Can we foresee Middle Power Action in a World of Geopolitical Tensions?

Posted on August 8, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

So we’ve been struggling to understand the current roles, and possible future roles of Middle Powers (MP). Context is important especially in the context of today’s global disorder that sees: ‘undying’ wars in the Ukraine and Gaza; seeming rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, the US and Russia and rising Global South demands. How might MPs act in the near term with respect to these current tensions whether in Europe, the Middle East or in the Indo-Pacific? Can MPs still exert and advance global governance leadership notwithstanding the disorder trends? In the next couple of Posts I hope to elaborate on MPs and MPD. As you will see MPs and their potential influence have represented an important stream of research inquiry.

The CWD – now the Changing World Dialogue, has maintained a strong interest in the role of Middle Powers and their Middle Power Diplomacy. We held various virtual CWD sessions through the pandemic and we have continued our inquiries as the pandemic abated. By the launch of the CWD sessions in September 2024, Colin Bradford, the lead Co-Chair of the CWD saw the ‘MP World’ this way:

“Global pluralism, developed in 2020-2023, posits the existence already of “autonomous” strategies and independence in foreign policies as a “global political dynamic” in global relations. Pluralism is a core concept for CWD, in that it leads to the “pluralization” of relations with China as an “alternative framework” to address the toxic tension in the bilateral China-US relationship in recent years. This has been the goal of CWD from its foundation.”

“In the last year of CWD exchanges, the importance of Middle Powers and Middle Power Diplomacy has arisen as the domestic driver of pluralism. This new CWD series seeks to elucidate the factors enabling countries to be Middle Powers and the features of their international behaviors which are effective in addressing global systemic challenges.”

“A better understanding of these factors and features could facilitate proactive national efforts to deliberately contribute to global pluralism by “punching above their weight” and to influence global governance outcomes that include China and the US but which “globalize” those outcomes, rather than narrow them by allowing great power dominance to prevail.”

“See quotations at the end of this note, one by Shiro Armstrong and one by Mari Pangestu, both of whom are participants in this series on the importance of Middle Power Diplomacy for Australia and for ASEAN.”

“The purpose of this new CWD series of Zoom Sessions in the next four months is to focus on the two-sided coin of global pluralism and middle power diplomacy in order to explore the degree to which they are capable of achieving the goals of CWD for humanity.”

Colin then turned to the goals of the CWD, as he saw it, from his ‘perch’ as a Co-Chair and identified the following:

“to preserve the world as a single international community;

to avoid another Cold War;

to strengthen global governance in the face of geopolitical tensions;

to prioritize the “good-of-the-whole” within and between nations; and

to mediate “difference” through dialogue by capitalizing on “diversity as an asset” rather than using it as a divide.”

And from there Colin sought to identify the dimensions of Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) as he saw it:

“This segment of the note is a highly preliminary and more a conversation starter than the articulation of a framework for future work to be undertaken on MDP. Indeed, it is the purpose of this CWD series to iteratively develop that framework. We are just beginning.

The domestic side of global pluralism is the drive, or lack of it, within a nation to play a role in international affairs that advances the country’s interests and enhances its profile in the international community. It is certainly not always the case that countries that could have the power and influence to play an international role have chosen to do so. Neither is Middle Power status conferred upon countries once and for all but rather is a characteristic that waxes and wanes with the historical trajectory of the country.”

Having articulated these MPD dimensions, Colin then described, as he saw it, the key elements of being a MP:

“Some key elements that immediately come to mind as factors affecting the capacity of a country to play a role internationally as a Middle Power are:

national leadership willing to embrace the ambition of being an MP;

size, but not necessarily always the case;

a pivotal issue and a moment in time when opportune to weigh in;

a platform for playing out the role where germane issues are raised;

an appreciation of the value of reputational capital that can accrue:

supporting principles, norms and ideals regarded as high ground;

regions matter as geographic spheres where MPD is played out; and

regions matter as Middle Powers in their own right.”

Finally, Colin pointed to what he saw as the emergence of MPs and MPD in the current geopolitical setting:

“Geopolitics today dominate international relations and weaken global governance.”

“The choice is between *** a bipolar geopolitical order dominated by China-US relations, the war between NATO and Russia, and divisiveness between the G7 and the BRICS AND *** a pluralized inclusive global order in which Europe differentiates itself as a global actor and more than two dozen Middle Powers and regional players, like ASEAN and the African Union, have influential roles.”

“In the pluralized inclusive order scenario, European countries which alone are not great powers but who do exercise independent influence as Middle Powers, and even Major Powers, such as France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, are definitely global actors. Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea are classic cases of Middle Powers in the literature. (8 MPs)”

“The rest of the G20 from the Global South fill out this scenario with Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico from Latin America, India and Indonesia from Asia, and South Africa and Turkey create a diverse array of strong voices in global affairs. (+8 MPs)”

“Then there is an orbit of influentials consisting of Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia that certainly have region-wide roles in Africa and the Middle East, but given the global repercussions of events in these two areas, play roles in global relations more broadly. (+ 6 MPs = a total of 24 Middle Powers, counting ASEAN and the AU)”

As a result of his inquiry Colin sought to put “his hands” around what he sees as the MPs in today’s global order. Colin, in fact produced 24 MPs:

“Europe: France, Germany, Italy, the UK

Pacific Asia: Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea

Global South: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey

Influentials: Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia

Regional Institutions: ASEAN, SAU (African Union)”

But the list was not complete and Colin adds the following from Central Asia mentioning: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan suggesting:

“They are relatively small landlocked countries but are in a pivotal geographic situation between China, Russia, Europe and the Middle East. And they are largely out of the western view of the world, which I think is a mistake.”

“These five Central Asian countries are also five of the ten members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in which China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia are members; Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (among others) are dialogue partners, and ASEAN, is a “guest attendee.”

“I would offer the thought for discussion that we give some attention to Central Asia as a region and to these five countries. Whereas I do not think we should focus on the SCO as a group, I do not think we should ignore it, which I must admit to having done for most of my career.”

“Pluralism exists today with leaders like India’s Modi, Brazil’s Lula, Turkey’s Erdogan, as well as Macron, Scholz, Meloni and EU leaders, taking independent positions, most notably in their relations with China. Instead of the China-US relationship dominating the global discourse, pluralism is manifested by assertive independence on the part of more than two dozen “middle powers” beyond the triad of great powers.”

As Colin concludes this examination, he ties the MP analysis to global summitry institutions in particular the G20 and the effort to maintain a single international community and blunt the negative impact of bipolarity:

“These two dozen entities have visible roles in a different drama. The G20 becomes a more significant platform that forces members of the G7 and the BRICS to talk, negotiate and even agree on concerted priorities and coordinated actions. The complexity of pluralism as a global political dynamic creates a mélange of perspectives and interests which is less ideological and a discourse which is more pragmatic, problem-centric, and professional. The G20 is the most prominent site where this new dynamic is played out, but not the only one.”

So that was where Colin saw the CWD focus on MP and MPD as we began our 2024 cycle of CWD zoom gatherings. It was a busy season of meetings including a series of MP gatherings including sessions on: Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Indonesia and Turkey.

In the follow on Post I want to reflect further on what we learned in our gatherings on MPs and MPD and focus in particular on the insights brought to us at the time, and then following on by Gareth Evans the former foreign minister of Australia. He had very valuable things to say.

Credit Image: MPSN (Middle Power Studies Network)

This Post first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/can-we-foresee-middle-power-action

The Active, Indeed Very Active, World of the ‘B… in Chief’

Posted on August 1, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

So President Trump and his minions were extremely active this past week. The President, as Bully in Chief, and his people are still going strong, especially when it comes to trade and tariffs. But there were other areas that this President and his administration pushed forward on and warrant a look. So much (re)gressive action is being taken that it is hard to keep up with it all. It is exhausting.

Starting at home you could not avoid the critical action being directed by the Head of the EPA, Lee Zeldin. As described by Maxine Joselow and Lisa Friedman at the NYTimes are Zeldin’s efforts to roll back the EPA underpinnings to fighting climate change – the ‘endangerment finding’. And do notice where Zeldin made his announcement:

“Lee Zeldin, the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, said on Tuesday the Trump administration would revoke the scientific determination that underpins the government’s legal authority to combat climate change.”

“Speaking at a truck dealership in Indianapolis, Mr. Zeldin said the E.P.A. planned to rescind the 2009 declaration, known as the endangerment finding, which concluded that planet-warming greenhouse gases pose a threat to public health. The Obama and Biden administrations used that determination to set strict limits on greenhouse gas emissions from cars, power plants and other industrial sources of pollution.”

“Without the endangerment finding, the E.P.A. would be left with no authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate the greenhouse gas emissions that are accumulating in the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels.”

It is a dramatic step. As described by the two reporters:

“The proposal is President Trump’s most consequential step yet to derail federal climate efforts. It marks a notable shift in the administration’s position from one that had downplayed the threat of global warming to one that essentially flatly denies the overwhelming scientific evidence of climate change.”

“It would not only reverse current regulations, but, if the move is upheld in court, it could make it significantly harder for future administrations to rein in climate pollution from the burning of coal, oil and gas.”

