The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: “Symbolically significant”, for now

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leader-led summit was held in Samarkand in this September. It brought global attention to the group first established by Beijing at the start of the 21st century. Not only was it Xi Jinping’s first trip outside the country since January 2020, with the ongoing war in Ukraine, but the meeting was also an opportunity for a sit down between Xi and Putin on the margins of the summit. That meeting was the immediate point of interest for the global media. In Samarkand, India’s PM Modi was openly critical of Russia as he tried to carve out a leadership position for the South Asian republic. While commentators noted that PM Modi did not hold a bilateral with President Xi indicating that the warmth of 2018’s Wuhan Summit between the two has not yet been rekindled.  Iran participated for the first time with the group now representing 40 percent of the world’s population and nearly a third of global GDP and all of which, barring India, are decidedly illiberal regimes.

While the SCO has more than two decades of existence, the summit is of interest not just because of the high-level leader diplomacy but on the peculiar qualities of a multilateral institution that is often neglected by Western scholars and analysts.

The SCO was established in 2001 by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with the intention of providing stability to the former Soviet Central Asian spaces with a particular focus on cooperation to combat what the members called the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. This initial motivation reflected China’s broader concerns about counterterrorism and Islamic extremism in the early 2000s as well as long term anxieties Beijing has had about the threat to the Communist Party of China (CPC) rule at the peripheries of the China.

The initial work of the SCO focused on coordinating the members’ security policies and sharing information, as well as conducting regular military exercises. The group added narcotic trafficking to its counterterrorism agenda and began to talk about economic collaboration and had periodic rhetorical flourishes about global governance and international order. From its initial membership of: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the SCO has expanded to include India and Pakistan in 2017and now Iran.

While the SCOs public diplomacy has been wide ranging, the group was, and remains at its heart, interested primarily on matters of international and transnational security. Yet as many analysts point out, Beijing and the members often appear disinterested in many quite obvious regional security matters, the most immediate example of which is the deadly clash between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan taking place barely 200 km from the current Summit which elicited neither comment nor action from individual leaders or the group as a whole.

Multilateral institutions often serve both symbolic and substantive functions. With the former, symbolic functions provide the opportunity to signal intent, represent collaboration and more broadly to perform statecraft. But substantive functions can provide the means to advance actual policy coordination and, in their more advanced forms, bind members into strict policy commitments, most famously exemplified by the EU and WTO. Most initiatives provide a blend of performance and policy as well as offering a platform at which ad hoc diplomacy can take place, such as the China-Russia meeting this year.

The SCO today is, however, a grouping that is long on symbolism and short on substance. At first glance it appears to be a good example of institutional balancing, that is when states use international institutions to balance against the influence of major powers. In this case the intention is to use the SCO to ensure that the US and its allies’ influence on the geopolitical dynamics in the Eurasian heartland is blunted. From this perspective bringing India into the fold was intended to hedge against Delhi’s growing alignment with Washington.

More broadly, it also represents a desire for a more multipolar and multimodal international order in which the North Atlantic powers have less influence; and liberal values are diluted as well.

While the symbolism is strong, and in the current moment it has particular salience given the Ukraine war illustrating starkly the clash between authoritarianism and democratic systems, there is little sign of the SCO making any meaningful progress on the substantive side of the ledger. One might be tempted to view the SCO as a nascent Central Asian NATO, yet the preferences of the key SCO powers remain low on concrete commitments as well as exhibiting not inconsiderable tensions between various members. At least for now, it is unlikely that the SCO will take any steps to move beyond the symbolic.

It is tempting, therefore, to write off the SCO as another example of shallow diplomacy in which grand statements of intent and photo opportunities are confused for actual statecraft. That is certainly true right now, but in the building of the foundations for collaboration among  influential and illiberal states in a geopolitically crucial zone of world politics, the members in general, and China in particular, have established a solid platform from which members may ultimately make good on their very real ambitions to transform the principles and practice of the regional order and possibly the international order.

