Are They All Middle Powers? Or, are there None!

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With a degree of valuable planning by my colleague Colin Bradford  at the China-West Dialogue, or CWD, we convened our first virtual session of the current year. And we were very pleased that some thirty folk joined us from across the digital world  – from Japan through Asia and Europe to Canada and the United States and on to Brazil. We hoped this session would be an opportunity to examine and critique “Asia’s Future at a crossroads: A Japanese strategy for peace and sustainable prosperity.” This very valuable Report was the outcome of years of work by the ‘Asia Future’ Research Group (Research Group)  co-convened by Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus of Keio University and Mike Mochizuki of the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University.

The Research Group began meeting in 2018.  In 2022 the Japanese government adopted a new “National Security Strategy” for the first time in a decade. And it was the evolved new Japanese foreign policy and security strategy that the Research Group critically reviewed.

The Research Group early on ‘revealed its hand’. As they declared:

What underlies the discussion and recommendations in this report is our serious concern that the new paradigm will leave Asia entangled and divided in the future.

And as a result the Research Group urged :

Japan’s long-held emphasis on a multifaceted and multilayered approach to Asia policy continues to be a constructive way to address the new regional and international challenges that have emerged.

What a continuation of this Japanese foreign policy approach demanded, according to the Report, was:

… Japan should maintain and promote security cooperation with the United States; but at the same time, it should also exercise leadership to help mitigate the competition between the U.S. and China in Asia through constructive diplomacy, thereby reducing the danger of great power war in the region.

The Research Group urged that Japanese policy not be reshaped by the rise in US-China rivalry and the growing geopolitical tensions in the international system generally and in the Indo-Pacific specifically. Alas, that may prove to be quite difficult.

Back to the Report, however. I am not doing justice to the fullness of the Report in this Post and those of you interested in international dynamics and relations in the Indo-Pacific, especially, I do encourage you to take some time with the Report. It will be worth it.

But I wanted to shift my attention in this Post to some of the debate that emerged during our CWD gathering and discussion of the Report. What was interesting in that discussion – and recognizing that the group was not made up of Japanese researchers – many reacted to the Report’s identification of Japan as a ‘Middle Power’ – clearly an IR crowd. This debate over the identification and impact of middle powers in international relations was further aided by the provision from our colleague Amitav Acharya of a new article by Robertson and Carr on middle powers. It is apparent that there has been a long running discussion – and I do mean long running – by IR colleagues – you’ll not be surprised to hear, over what is a middle power and the impact of these powers have on shaping global relations.

Now middle power labels have long been carried by a number of states most notably, Canada and Australia. These are the so-called traditional middle powers. The middle power definition was applied early to states that possessed structurally – that is the requisite ‘material power’ and what could then be described as being in the middle. These powers possessed less than the major, or great powers, such as the United States, and now China,  but more than those lesser powers. Unfortunately, an examination of the material powers status fails to bear this out as pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

For a start there is nothing ‘middle’ about the ranking of the middle powers. Canada and Australia, the classic middle powers, generally appear between 8th and 15th in various global lists of economic size or military capacity. This could not be classified as the ‘middle’ in a world of 143 states in 1960 and makes less sense in 2023 with 195 states.

Well, if the material power rankings don’t do it, and I think that is right, then for many the determination revolved about middle power behavior instead. As pointed out by Robertson and Carr:

The three core assumptions of middle power theory of states as international in focus, multilateral in method, and good citizens in conduct had clear analytical utility during periods of the 20th century, exemplified by a prominent practitioner–scholarly nexus during this period.

However, their analysis of some six contenders by the two authors, chosen by the two on “principles of consensus, hard cases, and breadth, our contemporary cases are, in alphabetical order, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey.” I’ll leave aside the obvious questions as whether all deserve in fact the middle power label, these states show, as analyzed by the authors, that the behavioral concepts are increasingly unable to capture the practices and actions of these states. As Robertson and Carr describe:

To be effective, middle-sized states must respond to, and evolve with the nature of the system they operate in. Conceptually therefore, the middle power concept ‘is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system’. … middle power theory no longer helps us distinguish or interpret these states. Changes in the international environment suggest this finding will endure. … As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’.

Assuming we can accurately describe in an international order those that are possibly middle powers then, the relations between and among state actors become critical in revealing middle powers. As a result in an order with US-China tensions and a growing willingness on the part of a growing number of states to act aggressively – read that Russia and Ukraine and Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah and indeed Iran as well then:

As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’. … As we enter a period that is marked by increased competition, a remembrance of the possibilities of middle power cooperation that produced initiatives such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the Ottawa Treaty deserves to be made.

What then is revealed by all this? Well lots. But let me suggest at least one conclusion. And it is not about Japan or middle powers but the difficulty of drawing conclusions and outcomes in international behavior. A little like astronomy: ‘all are working on all’. Examining at a point in time and then drawing conclusions from that moment the character and behavior of the global order and then looking forward may be all but futile. Or, at least, it is very difficult and must be approached with great caution. Caution is indeed the watchword.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

This Post appeared originally at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Comments and free subscription is welcomed.

 

 

Brazil’s G20 Hosting Year – 2024

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So the G20 Host – this year Brazil – is beginning to crank it up by announcing many G20 meetings now planned over the coming summit cycle. And we  are fortunate that the current leader of Brazil is not Jair Bolsanaro, no fan of the G20. Instead, we have the return to the Brazilian presidency, after a significant hiatus, of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula. That is important. Even though Lula can go a bit ‘over the deep end’ on the Global South,  he is committed to addressing climate change as well as critical global development subjects such as ending poverty, enhancing education and gender equality.

I was fortunate last week to participate in a session examining Brazil’s hosting year in the broader context of ‘Rethinking the Future of Multilateralism’. This session was a continuation of the ongoing effort by the Global Solutions Initiative (GSI) to examine the Informals, particularly in this case, the G20. GSI presents, among other things, the Global Solutions Summit that goes off annually in Berlin on numerous global governance subjects. At this recent virtual GSI session a very helpful presentation was provided by Feliciano Guimaraes of CEBRI. CEBRI along with FUNAG and IPEA – all Brazilian think tanks, are all part of the official T20 Organizing Committee for the Brazil hosting year. Back to that in a moment.