“Without the United States working to reduce emissions, it becomes far tougher for the world to collectively prevent average global temperatures from rising by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, or 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit, above preindustrial levels.”

From current legal actions underway I think there is a reasonable chance that at the Appeal Court level Zeldin’s actions might well be declared illegal but at the ‘Supremes’, it is a hard call.

These actions are potentially devastating but Zeldin’s actions reveal a dramatic alteration in Zeldin’s actions:

“The plan to eliminate the endangerment finding showcases the political evolution of Mr. Zeldin, who for years took moderate positions on climate change and other environmental issues.”

“A former congressman from a coastal community on Long Island that is struggling with rising sea levels linked to global warming, Mr. Zeldin once joined a bipartisan caucus to address climate change. In 2019 he broke with fellow Republicans to vote against an amendment that would have prohibited the E.P.A. from reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”

“An ally of Mr. Trump who prominently defended him during House impeachment hearings, Mr. Zeldin moved to the right on energy and other issues during his unsuccessful bid for governor of New York in 2022.”

“Just weeks after his nomination to lead the E.P.A., Mr. Zeldin declared that he would be “driving a dagger through the heart of climate-change religion” by repealing regulations on greenhouse gas emissions.”

Loyalty has become the sine qua non for Trump folk.

Now on the Trump bullying front both the actions against elite universities and then trade policy actions can’t be outdone.

On the trade front first. There is an explosion of tariffs issued by Trump following an anemic number of successfully reached agreements with the Trump administration. First there was a major ‘agreement’ reached earlier in the week with the EU, its second largest trade partner. The EU agreed to a 15 percent tariff after Trump threatened 30 percent. And, the EU committed to buying more energy from America, and apparently agreeing to buy more AI chips, and to invest $600bn in the U.S. Back to this agreement in a moment.

The new tariff rates established a 10 percent baseline for all imports to the U.S., while setting higher levies on many countries including Syria (41 percent), Laos (40 percent), Switzerland (39 percent), Iraq (35 percent), South Africa (30 percent) and India (25 percent). In addition, Trump imposed various punitive tariffs including a sweeping 50 percent tariff on most goods from Brazil beginning in one week. The U.S. Treasury also announced sanctions on Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes over the trial of former President Jair Bolsonaro for plotting a coup after he lost the presidential election. Trump appears outraged at the actions to punish the former president for his attempted coup. I suspect it brings back memories of his own actions.

In announcing the tariffs, which had been set to take effect on Friday, Mr. Trump invoked Brazil’s prosecution of its former president, Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally charged with attempting a coup to remain in power. Mr. Trump has said Mr. Bolsonaro is the victim of a “witch hunt.””

And his animus seemingly is not confined to Brazil. Trump raised tariffs with Canada as pointed out by the Toronto Star’s Raisa Patel and Josh Rubin:

“U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order late Thursday hiking tariffs on certain Canadian goods to 35 per cent, with no deal materializing between Ottawa and Washington as the clock ticked towards an Aug. 1 deadline to reach a trade agreement.”

Such a tariff rate would be punishing for sure, but the agreed USMCA exemption allows most cross border exports to cross tariff-free. It is estimated that the exemption covers about 94 percent of the items Canada exports to the U.S.

Now, back to the agreement with the EU for a second look. This agreement – a 15 percent tariff, immediately raised a strong round of criticism. A notable example was Zaki Laidi, a former special adviser to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and a professor at Sciences Po. As Laidi wrote in Project Syndicate in a piece titled, “The Trumping of Europe”:

“One can reproach Viktor Orbán, a friend of US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, for many things. But the Hungarian prime minister is not wrong to point out that we have just witnessed Trump “eating [European Commission President] Ursula von der Leyen for breakfast.” After all, the draft trade agreement the European Union has now concluded with the United States sets a 15% tariff on most European exports to the US, against a 0% tariff on US exports to Europe. Clearly, the match goes to Trump, 15 to nil.”

“This glaring asymmetry is a far cry from what Europe was demanding – namely, near-zero tariffs on both sides. And making matters worse, the framework also envisions $750 billion in forced purchases of US energy, $600 billion of European investment in the US, and additional orders of US-made military hardware.”

Laidi suggested the following as the conclusion of this negotiation:

“Still, from his standpoint, this outcome is exceptional. Europe cannot possibly claim to have “won.” At best, it managed to limit the damage. Von der Leyen arrived in Scotland weak and anxious; she left even weaker, but relieved.”

Laidi’s counter to the agreement von der Leyen reached is:

“Europe had plenty of cards to play, and it could have strengthened its hand further by coordinating its position with the two other G7 countries facing US bullying: Japan and Canada. Nor did the EU’s options stop there. Another formidable card is the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), which is designed for situations where “a third country would seek to exert pressure on the European Union or on one of its member states to take specific measures that would affect trade and investment.” That is precisely what has been happening.”

And while the result for the EU, as I see it was indeed middling at best Laidi does underscore that to be more effective what was required: a coalitional arrangement both within the 27 member countries of the EU, let alone coalitional agreement among at least some of the members of the G7. While the EU outcome may be a hard lesson, it does underscore that parties need to work much harder and more quickly to achieve coalitional arrangements whether within the EU or in a coalition of at least some of the members of the G7. Until then Trump bullying is not going away any too soon.

And then there is the ‘negotiation’ with Harvard University. Actually, in my youth, I was lucky enough to take a Harvard negotiation course. Given the ‘negotiation’ between Harvard and the Trump administration there is no small irony in the continuing Hravard programme as pointed out in a recent article in The Economist:

“At Harvard you can study negotiation. This being Harvard, there is in fact an entire academic programme dedicated to the craft. The principles are simple. Understand your alternatives—what happens if you fight rather than compromise—and your long-term interests. This being Donald Trump’s America, Harvard itself is now the case study.”

Trump has particularly targeted Harvard in his efforts to rein in rampant anti-semitism at universities most particularly seemingly the elite Ivy League campuses:

“Mr Trump has turned full guns on that supposed hotbed of antisemitism and left-wing indoctrination. America’s oldest and richest university would be his most satisfying trophy and its capitulation would become a template for coerced reforms across higher education. The government has sought to review some of Harvard’s coursework as Mr Trump has pressured it to hire fewer “Leftist dopes” and discipline pro-Palestine protesters. When the university refused, his administration froze federal research grants worth $3bn and tried to bar it from enrolling foreign students.”

The piece goes on to declare:

“Consider Harvard’s options. Litigation has succeeded initially: a judge paused the ban on foreign students. Harvard had a sympathetic hearing in its lawsuit to restore government funding. Yet the university knows that it cannot count on the Supreme Court, with its conservative majority. Meanwhile, the potential damage from Mr Trump’s campaign looks both acute and existential. Losing federal funds would transform Harvard from a world-class research university to a tuition-dependent one. They constitute 11% of the operating budget and represent almost all the discretionary money available for research. Making do without while maintaining current spending levels would see the university draw down its $53bn endowment by about 2% a year. That is possible for a while, though it would erode future income and much of the endowment is constrained by donor restrictions anyway.”

Notwithstanding Harvard’s litigation against the Trump bullying of the University, Harvard is probably eyeing the details of the Trump agreement with Columbia University as a template for a possible deal with the Trump administration.

It is an option for sure. I am sure such a deal will be difficult to swallow but otherwise the threat to Harvard remains all too real. Once again I am struck that the universities were apparently unable to gather together and act together – whether with collective legal action, or negotiation in a coalition. Of course the urge is to put it behind quickly and get back to ‘normal’ but dealing with the ‘Bully in Chief’ requires a more pointed collective strategy. I do hope such collective efforts emerge among the Trump targets to deal with the ‘Bully in Chief’.

Image Credit: Today News

This Post originally appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-active-indeed-very-active-world

Crisis and Reform at the UN

Posted on July 25, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

I’ll start by returning to a subject I broached in this earlier Substack Post, Finding Success for the BRICS+, where I raised questions over the impact at the conclusion of the Conference on Financing for Development:

“Just concluded in Seville Spain is the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4). As noted by SDSN, The UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) which operates under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, and designed to mobilize a network to drive action on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change this summit gathering is designed to”:

Adequately finance the UN system;
Increase financing for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
Increase their financing of the global commons; and
Agree on reforms of the international financial markets to ensure that savings flow to the poorer countries in the world.

According to author, Minh-Thu Pham, a nonresident scholar in the Global Order and Institutions Program at CEIP, in an article titled: “The Compromiso de Sevilla Marks a New Path for Development Finance”:

“At the outset of FFD4, the four co-facilitators—Mexico, Nepal, Norway, and Zambia—agreed that the AAAA [Addis Ababa Action Agenda] and the September 2024 UN Pact for the Future, which contained language committing to reforming international financial architecture, must be the minimal level of agreement in Sevilla.”

“The ultimate document they produced underscores a collective obligation to advance development, rather than a mere bargain between the Global North and South. Indeed, the very name—Compromiso de Sevilla—signals this distinction: While English speakers might hear “compromise” in the Spanish “compromiso,” the word actually means “commitment,” a linguistic nuance that captures the document’s aspirational rather than merely transactional character.”

