Responding to Disorder

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I have to start with the Biden press conference last night, of course. I wish Biden’s performance could allay concerns about his competence but, unfortunately, it was not good enough to do that.  Biden was certainly less combative than what was on display earlier but the stubbornness has not abated. And the mistakes remain. So, the Democrats are stuck for the moment.

Let’s turn now to the focus of this Post: coping with the disorder in the current international system and the real fear for the electoral outcome.

My close colleague, Yves Tiberghien, Professor of Political Science and the Konwakai Chair in Japanese Research, and also the Director of the Center for Japanese Research at the University of British Columbia put his finger on the stability/instability tension in the current global order. As he wrote recently for the Asia-Pacific Foundation:

In the current moment we are witnessing a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, with several dangerous hot spots and an acceleration of tit-for-tat dynamics.

The prime movers in this situation are China and the U.S., each animated and constrained by their domestic politics that sometimes limit their ability to deeply understand each other and engage in strategic, long-term calculations. The moves that each of them makes – which are usually framed as being defensive and reactive – are feeding a cycle of interactions that is transforming the region.

The central tension between the two leading powers is not aided by the current fallout from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the war in Gaza but the macro disorder is driven in the first instance by difficult US-China interests. And, it is because of the knotty interactions and the prospect for even greater bilateral tensions that so many of us are kinda ‘quaking in our boots’ over the impending national US elections. I was caught by the insight and ‘unexpressed’ emotion of one of the NYT’s most well known Opinion Columnists, Tom Freidman. He just recently wrote in the NYT, a piece titled: “The Devil May Be Enjoying This Election Season, but I Am Not”:

Both men running for president right now are unfit for the job: One is a good man in obvious cognitive and physical decline, and the other is a bad man who lies as he breathes, whose main platform is revenge — and who is in his own cognitive tailspin.

It kinda chills one’s ‘political soul’ when contemplating current US politics and policy.  It leaves open the prospect of dangerous international politics that demands effective Presidential leadership – which is exactly what seems to be missing in the current presidential contest. As Friedman writes:

At the same time, we are in the middle of defining the post-post-Cold War order, now that the U.S.-dominated post-Cold War order has come unstuck since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Managing a hostile Russia — aligned with an increasingly hostile China, aligned with malign actors like Iran and North Korea, and super-empowered nonstate actors like Hamas, the Houthis and Hezbollah — will take not only incredibly wise U.S. leadership but also a U.S. leader able to forge multiple alliances. The post-post-Cold War world can’t be managed by a lonely American superpower telling all its allies to spend more on defense or we will leave you to the tender mercies of Vladimir Putin.

Turning back to Yves Tiberghien for a moment, Yves identifies 3 hotspots in the current international scene: The Philippines, North Korea and Taiwan. Let me look at just one, what Yves identifies as the number one hotspot, the Philippines:

This is the top hot spot right now, and one without good safeguards or guardians. Some view it as perhaps the closest example in the region to a 1914 scenario. There is an urgency for talks between high-ranking officials in the U.S. and China talks, but the Biden Administration is distracted.

Now I will avoid any comparative historical references, – you know, it is just like World War I, or just like the Iraq decision etc.  I am not attracted to this form of analysis. And you should be careful as well. For my part having examined, rather long ago, the dramatically complex interactions and unique diplomatic actions of long ago political figures, including especially those political decisions leading up to World War I – thank you James Joll, these comparisons fail to attract me. The primary reason is most analyses comparing historical crises focus on the similarities but almost never examine the often dramatic differences in these historical comparisons. There are not only similarities but differences as well. And both must be examined, though they seldom are.

So let’s leave historical comparisons aside and let’s turn to a recent analysis. I was very pleased to see a just released piece by Ryan Hass in Foreign Affairs, titled: “Avoiding War in the South China Sea”. Ryan is from Brookings and is currently the Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center and he is also the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. Ryan served from 2013 to 2017, as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff. From what I know he retains links with many in the Biden Administration.

