BRICS Confusion is Rather Evident

Well, though still in the weekend, I must admit this Post is a bit late, though still available, I hope, for an enjoyable weekend read.

So, I was not planning to target the BRICS South Africa gathering a second time in this Alan’s Newsletter Post, at least not quite this soon. However,  the decisions taken, or not taken in some cases at this most recent BRICS Summit in Johannesburg South Africa was too ‘juicy’ to ignore.  As pointed out by Rajiv Bhatia of India’s Gateway House now, more than ever the diplomatic balancing act for the new and enlarged BRICS presents an even more dramatic challenge for this Leaders’ Summit:

As BRICS heads into its 18th year, [the South Africa Leaders’ Summit is the 15th] its success and way forward will depend on the members’ ability to tackle the principal challenge of retaining its internal solidarity while balancing expansion and its impact and influence in the world.

And that central point – retaining its internal solidarity while balancing expansion – is hard to foresee. There is confusion over who was chosen to add and indeed whether they have agreed to join, and what conditions; there is confusion over the choices themselves; and there is confusion over what the enlargement is likely to mean for this Leaders’ Summit.

It is evident that the enlargement has added heft to an already significant leaders’ group. As Bhatia points out:

As a grouping of five nations, BRICS represents 27% of the world’s land area, 42% of the population, 16% of international trade, 27% of global GDP in nominal terms, and 32.5% in PPP terms.

Now the group, according to, Bhaso Ndzendze in The Conversation , is:

The enlarged grouping will account for 46.5% of the world population. Using IMF GDP data, we can deduce that it will account for about 30% of global GDP.

On a PPP basis apparently, it will represent 37 percent of global GDP according to James Kynge in the FT.

So, six countries were identified as joining the BRICS come January 2024: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran. JIm O’Neill, formerly of Goldman Sachs,  who has been tagged for creating the BRICS acronym suggested this about the enlargement:

… I have questioned the organization’s purpose, beyond serving as a symbolic gesture. Now that the BRICS has announced that it will add six more countries – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – I pose the question again. The decision, after all, does not appear to have been decided on any clear objective, much less economic, criteria. Why, for example, was Indonesia not asked? Why Argentina and not Mexico, or Ethiopia and not Nigeria?

All good questions. Now the list, I would suggest, seems to reveal that China and Russia prevailed in the choices agreed to. Why, I suspect that is, is the BRICS enlargement includes Iran. As the NYTimes pointed out in its article on BRICS expansion:

The inclusion of Tehran — which has antagonistic relations with China’s chief rival, the United States — suggests that Chinese and Russian pressure had succeeded over the qualms of members like India, Brazil and South Africa, which maintain friendly ties with the West.

It is not unreasonable to suggest that adding Iran can only heighten the geopolitical tensions between the BRICS and others – most notably the G7, and most particularly the US with its many Iran sanctions.

Nevertheless, the hosts and commentators as quoted in the NYTimes again, tried to put the best face on it:

… South Africa, sought to put a hopeful spin on the enlargement decision in any case.

Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s representative in the BRICS negotiations, told reporters that the group needs to change with the times. “This is what BRICS is saying, let’s be more inclusive. BRICS is not anti-West,” he said.

And then of course there is the boosterism from the South Africa President, Cyril Ramaphosa as well (FP):

BRICS has embarked on a new chapter in its effort to build a world that is fair, a world that is just, a world that is also inclusive and prosperous,

As for Indonesia, an obvious choice for the BRICS to draw closer to ASEAN and Southeast Asia more  broadly. Why was it not part of the enlargement group? It would seem that Indonesia has not yet decided whether it wants membership. It has not submitted, apparently, a letter of intent. Also, it appears, notwithstanding the announcement that the UAE, in fact, has not decided whether to accept the BRICS invitation, though I suppose in the end it will.