Image Credit: YouTube

Constructing an Inclusive Order: Avoiding Fragmentation and Worse – Disorder

Two summits completed and another off in the distance, but impacted by these just completed summits. A crowded summit schedule has begun.

The statements were voiced and the Leaders’ Communique issued by the G7 at Schloss Elmau to be followed by more speeches and statements and the issuing of the “Strategic Concept”  a once ever ten year statement by NATO at Madrid.

What have we learned from this G7 and the NATO gatherings? Let me first focus on the G7 Summit. Well, first it is relevant that we take into account the position expressed by one of the longstanding observers of the summit process, Sheffield’s Hugo Dobson. As he concluded, along with his colleague Greg Stiles in Global Policy , reflecting their review of the German G7 and in particular the Leaders’ Communique:

In summary, and despite what we have tried to do here, beware reading too much either positively or negatively into a single summit document. Rather, this communiqué should be placed in the context of a network of summits – most immediately the NATO Summit in Madrid later this week and looking further ahead to the Indonesian-hosted G20 Summit later this year.

And it is a summary and caution well worth heeding. Nevertheless, the tone is worth further comment. The G7 took the time and the Communique to underscore their self characterization as a democratic forum. In their Communique opening the G7 declared:

 As open democracies adhering to the rule of law, we are driven by shared values and bound by our commitment to the rules-based multilateral order and to universal human rights. As outlined in our Statement on support for Ukraine, standing in unity to support the government and people of Ukraine in their fight for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future, we will continue to impose severe and immediate economic costs on President Putin’s regime for its unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, while stepping up our efforts to counter its adverse and harmful regional and global impacts, including with a view to helping secure global energy and food security as well as stabilising the economic recovery. 

 

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A Veteran Chinese Diplomat – Cui Tiankai – speaks to the Media

Cui Tiankai, China’s former ambassador to the U.S. made a public appearance on December 20, 2021, in Beijing. It was his first public comments since leaving his U.S. ambassadorial post and returning to China. Additionally, this image shows Ambassador Cui more recently sitting down with Ian Goodrum for a moderated interview on January 10, 2022 with the ChinaDaily.

During Cui Tiankai’s earlier December speech* he stressed that:

Since the purpose of the struggle [between the U.S. and China] is to protect the interests of the people and the overall strategy, then during the struggle, [we] should reduce the cost and influence to our interests and grand strategy as much as possible. In principle, [we] don’t fight unprepared wars; don’t fight wars that we are not confident with; don’t fight wars due to anger; don’t fight wars of attrition. The people worked very hard for their prosperity; we absolutely cannot have anyone take that away. Also, we absolutely cannot lose it due to our own carelessness, slack, and incompetence. 

Moreover, Cui Tiankai claimed that:

The status-quo of U.S.-China relations will continue, the U.S. would not accept the rise of another major power of a different political system, ideology, culture, and even race.

 

In terms of America’s China policy, there is a strong factor of racism. Some people mention it, but some people don’t. The U.S. will inevitably do whatever it takes and everything it can to suppress, contain, separate, and surround to overwhelm China even without a bottom line. To this effect, we need to have a clear mind and full preparedness to confront a future unstable, difficult, and even roller-coaster-like future of U.S.-China relations.

These views are sobering to say the least.

Cui Tiankai remains a close ally to Xi Jinping, and his experience in the U.S. makes him perhaps the most competent person among China’s senior officials in understanding the U.S. from China’s perspective. Katsuji Nakazawa in an article for the Nikkei Asia explains that Cui Tiankai’s speech aimed to modestly warn Xi Jinping not to engage in unnecessary conflicts with the U.S. and divert China’s current ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” (WWD) and hardline foreign policy towards the U.S. However, Ambassador Cui’s remark could also have served  as a wake-up call for top leaders to accept that China may not be in an optimal position to engage in further conflicts.