There are a number of valuable insights that Ryan conveys in the current problem. Let’s first start with the problem. The South China Sea (SCS) dispute arises over the Spratly Islands with ongoing territorial disputes among Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam concerning “ownership” of the Spratly Islands, a group of islands and associated “maritime features” (reefs, banks, and cays etc.) and strong positioning in the South China Sea. The central bully in this story is China that essentially claims all of the South China Sea.  Nevertheless, the others also maintain their individual country claims. In 1999 the Philippines ran an old vessel, the Sierra Madre aground on the Second Thomas Shoal. China initially demanded that the Philippines remove the vessel and has harassed the Philippine efforts to resupply the military personnel that remain on the vessel though to this point China has been unsuccessful in preventing Philippine resupply. As Ryan points out:

The risk remains high that an incident could result in the death of a Filipino soldier, potentially triggering the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty and bringing American and Chinese forces to the brink of conflict.

That is the heart of the problem for the US, China and the Philippines. Threading the needle is what it will take; and of course that is exactly what chills those of us looking at the current race for the presidency. But Ryan suggests a policy that enhances deterrence and limits what Yves described as ‘tit-for-tat’ actions.

For Washington, success is upholding the credibility of its alliance commitments, avoiding conflict with China, and preventing Chinese occupation of Second Thomas Shoal. Achieving these results will require Washington to weigh every policy decision against whether it does more to prevent or provoke a crisis. Second Thomas Shoal is a strategic challenge with a military dimension.

It is a touchy balance of maintaining commitment, and thereby deterring China and at the same time not giving full rein to the strategic – and not so strategic actions in the US and in fact in the Philippines,  to tip over into conflict. Reflecting this balance is Ryan’s positioning:

It is not a military problem with a military solution. Washington must resist pressure to frame this issue as a test of wills between the United States and China and instead leverage Beijing’s bullying at Second Thomas Shoal to strengthen its relationships in the region.

Given the conflicting imperatives of the three major participants, the United States will need to walk a tightrope. It cannot allow itself to beseen as passive in the face of Chinese pressure against its treaty ally. On the other hand, Washington must preserve its position as defender of the status quo, thereby sharpening the contrast with China’s revisionist attempts to alter the situation at Second Thomas Shoal.

It is, as Ryan points out, critically important to signal soundly to China, US commitment without creating reactive offense:

U.S. policymakers must resist the urge to turn Second Thomas Shoal into a contest of wills between the United States and China and urge Beijing to do the same. The more the standoff becomes publicly framed as a showdown between great powers, the more likely that nuclear-armed rivals could find themselves in a nose-to-nose confrontation over a rusting boat.

And I think sensibly Ryan urges the following:

Washington should enlist as many concerned countries as possible to privately counsel Beijing against further escalation. Greater engagement by more actors, especially the Southeast Asian states that Beijing seeks to pull closer, will make the current dispute seem less like a binary clash between the United States and China.

The United States’ best option for limiting risk is to chart a middle path between succumbing to a military test of wills and putting pressure on the Philippines to give in to Chinese pressure. Conflict is possible, but far from preordained.

All this examination underscores the complexity and careful steps required to contain tit-for-tat US-China actions that could lead to a security disaster. It is hard now not to contemplate the worst with either crazy Trump, for sure but now possibly a seriously diminished Biden. We can only hope that the presidential outcome is not as currently predicted.

Image Credit: Al Jazeera

 

What is Needed for MPD Success?

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It is really not possible to begin this Substack Post without a quick glance at the first US Presidential debate of 2024. It was ugly. It was a tough night, especially for President Biden but I will let the political pundits to have their say.