And then there is – Argentina.  Argentina remains mired in a dreadful economic crisis. If in the end new members will be asked to contribute capital to the most important BRICS creation, in my opinion, the New Development Bank (NDB), Argentina is far more likely to ask for support than to be able to contribute support. In the end, I suspect it was Brazil and its current president, Lula that pressed for membership to be extended to Argentina.

As just noted, the most notable significant BRICS achievement, in my opinion, has been the creation of the NDB. There  was some indication that the expanded members would all be required to contribute to the NDB.  And that still may occur.  Still, it is disappointing that not more was mentioned of the NDB by the current announcements.

There was, also, a fair bit of reporting, and loud statements prior to the conclusion of the Summit, that suggested the BRICS might well take steps to create some form of common currency, or steps at de-dollarization by the BRICS. But as was pointed out by Henry Poenisch in OMFIF:

declaration released at the gathering in Johannesburg on 24 August made no mention of a common currency and instead focused on bilateral clearing – the second-best option. It stressed the importance of ‘encouraging the use of local currencies in international trade and financial transactions between Brics as well as between their trading partners.’

Yet, it seems to me the enhanced use of local currencies, except possibly the Chinese renminbi, is a rather questionable proposition. Using some of the local currencies available, and then holding the surplus for future use doesn’t seem a rather appealing course of action.

Finally, what most commentators failed to point to in their descriptions of the enlargement of the BRICS is that two of the six new members – Argentina and Saudi Arabia – are already members of the G20, as of course are all of the original BRICS. Rather than contemplating the consequence of the enlarged BRICS for global policy progress, it strikes me targeting the efforts, and today’s evident hardships in advancing global governance in the face of rising geopolitics by focusing attention on the G20 might well be a more fruitful avenue of inquiry if one was examining global summitry and the efforts to advance global governance. Looking again, at Jim O’Neill he turns, not reasonably, in this direction:

What the world really needs is a resurrected G20, which already includes all the same key players, plus others. It remains the best forum for addressing truly global issues such as economic growth, international trade, climate change, pandemic prevention, and so on. Though it now faces significant challenges, it still can reclaim the spirit of 2008-10, when it coordinated the international response to the global financial crisis. At some point, the US and China will have to overcome their differences and allow the G20 to return to its central position.

This was originally posted at my Substack ‘Alan’s Newsletter’ You can view there and you are free to subscribe as well.
https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/brics-confusion-is-rather-evident?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web
Image Credit: France 24

Focusing on the China-West Dialogue Project (CWD); Advancing Global Governance; and Improving US-China Relations

Now, turning back to the Global Summitry Project (GSP) and the Vision20 – collective efforts of Yves Tiberghien, Professor of Political Science and Konwakai Chair in Japanese Research at the University of British Columbia (UBC), Colin Bradford, nonresident Senior Fellow from Brookings  and myself, the Director of the Global Summitry Project. We have initiated various research initiatives.

A critical major effort over some three years has been the China-West Dialogue Process (CWD). The CWD has been Co-Chaired with Colin Bradford, the lead Co-Chair of the CWD and myself. This initiative has held some twenty plus virtual gatherings and many participants are set to gather in person for the first time in years at the Global Solutions Summit in Berlin May 15-16th <https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/programs/china-west-dialogue/?utm_source=MASTER_Verteiler&utm_campaign=33fe63ffef-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_11_11_10_44_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4f4e08bb85-33fe63ffef-447373003> to focus on US-China relations and assess how the G20 can advance critical, and dramatically needed global governance issues – global debt management, climate change policy, global food security and health security.

What is required, however, and is currently missing, is that the two leading powers turn their minds to such critical global governance policy efforts – both bilateral and multilateral.  From the beginning the CWD has targeted first Trump policy and now Biden foreign policy. Trump Administration officials made it clear that ‘engagement with China’ born in the Nixon Administration was at an end. Both Administrations called for competition though not for conflict. The outcome so far, especially for bilateral relations has been dismal.