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The Missing Mechanisms – Examining the Current Summitry Cycle: Rome G20 and Glasgow COP26

So many summits recently: from the Rome G20 Summit, to the Glasgow COP26 Summit, to APEC, and finally the East Asia Summit. It is the crescendo of the annual summitry cycle. And, this year, 2021, was particularly noteworthy. In this summit cycle we had in person leaders gatherings at the Rome G20 Summit, immediately followed by the 5-year COP ‘check-in’ with many G20 leaders flying off directly to the Glasgow Summit following the Rome G20 Summit. It is not a surprise given the importance of these summits that colleagues have been attracted to assessing the advances, or the limitations of these gatherings and then more generally to examine the overall effectiveness they present of multilateral leadership.  One of the key assessments, not surprisingly, is to determine whether these summits, and therefore the multilateralism underpinning them can meet the rising global governance challenges facing the international system. Prime Minister Draghi who chaired the recently concluded G20 Rome Summit had this to say about multilateralism, and inferentially the G20:

“Multilateralism is the best answer to the problems we face today. In many ways it is the only possible answer,”  he said in his opening comments on Saturday. 

 

From the pandemic, to climate change, to fair and equitable taxation, going it all alone is simply not an option. We must do all we can to overcome our differences”.

Yet the judgements from the experts have generally been measured, even rather downbeat, over the current G20 and COP26 and other summitry efforts. Broadly there is recognition of some material advances in the global governance agenda, especially concerning climate change efforts but the fundamental – and many would argue the urgent and necessary collective actions – seem to elude global summitry policy making. And, most agree that more global order needs are just out of reach. Here, my colleague Yves Tiberghien in East Asia Forum (EAF)  had this to say about the G20 and the critical multilateral efforts:

The G20 is currently unable to function as the incubator for the reform of global governance institutions that the world needs to manage global markets and pressing systemic risks. It is proving unable to manage the great frictions between established and emerging powers.

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The Current Narrative of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Policy: “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

When it comes to China’s current foreign policy, phrases such as “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy” (WWD) and “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) frequently appear. The name WWD originates from a Chinese film series, “Wolf Warrior”, which depicts a patriotic solider battling foreign powers and mercenaries. Nowadays, many refer to China’s increasingly strong statements and assertive diplomatic declarations as WWD.

On the other hand, BRI refers to global infrastructure development projects led by China to promote international cooperation, multilateralism, and trade. It may appear that these two sets of foreign policy approaches rather conflict. However, the phrase “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind” (人类命运共同体), a part of the official narrative of China’s foreign policy may have led to both of these contrasting approaches. What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”? How does this phrase explain trends in China’s recent foreign policies including WWD and also BRI?

What is “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”?

By literal translation, the above phrase means “A Community of Shared Fate for Mankind” (SF) rather than, as it is often expressed in English, “A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. SF suggests a global order described by China’s President Xi Jinping encompassing the shared rights and responsibility of each nation in terms of “politics, security, economy, culture, and environment” in a globalized world. In President Xi’s words SF is: “to build A Community of Shared Future for Mankind [to] construct a beautiful and clean world with long lasting peace, general security, mutual prosperity, openness, and inclusivity”. At a United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting in July, 2020, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that China will push to build SF by promoting multilateralism in accordance with international laws and “… denounce global hegemony and protectionism”. These and other  remarks by China’s leaders demonstrate, it would seem, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition to achieve greater global influence, and that China is prepared to work with all nations to build a SF. Indeed, not all nations may be agreeable with the ideology of SF. It is inevitable that the CCP will face some frictions when it tries to expand the influence of SF in the world. Therefore, the CCP may have to use a tailored approach in its foreign policies to push its SF agenda.