What has Brazil ‘put out’ as the priorities of the Brazilian hosting? It appears these are its priorities:

  • Social inclusion  and the fight against hunger
  • Energy transition and sustainable development
  • Reform of global governance institutions

Now a big ‘shout out’ to the first two priorities. These are demanding goals but linked to Brazilian international policy efforts. But the third is a bit of a warning. Institutional reform – whether of the UN or the IFIs – the IMF and the World Bank – are perennial subjects.  Over the recent years, if not before, it has become all too apparent that reform in the current geopolitical context is not possible. Look at the recent HLPF Summit – the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, held by the UN last September. Lots of talk but …  And now we are accelerating toward the Summit of the Future, this coming September 2024. Again great hope:

The Summit of the Future is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

Valiant goals, but the will and collaborative energy is not there I’m afraid.

But back to the efforts of Brazil as host of the G20. It is evident that the administration and structure of the G20 has broadened and deepened over the years. Take a look at its current development of the structure and policy process as we have set it out recently at the Global Summitry Project website. Today, there are well developed Sherpa and Finance Tracks as pointed to by Feliciano Guimaraes. And as he further points to Brazil’s efforts, it is making advances to, as he points out, “to establish a close dialogue with the G20 Sherpa and Finance tracks with a view to increasing the incidence of T20 recommendations.”   Further, there are many Working Groups and Task Forces developing policy proposals. And as Feliciano points out there is a Brazilian emphasis on the Engagement Groups as well with the hope that:

The G20 Social Summit – Social guarantees civil society’s participation and contribution in discussions and policy formulations related to the G20 Summit.

It encompasses the activities of 12 Engagement Groups, in addition to initiatives and events coordinated between the sherpa and finance tracks and non-governmental actors, as well as initiatives from G20 countries’ societies.

A key highlight of this engagement is the upcoming Social Summit, scheduled to take place from November 15 to 17, 2024, on the eve of the G20 Leaders’ Summit, set for November 18 and 19, both hosted in Rio de Janeiro.

During the G20 Social Summit, civil society representatives will present their proposals, marking a significant opportunity for their voices to shape the agenda.

Feliciano emphasizes, in addition to the civil society participation largely presumably through the C20, the importance of the T20. As he sees it:

 … the G20’s “ideas bank,” gathering and disseminating analyses by think tanks involved in global issues, alongside insights from high-level experts. It aims then to influence the negotiations and the final declarations made by the G20.

But Feliciano is not so swept up in the G20 summitry process that he fails to see the challenges posed by this hosting year. He sets out the challenges that Brazil faces:

•Having financial resources to organize hundreds of meetings (government + philanthropy + business);

•Generating credible and impactful ideas/processes/proposals (less is more);

•Managing the G7-BRICS rivalry (G7 – G20) – being a bridge-builder;

•Being more global and less local (cannot mimic Modi’s India);

•Avoiding contamination from the Ukraine War (Indian challenge);

•Managing the growing rivalry between the USA and China in working groups and the summit;

•Being able to propose and innovate – themes, ideas, and processes (depends on organized civil society); and

•Improving the inclusion of new actors in the processes (W20, C20, and L20).

These challenges are formidable and limit ultimately the advances that Brazil can bring to the summit process. But he also sees opportunities for Brazil. And he sets these out as well:

•Strengthening Brazil’s role in discursive leadership;

•Rebuilding Brazil’s international prestige (G20 + COP30 in Belém);

•Advancing priority agendas – inequality, climate change, and global governance reform;

•Opportunity for strengthening coordination among BRICS+ with the sequence of troikas;

•Empowering organized civil society to participate in major international debates;

•Expanding the range of international topics within Brazilian society; and

•A significant showcase of Brazil’s political capacity to produce credible and feasible ideas/results.

There is opportunity; but we have seen the building of a large summitry machine that is unlikely to be able to make the kind of progress that hosts desire. Looking back over the years since the emergence of the Informals there has been a back and forward motion to these Informals. Leader frustration over the burdening of their efforts to act collectively without being hemmed in by bureaucracies led to attenuation by leaders from policy machinery only to have it grow again over the years to assist leaders in advancing global governance policies. The dilemma is, however, not over the administrative and policy assistance but the weakened state overall of multilateralism. The decision making remains at the leader level and there is little collective commitment. National policy dominates at the cost of collaborative policy making no matter what the structure and policy support.

This Post first appeared on my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/brazils-g20-hosting-year-2024

Feel free to comment and subscribe there.

Image Credit: portal.gov.br

 

Biden Trade Protectionism

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There is a continuing interest in capturing the state of the current global political economy and the global economic policymaking of the major states – the US, China, India, Brazil, Europe, Japan, Korea, and others. Not surprisingly the debate is most active in the US. Experts and officials alike are intent in describing current Biden Administration policy. Most recently some experts have been labeling the global economic framework as ‘post- neoliberalism’, defining it, apparently, in contradistinction to the previous dominant policy framework – ‘neoliberalism’.  The dilemma of course is a definitional one as much as anything else  – the terms are well known, their meaning not so much. 

Recently, colleagues of mine have kicked off a discussion. One, Dan Drezner, from the Fletcher School and the Substack ‘Drezner’s World’ has waded into the policy mix, actually in an article from Reason titled, “The Post-Neoliberalism Moment”. As Dan early in the piece thought to frame first neoliberalism he suggested the following: 

The term neoliberal has been stigmatized far more successfully than it has been defined. For our purposes, it refers to a set of policy ideas that became strongly associated with the so-called Washington Consensus: a mix of deregulation, trade liberalization, and macroeconomic prudence that the United States encouraged countries across the globe to embrace. These policies contributed to the hyperglobalization that defined the post–Cold War era from the fall of the Berlin Wall to Brexit.

Dan made it clear, however, that this economic model no longer dominates: 

In the 16 years since the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberalism has taken a rhetorical beating; New Yorker essayist Louis Menand characterized it as “a political swear word.” Until recently, no coherent alternative set of ideas had been put forward in mainstream circles—but that has been changing. 

And what has been the replacement, well Dan suggests that its the politicians and officials that have been most active in leaving neoliberalism behind:

These ideas are being shaped by powerful officials. The primary difference between Biden and Trump in this area is that Trump’s opposition to globalization was based on gut instincts and implemented as such. The Biden administration has been more sophisticated. Policy principals ranging from U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai to National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan have been explicit in criticizing “oversimplified market efficiency” and proposing an alternative centered far more on resilience.

For elements of this policy transformation one need only look to recent Biden Administration policies including the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. As Dan concludes, the totality of these policy initiatives is: “all represent a pivot to industrial policy—a focus on domestic production.” 