She goes on further to argue:

“Despite some disappointments, the Compromiso de Sevilla is a major win for the Global South, particularly developing countries most vulnerable to economic shocks. It marked the emergence of a new path for international cooperation, based on three principles: maximizing development impact, giving Global South countries greater voice and influence over financial and debt structures, and strengthening country leadership and country-led initiatives. The fact that an outcome was reached by consensus provides yet another signal that a new breed of multilateralism is emerging to meet the needs of the moment—albeit one without the United States.”

How does she see the outcome? Well, that seems pretty clear:

“Ultimately, the Compromiso de Sevilla is a substantive advance both for the Global South and the cause of multilateralism. Four key policy provisions stand out.”

“Lacking an effective global architecture for managing sovereign debt, the world’s poorest countries are paying more on servicing their debt than on health and education combined. Despite sharp North-South differences, negotiators reached agreement on important initiatives to lower debt burdens:

Creating a borrowers forum with a secretariat in the UN Conference on Trade and Development to provide borrowing states a platform to coordinate

Convening a new working group under the UN secretary-general, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, tasked with examining responsible borrowing and lending practices

Endorsing increased local-currency lending to reduce pressure in crises

Establishing a global debt registry housed at the World Bank

Calling for a strengthened G20 Common Framework

Agreeing on an intergovernmental dialogue at the UN on closing gaps in the debt architecture.”

Yet she is willing to see that in the end:

“As Zambia’s UN ambassador Chola Milambo declared, “at the end of the day, it’s going to be implementation that matters.” To build on the Compromiso de Sevilla, the Spanish hosts and the UN proposed a Sevilla Platform for Action to encourage partnerships between member states, civil society, and the private sector to announce initiatives to operationalize and execute specific elements of the agreement. The platform now includes over 130 initiatives, cutting across thematic areas, methods, and political coalitions. Collectively, they suggest increasing awareness that complex multilateral agreements need relentless follow-up efforts to become a reality. Some initiatives may fail, but through sheer volume of ideas and effort, others will have an impact. (Helpfully, the UN has created a digital registry of all initiatives under the Platform for Action.)”

As the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) reviews and ultimately comments on the results of Seville:

“UN Member States have approved the outcome document of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) and transmitted it to the Conference for adoption. The ‘Compromiso de Sevilla’ recognizes the annual financing for development (FfD) gap of USD 4 trillion and launches “an ambitious package of reforms and actions to close this financing gap with urgency,” while catalyzing sustainable development investments at scale.”

The reality is that it is not the number of initiatives – as striking as they may appear to be – and the result here is 130 initiatives, but it is as the Zambian UN ambassador is quoted as saying, how much implementation of these initiatives occurs.

There are a multitude of initiatives notwithstanding the UN faces a $USD 4 trillion gap. And there is growing recognition of a deep financing crisis at its many institutions. As a result of UN80 the Secretary General Antonio Guterres has been seeking a 20 percent reduction in its workforce and consolidations wherever possible.. As Colum Lynch of Devex made clear:

“The U.N.’s financial future just got worse.

For weeks, the world body’s leadership has been plotting out plans for slashing funding and downsizing its workforce by at least 20%.”

“But the recent passage of a law clawing back more than $1 billion in U.S. funding to the United Nations for everything from peacekeepers to human rights promotion and nutritional supplements for children in conflict zones has made it clear it will have to dig deeper. And it coincides with a State Department announcement on Tuesday that the U.S is withdrawing from UNESCO.”

“The White House “rescissions” — provisions to cancel congressionally appropriated funds — would cut more than $361 million in funding for U.N. peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ballooning Washington’s already whopping peacekeeping arrears to about $1.8 billion, according to Better World Campaign. The U.N. maintains that the U.S. is legally obligated to pay its full share of peacekeeping costs.”

“A proposed House budget for fiscal year 2026 that is making its way through the House appropriations committee envisions even deeper cuts, capping peacekeeping funding at about $560 million, a roughly 54% cut from 2025. The funding for international organizations would drop from about $1.54 billion to $310.2 million. It would also prohibit funding for several U.N. agencies that are unpopular among Republicans, including UN Human Rights and the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.” …

“The package also targets another critical funding account, the international organizations and programs account, with over $450 million in voluntary U.S. funding for UNICEF ($142 million), the U.N. Development Programme ($81.5 million), UN Human Rights ($17.5 million) and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ($3.5 million).”

The Trump administration’s latest action, as just noted above, is to announce that it is leaving UNESCO. As described by Lynch:

“In announcing its decision to leave UNESCO, a State Department spokesperson said the Paris-based agency’s recognition of the “State of Palestine” ran “contrary to U.S. policy” and contributed to anti-Israel rhetoric. The spokesperson also accused UNESCO of advancing “divisive social and cultural causes” at odds with the “America First” foreign policy.””

And as Lynch further points out these cuts and terminations have occurred before:

“The cuts are being imposed before the U.S. has even concluded its own long-awaited 180-day review of U.S. contributions to international organizations, and before Mike Waltz, president Trump’s nominee to lead the U.S. delegation at the U.N., has been confirmed by Congress and begins his work.”

So where does that leave the UN when it comes to trying to achieve the critical SDGs, Agenda 2030, the UN’s global development strategy:

“The 10th Edition of the Sustainable Development Report published just this past June features the updated SDG Index and Dashboards, which assess and rank all UN Member States on their performance across the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. It also introduces a new SDGi Index, focused on 17 headline indicators to measure overall SDG progress since 2015.”

“Despite these important gains”, as described by António Guterres Secretary-General of the United Nations, “conflicts, climate chaos, geopolitical tensions and economic shocks continue to obstruct progress at the pace and scale needed to meet the 2030 target. This year’s Sustainable Development Goals Report finds that only 35 per cent of SDG targets are on track or making moderate progress. Nearly half are moving too slowly and, alarmingly, 18 per cent are in reverse. We face a global development emergency.”

“Over 800 million people are trapped in extreme poverty and hunger. Carbon dioxide levels are at the highest in over two million years, and 2024 was the hottest year on record, surpassing the 1.5°C threshold. Peace and security have worsened, with over 120 million people forced from their homes, more than double the number in 2015. Meanwhile, debt servicing costs in low- and middle-income countries reached a record $1.4 trillion, squeezing resources needed for sustainable development.”

Likely all the nations will soldier on for the next five years at the UN trying to achieve the 17 goals. But let me make a suggestion. If implementation is the measure of success, maybe the preferred strategy for completing Agenda 2030 is to identify a priority group of SDG goals – a little like a return to the MDGs – but in this case say five goals. Then having chosen the ‘priority five’ the UN and all the members then put their collective energies on reaching the targets for those five goals. I would further suggest that the UN members choose, and then focus on this subset of five priority goals based, it seems to me, on those critical five where the data is most available and complete across all the members. The ‘priority five’ could enable national actors to track and report on implementation. Success could possibly then breed success. And if the UN and the national actors could accept that there was overreach with the 17 targets and Agenda 2030 – and course correct, well maybe success is still possible.

Anyway it’s a thought.

Epilogue: ProJune 26, 2025, marks 80 years since the signing of the UN Charter. The UN Secretary-General launched the UN80 Initiative to modernize the organization and address emerging global challenges.

This Post first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter. https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/crisis-and-reform-at-the-un

Multilateralism: No Longer a Crisis but Sadly, ‘Just Kinda Fading Away’

Posted on July 17, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

It has been labelled, ‘the crisis of multilateralism’ particularly as it targeted the UN and some of its specialized agencies, like the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) . But it seems to me, and I suspect to many other observers and experts that we are beyond just a crisis. With the return of Donald Trump we are witnessing the ‘fading away of multilateralism’. As noted in the WPR, Daily Review:

“Anyone who works on the U.N. or multilateral affairs more generally deserves a very long summer vacation this year. The past six months have wreaked havoc on the U.N. system, as the Trump administration has created enormous financial and political disruption. Many international officials will be heading to the beach unsure of whether they will have jobs by the end of the year due to U.S. funding cuts.”

Well, it is now 80 years in, yes 80 years since the creation of the UN. As pointed out by Richard Gowan who is currently the U.N. director at the International Crisis Group writing in FP:

“Today, the U.N. has 193 members, but amid ongoing bloodshed in Ukraine and Gaza and elsewhere, none of them—including the five veto powers in the Security Council—can pretend that it is succeeding.”

“The Trump administration has meanwhile plunged the institution, which has long been short on cash, into a financial crisis by withholding almost all funds for its activities. Secretary-General António Guterres has directed staff to slash the workforce by a fifth in 2026”

“Big U.N. humanitarian agencies such as the World Food Program, which are heavily reliant on U.S. support, are making even more drastic cuts. In private, very senior international officials speculate that the U.N. may go the way of the League of Nations.”