SF as an Umbrella term for China’s Foreign Policy

President Xi has publicly made statements such as “[the CCP] will reference history and create the future. It must continuously push and construct A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”. Under this guidance, top Chinese officials have made clear that China’s foreign policy will revolve around SF. China’s approach to global order, then,  promotes politically correct topics such as climate change, global disparity, and it also opposes terrorism and hegemony. Although it encourages cross-cultural exchange, it makes no explicit mention of protecting the rights of marginalized communities. The vague language in the SF permits CCP officials greater flexibility in deciding what kind of matters are consistent with the SF and therefore align with President Xi’s agenda.

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How Japan Can Navigate Growing US-China Tensions

US-China tensions have emerged to dominate the geopolitical space. How is this rivalry affecting states, particularly in the Asian context? Japan, a long-standing ally to the US, and at the same time a key economic partner to China, finds itself, as do other states in the region, in a difficult position. Still the US-China rivalry alone fails to fully define the foreign policy challenges Japan faces currently. With the Olympics just recently completed in Japan, and COVID-19 numbers on the rise, vaccination numbers still relatively low, continuing cool relations with South Korea, nuclear tensions with North Korea, and finally a looming national election, it is important to recognize that there are a variety of serious issues that Japan’s current political leadership faces.

The US provides Japan with defence and security, but China boosts the Japanese economy, with 22% of Japanese exports going to China in 2019 alone and increasing another 5.1 percent in 2020. Japan is wary of losing its status as a major power but understands that choosing between the two superpowers is surely a lose-lose proposition.

Territorial Disputes

Territorial disputes are a long-standing issue for Japan. Between 2010-2012 tensions began escalating with China over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. However, while the Senkaku Islands remain an area of contention, the question of Taiwan is a cause for even greater concern. Japan’s southernmost island, Yonaguni, is just some 111km east of Taiwan, and in recent months, China’s presence around Taiwan has grown. Threats have increased. In April 2021, when Prime Minister Suga visited President Biden in Washington, their joint statement on the renewal of the US-Japan partnership mentioned “Taiwan” for the first time since 1969: “We underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”

Beijing responded harshly to the statement and accused the US of interfering in “internal affairs”. For a country like Japan, a response of this nature raises concern: China’s been known to utilize economic means to retaliate against countries that condemn their actions. Therefore, while it may be important for Japan to collaborate and work with the US on matters relating to Taiwan, Japan is treading quite carefully with China.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama argued that the US-Japan Joint Statement’s mentioning of “Taiwan” was counterproductive to seeking cooperative relations with China. However, various US military officials in the Indo-Pacific have argued conflict between China and Taiwan is highly probable in the next six years. Given Japan’s proximity to Taiwan and the US’s presence in the region, Japan must consider the wider geopolitical implications.

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Reaching Agenda 2030 by 2030 – The High Level Political Forum (HLPF) 2021

As the annual global stocktaking on the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development this year’s High Level Political Forum (HLPF) was held from July 6th to July 15th under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Mandated in 2012, the HLPF is the main UN forum targeting sustainable development progress. The HLPF devises international political declarations and countries present their voluntary national reviews (VNRs) on progress in reaching the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals). The HLPF also features a three-day ministerial segment. Apart from the 42 VNRs that states presented in 2021, the main outcome document of this year’s HLPF was a Ministerial Declaration. This Declaration had been negotiated for four months before the HLPF meeting and the Declaration was adopted by acclamation on July 15th. This most recent Declaration describes Agenda 2030 as a blueprint and plan of action to respond to and recover from the global Covid-19 pandemic.

The pandemic has had a substantial negative impact on many SDGs. In the first year of the pandemic alone:

Focussing on nine SDGs:

  • 1 – No Poverty
  • 2 – Zero Hunger
  • 3 – Good Health and Well-Being
  • 8 – Decent Work and Economic Growth
  • 10 – Reduced Inequalities
  • 12 – Responsible Consumption and Production
  • 13 – Climate Action
  • 16 – Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, and
  • 17 – Partnerships for the Goals,

the Ministerial Declaration highlights the negative effects on these goals and negative effects on other SDGs. Nevertheless, the international community reaffirmed its commitment to the Agenda 2030 and its individual goals calling for enhanced measures and intensifying the responses to the global challenges currently pertaining to Agenda 2030. However, The Declaration stops short, however, of concrete agreements on policy measures, or financial commitments to getting back within reach of achieving the SDGs by 2030.