In constructing this post-neoliberalism model, folks argue that there is a necessary trade-off between resilience and efficiency. As Dan suggests: “A key assumption behind post-neoliberalism is that policy makers can implement the right policies in the right way to nudge markets in the right direction.” 

Now another colleague of mine, Henry Farrell from Johns Hopkins, tries his hand at a definition in a recent Substack Post at his ‘Programmable Mutter’, titled, “If Post-Neoliberalism is in Trouble, We’re all in Trouble”. The Post partly responds to Dan, and further articulates Henry’s view of post-neoliberalism. As he describes it: 

A key assumption behind post-neoliberalism is that policy makers can implement the right policies in the right way to nudge markets in the right direction. … I see post-neoliberalism less as a coherent alternative body of thought, than as the claim, variously articulated by a very loosely associated cluster of intellectuals and policy makers, that markets should not be the default solution. … More generally, post-neoliberalism isn’t and shouldn’t be a simple reverse image of the system that it has to remake. It can’t be, not least because it has to build in part on what is already there.

The dilemma, as I see it, for understanding any of these  post-neoliberalism models, and also, though less intensely – neoliberalism, is pretty much all definitional. The base of the problem is not really understanding what ‘resilience’ and ‘efficiency’ really mean. And that in turn causes confusion over trying to then understand ‘globalization’.  And that unfortunately builds vagueness into our understanding of these economic models especially over what we are to understand to be – post-neoliberalism. 

But what isn’t so difficult to understand is the problem that has been created in this post-neoliberal period by current trade policy especially as seen in the United States. Layer it as much as you can but the Biden Administration policy is ‘protectionist’ and the Trump Administration, was, and will in all likelihood be, even more protectionist if Trump is returned to office in late 2024. As Inu Manak has written in a recent piece for the Hinrich Foundation in Australia – a foundation focused on global trade: 

Trade has become toxic, not just on the campaign trail, but in the way that it is discussed by both Democrats and Republicans. “Traditional” US trade policy, which began to form its nearly century-old roots under the leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, has been described by US Trade Representative Katherine Tai as “trickle-down economics,” where “maximum tariff liberalization…contributed to the hollowing out of our industrial heartland. … The current US approach to trade, if it can be called an approach at all, risks weakening US influence abroad and economically disadvantaging Americans at home. It rests on the false belief that retrenchment of “traditional” US trade policy—by putting America First or catering to a select group of US workers and branding such efforts as “worker-centric trade policy”—will somehow restore the United States to a position of hegemonic dominance with no peer competitor. 

The Biden Administration’s allergy to new trade policy initiatives can be seen in its Indo-Pacific economic strategy – the IPEF – the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. This framework is intended to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness for the fourteen countries negotiating the IPEF. The countries included are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam with the United States. The IPEF partners represent 40 percent of global GDP and 28 percent of global goods and services trade. Negotiations have proceeded well for three of the four pillars including supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy pillars but the Biden Administration has decided not to proceed in negotiating for fair and resilient trade. As William Reinsch at CSIS described the situation: 

The commentariat is busy these days debating the future of the Biden administration’s trade policy in the wake of its effective abandonment of the trade pillar in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) negotiations. (The administration says the talks will continue, and I imagine they will, but I don’t see a conclusion, at least before the election.) The policy is clearly a failure at this point, …

As colleague Ryan Haas of the Brookings Institution, and a former US official – from 2013 to 2017, Hass served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff – underscored in his examination of trade policy in the Indo-Pacific: 

These constraints will be most visible on trade. The absence of a credible trade and economic agenda for Asia has been the Biden administration’s greatest weakness. Political and national security imperatives will continue to drive the United States’ approach to trade. Do not expect any outbreak of creativity or boldness on trade by the Biden administration in 2024.

The Biden Administration failed to roll back the tariffs imposed by the Trump trade folk. It is a major failure of US trade policy and an expression of the Biden SAdministration’s trade protectionism. It bodes ill for growing the global economy and achieving productivity gains for the United States and others.

Image Credit: E-International Relations

This Post originally appeared at my Substack Post Alan’s Newsletter – https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/biden-trade-protectionism?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcome=true

 

The First Informal Falters

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Yup, a little late in the weekend it is. But then for some Monday is a holiday. Mea culpa, but I was deep into completing a draft chapter for a yet to appear volume – which, in fact is scheduled to be released by 2025. The publication year, by the way, is important. My chapter will be part of a planned edited volume by Edward Elgar Publishing. There will be many chapters, so I am told, that will review and analyze the G7. It will do so on the 50th anniversary of the initiation of the G7 Leaders Summit. Yup, Rambouillet, the acknowledged first G7 Leaders Summit – it was actually, the G6 – France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US at that moment in time – met in 1975.  All the chapters, I suspect, will cover aspects of this ‘First Informal’, the G7, and, I suspect, the other Informals as well – that is the G20 and the BRICS.

Wow, the 50th anniversary of this First Informal! Certainly, I was interested in examining the role of the First Informal not to mention the Others.

Unfortunately, as you explore the Informals – indeed the promise of the Informals, you come face to face with the state of effectiveness of this leader-led summit. Has this multilateral instrument been effective?  It is hard not to assess that the Informals have not met the hopes of those initiating and managing this and all of these informal institutions.

The emergence of the Informals reflected in part the fading power of the Formals – the institutions of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and some others – and the intent to advance collective global governance policymaking . A more cynical view would suggest that these major western powers – the US, UK, and Europeans, not to mention Japan, sought to resolve growing global economic problems in the 1970s impacting them and more broadly the global economy without interference of others in the global economy – newly emerging market economies and more broadly the Global South. As I wrote in the early paragraphs of the draft chapter:

“Beyond just a question of representation, however, there is the continuing question, quite crucial, of the effectiveness of all these Informals.” As I concluded: “… their structures and processes have not led to the desired policy leadership as was hoped by early leaders.

There are various explanations, I believe, in undermining the success of First Informal – and helping to explain the current weakness of it and all the Informals. These ‘forces’ are, I believe, hobbling global governance progress in the current global order. One element, of course, is the lack of  broad representation – this is after all just the G7. But there is more. Recently the United States has focused the G7 on like-mindedness and beyond that, at least in a US view – expressed in part by the statement of Antony Blinken, the Secretary of State, that the G7 is:

… the steering committee of the world’s advanced democracies, demonstrating unprecedented unity of purpose and unity of action on the issues that are defining the 21st century.