Well, that statement is rather depressing. So, what is the institution focused on? Well, according to Gowan:

“Diplomats lament the situation but note that their political masters in capitals have other priorities. Governments the world over are concentrating on how to deal with U.S. tariffs and evaluating how Washington’s policies will impact their security. Few have time to worry about multilateral affairs—or the appetite to pick a fight with Trump over second-order concerns in the U.N.system. Officials accept that, at a minimum, the organization will have to take the pain and do “less with less.”” …

“By some criteria, the U.N. has always been a disappointment. The crafters of the U.N. Charter, who proposed the organization at conferences in Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, envisaged an organization that would allow the big victorious powers that emerged from World War II—the United States, Soviet Union,China, Britain, and France—to police the world. That vision fell apart almost as soon as the U.N. started to operate, as the Cold War began and the European empires began to disintegrate.”

“One reason that U.N. members are tiptoeing around a broader debate on the organization’s future—in addition to competing priorities with the United States—is that they worry it would degenerate into another shouting match over how to allocate scarce resources to these priorities.”

Even in the face of such difficulties, and they are powerful, Gowan at least hopes there is a future. As he argues:

“Even when it comes to geopolitics, the organization still has a few continuing strengths that are worth recognizing and preserving.

First, it remains a space where the major powers meet, identify each other’s red lines, and bargain on a day-to-day basis at a time when other channels of communication are closed or difficult.”

And he concludes – and I think this is important – there is yet voice and possible progress:

“For the time being, it is necessary to accept that the United Nations will enter its ninth decade smaller and poorer than the past. It is certainly far less influential than its founders hoped. But if it can remain open as a channel both for major power bargaining and for smaller states to make their voices heard, then it will continue to have diplomatic value. If its operational arms can at least maintain services to the world’s neediest populations despite U.S. and other aid cuts, then it will help the vulnerable through a dangerous time.”

“As the U.N.’s members navigate a wildly uncertain world, they should at least aim to maintain some of the organization’s basic contributions to handling global disorder.”

That note of hope is important and I will return to what Gowan describes as “major power bargaining and for smaller states to make their voices heard”. There may yet be forward action; and we need to keep looking for it.

Then there is the dismantling of US aid and multilateral support. As pointed out by the Economist in an article on US foreign aid:

“First the guillotine’s blade fell. Now the death warrant must be signed. Almost as soon as Donald Trump took office for a second time he began defunding programmes he disliked. But under the constitution only Congress has the right to say how America spends its money. So Mr Trump has sent the legislature a “rescission” package, requesting that it claw back $9.4bn of spending that it had previously approved.”

“In 2023 America spent $80bn on foreign aid, including money for humanitarian assistance, development and healthcare. Americans think that they are more generous than they are. When pollsters ask them to estimate what proportion of its budget the federal government spends helping people abroad, the average answer is 26%. In reality it is about 1%, 0.25% of America’s GDP. But the money matters a lot to its intended beneficiaries. America contributes a significant share of the world’s foreign aid, including 40% of humanitarian aid. Reducing that will lead to the closure of some programmes and destabilise international organisations that administer the money, such as the World Health Organisation and World Food Programme.”

As I sit here today finalizing this Post, subject to some saving efforts – PEPFAR – The United States President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, for instance – the rescission bill seems destined to pass and be signed into law.

Finally, the Informals have not escaped the ‘Trump axe’. In this instance it is not so much funding, though that may happen as well, but action. The G20 is not scheduled to hold its Summit, this year in South Africa, until November 22-23rd. But that has not prevented the US from already being disruptive. The G20, as those who have read this Substack know, or have examined for instance the description of the G20 and its actions at the Global Summitry Project (GSP) website, the G20 is today a highly developed set of Ministerial gatherings, Task Forces, Working Groups and an elaborate set of Engagement Groups all working in some manner toward initiatives at the Summit. Well, key US officials, namely Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent have chosen to avoid attending their respective ministerial gatherings. Most recently is the Secretary of the Treasury. As pointed out by Colleen Goko and Kopano Gumbi at Reuters:

“Another no-show by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Donald Trump’s tariff threats and rising tensions between Washington and BRICS countries all look set to overshadow this week’s meeting of G20 finance chiefs in Durban, South Africa.”

“Several key officials including Bessent skipped February’s Cape Town gathering of finance ministers and central banks in the grouping, already raising questions about its ability to tackle pressing global challenges.”

Now Bessent, apparently, will skip this latest G20 finance and central bankers gathering. This has raised real concern about G20 progress. As described by Josh Lipsky, in this same Reuters piece, the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council:

“I think it’s problematic not to have the world’s largest economy represented at the table, at least at a senior political level,” said Josh Lipsky, chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council.”

“”It raises questions about the G20’s long-term viability,” said Lipsky, adding that Bessent’s absence foreshadowed U.S. plans for a slimmed-down, “back to basics” G20 when it assumes the grouping’s rotating presidency next year.”

We have had continuing discussions among Changing World Dialogue (CWD) colleagues over the impact of U.S. presence or absence for the G20 at South Africa and further the impact of the U.S. G20 hosting role which is set to occur in 2026. I suspect the impact on both is a function of just how disruptive the U.S. might be. Yes, there is a real price to pay for U.S. absence and some think the Informals cannot proceed without the U.S. Yet it seems to me, if the U.S. is determined to torpedo key subjects and possible progress on such issues as climate change or development financing then maybe we can live without it for now.

While I lean, if ever so slightly, to proceeding without U.S. attendance, if the U.S. is determined to be destructive and willful, well then without may be the preference. But for that to occur, it seems to me it can only occur if Major/Middle Powers – some of Canada, Australia, UK, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia or Brazil – are prepared to act collectively and to advance global governance action, at least for now, in plurilateral grouping. I and others have been trained on Major/Middle Power collective efforts. I must say to date there is little development to chronicle. That will need to change. Now, there’s the rub.

The Conclusion of the BRICS+ Summit: What are the Informals for?

Posted on July 9, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

Well the BRICS+ Summit is over. Some thoughts on the just concluded Summit as well as reactions to continuing Trump tariffs.

So the BRICS+ wrapped up earlier in the week. And it’s fair to ask – so what? But before we get to that, it’s impossible to avoid the all too apparent craziness of the Trump tariffs. It appears that Trump has chosen to resort to letters to various trading partners announcing new tariffs, failing significant advances in so many tariff negotiations. As pointed out by Ishaan Tharoor the foreign affairs columnist and anchor of Today’s WorldView at WAPO:

“President Donald Trump threatened to impose tariffs of between 25 percent and 40 percent on imports from 14 countries, including Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Bangladesh, unless they address his concerns over perceived bilateral trade imbalances.”

After the Rio de Janeiro Declaration became public on Sunday, Trump turned his ire on at least the BRICS+ members. As Trump wrote at Truth Social:

““Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an ADDITIONAL 10% Tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy,””

Trump then repeated and widened his tariff threat the following day. As described by Anusha Rathi, Editorial Fellow at Foreign Policy:

“Trump on Tuesday also reiterated his threat to impose 10 percent tariffs on BRICS member nations, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and five other countries, accusing them of being “anti-American” and of trying to destroy the U.S. dollar. At the end of the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro over the weekend, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said the world doesn’t need an “emperor,” referring to Trump’s threat.””

Meanwhile, the Trump tariff demands roll on. As described at CNN by John Liu and Matt Egan:

“President Donald Trump said at least seven countries can expect tariff letters on Wednesday morning, as he ramped up pressure on nations to strike deals with the United States by saying his new August 1 deadline would not be extended.”

“The announcement came as Trump vowed to slap a 10% levy on imports from the BRICS group of emerging economies, revealed plans for a 50% tariff on copper imports and threatened a massive 200% import tax on pharmaceuticals, renewing uncertainty for the global economy and markets – which have already experienced months of volatility.”

““A minimum of seven” tariff notices will be sent out to American trade partners Wednesday morning, Trump said on Truth Social Tuesday, adding that “an additional number of countries” would receive letters in the afternoon. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told CNBC earlier on Tuesday that 15 to 20 letters are expected to be sent over the next two days.””

At least today, Trump writes on Truth Social platform it will all happen by August 1st:

“Trump said on Tuesday that there will be no further extension of the deadline. “All money will be due and payable starting AUGUST 1, 2025 – No extensions will be granted,” he posted on Truth Social. That marked a shift in tone from his comments the previous day that the August 1 date was “firm” but also “not 100% firm.””

But then as we have seen in the past a deadline is not necessarily a deadline to Donald Trump.

Turning to the BRICS+ Informal, What are we to make of the gathering and the role the members see for this Informal? Its origins are as early as the G20 leaders summit. And as we noted in the earlier Substack Post, “Finding Success for the BRICS+” we have seen a significant enlargement of the Informal with at least 10 members, maybe 11 – it is unclear whether Saudi Arabia accepts membership, and now additionally, 10 partners.

Commenting on the Kazan Summit hosted by Russia in 2024, Alexandra Sitenko at IPS recently wrote:

“Last year’s BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, was clearly aimed at demonstrating the growing political and economic influence of the group of states. This was evident, among other things, in the admission of new full members and the discussion about setting up alternative international payment and trading platforms.”

There was a view coming out of the Russian Kazan Summit, according to Christopher Sabitini at Chatham House, just prior to the BRICS+ that the leadership of BRICS+, namely China and Russia, that the significant expansion could serve to make it [the BRICS] anti-western:

“The risk was the body would be turned into an anti-American forum, doing the bidding of China and Russia. For many, the later 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, hosted by Vladimir Putin, reinforced the perception that the bloc had become a platform to challenge the Western order – even as democratic Indonesia joined the group.”