As my Co-Chair Colin Bradford wrote on March 7th: “The strategic competition between the US and China is real and must be accepted and managed. But the confrontational narratives of this binary relationship are dominating and weakening global leadership and governance and present a threat to the global order.”   As the Editorial of the NYTimes, today, March 12th, urges: “Americans’ interests are best served by emphasizing competition with China while minimizing confrontation. Glib invocations of the Cold War are misguided. It doesn’t take more than a glance to appreciate that this relationship is very different. Rather than try to trip the competition, America should focus on figuring out how to run faster, …” <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/opinion/china-us-relationship.html?referringSource=articleShare>. Competition is not the problem for the Biden Administration; but collaborative policy making certainly appears to be. And current policy has made it more difficult. All one needs to do is to examine the interaction of the Biden Administration and the Chinese Government and Party on “balloon gate”. As Paul Herr of the Chicago Council identifies in his post at EAF: <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/03/12/ballooning-mistrust-in-the-us-china-relationship/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter2023-03-12> “Washington and Beijing’s response to the appearance of a Chinese surveillance balloon over the United States in February 2023 illustrates several aspects of the current US–China relationship that will make it very difficult to reverse the downward spiral in bilateral ties. The episode displayed mutual distrust, latent hostility, a failure to communicate and the adverse impact of internal politics on how the two sides deal with each other.”

As the CWD has identified at the GSI CWD Website – <https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/programs/china-west-dialogue/> “The CWD’s fundamental goal is to help reshape the narratives and behaviours of US-China relations from friction to function by engaging other middle and major powers and emerging powers in a reframed China-West relations in G20 processes and other public forums. The aim of the Project is to identify new political dynamics that yield more productive relations in the international system.” At the CWD has identified, and noted by Colin Bradford on March 7th: “The CWD has concluded that the G20 is the most important platform for profiling and actualizing these alternative political dynamics in the year-long official G20 processes, which could enable convergence on systemic threats and ease geopolitical tensions.”

It is a challenging  goal in the face of current difficult US-China relations – but crucial for settling global order relations that have become ‘so rocky’ and unsettled in the last several years.

March 12, 2023

 

Constructing an Inclusive Order: Avoiding Fragmentation and Worse – Disorder

Two summits completed and another off in the distance, but impacted by these just completed summits. A crowded summit schedule has begun.

The statements were voiced and the Leaders’ Communique issued by the G7 at Schloss Elmau to be followed by more speeches and statements and the issuing of the “Strategic Concept”  a once ever ten year statement by NATO at Madrid.

What have we learned from this G7 and the NATO gatherings? Let me first focus on the G7 Summit. Well, first it is relevant that we take into account the position expressed by one of the longstanding observers of the summit process, Sheffield’s Hugo Dobson. As he concluded, along with his colleague Greg Stiles in Global Policy , reflecting their review of the German G7 and in particular the Leaders’ Communique:

In summary, and despite what we have tried to do here, beware reading too much either positively or negatively into a single summit document. Rather, this communiqué should be placed in the context of a network of summits – most immediately the NATO Summit in Madrid later this week and looking further ahead to the Indonesian-hosted G20 Summit later this year.

And it is a summary and caution well worth heeding. Nevertheless, the tone is worth further comment. The G7 took the time and the Communique to underscore their self characterization as a democratic forum. In their Communique opening the G7 declared:

 As open democracies adhering to the rule of law, we are driven by shared values and bound by our commitment to the rules-based multilateral order and to universal human rights. As outlined in our Statement on support for Ukraine, standing in unity to support the government and people of Ukraine in their fight for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future, we will continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on President Putin’s regime for its unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, while stepping up our efforts to counter its adverse and harmful regional and global impacts, including with a view to helping secure global energy and food security as well as stabilising the economic recovery. 