Considering that the efforts to achieve Agenda 2030 were already in threatened – even before the pandemic – this failure to commit to action is disappointing. Even at the HLPF in 2019, the diagnosis there was that the global response to implementing the SDGs had not been ambitious enough and that accelerated action was needed. In 2020, marred by the early months of the pandemic, the HLPF was not even able to produce a Ministerial Declaration. At the time there was a lack of consensus among the states. Whoever was waiting for a “now-or-never” moment leading to a more ambitious Ministerial Declaration this current year would be disappointed. Despite explicit consensus that the knowledge, science, technologies and resources are readily available to make progress in the future, and despite the assessment of many of the current challenges pertaining to the SDGs, the political will and the willingness to compromise are lacking. One is struck that an opportunity to reconstruct the world and bringing Agenda 2030 closer, the goals was ‘thrown away’. As the UN General Assembly President Volkan Bozkir put it: “rarely has a society been given the opportunity for such a radical change”, but the ministers failed to capitalize on this opportunity and appeared to be paralyzed by politics and narrow national interests.

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Biden, Suga, Xi and Yes, Others – the New Mix Reshaping Global Order Relations

 

The current state of the international system. That is what I hope RisingBRICSAM can tackle in the next set of posts. While I remain the named blogger here at RisingBRICSAM,  I shall not be undertaking this task alone. Nope. I have been fortunate enough these past weeks to be working with a great set of recent, or near MGA graduates from the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto.

And all of us in various ways have had  opportunities to examine in some detail aspects in the evolving global order. In addition, many of these same researchers have joined in the China-West Dialogue (CWD) research and online meetings. But more on that in a moment.

 

There is as you will see a host of significant influences shaping the global order and its politics. Probably the most immediate has been Covid-19. The waves of the virus have had a significant influence on all the major and minor actors in the global system.

The global public health crisis has also underscored the growing array of new actors in the global order. Of course the many states – leading powers, major powers, emerging and developing powers, and also the international organizations both formal and the often forgotten but in fact critical informal institutions.

The array of these state actors have been significantly supplemented during the pandemic by sub-state actors – whether regions, networks or local actors and even more dramatically non-state actors such as foundations, public and private corporations.  The pandemic has underscored the growing role of technology and digital organizations. One of the envisaged posts will focus on the global developments of Agenda 2030 – the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – and the threat that the Covid-19 pandemic has posed to achieving these critical global development goals by the end of the decade.

The virus has been dramatic globally. But then as well has been the replacement of the Trump Administration and its ‘America First’  foreign policy in the United States with the Biden Administration’s autocracy versus democracy and build back better world (B3W). Both administrations grappled with, or amplified, the reemergence of geopolitics with the intensifying rivalry between the United States and Xi Jinping’s China. Even in these early months, the Biden Administration has represented a highly different domestic and diplomatic effort from the often chaotic years of Trump policies though it appears the Biden Administration has moved slowly on revising aspects of American foreign policy including with China. Some of the early and continuing analysis and research at the Global Summitry Project (GSP)  on US and US-China foreign policy has been undertaken by the China-West Dialogue Project (CWD) co-chaired by Colin Bradford, non-resident senior fellow from Brookings and myself. For almost two years we have met largely virtually with thought leaders – former officials, policymakers, academic experts – from around the globe to build a narrative that can accommodate competition, avoid confrontation and vitally permits collaboration – an approach that counters the ideological divisions that have emerged with rising US-China tensions.