Expectations for the Brazilian Summit were always somewhat guarded. Importantly, leaders from the two major powers, Russia and China had chosen to forego attendance this year in Brazil: Putin because of an outstanding international arrest warrant for Russian actions in the Ukraine conflict and China’s, Xi Jinping not so obviously though it was thought he’d met with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil twice in the recent past.

The general conclusion from the gathering and the joint Declaration is that Lula was able to stay away largely from geopolitical issues. As my colleague Oliver Stuenkel, an Associate Professor at the School of International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo, Brazil wrote in FP on the conclusion of the Summit:

“This year’s BRICS leaders’ summit was relatively subdued compared with recent meetings of the bloc, which underwent a rapid expansion and recently added several new members. But the event, held on Sunday and Monday in Rio de Janeiro, still managed to attract U.S. President Donald Trump’s ire.”

“In an attempt to avoid tariff threats from Trump, host Brazil emphasized issues such as economic development and climate rather than more contentious topics, such as the use of local currencies in intra-BRICS trade.””

“The 16,000-word summit declaration released on Sunday was in large part boilerplate. Just like previous BRICS documents, it contained a strong defense of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. It detailed technical matters involving ties between people, bureaucracies, businesses, and civil society in BRICS member countries. The declaration also called for inclusive artificial intelligence governance that respects the regulatory needs and autonomy of the global south.”

“On Sunday night, however, Trump posted on Truth Social threatening an additional 10 percent tariff on any country “aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS.” The brief post did not clarify whether the threat extended only to the bloc’s members or whether its partner countries should also be on notice. The statement was particularly alarming for those BRICS countries and partners, such as China, India, and Indonesia, attempting to negotiate trade deals with Washington ahead of July 9, Trump’s initial deadline for imposing sweeping tariffs. (The White House announced on Monday that it would delay implementing those tariffs until Aug. 1 to give countries more time to negotiate.)”

Even in the face of such ‘trash talk’ from Trump, Brazil went out of its way to tamp down the tension as noted again, in the FP piece by Oliver Stuenkel. Such an effort was evident in a statement from Celso Amorim, a Brazilian diplomat who served previously as Minister of Foreign Affairs and also Minister of Defence:

“Amorim immediately sought to de-escalate: Trump’s “threats only show the need for an organization like the BRICS, which has the capacity to react, to meet and reach conclusions. … [BRICS] didn’t threaten the U.S. with anything.” A South African trade ministry spokesperson told Reuters that the country was not anti-American and remained interested in negotiating a trade deal with the United States.”

Back to Alexandra Sitenko at IPS, she concludes:

“The summit in Rio shows that the group is more economically relevant and politically present than ever before. As a platform for the Global South, BRICS could contribute to a rethink of global governance in the medium term. In this regard, the Rio summit was a step towards a multipolar, non-confrontational world order.”

At the Brics Brasil, Maiva D’Auria, suggested that members remained committed to development:

“At the Summit, BRICS member countries reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and to defending international law, including the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter. The document also calls for the increased participation of developing countries, particularly those in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, in global decision-making processes and structures.”

It might be; but it might not be given the diversity of views held by this expanded membership. One thing I can say though is to the extent the BRICS and now the BRICS+ club was, and is, committed to development there is less than meets the eye. While Lula celebrated the tenth anniversary of the New Development Bank (NDB) with the presence of Dilma Rousseff, former Brazilian President, and currently the President of the NDB

Again from Brics Brasil, Mayara Souto writes:

“Lula underscored the significance of the New Development Bank (NDB) in the international debate on reforming global financial institutions, a thematic priority under the BRICS Finance track. He remarked that “our Bank is not merely a major institution serving emerging economies; it stands as evidence that a reformed financial architecture and a more equitable development model are possible.””

“NDB’s commitment to allocate 40% of its funding to sustainable development projects is aligned with the Climate Financing Declaration to be adopted at the BRICS Summit.”

The goals are of course praiseworthy and raising funds for climate change financing and global development are critical but the members probably can’t escape the need for ‘first mover action’ by the members and partners themselves to show real commitment in the face of the ‘Days of Trump’.

Image Credit: Brics Brasil

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-conclusion-of-the-brics-summit

Finding Success for the BRICS+

Posted on July 3, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

Just in time for the July 4th break here is the latest from Alan’s Newsletter. For my American friends – ‘A Good Fourth of July’

So the summits just seem to keep rolling along. Unlike the most recent summits, the G7 and NATO, the more immediate ones are without leaders and the most disruptive one of those – US President, Donald Trump.

Just concluded in Seville Spain is the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4). As noted by SDSN, The UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) which operates under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, and designed to mobilize a network to drive action on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change this summit gathering is designed to:

“This landmark convening offers a critical opportunity for Member States to advance crucial reforms to the Global Financial Architecture (GFA), the system of public and private finance that channels the world’s savings into investment.”

As described by IISD, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), an independent think tank:

“There are four categories of public goods that must be addressed in Sevilla. First, the UN member states must adequately finance the UN system itself.”

“Second, UN member states must increase their official financing of the Sustainable Development Goals in the lead-up to 2030, including debt relief as needed to create the fiscal space to achieve the SDGs.”

“These countries have delayed critical increases in International Monetary Fund quotas and Special Drawing Rights allocations.”

“Third, UN member states must increase their financing of the global commons, including the biodiversity of the world’s tropical rainforests, the marine life of the oceans, and the protection of the atmosphere, freshwater, soils, coastlines, wetlands, and other ecosystems from transboundary pollution and global-scale degradation.”

“Fourth, UN member states must agree on critical reforms of the international financial markets to ensure that world saving flows to the countries with the highest investment returns and the highest growth prospects – which are the poorer countries in the world. This is not the case today.”

What these objectives tell us at a glance is that the ‘system’ is still operating with blinders on when it comes to multilateralism and the prospect of policy advances through multilateral institutions. Today’s ‘system’ is not your classic multilateral system given we are in the midst of Trump 2.0. Indeed, these days it is more likely that Trump will withdraw US funds altogether as opposed to meeting the all too evident funding crisis for various UN agencies including the UN itself.

Meanwhile, we are already closing in on the next leader-led summit, the BRICS+ set to take place in Brazil and led by its president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula, for July 6th-7th. The BRICS has a longstanding and high profile emerging around the same time as the leader-led G7 Summit. The BRICS was seen in some ways as the – not G7 – meaning not made up of western allied leaders. As described by Mariel Ferragamo in a Background note at CFR:

“Established in 2009, BRICS was founded on the premise that international institutions were overly dominated by Western powers and had ceased to serve developing countries. The bloc has sought to coordinate its members’ economic and diplomatic policies, found new financial institutions, and reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar.”

The original membership was made up of: Brazil, Russia, India, China, hence the BRIC to become by 2011 the BRICS adding as a full member South Africa. The BRICS remained static until 2024 but then enlarged with:

Egypt.
Ethiopia
Iran
UAE
Saudi Arabia, though it has not fully adopted membership;
and in 2025, Indonesia

Argentina was also invited to become a full member but according to the CFR Backgrounder, “President Javier Milei pledged to turn the country in a pro-West direction, saying that it would not “ally with communists.”

Meanwhile, the BRICS created an additional category – this ‘partners’. The partners now include:

Belarus
Bolivia
Cuba
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Thailand
Uganda
Uzbekistan,
Nigeria and in June
Vietnam

Partner countries are invited to BRICS summits and other meetings, but their participation may be limited or contingent on consensus among full members.

There then are the current members and additionally the partners. But the question: what is the leadership role of the BRICS+? This remains unclear. As described by Feliciano Guimarães, international relations professor at the University of São Paulo (USP), and academic director at the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) he argues, in Valor International, … “the expansion of BRICS demands more diplomatic skill from Brazil to ensure that defense and security disputes don’t derail the bloc’s cooperation and global governance reform agenda.”

“Mr. Guimarães added that negotiations would already have been difficult without the Iran-Israel war, but that doesn’t mean the summit is doomed: “Yes, it’s gotten harder, but it’s unlikely Brazil will fail. Everyone—including Iran’s government—has an interest in Brazil’s success at this summit. Exposing President Lula to failure would be a major setback for BRICS.””

The membership expansion of the BRICS has left questions over the role of the group as you can read from Feliciano’s examination. What leadership role is possible for this diverse enlarged group, especially with major powers such as China and Russia and indeed also India? Can the BRICS group play a role in shaping global order relations as might the other contending global leaders summit, the G20? If so, how? Can the BRICS+ play a stabilizing role, or is it more likely to play a disruptive role in a heightened and possibly more fractious geopolitical environment?

For Brazil the current host, and its leader Lula, the role has become more fraught. As pointed out by Christopher Sabitini in his article for Chatham House titled, “Brazil’s BRICS agenda may be hard to accomplish after the Iran–Israel war”:

“But the Iran–Israel war – and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – will likely create dangerous distractions to an effective summit outcome along the lines that Brazil had hoped when it assumed the bloc’s presidency.”