 

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Biden, Suga, Xi and Yes, Others – the New Mix Reshaping Global Order Relations

 

The current state of the international system. That is what I hope RisingBRICSAM can tackle in the next set of posts. While I remain the named blogger here at RisingBRICSAM,  I shall not be undertaking this task alone. Nope. I have been fortunate enough these past weeks to be working with a great set of recent, or near MGA graduates from the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto.

And all of us in various ways have had  opportunities to examine in some detail aspects in the evolving global order. In addition, many of these same researchers have joined in the China-West Dialogue (CWD) research and online meetings. But more on that in a moment.

 

There is as you will see a host of significant influences shaping the global order and its politics. Probably the most immediate has been Covid-19. The waves of the virus have had a significant influence on all the major and minor actors in the global system.

The global public health crisis has also underscored the growing array of new actors in the global order. Of course the many states – leading powers, major powers, emerging and developing powers, and also the international organizations both formal and the often forgotten but in fact critical informal institutions.

The array of these state actors have been significantly supplemented during the pandemic by sub-state actors – whether regions, networks or local actors and even more dramatically non-state actors such as foundations, public and private corporations.  The pandemic has underscored the growing role of technology and digital organizations. One of the envisaged posts will focus on the global developments of Agenda 2030 – the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – and the threat that the Covid-19 pandemic has posed to achieving these critical global development goals by the end of the decade.

The virus has been dramatic globally. But then as well has been the replacement of the Trump Administration and its ‘America First’  foreign policy in the United States with the Biden Administration’s autocracy versus democracy and build back better world (B3W). Both administrations grappled with, or amplified, the reemergence of geopolitics with the intensifying rivalry between the United States and Xi Jinping’s China. Even in these early months, the Biden Administration has represented a highly different domestic and diplomatic effort from the often chaotic years of Trump policies though it appears the Biden Administration has moved slowly on revising aspects of American foreign policy including with China. Some of the early and continuing analysis and research at the Global Summitry Project (GSP)  on US and US-China foreign policy has been undertaken by the China-West Dialogue Project (CWD) co-chaired by Colin Bradford, non-resident senior fellow from Brookings and myself. For almost two years we have met largely virtually with thought leaders – former officials, policymakers, academic experts – from around the globe to build a narrative that can accommodate competition, avoid confrontation and vitally permits collaboration – an approach that counters the ideological divisions that have emerged with rising US-China tensions.

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So Many Summits!

This weekend we open on a sustained set of Summits beginning with the G7 hosted by the UK in Carbis Bay.  Along with various states easing restrictions and beginning to open after months of Covid lockdown, we now have the in-person opening of this summit season. The G7 will be followed by a NATO gathering, then an EU-US summit and then a sort of ‘back to the future’ classic ‘cold war’ summit, this between US President Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Our colleague, Stewart Patrick at CFR identified 10 summits just before the start of this calendar year. His list included:

  • The NATO Summit
  • US-EU Summit
  • Summit for Democracy
  • UN Convention on biological diversity COP15, Kunming China
  • G7 Summit
  • WTO Ministerial Conference
  • NPT Review Conference
  • The Opening of the General Assembly of the UN
  • G20 Summit
  • UNFCCC COP26 Glasgow

Now there are even some others as well that are not on the list and have occurred already. Before this G7 we saw the newly elected US President hold a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad Summit, on March 12th, the first with leaders from India, Australia, Japan and the United States. And in April the President organized  a Leaders Summit on Climate. Over 40 leaders attended virtually including notably President Xi Jinping of China. As the State Department noted, the Climate Summit was intended “to rally the world in tackling the climate crisis and meeting the demands of science.” It was also seen as a precursor to the COP26 Glasgow meeting scheduled to be held from November 1st to 12th and right after the G20 Summit.

It is tough to keep track of all the summits planned, or already concluded. But here are some additional summits planned for this calendar year.