This US “steering committee” focus on the G7 has arisen at the same time, or in part because of, the return of geopolitics, particularly the growing rivalry and competition between the US and China in international relations. While the US-China rivalry does create tensions in the G7, still these tensions are nothing like that in the G20 with the mix of developed and developing members and most obviously including the US and China and in fact the US and Russia.

The US-Russia tension speaks to the growing global disorder erupting with various regional conflicts. There is nothing more dramatic than in the past two years and more of the Russia-Ukraine war in the heart of Europe. Then there is a more recent but no less dramatic war between Hamas and Israel in the Mideast that is spreading regionally.

As described by the President and the CEO of the International Crisis Group (ICG), Ero Comfort and the ICG Executive Vice President, Richard Atwood (2024) in a recent FP post:

Worldwide, diplomatic efforts to end fighting are failing. More leaders are pursuing their ends militarily. More believe they can get away with it. … So, what is going wrong? The problem is not primarily about the practice of mediation or the diplomats involved. Rather, it lies in global politics. In a moment of flux, constraints on the use of force—even for conquest and ethnic cleansing—are crumbling.

And then there is uncertainty of US commitment to the multilateral order as we watch the possible return of a second Trump presidency. Even without that the current Biden Administration has too often exhibited a tepid commitment to a multilateral order.

All these forces have weakened the actions of the Informals and the broader multilateral initiatives. Multilateral weakness is a threat to the current global order and raises the prospects of growing harmful global disorder.

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter, a Substack Post – https://substack.com/@globalsummitryproject

Image Credit – Japan’s Office of the Prime Minister

As the Year Begins to Close

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So, as we enter the holiday season with Christmas just around the corner and as we close in on the end of the year, it is reasonable to reflect on the progress of some of the research areas we have targeted.

One focus area is the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), or what is referred to at the UN as Agenda 2030. This past September we saw the High Level Political Forum (HLPF) gather on September 18th and 19th during the UNGAs High-Level Week. The UN Secretary-General called the SDG Summit gathering the “centerpiece moment of 2023.” It took place at the midpoint of implementing the development agenda adopted by countries in 2015: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The HLPF meets under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, known as the SDG Summit . In 2023, the second SDG Summit took place (the first was in 2019) bringing together Heads of State and Government to review and renew efforts towards achieving the SDGs. The Summit culminated in the adoption of  a political declaration to accelerate action to achieve the 17 goals. Now I have written before on the SDGs but the question is what conclusions can we draw from this second UNGA gathering.

The first and critical conclusion of the HLPF is that Agenda 2030 is in jeopardy. As the the political declaration announced:

8. The achievement of the SDGs is in peril. At the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda, we are alarmed that the progress on most of the SDGs is either moving much too slowly or has regressed below the 2015 baseline. Our world is currently facing numerous crises. Years of sustainable development gains are being reversed. Millions of people have fallen into poverty, hunger and malnutrition are becoming more prevalent, humanitarian needs are rising, and the impacts of climate change more pronounced. This has led to increased inequality exacerbated by weakened international solidarity and a shortfall of trust to jointly overcome these crises.

And the answer by the Heads of State and the UN Secretary General is right there in the next paragraph:

9. We commit to bold, ambitious, accelerated, just and transformative actions, anchored in international solidarity and effective cooperation at all levels. We will promote a systemic shift towards a more inclusive, just, peaceful, resilient and sustainable world for people and planet, for present and future generations.

10. We will devote ourselves collectively to the pursuit of sustainable development including through international cooperation and partnership on the basis of mutual trust and the full benefit of all, in a spirit of global solidarity, for the common future of present and coming generations.

So it is all about ‘acceleration’ and collective action.  And further describing this notion of acceleration, the Declaration urges:

30. We must meet the moment by taking immediate measures to scale up efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, including through development cooperation, SDG investments, reforming the international financial architecture, supporting sustained, inclusive and sustainable growth, enhancing macroeconomic policy cooperation, exploring measures of progress on sustainable development that complement or go beyond gross domestic product, and implementing actions to accelerate sustainable development, in particular in support of developing countries.

And it is apparent from the Declaration that the hope is to accelerate all 17 goals and their various aspects. But the issue is how.  And there it appears that there is little to offer although the Declaration does point to the Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs)  that many countries, though not all – note the United States has never prepared a VNR – have prepared which the Declaration suggests has “generated valuable lessons learned and have helped countries monitor progress and integrate the Sustainable Development Goals into national plans and policies.”

The hope is that all countries will focus on all the goals of Agenda 2030 pointing to the needed effort in all in paragraph 38. Pointedly, the Declaration looks to accelerate financing for the developing countries and reviews those policies that are designed to provide such financing. As the Declaration urges:

We commit to accelerate the full implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and to take further actions to scale up financing for sustainable development, and provide means of implementation for developing countries, …

Many of these policies such as expanding Multilateral Development Bank efforts are valuable but how. Too much of the Report seems to be aspirational, valuable reminders but not providing concrete steps to success.

Now far more innovative is the 17 Rooms Project that is brought by the Sustainable Development Project at Brookings with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. As pointed out in their Synthesis Report:

The story of the Sustainable Development Goals’ second half out to 2030 is yet to be written. In practical terms, much of the story will boil down to groups of people getting together to listen, debate, and act on concrete next steps. This is the underlying spirit of 17 Rooms. In the 2023 annual flagship, 17 highly curated working groups, one per SDG, came together to craft new forms of actionable, collaborative leadership over a 12-to-18-month horizon. Their efforts addressed priorities like confronting the multi-dimensional challenge of climate change, harnessing frontier technologies, elevating local approaches to global issues, and reframing challenges to inspire action.

When you read the Report you see that many of the Groups offer plans that initiate from the sub-state and nonstate level, whether from the local community, the private sector or the provincial or state level. For example Room 17 – “Partnerships for the Goals” the Report urges:

the development of local agency and leadership as the driving force for system change and for helping to advance long-term outcomes across all SDGs. They rallied around the concept of collective leadership as a term to describe investing in the agency and collaborative capacities of locally rooted leaders and their allies.

And the energy and effort may indeed be there at these governance levels. But it leaves a problem: what I would describe as the ‘implementation gap’. While initiatives of this sort make great sense, achieving the SDGs, it seems to me, will require in the end national and then collective national action that also can be augmented by international organization collaboration. As valuable as it is to have the action at the substate and private sector levels, it seems imperative in the end that we ‘rope in’ the collective effort of national and international efforts.  And that is not apparent.