On top of these conflicts, Lula, himself has suffered from poor numbers and rising discontent in the country as opposed to his much greater popularity in previous leadership episodes. As the Economist sees it:

“Originally, being a member had offered Brazil a platform from which to exert global influence. Now it makes Brazil look increasingly hostile to the West. The more China transforms the BRICS into an instrument of its foreign policy, and the more Russia uses the BRICS to legitimise its war in Ukraine, the harder it will be for Brazil to keep saying it is non-aligned,” says Matias Spektor of the Fundação Getulio Vargas, a university in São Paulo.”

“Brazil’s role at the heart of an expanded and more authoritarian-dominated BRICS is part of Lula’s increasingly incoherent foreign policy. He has made no effort to forge ties with the United States since Donald Trump took office in January. There is no record of the two men ever meeting in person, making Brazil the largest economy whose leader has not shaken hands with America’s president. Instead Lula courts China. He has met Xi Jinping, China’s president, twice in the past year.”

So where does this leave the BRICS+? Again, according to Christopher Sabitini at Chatham House:

“The risk was the body would be turned into an anti-American forum, doing the bidding of China and Russia. For many, the later 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, hosted by Vladimir Putin, reinforced the perception that the bloc had become a platform to challenge the Western order – even as democratic Indonesia joined the group.”

“Now comes the test: can a heterogenous BRICS+ grouping collectively and constructively promote Brazil’s brand of democratic multilateralism, respect for international law and measured reform of the international system? And can it serve as the fulcrum to facilitate the global rebalancing of economic, diplomatic, and normative power Brazil wants?”

“Much will hinge on whether the group can move beyond emptily opining on the Israel–US–Iran and Russia–Ukraine wars, to issues of more lasting, institutional consequence. Officially, Brazil is hoping to guide discussion toward concrete themes: the green energy transition, cooperation on vaccines, and expanding most-favoured nation status to all countries in the World Trade Organization.”

To add to Lula’s headaches, key leaders, namely Vladimir Putin, and far more surprisingly, Xi Jinping are not apparently going to attend the Summit. For Putin the international arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court is sufficient to keep him away. But the absence of Xi Jinping is more troubling as indeed this the first non-appearance at the BRICS for the Chinese leader. And Lula will have to deal with Iran and its determination to defend its position following the war with Israel and US bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites. As Christoper Sabitini suggests:

“Iran has announced that it will send a delegation, as will Russia. Their presence risks dragging the summit away from Brazil’s agenda towards issuing statements in defence of national sovereignty – a theme pointedly skirted before by BRICS member states when raised in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”

Nevertheless, Mihaela Papa, the director of research and principal research scientist at the MIT Center for International Studies, where she leads the BRICS Lab. and Walter Streeter of the Fletcher Forum see the BRICS+ this way:

“As the BRICS group prepares for its July 2025 summit in Brazil, a new map of global alignment is emerging—one driven not by military alliances or ideology, but by a push for new partnerships in pursuit of multilateralism, trade and development.”

“Now, with Washington further retreating from key international institutions and U.S. tariffs unsettling global markets, BRICS has moved into the global spotlight, positioning itself as the new champion of multilateralism.”

“From its outset, BRICS has stood on two pillars: the determination to chart an independent course and the drive to invest in new international institutions.”

“BRICS already committed to deeper financial cooperation at the bloc’s 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, creating a cross-border settlement system and strengthening banking and financial markets infrastructure. The 2024 summit also tasked BRICS finance officials with considering and reporting on the use of local currencies, payment instruments and settlement platforms. These efforts, coupled with deeper engagement with BRICS+ countries and realignment of supply chains, further help reduce reliance on the dollar.”

Such a move away from the dollar has raised the ire of President Trump who has threatened serious tariffs if the BRICS threatens the US reserve currency position.

So what will constitute a measure of success for Brazil in its BRICS hosting? I asked my good colleague Gregory Chin at York University, and a close observer especially of the BRICS, New Development Bank – see his article in Global Policy, “Introduction – The evolution of New Development Bank (NDB): A decade plus in the making”. Now one aspect he mentioned will not occur: that is the attendance of leaders from key members Russia and China. But then he suggests:

“One substantive goal of the Brazilian authorities for their BRICS Presidency is to advance a shared intra-BRICS global climate agenda — the “BRICS Climate Leadership Agenda”, plus a “BRICS Leaders’ Framework Declaration on Climate Finance”. If a joint statement on each can emerge from the Rio Summit, and some actions ensue, it would constitute success for the summit.”

Well there then from my good colleague is a measure of BRICS+ Brazilian success. Let us see how it goes; and I will return to the BRICS+ after the Summit.

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/finding-success-for-the-brics

Image Credit: Ricardo Stuckert

NATO – the Continuing Course of ‘Trump-driven Summitry’

Posted on June 26, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

So the ‘24 hour’ summit parade – or should I say the Trump performance spectacle – continues. We saw his 24 hour star performance at the G7 Summit at Kananaskis – kept in line by Canada’s new prime minister Mark Carney; and now we played the audience to the 24 hour NATO summit choreographed by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.

And now to his ‘star performance’ in the Hague at the NATO Summit. The event as we found out was finely tuned by the Secretary-General Mark Rutte including ending it after just 1 day to avoid, I presume, having Trump loudly leave the gathering early. Now in no way do I want to be dismissive of Rutte’s really excellent framing for the meeting. The marshalling of support was clearly described by our friends at the NYTimes:

“Mr. Rutte is skilled at handling Mr. Trump and has no embarrassment about flattering him. In an unusually unctuous message that Mr. Trump released on Tuesday, Mr. Rutte praised him for making Europe “pay in a BIG way” on increased military spending and for his “decisive action in Iran, that was truly extraordinary, and something no one else dared to do.””

“To try to ensure a smooth summit, Mr. Rutte said: “Donald, you have driven us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe, and the world,” getting allies to commit to spending 5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. “You will achieve something NO American president in decades could get done,” Mr. Rutte added. NATO officials confirmed that the message, which Mr. Trump posted on social media, was authentic.”

The self congratulation was all about the commitment to raise defense spending demanded by Trump. And to be fair, objectively Trump’s insistence on greater defense spending efforts by NATO members was long overdue, especially in the light of continuing Russian actions against Ukraine and worries by Eastern European countries close to Russia. But even the agreement to move to 5 percent of GDP had a ‘sleight of hand’ at play as pointed to by the The Economist:

“The solution was two-fold. One trick was to stretch the timeline for meeting the target. Many states had pushed for 2032, with steady annual increases to get there. Others, though, under greater fiscal pressure—and not just Spain—pushed for 2035. In the end, regrettably, the laggards won, though allies are supposed to submit annual plans showing a “credible, incremental path” to the target, and will be subject to a bigger review in 2029.”

“The problem is that Russia is rebuilding its armed forces faster than previously thought. It had been assumed that it would take Russia seven years after any ceasefire in Ukraine to reconstitute its forces to the level needed for a confrontation with NATO. “The general assessment now should be five years,” one senior NATO official told The Economist. “Let’s not kid ourselves,” complains Dovile Sakaliene, Lithuania’s defence minister, suggesting that Russia could attack before the new spending turned up. “2035 is after the [next] war.””

Well kinda pandering but otherwise NATO leaders would likely have faced a growling and very unhappy Trump. The victim here, though, Ukraine. The Hague Summit Declaration is all of 5 paragraphs. And buried in paragraph 3 is the following:

“Allies reaffirm their enduring sovereign commitments to provide support to Ukraine, whose security contributes to ours, and, to this end, will include direct contributions towards Ukraine’s defence and its defence industry when calculating Allies’ defence spending.”

So, no clear condemnation of Russian aggression, no heartfelt declaration of support and determination to provide weapons needed by Ukraine, no upping sanctions but rather a tie in to the overall agreed spending increase by all NATO nations – skip Spain – to 5 percent of GDP. Wow. Steven Erlanger, the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, at the NYTimes underscored the muting of Ukrainian support:

“But it [the Declaration] makes no mention of NATO’s promise of eventual membership to Ukraine and Georgia, as previous summit communiqués have done. Past commitments, Mr. Rutte has explained with some exasperation, are considered settled and do not need to be repeated.”

So, Trump has succeeded in contorting – or at least reshaping – the Nato Summit to mirror and match his, Trump’s interests and quite frankly that is it. As pointed out in WPR:

“That solicitousness is in some ways understandable. During his first term, Trump made no effort to hide his disdain and even hostility toward the alliance, which he has portrayed as a way for wealthy European states to freeride on U.S. defense spending, with little to no benefit to Washington. Moreover, Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on his commitment to Article 5. And when it comes to the principal threat now facing the alliance’s European members—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—Trump has adopted many of Moscow’s talking points, while curtailing U.S. support for Kyiv.”

And as for Article 5 – the collective security provision for the NATO members – the ‘heart’ of the alliance – with Trump at the helm I wouldn’t really want to put it to the test.

Indeed as the Economist somewhat startlingly described it relying on the words of Nato’s Mark Rutte:

“The tone was that of a parent congratulating a toddler. “Donald, you have driven us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe and the world,” wrote Mark Rutte, the secretary-general of NATO, in a text message to Donald Trump, America’s president. Europe is going to pay in a BIG way, as they should, and it will be your win.””