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Measuring American Foreign Policy for ‘Competition without Catastrophe’: The Alaska US-China Summit

With President Biden’s first official news conference last Thursday March 25th, the news conference brought the curtain down on the first meeting of top foreign policy officials from the United States and China. The public side of the Summit was a rather fiery uncooperative back and forth between the leading government officials from both China and the United States. We are led to understand, however, that the private meetings that went on into the next day were more productive. And with both encounters past, the shape of the competition between China and the United States began to take some public shape.

For some time now we have been made aware that a more confrontational  approach in US-China relations was likely. As David Sanger describes in a recent NYT article, the ‘Washington beltway’ view has crystallized around a far more competitive foreign policy with China. And the Biden foreign policy has reflected, seemingly, this rare political consensus:

For a president barely 10 weeks into office, casting the United States as confronting a global struggle with the Chinese model has some clear political benefits. One of the few issues that unites Democrats and Republicans is the need to compete head-on with Beijing.

William Galston at Brookings reviewing American public opinion toward China underscores how American public opinion has turned against China particularly after the Trump years:

All things considered, the Biden administration will enjoy substantial public support if it places competition with China at the center of its foreign policy, and it will pay little price for the blunter rhetoric its senior officials employed during the recent meetings in Alaska with their Chinese counterparts. On the other hand, most Americans have not focused on the military dimensions of this emerging relationship and are not prepared for a possible conflict over Taiwan.

Advisors to Joe Biden during the election period, and many of these same folk now as officials for President Biden, are describing and clarifying US policy toward China that they had previously written about pre-election. The dominant position as articulated by the senior policy folk such as Jake Sullivan, now National Security Advisor to the President and Kurt Campbell now the ‘Asia Tsar’ is strategic competition, or slightly more poetically, ‘competition without catastrophe’ the title of their consequential 2019 FA article. Continue reading

Which Countries are Middle Powers – And Why are They Important to the Global Order? Part 2

The growing geopolitical tensions in the international system, in particular  between the United States and China and also with Russia, have led to a chorus of voices urging on middle powers to greater efforts in maintaining  and even strengthening a rules-based order. Roland Paris in a major Chatham House Brief titled: “Can Middle Powers Save the Liberal World Order?” pointed at various urgent calls from international experts:

Gideon Rachman, a Financial Times columnist, has proposed a ‘middle-powers alliance’ to ‘preserve a world based around rules and rights, rather than power and force’. Two eminent American foreign-policy experts, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, have also called on US allies to ‘leverage their collective economic and military might to save the liberal world order’.

The urgency and calls for middle power action rose perceptively, of course, with ‘America First’  from the Trump Presidency and from the failure of the leading powers – the United States and China – to organize global governance efforts to tackle the global pandemic. Indeed the global pandemic has seemingly ‘lit a fire’ under experts and officials issuing a rising chorus of calls for greater middle power action in the face of leading power failure. An  evident instance is a recent article from  Foreign Affairs from our colleague Bruce Jones from Brookings titled:“Can middle powers lead the world out of the pandemic? Because the United States and China have shown that they can’t”.

In Part 1 of this Post series we attempted to identify which states experts were referring to when they issued the call for middle power action. We ended up with a variety of categories. There were the traditional states, Canada, Australia and maybe South Korea and Singapore. There were states that fell within the top 20 economic powers  – way too many states but lots of familiar powers. And then there were all those states , identified by Jeffrey Robertson in his insightful article: “Middle-power definitions: confusion reigns supreme” in the Australian Journal of International Affairs (2017. 71(4): 355-370, with an interest in and “capacity (material resources, diplomatic influence, creativity, etc.)resources, diplomatic influence, creativity, etc.) to work proactively in concert with similar states to contribute to the development and strengthening of institutions for the governance of the global commons.” And in fact there seemed to be a bit of a marriage between middle powers and multilateralism in the newly created “Alliance for Multilateralism” created by the foreign ministers of France and Germany that umbrellaed at its creation some 40 states.

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