This appeared initially as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/as-the-year-begins-to-close?utm_source=profile&utm_medium=reader2

Image Credit: United Nations

The Troubling Aggressiveness of the House Select Committee on China

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This is an effort to unpack the US-China relationship and its impact on the current global order following the Xi-Biden Summit at the margins of the APEC Summit last month in San Francisco. It is difficult to assess the consequences of the very real US-China competition and the potential for not just competition but confrontation and conflict. As Fareed Zakaria describes it in an opinion piece in the Washington Post:

China is the largest of the challenges and the one that, in the long run, will shape the international order — determining whether the open international system collapses into a second Cold War with arms races in nuclear weapons, space and artificial intelligence.

But that nuanced assessment is not found everywhere. We’ve made passing reference in the past in this Substack posts to the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition  Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee).  With the most recent Select Committee Report the grim clarity of the Select Committee’s view is on full display.

This Committee, it seems to me, is the cutting edge of the reaction against decades-long ‘engagement’ strategy in US-China foreign policy. The ‘death of engagement’ came with the Trump years but has continued with some in the Biden Administration. From a position that argued that economic interdependence between the United States and China would encourage  peace and stability between the two and in the more extreme view that such engagement would even be a force for political  liberalization in China, that view is ‘dead and buried’. While the latter view of political liberalization was clearly ‘over the top’, the notion of economic interdependence promoting economic growth and prosperity and encouraging continuing focus on societal wellbeing was not then and is not now. But not for the Select Committee.

The Select Committee was created on January 10, 2023 at the beginning of the 118th Congress to, according to the recent Select Committee Report, to: “investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States.” At that time, it was then Speaker Kevin McCarthy – yes the same guy who was fired from Speaker and has now left Congress –  who appointed Mike Gallagher its Chair.  Gallagher was first elected to the US House of Represenattives in 2016 and is a Marine veteran who was deployed twice to Iraq as a commander of intelligence teams, and was on now-retired Army Gen. David Petraeus’s Central Command Assessment Team.

Gallagher has been vocal about what he sees as the Biden Administration’s failure to understand the threat posed by China. In an early set of remarks as Chair Gallagher made clear what he believed to be the necessary course correction in US policy toward China. In an interview in the spring Gallagher laid out his vision:

I think there should be three pillars to our grand strategy vis-a-vis China. One is traditional military competition, hard power, and there we need multiyear appropriations for critical munition systems that need to be prepositioned in the Indo-Pacific. … The second line of effort involves ideological competition. Human rights go in this bucket. One of the things we can do in this area is make sure that the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is fully implemented and that companies aren’t exploiting any loopholes. … The third line of effort is the most complex. It’s what I call economic statecraft, or what others refer to as “selective economic decoupling.

From early on, indeed from his opening remarks at the Select Committee’s first hearing in February, Gallagher has been explicit that he views the competition and rivalry with China as an “existential struggle”:

We may call this a “strategic competition,” but this is not a polite tennis match. This is an existential struggle over what life will look like in the 21st century — and the most fundamental freedoms are at stake.

The Select Committee is made up of the following members:

Chair: Mike Gallagher WI-08

Republican Members

Robert J. Wittman VA-01

Blaine Luetkemeyer MO-03

Andy Barr KY-06

Dan Newhouse WA-04

John R. Moolenaar MI-02

Darin LaHood IL-16

Neal P. Dunn FL-02

Jim Banks IN-03

Dusty Johnson SD-

Michelle Steel CA-45

Ashley Hinson IA-02

Carlos A. Gimenez FL-28

Ranking Member: Raja Krishnamoorthi IL-08

Democratic Members

Kathy Castor FL-14

André Carson IN-07

Seth Moulton MA-06

Ro Khanna CA-17

Andy Kim NJ-03

Mikie Sherrill NJ-11

Haley M. Stevens MI-11

Jake Auchincloss MA-04

Ritchie Torres NY-15

Shontel M. Brown OH-11

It is notable that all members of the Committee, Republican and Democrat, with the  exception of Representative Auchincloss, a Democrat, signed this most recent recent Report by the Select Committee. It underscores the growing negative  shift in Congress over the relationship with China. As pointed out recently in the NYTimes:

… that ties to China could be weaponized in the event of a conflict. It could be catastrophic for the U.S. economy or the military, for example, if the Chinese government cut off its shipments to the United States of pharmaceuticals, minerals or components for weapons systems.

Beijing’s subsidization of Chinese firms and incidents of intellectual property theft have also become an increasing source of friction. In some cases, China has allowed foreign firms to operate in the country only if they form partnerships that transfer valuable technology to local companies.

The report said that the United States had never before faced a geopolitical adversary with which it was so economically interconnected, and that the full extent of the risk of relying on a strategic competitor remained unknown. The country lacks a contingency plan in the case of further conflict, it said.

And, it reflects what is today described as ‘bipartisanship’ in US-China relations.

The current Report, titled ‘Reset, Prevent, Build: A strategy to win America’s economic competition with the Chinese Communist Party’ was intended to address, what the Report describes as an “equally critical concern: America’s economic and technological competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” – one of three pillars identified by the Select Committee. The central narrative of US-China relations, according to the Select Committee was, and is:

For a generation, the United States made a bipartisan bet that robust engagement with the PRC would lead the PRC to open its economy and financial markets, which would in turn lead to reforms in the political system, greater freedom for the Chinese people, and peace and stability in the region. That bet has failed. The PRC, led by the CCP, has abandoned the path of economic and political reform, doubled down on repressive activities at home, and engaged in destabilizing activities in the region. In the decades since its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the PRC has consistently broken its promises, which ranged from commitments to allow wholly foreign-owned internal combustion engine vehicle manufacturing licenses in the PRC to pledges to reduce market-distorting agricultural subsidies. It committed to these reforms dozens of times and reneged each time.

At the same time, the CCP has pursued a multidecade campaign of economic aggression, fulfilling General Secretary Xi Jinping’s directive to be the “gravediggers of capitalism.” It has employed extensive mercantilist and coercive policies to hollow out the American economy and displace American workers and has wielded extensive subsidies at unprecedented levels and market access restrictions to strengthen indigenous industries and decrease the PRC’s reliance on foreign partners. At the same time, it has sought access to U.S. technology, expertise, and capital. It has often done so illegally, stealing as much as $600 billion per year of intellectual property (IP) and technology—in what the former director of the National Security Agency called “the greatest transfer of wealth” in history.