So what is the state of alliance relations following this seeming Trump ‘love fest’. Here is how WPR described the current state of alliance relations:

“Neither Trump’s calls for increased European defense spending nor European calls for increased strategic autonomy were anything new. But the sense of being under threat from both the east, in the form of Russian revanchism, and the west, in the form of U.S. retrenchment, for a moment seemed to create an urgency that was unprecedented.”

In the end Trump seemed satisfied by it all. Why wouldn’t he be. But a rather more insightful view was expressed by the President of the Czech Republic and recorded in the NYTimes:

“The president of the Czech Republic, Petr Pavel, a former general, put it well last week when he summarized his outlook for the summit.

On the one hand, he said, expectations for the summit are high, especially for new targets for military spending, but the goals are also limited because of the U.S. administration’s “approach.””

Great fanfare; much Trump performance; but far less than meets the eye.

This Post first appeared at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/nato-the-continuing-course-of-trump

Image Credit: France24

From EAF – ‘Trump’s disruption in Canada leaves the G7 at a crossroads”

Posted on June 22, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

Sorry for the Post’s delay. The following is a Post prepared for the East Asia Forum (EAF) on the recently concluded G7 Summit hosted by Canada in Kananaskis. It appeared today at EAF Sunday June 22, 2025.

Trump’s disruption in Canada leaves the G7 at a crossroads

Still in Search of Middle Power Leadership

Posted on June 11, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

In a world of continuing geopolitical tensions, myself and colleagues from CWD have been determined to probe into the role(s) of Middle Powers (MPs) and to describe Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) all in the hopes of uncovering how MPs might assist in stabilizing international relations and the current global order.

Back in December I took my first crack at the subject with this Alan’s Newsletter Substack Post – ‘A Start on Middle Powers and Their Diplomacy’. Also, CWD, then ‘China-West Dialogue’ and now, perhaps, ‘Changing World Dialogue’ called on some of our expert compatriots to examine MPs and MPD in a variety of settings.

As I wrote then:

“So, where did we look? We in fact used the fall of 2024 to showcase a number of possible MPs and to examine the policies and political behaviors followed. At CWD we held the following Zoom sessions:

· Our lead off was on Japan with Mike Mochizuki (GWU) as the Lead Organizer;

· then Active Non-Alignment with Latin America, led by Jorge Heine (BU) and former Ambassador for Chile as the Lead Organizer;

· South Korea with Yul Sohn (Yonsei University) as the Lead Organizer;

· Turkey with Guven Sak (Tepav) as the Lead Organizer;

· Australia and New Zealand with Shiro Armstrong (ANU/EAF) as Lead Organizer assisted by our own Richard Carey (OECD Alumnus); and

· Indonesia and ASEAN with Maria Monica Wihardja (ISEAS) as the Lead Organizer.”

Why focus on these global order actors? Well, as I suggested at the time:

“Then we were interested in what influence, or potential influence these MPs expressed in the growing global order/disorder – growing tensions between the United States and China and the unremitting regional conflicts in the Middle East and Europe. Where, if anywhere, were MPs influencing international relations and enhancing, perhaps, international stability and advancing global governance actions especially in such critical areas as climate transition, climate finance, debt management, global financial regulation and more? These efforts, we anticipated, could stabilize global relations in the face of current damaging international actions and the sour relations held by the leading powers, China and the US. We were determined to look at MPs, especially with the return of a US Trump administration and the possible significant impact of Trump 2.0 on global order stability.”

This past weekend I was reminded of MP presence and action in a piece in the Toronto Star by a colleague from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, Joseph Wong. These days Joe teaches at the Munk School but he also serves as Vice President International at the University. Just recently he wrote this piece titled, “Rise of the middle powers. Here’s how Canada can wean itself off of U.S. dependence”. Wong’s focus, not surprisingly, was on Canada and the role of MPs in shaping the global economy and strengthening democratic practices but Joe saw Canada’s actions in the face of Trump 2.0 as part of a larger MP picture to weaken the negative impact of major powers in the larger global order. As he wrote:

“As leaders of the G7 countries prepare to meet in Kananaskis next week, middle power nations, such as Canada, need to step up and take on leadership roles in restructuring the global economy, shoring up democratic practices internationally and investing in talent to boost productivity and innovation at home.”

“The simultaneous efforts by industrial economies to diversify their foreign economic relations have the potential to restructure the world economy. Each of these economies on its own may be a middle power, but together, they represent a sizable portion of the global economy.”

“Imagine if each of these middle powers reduced their trade dependence on the U.S.by just 10 per cent and made up that deficit by solidifying alternative trade partners and building up new and more resilient supply chains. Together they could collectively rewire the circuitry of the global economy for the long-term.”

So the Wong piece was a reminder of the potential influence of yes, MPs. And my on again off again MP focus was reignited. It is evident as this Post unfolds that MP action is on the minds of many of my colleagues as we see the aggressive policies of Trump 2.0. Mathias Jobelius, the Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s office in New York just recently wrote a piece that examined the undermining of the key multilateral institution the UN now entering its 80^th year. Jobelius assessed the state of multilateralism in an IPS piece, titled: “Unfinished Business”. In that piece he raised the question of whether multilateralism could continue to exist in an emerging multipolar world. He answered in the positive and declared this:

“The answer is ‘Yes’. The basics are all in place. The overwhelming majority of countries would like a rules-based order and support the principles of the UN Charter, even if they resist its selective application.”

And how could this be achieved, Jobelius turned to MPs:

“This needs to be utilised — for example, by creating an alliance of medium-sized powers. If 20 large middle powers from all continents with a commitment to multilateralism were to join forces, they would carry enough weight to counter the big power politics and strengthen the multilateral order.”

Continuing the MP narrative, my colleague Bruce Jones from Brookings and a number of his compatriots, Ravi Agrawal, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Karin von Hippel, Lynn Kuok and Susana Malcorra identified the critical role for such MPs in a piece these authors, did for the World Economic Forum (WEF) White Paper compendium titled: “Shaping Cooperation in a Fragmenting World” that was published in January 2024. Their chapter, is titled, “Global Security “Cooperation” in an age of distrust and insecurity: Managing distrust and forging responses despite it necessitates new approaches that include establishing new partnership mechanisms”. In the piece they acknowledge the growing conflict in the international system:

“The international system has never been free of violence and inequity. Yet today, as violence is rising, order is eroding and the spectre of nuclear war is casting its menacing shadow, greater urgency – and creativity – is needed to reduce the risk of conflict.”

Part of their solution as offered in the piece includes the creation of a an institution that is built in part on MPs, what they describe as a “middle/major powers” grouping – an M-10 (or similar), as these authors call it. And what is that:

S“At this moment of intense need, a standing mechanism that links the western major and middle powers with the non-Western ones (Brazil, India, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, etc.) would create a diplomatic mechanism that could straddle the increasingly bifurcated worlds of the G7, Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and the expanded BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, plus newly admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).”

“The proposed grouping – a kind of “coalition of the capable” – would have the diplomatic flexibility and heft to raise the costs to the great powers for actions or behaviour that seriously undermined the multilateral order and the quiet diplomatic channels to help find de-escalatory off-ramps and similar mechanisms.”

“Within this, there should be a “middle powers mediation group” on issues like Russia/Ukraine. Unlike the various unilateral peace initiatives attempted to date, a middle-powers grouping with cross-regional representation would have the diplomatic weight, the range of perspectives and the combined geopolitical clout to change the terms of debate around viable pathways to war termination and a stable peace.”

So, MPs could as they see it buttress the impaired multilateral system. Good and sensible ideas but yet we do not see such initiatives at least in this moment of the global order. Unfortunately, in fact, there are MP initiatives that have not ‘taken off’ as I found out. Let me just mention one that seemed significantly promising: the ‘Alliance for Multilateralism’. I was quite taken with this initiative and focused on it in my chapter in Lim Wonhyuk’s edited volume for Brooking’s, Unfinished Transformation: Domestic Politics and International Relations since the Covid-19 Pandemic”. at that time with my chapter, “The Possibilities for “Effective Multilateralism” in the Coming Global Order”. The initiative seemed to me as a major MP effort. As I then described it in the chapter:

(P. 124)* “What may be helpful, in fact, is a designation recently proposed by the current French foreign minister, Jean Yves Le Drain, along with the German foreign minister, Heiko Maas. In 2019, these foreign ministers launched the new “Alliance for Multilateralism,” tied to the United Nations. The leaders and the participants in this alliance are not referred to as middle powers, but the host and cohost countries and the participants are all designated as “goodwill powers.” This designation emphasizes the collective action purpose of this contemporary multilateralism. There is no reference to “middle powers,” or powers generally, which, as I have just pointed out, is rather misleading in any case. Thus, “goodwill powers” may be a useful term. We will come back to the idea of goodwill powers as we explore “effective multilateralism” in the final section.”

(P. 127) “Let us return for a moment to the Alliance for Multilateralism. It appears as yet to be another instance of effective multilateral effort in the contemporary global order. As pointed out above, this initiative was launched by the foreign ministers of France and Germany. Its initial meeting was on April 2, 2019, in New York during the German UN Security Council Presidency. It was followed by a meeting on September 26, held during the High-Level Week at the UN General Assembly. The meeting was called by Germany and France and was cohosted by Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore, and Ghana. Forty eight countries participated in this September gathering.”

