shortfall of trust to jointly overcome these crises.

And the answer by the Heads of State and the UN Secretary General is right there in the next paragraph:

9. We commit to bold, ambitious, accelerated, just and transformative actions, anchored in international solidarity and effective cooperation at all levels. We will promote a systemic shift towards a more inclusive, just, peaceful, resilient and sustainable world for people and planet, for present and future generations.

10. We will devote ourselves collectively to the pursuit of sustainable development including through international cooperation and partnership on the basis of mutual trust and the full benefit of all, in a spirit of global solidarity, for the common future of present and coming generations.

So it is all about ‘acceleration’ and collective action. And further describing this notion of acceleration, the Declaration urges:

30. We must meet the moment by taking immediate measures to scale up efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, including through development cooperation, SDG investments, reforming the international financial architecture, supporting sustained, inclusive and sustainable growth, enhancing macroeconomic policy cooperation, exploring measures of progress on sustainable development that complement or go beyond gross domestic product, and implementing actions to accelerate sustainable development, in particular in support of developing countries.

And it is apparent from the Declaration that the hope is to accelerate all 17 goals and their various aspects. But the issue is how. And there it appears that there is little to offer although the Declaration does point to the Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) that many countries, though not all – note the United States has never prepared a VNR – have prepared which the Declaration suggests has “generated valuable lessons learned and have helped countries monitor progress and integrate the Sustainable Development Goals into national plans and policies.”

The hope is that all countries will focus on all the goals of Agenda 2030 pointing to the needed effort in all in paragraph 38. Pointedly, the Declaration looks to accelerate financing for the developing countries and reviews those policies that are designed to provide such financing. As the Declaration urges:

We commit to accelerate the full implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and to take further actions to scale up financing for sustainable development, and provide means of implementation for developing countries, …

Many of these policies such as expanding Multilateral Development Bank efforts are valuable but how. Too much of the Report seems to be aspirational, valuable reminders but not providing concrete steps to success.

Now far more innovative is the 17 Rooms Project that is brought by the Sustainable Development Project at Brookings with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. As pointed out in their Synthesis Report:

The story of the Sustainable Development Goals’ second half out to 2030 is yet to be written. In practical terms, much of the story will boil down to groups of people getting together to listen, debate, and act on concrete next steps. This is the underlying spirit of 17 Rooms. In the 2023 annual flagship, 17 highly curated working groups, one per SDG, came together to craft new forms of actionable, collaborative leadership over a 12-to-18-month horizon. Their efforts addressed priorities like confronting the multi-dimensional challenge of climate change, harnessing frontier technologies, elevating local approaches to global issues, and reframing challenges to inspire action.

When you read the Report you see that many of the Groups offer plans that initiate from the sub-state and nonstate level, whether from the local community, the private sector or the provincial or state level. For example Room 17 – “Partnerships for the Goals” the Report urges:

the development of local agency and leadership as the driving force for system change and for helping to advance long-term outcomes across all SDGs. They rallied around the concept of collective leadership as a term to describe investing in the agency and collaborative capacities of locally rooted leaders and their allies.

And the energy and effort may indeed be there at these governance levels. But it leaves a problem: what I would describe as the ‘implementation gap’. While initiatives of this sort make great sense, achieving the SDGs, it seems to me, will require in the end national and then collective national action that also can be augmented by international organization collaboration. As valuable as it is to have the action at the substate and private sector levels, it seems imperative in the end that we ‘rope in’ the collective effort of national and international efforts. And that is not apparent.

This appeared initially as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/as-the-year-begins-to-close?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2

Image Credit: United Nations

Rising BRICSAM

'Breaking' Knowledge, Information and Commentary on Rising BRICSAM and Global Governance Summitry