This Select Committee Report presents findings from the Committee hearings and it outlines recommendations for a strategy for the economic and technological dimensions of the competition with China. Once again there are three pillars to the described strategy with the intent to “…reset the terms of economic and technological competition and shape a strategic environment that favors the national and economic security of the United States and its allies while upholding our values.” The pillars include:

  • First, the United States must reset the terms of our economic relationship with the PRC and recognize the serious risks of economically relying on a strategic competitor;
  • Second, the United States must immediately stem the flow of U.S. technology and capital that is fueling the PRC’s military modernization and human rights abuses.
  • Third, the United States must invest in technological leadership and build collective economic resilience in concert with its allies.”

Identifying just these three pillars fails to do justice to the rather ‘breathtaking’ list of recommendations – some 150 recommendations – that covers a multitude of issues from AI to rare earth production and manufacturing. As described in the Washington Post:

The report, released Tuesday by the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, contains a broad legislative blueprint that — if followed — could ratchet up duties on Chinese goods, significantly curtail certain U.S. investments in China and further restrict or ban U.S. market access for companies including TikTok, as well as drone makers, chip manufacturers and telecommunications groups.”

Though the Select Committee Report describes something less than full throttled decoupling it is hard not to see the rising barriers to US-China trade and investment and the rising protectionism and the costs for the United States and its allies and partners from such a severe strategy as outlined in the Report.

Reading the Select Committee Report one could be forgiven if one presumed that the US-China competition was just a ‘hair’s breadth’ from a dramatic confrontation.

It leaves one unnerved and more than slightly depressed.

This was posted earlier at my Substack Post, Alan’s Newsletter – https://substack.com/@globalsummitryproject

Image Credit: Asia Freedom Institute

Transition and Renewed Focus

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Well it can’t be bad news all the time; at least I hope not. Given the turbulence and death with two ongoing wars – Russia -Ukraine and Hamas and Israel, the renewal, or transition, of several summits is a positive global order sign. At least I hope so.

On the global summitry scene, this week we will witness the transition of G20 hosting from India to Brazil, presumably on December 1st. Thus, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will lead Brazil as the 2024 host of the G20. And what can we expect from Brazilian leadership? According to statements from President Lula: 

“Brazil will focus on reducing hunger and poverty, slowing climate change and global governance reform when it heads the G20 group of the world’s largest economies starting next month, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said on Thursday.”

Brazil is planning to hold the annual leaders’ summit in November 2024. And as Lula has declared: 

“I hope we can address the issues that we need to stop running away from and try to resolve,” Lula at a meeting with cabinet ministers to lay out Brazil’s priorities for the G20.”

Though Lula had, I suspect, hoped to take a triumphant turn as host of the G20, his leadership has been dampened, I suspect, with the election of the other Latin American regional power,  Javier Milei. As described in the Guardian: 

Javier Milei, [is] a volatile far-right libertarian who has vowed to “exterminate” inflation and take a chainsaw to the state, has been elected president of Argentina, catapulting South America’s second largest economy into an unpredictable and potentially turbulent future.

This is no companion for Lula in the G20 and the region. The volatility in recent national elections rolls on.  In this regard note the Netherlands and the strong showing of the anti-Islamic Geert Wilders. After 25 years in parliament, his Freedom party (PVV) is set to win 37 seats, well ahead of the nearest rival, a left-wing alliance. 

So there is volatility in a variety of national scenes that matches the uncertainty in the international scene. It is a troubling warning signal for advancing collective global governance. 

Still forward effort can be had for the moment internationally. Notably we can point to the gathering of foreign ministers of South Korea, Japan and China. This is the first Triple Summit gathering of foreign ministers since 2019. Faced with the pandemic but more pointedly the tensions between Koea and Japan no Triple Summit gathering has occurred. As chronicled in the SCMP:  “… the host, South Korea’s Park Jin, said after the meeting that the three ministers reaffirmed their agreement to hold the summit as soon as mutually convenient, according to Seoul-based Yonhap News Agency. 

“We will continue efforts to make sure that the holding of a summit will materialise in the near future,” Park was quoted as saying.” 

The key to this emerging initiative is the current improvement in relations between Korea and Japan. This easing of tensions has reopened the prospect of trilateral gatherings and the matching Indo-Pacific gatherings that includes the United States with this Trilateral effort. It is not an answer to the tensions generated by the US-China rivalry but it builds a better Indo-Pacific base. 

And in the category of renewed focus, and it is, is the major climate gathering  – starting this Thursday, COP28. As described by the think tank,  IISD

“The 2023 UN Climate Change Conference will convene from 30 November to 12 December 2023 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). It will comprise the 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 28);

In a letter dated 13 January 2023, the UNFCCC Secretariat announced that Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology and UAE Special Envoy for Climate Change, has been appointed to serve as COP 28 President-Designate.”

Many were disappointed by this COP28 leadership choice. However, it was a regional choice question with the Asia-Pacific Group determining the President (The regional groups include: The African Group, the Asia-Pacific Group, the Eastern Europe Group, the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) and the Western European and Others Group (WEOG)) but it is what it is and COP 28 does appear to signal some progress. As Lisa Friedman of the NYTimes points out, progress may well be had at COP28 because of the following:

“The first is what’s called the global stocktake. This is the first formal assessment of whether nations are on track to meet a goal they set in Paris in 2015 to limit the rise in average global temperatures to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels. 

…Second, there is an expectation that nations will finalize the so-called “loss and damage” fund they agreed to create last year. The major questions to be resolved include who will pay into the fund and who will have access to the money. 

Finally, there is the political agreement that could emerge from the summit. It is likely that nations could agree on a deal to replace polluting fossil fuels with clean energy such as wind and solar power. The question is whether nations agree to phase out fossil fuels and, if so, what caveats are attached.”

The gathering is huge. Diplomats from nearly 200 countries, and many heads of state and government, will gather to try to draft a plan to accelerate the global transition away from fossil fuels. 

We shall see, but the possibilities are there especially given that China and the US confirmed following agreement between John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua that the US and China are committed to:

“Both countries support the G20 Leaders Declaration to pursue efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030 and intend to sufficiently accelerate renewable energy deployment in their respective economies through 2030 from 2020 levels so as to accelerate the substitution for coal, oil and gas generation, and thereby anticipate post-peaking meaningful absolute power sector emission reduction, in this critical decade of the 2020s.” 