  • APEC
  • East Asian Summit
  • ASEAN Summit

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Measuring American Foreign Policy for ‘Competition without Catastrophe’: The Alaska US-China Summit

With President Biden’s first official news conference last Thursday March 25th, the news conference brought the curtain down on the first meeting of top foreign policy officials from the United States and China. The public side of the Summit was a rather fiery uncooperative back and forth between the leading government officials from both China and the United States. We are led to understand, however, that the private meetings that went on into the next day were more productive. And with both encounters past, the shape of the competition between China and the United States began to take some public shape.

For some time now we have been made aware that a more confrontational  approach in US-China relations was likely. As David Sanger describes in a recent NYT article, the ‘Washington beltway’ view has crystallized around a far more competitive foreign policy with China. And the Biden foreign policy has reflected, seemingly, this rare political consensus:

For a president barely 10 weeks into office, casting the United States as confronting a global struggle with the Chinese model has some clear political benefits. One of the few issues that unites Democrats and Republicans is the need to compete head-on with Beijing.

William Galston at Brookings reviewing American public opinion toward China underscores how American public opinion has turned against China particularly after the Trump years:

All things considered, the Biden administration will enjoy substantial public support if it places competition with China at the center of its foreign policy, and it will pay little price for the blunter rhetoric its senior officials employed during the recent meetings in Alaska with their Chinese counterparts. On the other hand, most Americans have not focused on the military dimensions of this emerging relationship and are not prepared for a possible conflict over Taiwan.

Advisors to Joe Biden during the election period, and many of these same folk now as officials for President Biden, are describing and clarifying US policy toward China that they had previously written about pre-election. The dominant position as articulated by the senior policy folk such as Jake Sullivan, now National Security Advisor to the President and Kurt Campbell now the ‘Asia Tsar’ is strategic competition, or slightly more poetically, ‘competition without catastrophe’ the title of their consequential 2019 FA article. Continue reading

Which Countries are Middle Powers – And Why are They Important to the Global Order? Part 2

The growing geopolitical tensions in the international system, in particular  between the United States and China and also with Russia, have led to a chorus of voices urging on middle powers to greater efforts in maintaining  and even strengthening a rules-based order. Roland Paris in a major Chatham House Brief titled: “Can Middle Powers Save the Liberal World Order?” pointed at various urgent calls from international experts:

Gideon Rachman, a Financial Times columnist, has proposed a ‘middle-powers alliance’ to ‘preserve a world based around rules and rights, rather than power and force’. Two eminent American foreign-policy experts, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, have also called on US allies to ‘leverage their collective economic and military might to save the liberal world order’.

The urgency and calls for middle power action rose perceptively, of course, with ‘America First’  from the Trump Presidency and from the failure of the leading powers – the United States and China – to organize global governance efforts to tackle the global pandemic. Indeed the global pandemic has seemingly ‘lit a fire’ under experts and officials issuing a rising chorus of calls for greater middle power action in the face of leading power failure. An  evident instance is a recent article from  Foreign Affairs from our colleague Bruce Jones from Brookings titled:“Can middle powers lead the world out of the pandemic? Because the United States and China have shown that they can’t”.

In Part 1 of this Post series we attempted to identify which states experts were referring to when they issued the call for middle power action. We ended up with a variety of categories. There were the traditional states, Canada, Australia and maybe South Korea and Singapore. There were states that fell within the top 20 economic powers  – way too many states but lots of familiar powers. And then there were all those states , identified by Jeffrey Robertson in his insightful article: “Middle-power definitions: confusion reigns supreme” in the Australian Journal of International Affairs (2017. 71(4): 355-370, with an interest in and “capacity (material resources, diplomatic influence, creativity, etc.)resources, diplomatic influence, creativity, etc.) to work proactively in concert with similar states to contribute to the development and strengthening of institutions for the governance of the global commons.” And in fact there seemed to be a bit of a marriage between middle powers and multilateralism in the newly created “Alliance for Multilateralism” created by the foreign ministers of France and Germany that umbrellaed at its creation some 40 states.