(P. 128) “The goals, as declared by the Alliance, are:

· to protect and preserve international norms, agreements and institutions that are under pressure or in peril;

· to pursue a more proactive agenda in policy areas that lack effective governance and where new challenges require collective action; and

· to advance reforms, without compromising on key principles and values, in order to make multilateral institutions and the global political and economic order more inclusive and effective in delivering tangible results to citizens around the world.

The Alliance also makes a point of identifying its outreach to nonstate actors as stakeholders and partners for the challenges the Alliance faces. The Alliance has held four meetings since its creation. These gatherings sought to promote, among other things:

· improved governance for the digital world. The Alliance bolstered support for the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace;

· implementation of international humanitarian law to protect the work of humanitarian workers and space for humanitarian action and support for the fight against impunity, at the opening of the session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva on February 24, 2020; and

· support for the central role of the World Health Organization in the management of COVID19.”

The Alliance for Multilateralism seemed like a dramatic instance of real world MP action and MPD. But it appears as though the network did not survive its initiation.

I suspect, and others seem to suspect as well that the Informals – the G7, the G20 and the BRICS+ – might provide the environment for possible MP action. And indeed just as I was finishing off this Post – sorry for this rather unusually lengthy Post – I was met with a piece that does exactly that. So my good colleague John Ikenberry from Princeton and some of his colleagues, Victor Cha, from CSIS and Georgetown University and John Hamre from CSIS just published in Foreign Affairs, “How Global Governance Can Survive With the Right Reforms, the G-7 Can Sustain the Rules-Based Order.” There they see the prospect for global governance action from the G7:

“The body that develops solutions to today’s global problems must becomposed of governments that trust each other, share similar values,possess significant economic and political power, and have a trackrecord of working together. This is where the G-7 comes in.”

“But the G-7 can aim for meaningful action that sustains global order. By coordinating their economic, development, security, energy, and technology policies, its members can impose sanctions to deter conflict, set rules and norms to keep pace with technological innovation, punish predatory economic behavior, support democratic governance, combat disinformation, and help the developing world with food security and labor standards.”

The problem, however, as I see it in their focus on the G7 is that their hope for such action requires altering the current membership and the ways that it currently operates. As they say:

“Before they can play this role, however, the G-7 must be overhauled.”

It seems to me that effective action by MPs or MPs plus some major powers possibly can only occur on an informal basis otherwise we are back to, dare I say it, UN reform. Realistically, changes of the sort proposed by John and his colleagues are unfortunately unlikely to happen. Still a focus on the Informals with the G7 occuring on June 15-17th in Canada, the BRICS+ Summit scheduled for July 6-7th in Rio de Janeiro and G20 Summit in Johannesburg on November 22-23rd, all are worth watching closely for signs of MP and possibly beyond MP collective action. We will certainly be watching and reporting.

The Post appeared originally at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/still-in-search-of-middle-power-leadership

*The page numbers are used here as there is no digital version of the Lim Wonhyuk volume, as I mentioned in an earlier Substack Post.

Leadership, or Possibly Plurilateral Collective Action? Hmmmm

Posted on June 5, 2025 by Alan Alexandroff

We’ve been raising over recent Posts, well at least one, the evident diminishing of multilateralism in today’s global order – with consequences of course. We’ve raised the concern that many, if not most of the formal multilateral institutions starting with the UN and the IFIs and the many specialized agencies have struggled to advance global governance policies. I have been contemplating this since my Substack colleague Peter Singer wrote a Post (‘UN leadership: relentlessly focused on results?’) followed up with another Post, ‘How Should Bill Gates Spend $200 Billion?’ Especially with the former Post, Peter targeted UN leadership – especially in light of upcoming leadership changes including a new Secretary General. In his Substack, ‘Global Health Insights’, he wrote:

“A key lever is leadership. Over the next three years, (at least) three major UN bodies will select (or elect) new leaders: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2025, the UN Secretariat in 2026, and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2027. The future of the UN may well hinge on whether these new leaders possess one crucial characteristic: a relentless focus on results.”

“Each of these organizations plays a vital role in advancing the UN’s mission, from tackling global poverty (UNDP) to global health (WHO), to peace and security and coordination of the UN system (UN). Yet despite their importance, the UN system has often struggled to deliver timely, measurable outcomes—an issue exacerbated by dwindling trust and funding. With Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) badly lagging and support for the UN increasingly under threat, the need for results-focused leadership is more urgent than ever.”

“The UN desperately needs leaders who are singularly focused on delivering measurable results. Without results, there is no trust; without trust, there is no funding. Results must be the cornerstone of any leadership candidacy.”

Now Peter has been much closer to some of these multilateral institutions than I have so I suspect he has seen leadership up close. But I still worry that national commitment to advance collective action remains the heart of the current global governance problem.

I was struck by this example, recently. This is the effort to conclude a Plastics Treaty. A multilateral agreement on such a Treaty was to have been concluded at Busan Korea last year. It wasn’t. So let’s take a look. Patrick Schroeder is now at Chatham House in the UK, and before that a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex and even earlier he was based in Beijing, where he worked extensively on development cooperation programmes for the European Union and climate change initiatives with the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) on the question of the Treaty. As Schroder pointed out in his piece at Chatham House, late in 2024 titled, “The failed Busan negotiations show good science and flexibility are needed to secure a plastics treaty”:

“The Intergovernmental Negotiations Committee on Plastic Pollution (INC) had a clear mandate from the United Nations Environment Assembly in 2022 to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2024. However, the lengthy and complex process was marked by intense debates and competing national interests.”

The problem as he pointed out:

“In the final phase, two major country blocs emerged. A larger group of over 100 nations supported a comprehensive approach to end plastic pollution.”

This larger group sought to:

“… include limiting upstream production of plastic polymer feedstocks and harmful chemicals used in plastics, while not restricting the treaty’s scope to the sustainable design of products and waste management.”

But there was a smaller group:

“A smaller but influential bloc, consisting of fossil-fuel producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, resisted efforts to include measures regulating upstream production. This division created significant tension and stalled progress.”

“Production caps have been identified by scientists as a key mechanism to reduce plastic pollution. Modeling by the University of California Berkeley shows that a cap on global virgin plastic production at 2020 levels would yield a reduction of mismanaged plastic waste in 2050 from 121 to 72 Mt.”

The result according to Schroeder:

“A deadlock over the proposed Article 6 on production caps or reduction of primary plastics production has left the negotiations at an impasse that threatens meaningful progress.”

“The lack of willingness to compromise on both sides and inability to find common ground poses a significant risk to the effectiveness of the negotiations. Without a pathway to reconcile differing priorities, the risk increases of a fragmented agreement or outright failure.”

“Such rigidity not only delays progress but also erodes the spirit of collaboration necessary to tackle global challenges such as plastic pollution, setting a dangerous precedent for future negotiations on critical environmental issues.”

And now look at the continuing reporting of multilateral results for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As IISD reports for the annual High Level Panel Forum (HLPF) due this coming July:

“Titled, ‘Progress Towards the Sustainable Development Goals,’ the May 2025 report uses inputs from more than 50 international and regional organizations to assess progress made since 2015 against the global SDG indicator framework. It finds that the world is on track to meet or is making “moderate” progress on 35% of the 137 SDG targets with available data. It also shows that progress on 47% of the targets is insufficient, and 18% of the targets have regressed from the 2015 baseline. The report “reaffirms the imperative to intensify efforts to reverse these trends” in the five years that remain until the 2030 deadline.”

“To “reverse alarming trends and consolidate hard-won gains,” the report calls for urgent action around six “collectively agreed-upon” transitions to drive transformative change: food systems; energy access and affordability; digital connectivity; education; jobs and social protection; and climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution.”

“Highlighting sustainable development as a core pillar of multilateral cooperation, as reaffirmed by the Political Declaration of the 2023 SDG Summit and the 2024 Pact for the Future, the report underscores that “[s]ustained multilateral engagement is essential to keep the SDGs within reach.”

Is UN leadership the central issue – possibly, but the central focus does seem to me to lie with collective national action. And it may be that something less than full multilateral collective action may be a start to the answer. Thus a subset of the full multilateral group, a plurilateral group of members, could gather and agree amongst themselves on agreed percentage cuts to imports for these plurilateral members. Begin the process and aid in the transition away from plastics. And as for the SDGs, a plurilateral group of members could announce enhanced targets for the group of six “collectively agreed-upon” transitions. These are just two collective action moves. I am sure there are significant others and I would additionally suggest bringing on board as many of the G20 members – we know the Trump US will not – but others may act collectively and possibly initiate and commence action by significant subset of this key Informal.

Consensus needs to be set aside for the moment. For now in this fractured global order creative plurilateral effort is, I think, a key to moving collective global governance action. Action is required, and I anticipate, build on itself. It starts though with forward action even if we start with plurilateralism.

This orinally appeared as a Post at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/leadership-or-possibly-plurilateral

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