Even in these troubled times, it appears that progress is possible. We will follow it. 

This Post was originally a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/transition-and-renewed-focus?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Image Credit: GreenBiz

Maintaining ‘Entanglement’: APEC Summit Discussions including the Xi-Biden Bilateral Summit

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Doing some quick catch up on the APEC Summit that was held between November 11th and 17th in San Francisco. The main event, as it turned out, was the much discussed bilateral summit between China’s Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden. While the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) meetings to receive some attention – more for what didn’t happen than what was secured – the APEC gathering activity was dominated by US-China Bilateral Summit and there was some attention paid to the other bilateral Summit of note that between President Xi and the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

The Post here is constructed from several Substack Posts in Alan’s Newsletter: “Maintaining ‘Entanglement‘: APEC Summit discussions and more” and “It’s working; just not like what was anticipated: The sudden rise of Bilaterals”; and “So Success, or What? Final thoughts on the Summits in San Francisco”. Feel free to subscribe to my Substack: Alan’s Newsletter

Maintaining ‘Entanglement’: APEC Summit discussions and more

It appears that we are likely to see a meeting this month of President Xi and President Biden at the margins of the APEC Summit. I think that is a good thing. What can we, or should we, expect from such a summit of leaders of the two leading powers? While contemplating this question, I was caught by two articles written by Brookings colleague, Ryan Hass. Ryan has recently been named director of the John L. Thornton China Center and holds the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at Brooking is also a senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies. Ryan has contributed two first rate articles on US-China relations – what they are, and what they need to be.*

First, there is the big question of where US-China relations are, and then where they need to be? There is little question that Ryan is correct in believing that the US and the global order would be far worse off if China were to exit the current international system fragmenting what is still a critical -and I believe necessary – ‘single international community’. As Ryan urged in one of the two contributions, this a recent Foreign Affairs piece:

Washington should aim to preserve a functioning international system that supports U.S. security and prosperity—and that includes China rather than isolates it. Meanwhile, the United States should maintain a strong military to deter China from using force against the United States or its security partners and seek to sustain an overall edge over China in technological innovation, particularly in fields with national security implications. … Washington’s goal should be to keep China entangled in a global system that regulates interstate behavior and pushes Beijing to conclude that the best path to the realization of its national ambitions would be to operate within existing rules and norms.

‘Entanglement’ as a strategic aim strikes me as ‘right on target’.

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The SDGs are faltering! What can be done?

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Returning to the SDGs

We have pointed out in the past – either through LinkedIn or in Substack posts that the Global Summitry Project (GSP) has targeted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The issue is now front and center as we enter the UN General Assembly’s return next week.  The 2023 SDG Summit will take place on September 18th and 19th. It will mark the beginning of, at least according to the UN Secretary General, Antonio Gueterres, “a new phase of accelerated progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals with high-level political guidance on transformative and accelerated actions leading up to 2030”. At least that is his hope.

Early on the GSP identified this initiative as a means to assess the health of current multilateralism. First, a quick review of the SDGs:

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The SDGs were passed unanimously at the UN General Assembly in 2015. Agenda 2030, as it was called at the UN, identified 17 goals, 169 targets and at least 241 indicators.

These goals, targets and indicators, unlike the earlier Millennium Development Goals Initiative  – the MDGs – were designed to apply not just to developing countries but to all countries, whether developing or developed. Agenda 2030 was not then just a classic development effort. This effort was, and is, a global project for all states. Achieving the SDGs is about securing global development and achieving global sustainability for all – developing, emerging market and developed economies, Global North, Global South – all. Here are the goals:

Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere

Goal 2: Zero Hunger

Goal 3: Good Health and Well-Being: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

Goal 4: Quality Education

Goal 5: Gender Equality: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

Goal 6: Clean Water and Sanitation: Ensure access to water and sanitation for all

Goal 7: Affordable and Clean Energy: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy

Goal 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth: Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all

Goal 9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure: Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

Goal 10: Reduced Inequalities: Reduce inequality within and among countries

Goal 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities: Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

Goal 12: Responsible Consumption and Production: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

Goal 13: Climate Action: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

Goal 14: Life Below Water: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources

Goal 15: Life on Land: Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss

Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies

Goal 17: Partnerships for the Goals: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.
The ‘Two Summits’

Now we are on the case of the SDGs at the GSP. As a result we are following what are often referred to as the “Two Summits”. The first is the SDG Summit: The UN Secretary-General calls the SDG Summit [HLPF Summit, September 2023] the “centerpiece moment of 2023.” It takes place at the midpoint – completion of the first 7.5 years toward the final goal – for fully implementing the development agenda, the SDGs, adopted by countries in 2015 in 2030.

In 2024, in addition, a second Summit will take place. The UN will convene the Summit of the Future (SOTF). The theme of this Summit – ‘Multilateral Solutions for a Better Tomorrow.’ In September 2021, the Secretary-General issued a report, ‘Our Common Agenda’ urging a speed up of the implementation of the SDGSs and advancing the commitments contained in the UN75 Declaration. In some cases, the proposals addressed gaps that emerged since 2015, requiring new intergovernmental agreements. The report, therefore, called for the convening of a Summit of the Future to forge a new global consensus on readying for a future that is rife with risks but also opportunities. The General Assembly agreed to hold the SOTF Summit on September 22nd and September 23rd 2024. A ‘Pact for the Future’ is expected to be put before the UNGA and approved.  The Summit’s aim is to reinforce the UN and global governance structures to better address old and new challenges and to formulate a ‘Pact for the Future’ that would help advance the SDGs by 2030.

Overall, the SOTF, it is hoped, will revitalize multilateralism and lead, possibly, to needed multilateral institutional reform and provide a convincing narrative spelling out how the SOTF can:

●  foster enablers of SDG acceleration such as digitalization and access to finance;

●  tackle obstacles to SDG implementation, for example, through the New Agenda for Peace, by promoting effective crisis response through the Emergency Platform, by addressing fake news, and by supporting global public goods financing;

●  reinforce international standards conducive for the SDGs, including Beyond GDP, ‘longtermism’ and rights for future generations, and of course those on human rights and gender; and

●  develop a more networked, inclusive, and effective UN for SDG acceleration through the Emergency Platform, Youth Office, and a biennial summit with IFIs and the G20, among others.