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Which Countries are Middle Powers – And Why are They Important to the Global Order? Part 1

I had a debate very recently with my China-West Dialogue (CWD) colleague, Colin Bradford. In a memo we were working on for CWD, he described the two major trade agreements, CPTPP and RCEP. He then added:

 

These two trade agreements show that middle powers are able to take multilateral actions on their own that make an impact.(*)  

But which countries do we see achieving that? And behind that, why have analysts and policy makers become significantly more interested these middle powers in the Trump era recently past?

Counting the Middle Powers

The debate begins with the ‘Who’. Though Colin and I were generally agreed on the content of the article, we went around in circles over which countries we could, and should, identify as middle powers. Now, I was more than ready to forgive Colin his vague characterization of middle powers and then broad inclusion of the same – after all he is an economist – but soon thereafter I stumbled over a rather recent article by Bruce Jones, also of Brookings. and a well known international relations analyst. The article found in FA and titled, “Can Middle Powers Lead the World Out of the Pandemic? Because the United States and China Have Shown They Can’t” tackled the question of the current middle power membership. Given the subject matter of the article, Bruce was called upon to identify in some manner, the states that captured the current set of middle powers:

The concept of “middle powers” is imprecise and somewhat inchoate, but it generally refers to countries that are among the top 20 or so economies in the world, lack large-scale military power (or choose not to play a leading role in defense), and are energetic in diplomatic or multilateral affairs. These countries were seeking to fill part of the international leadership void even before the crisis, particularly when it came to buttressing the rickety multilateral system.

So, there we were. I had no difficulty acknowledging that the term was “imprecise and inchoate” but as for the rest of the features identified by Bruce, well, not so sure. Increasingly, I came to suspect that this was likely to be one of those classic international relations definitions – unclear and contested.

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The Link Between Domestic Politics and Global Governance

Colin Bradford is the Guest Blogger for this Post. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Brookings in Washington. He is a also a Principal of the Vision20 and a Co-Chair of the China-West Dialogue all with Yves Tiberghien, Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia and Alan S Alexandroff Director the Global Summitry Project of Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto and the Blog Master here at RisingBRICSAM

The underlying political driver of the current tensions in the global order is the actual or potential failure of economies to deliver social outcomes that are politically sustainable.  This is not just a phenomenon that brought about Brexit and Boris Johnson in the UK or Trump in the US – now apparently unelected.  This has been, and is, the drama of developing economies for decades. The failure to deliver social outcomes that are politically sustainable is  the source of social unrest now in Eastern Europe, the fear of the Communist Party of China, and the discontent of Europeans with the strictures of the EU.  It is global and deep seated; sweeping and systemic.

Populist nationalism is on the rise and authoritarianism is increasing as a result. The easy road for politicians to take today is to appeal to national strength and rally their publics around the flag.  The hard road to take is seize on this moment of hyper-interconnectivity revealed by the COVID 19 crisis and realize that strong multilateral cooperation and coordination is essential for global health and economic recovery in the short run and systemic transformation in the medium and long run.

The urgent necessity is for governments, societies and firms to realize that there is no going back to normal, that systemic crises require systemic change and that social priorities and people-centered policies are vital to restoring confidence in markets and governance.

But to systemically transform the social order reinforcement, resonance and support from the global system of international institutions is the new global governance priority.  Multilateralism needs to be revived to create innovative responses to these new domestic social priorities.  Strengthening the WHO, the ILO, the OECD and the multilateral regional development banks is necessary so that they can become the drivers of the international system as front-line innovators, taking on the dominant norm setting roles that the IMF, World Bank and WTO assumed during the Bretton Woods era.