The Multilateral Disconnect

So, where are we? At the midpoint it is evident the implementation of the SDGs is in deep, very deep trouble. As former UN Deputy Secretary General and currently the President of the Open Society Foundations, Mark Malloch Brown has recently written in FP:

Confirmation of that gloomy picture will come at the summit on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on Sept.18-19 . This was meant to be a midway progress review: the implementation period for the 17 interlinked objectives, which include ending extreme poverty and hunger, began in 2016 and is due to end in 2030. The world is far from the right track. Out of 140 metrics by which the SDGs are measured, half are not on the desired trajectory and about one-third have stalled or gone into reverse. … Time and trust are running out, both on the SDGs and the wider restoration and renewal of the multilateral system.
There will be serious efforts at the UN meetings to urge all to focus on the SDGs and accelerate efforts to achieve these goals. But there is a huge problem – a serious disconnect. And it spells continuing problems for collective global governance efforts. There is an unfortunate glaring disconnect here. The urging is  occurring at the multilateral level but the implementation is at the national level. And efforts at the national level are either underwhelming or, sadly, non-existent. Multilateralism continues to largely occur at the national level and as I have pointed out before, key member states, read that the United States – are disengaged from any national effort. US executive and congressional budgeting processes and finance and development policy implementation are simply void of any SDG policy efforts. And the US is not the only member state in this situation. The rhetoric may be there at the international level but today it does not link to national policy action. Now, in the face of the absence of national policy, numerous local and regional actors and non-state actors, corporations and civil society organizations (CSOs) have stepped in. But their efforts, I am afraid, cannot substitute for national efforts. Without that the strong urging will continue at the international level but without serious progress.

What can be done? We will return to this here.

This Post was first uploaded to my Substack at Alan’s Newsletter:

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-sdgs-are-faltering-what-can-be

Feel free to comment and consider subscribing to my Substack.

 

Troubles with Global Summitry

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We are definitely in the midst of Global Summitry gatherings. With the BRICS Summit just recently ended, we are deep into the G20 weekend gathering in New Delhi. So much commentary has accompanied these summitry gatherings. But I caution casual observers and readers: there are way too many assessments and conclusions drawn by all those folks that unfortunately barely pay attention to Global Summitry through much of the year. You can see this in the various ‘hair on fire’ commentaries in the assessments and consequences of the actions of key players in both the BRICS and now especially with the G20. Too many declarations of the G20 demise; firm conclusions that China and Russia would block any consensus statement that sought to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; the fragmentation of global summitry with the rise of the BRICS plus and the demise of the G20 with leaders from Russia and China choosing to absent themselves from summit.

Now don’t get me wrong, the geopolitical pressures, particularly rising US-China competition and opposition and condemnation of Russia for its unprovoked aggression on Ukraine are impactful. The geopolitics has seemingly hindered the G20 in advancing global governance policies. Yet the global governance agenda and goals remain. Look at the G20 agenda as described by Damien Cave in the NYT:

The agenda in New Delhi includes climate change, economic development and debt burdens in low-income countries, as well as inflation spurred by Russia’s war in Ukraine. If members can reach consensus on any or all of these subjects, they will produce an official joint declaration at the end.

In the ‘hair on  fire’ camp here is a piece by Alec Russell in the FT

The countdown to the talks was dominated by news that Xi was not going to attend. This was widely seen as a major blow to the G20, and an acceleration of the shift to a world in which a China-led bloc is facing off against a US-led one, with many countries hovering in the middle.

But the collective global governance effort has not been stymied. Indian efforts to reach consensus have proven successful. The G20, thanks to India, has released the Declaration a day early. Our good fortune. As described by the Indian Sherpa the Declaration was:

… a complete statement with 100% unanimity” that highlights India’s “great ability to bring all developing countries, all the emerging markets, China, Russia, everybody together at the same table and bring consensus.

He went on:

Urging adherence to the United Nations Charter, the New Delhi statement says: “All states must refrain from the threat or use of force to seek territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.

So there we are, a consensus statement has been issued. As often is the case, the document was not short, some 29 pages of declaration plus pages of annex.  Nevertheless it ended on a ‘high note’:

81. We reiterate our commitment to the G20 as the premier forum for global economic cooperation and its continued operation in the spirit of multilateralism, on the basis of consensus, with all members participating on an equal footing in all its events including Summits. We look forward to meeting again in Brazil in 2024 and in South Africa in 2025, as well as in the United States in 2026 at the beginning of the next cycle. We welcome Saudi Arabia’s ambition to advance its turn for hosting the G20 Presidency in the next cycle. We also look forward to the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2024 as a symbol of peace, dialogue amongst nations and inclusivity, with participation of all.

But a reading of the Declaration raises again the question: what success has in fact been achieved? As Caves points out:

But how much progress has the G20 made toward its ambitions? And what can be expected from this year’s meeting in India on Saturday and Sunday? … Then what? Often, not much, when it comes to real-world results. Most of the grouping’s joint statements since it formed in 1999 have been dominated by resolutions as solid as gas fumes, with no clear consequences when nations underperform.

‘Solid as gas fumes’. Well, in many respects the Declaration is no more than a statement of collective progress – what have we collectively identified as worthy of committing to and implementing. And, I did note, in an earlier Substack Post, Not Simply the Pace of Summitry that Leaders and their official are working toward commitment but:

So, let me at least raise in this Post, what I believe is the ‘continuum of action and commitment’ available to leaders in these various Leaders’ Summits. This continuum identifies the extent to which global governance policies have been secured. We move from the aspirational, often set out in the leaders’ declarations or communiques all the way to implementation by a country. What is evident from the continuum is that these folks are governmental leaders. And, as a result no matter what the communique announces, individual leaders’ may, or may not, actually implement a collective wish set out in a declaration.  This is well beyond just the aspirational.

The continuum, as I see it, is:  Consultation/ Cooperation/ Coordination/ Collaboration – the 4Cs of global governance progress, as I see it. Distinguishing between these concepts can be quite difficult. And of course, beyond this is, collectively achieving the actions, proposals and policies that are set out in the communiques, or announced at the Leaders’ gatherings.

And that is paydirt. Collectively achieving the actions set out in all these Summit Declarations – implementing policy in other words – is global governance success. Such implementation lies generally at the national political level, although there are instances where international organizations do in fact implement.

Bottom line: it requires a lot more than a statement in a Leaders’ Declaration to achieve global governance progress. But a number of us are watching including my colleagues at the CWD process.

This Post was originally uploaded to my Substack – Alan’s Newsletter. Feel free to subscribe.

Image Credit: Al Jazeera