The fact that social priorities are primordial domestic priorities does not mean the international institutions have no role to play.  To the contrary, key roles of international institutions are essential now through peer reviews, sharing best practice, and widening the array of policy options for national governments to engage in selective borrowing for internal application based on national criteria, culture and practice.   The funding international institutions provide provokes dialogues with governments and societies about priorities and challenges which enable countries to take advantage of global knowledge frontiers embodied in the experience of international institutions. Returning to knowledge-based policy making in national practice, which is sorely needed now, can be facilitated by these interactions between global institutions and national governments.

New forms of multilateralism and a new global order need to support transformation in the social order. This force field also operates in reverse.  Social transformation would strengthen societies as a whole such that the new social order would support the global order by: reducing ‘my-country-first’ nationalism, unilateralism, and dampen geopolitical tensions. The social order and the global order would be in constructive symbiosis instead, as currently, in rather destructive dynamics of a bipolar competitive era.

The new nexus between economics, society and the global order would create positive synergies toward better futures and greater systemic sustainability.

Image Credit: TechCrunch

What Comes Next for the Global Order?

 

Much hurried prediction, or more correctly, should I say speculation has been expressed by IR experts over the  impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the current global order. One of IR’s leading lights, Richard Haass, President of CFR has been ‘front and center’  in painting a post Covid global order. It’s not very pretty, nor much of an order. In an April article in Foreign Affairs  he describes the future global order in quite ‘downbeat’ terms:

Yet the world that will emerge from the crisis will be recognizable. Waning American leadership, faltering global cooperation, great-power discord: all of these characterized the international environment before the appearance of COVID-19, and the pandemic has brought them into sharper-than-ever relief. They are likely to be even more prominent features of the world that follows.

He suggest further that even were Biden to be elected the effort to  bring a more traditional global governance system would be stymied:

Even if a foreign policy “traditionalist” such as former Vice President Joseph Biden wins the November presidential election, resistance from Congress and the public will prevent the full-scale return of an expansive U.S. role in the world. And no other country, not China or anyone else, has both the desire and the ability to fill the void the United States has created.

Given this rather grim near future I was caught by the Foreign Policy article by Oona Hathaway and her Yale Law School colleague, Scott Shapiro:

The crisis offers the opportunity to transform the global order from one dominated by a single state, or a small number of them, to a more equal system of global governance. It’s time to stop waiting for a hegemon to come to the rescue and instead try to address more of our global problems through independently organized global clubs.

So, no more hegemon – no US; no China. Instead moving forward and in a position to tackle global governance challenges will be ‘global clubs’.  The characteristics of such club membership – that is excluding members who fail to adhere to the agreed rules – make such clubs reasonable, in fact highly useful  where great power leadership has receded. As the authors suggest:

The idea of decentralizing global governance to shifting alliances of like-minded nations is not entirely new. Much of international law already operates on precisely this principle of shared interests and decentralized enforcement. But unmooring global governance from reliance on a hegemonic actor, and from the global institutions we’ve known since the end of World War II, could become reality in part because of the conditions created by the pandemic.

As they conclude: 

The club rules are enforced not by a hegemon but by members directly by denying the benefits of membership to bad actors. One advantage of such decentralized governance is that any state can start a club. It doesn’t take a hegemon; it just takes a good idea.

These global clubs certainly bring a shift in global governance leadership and policymaking. Their global club thinking may be just the ‘tonic’ needed for what we’ve identified – that is the Vision20 principals, Colin Bradford, Yves Tiberghien and myself – as ‘effective multilateralism. We have described effective multilateralism, at least with  respect to the G20 leaders as “the elective, targeted, and purposeful actions with varied coalitions. We believe encouraging effective multilateralism is a vital tool in meeting the challenges the G20 and the international system face.” 

What Hathaway and Shapiro have offered possibly is a logic for organizing such coalitions. While we have witnessed various multilateralism initiatives, note the ‘Alliance for Multilateralism‘ offered up initially by the foreign ministers of France and Germany. What we haven’t seen is action.

Now is the time.

Image Credit: picture-alliance/AP/photo/T. Camus