Now to the  subject of this week’s Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter – a focus on Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) and the capacity of Middle Powers to drive global governance activities. We start with an examination first on multilateralism. There is a strong logic to this starting point given we are beginning by targeting the institutional apex of the international multilateral system – the UN and its agencies. This introduction is also understandable given that the UN will, this September, complete a UN summit cycle which I have referenced in past Substack Posts. This UN summit cycle commenced in 2023 with the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals) Summit and it will complete with the critical Summit of the Future (SoTF) this September in New York with the finalization and issuing of the Pact for the Future. In preparation for the UNGA 79th edition, and its opening gathering of Heads of State and Government for  the SoTF, and as described by IISD, the UNGA has elected its newest President:

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) has elected, by acclamation, Philemon Yang, former Prime Minister of Cameroon, to serve as President of its 79th session. His tenure will be guided by the theme, ‘Unity in diversity, for the advancement of peace, sustainable development and human dignity for everyone everywhere.’

And with the usual optimism and urgency the new President declared:

I am convinced that through dialogue, through consensus, talking together and looking to the future together, we can solve problems,” Yang said speaking to journalists following the elections.

Yang underscored the continuing multilateral wish:

Outlining the thrust of his Presidency in his vision and mission statement, Yang describes the UNGA as the highest, most representative deliberative body at the global level, which serves as “the lone forum where, based on sovereign equality, States in their diverse opinions meet to jointly seek solutions” through the free expression of diverse convictions, opinions, interests, and  approaches.

To preserve peace, promote sustainable development and protect the planet,” Yang underscores, “the international community should ensure that the objectives jointly set by Member States… are achieved.” According to his statement, the need to fast-track the measures to be taken by the UNGA to ensure the effective implementation of mutual commitments will be one of Yang’s priorities.

The collective effort is heartfelt without question but after the last several decades it has to be accepted as wishful thinking, nothing more. I don’t know how else to describe the effectiveness of the UN.

If formal institutional multilateral action has faltered in the growing international disorder: the rising tensions between the two great powers US and China, and recourse to aggression in the Russian war on Ukraine,  and the Hamas-Israel Gaza war, then where can the global order firm up international stability and advance collective efforts?  Where can the  global order save the planet and improve collective efforts in critical areas of global finance, cybersecurity and AI just to mention three critical subjects?

In our discussions and work at the China-West Dialogue (CWD) we have examined MPD with growing positive reflection and a nod to Middle Power action in the face of weakened multilateral progress. The CWD lead Co-Chair, Colin Bradford has pivoted to an examination of MPD. He does this in a recent article, “Toward a New Era in Global Relations: The Potential of  Middle Power Diplomacy” in the 2024 Global Solutions Summit edition of  Global Solutions Journal. Now almost without exception raising the MPD configuration immediately encourages a discussion over what is, and what is not, a Middle Power. We found that out in one of our recent CWD gatherings. As fun as that discussion can be there is no real conclusion to it and I would note that Colin has avoided that seemingly inevitable discussion by targeting the G20. As Colin points out, the G20 consists of the following:

The 9 EMPs [emerging market powers] along with the 9 AIC [advanced industrial countries] MPs constitute a significant and diverse number of Middle Powers that have the potential to change the global landscape, if and as they choose to exercise global leadership in ways that cut across traditional groups, incorporate contradictory viewpoints and focus hard on practical policy issues and avoid ideological polemics and geopolitical theatrics.

From the start, then, Colin turns his MPD focus on the role of those Middle Powers in the G20 and more particularly the series of immediate G20 presidencies beginning with Indonesia in 2022, followed in 2023 by India, Brazil in 2024, and South Africa in 2025. As he writes:

The argument in this paper is that, as a result, 2024 could be a year of opportunity for advancing global governance in addressing global challenges by capitalizing on latent, underlying global political dynamics to tee up a new era in which global governance can advance, even as systemic competition continues between the US, China, and Europe. … The Brazilian and South African G20 presidencies during 2024 and 2025, with the US to follow in 2026, could become pivotal focal points for the transition to a new era in global relations in which middle-power diplomacy demonstrates the feasibility of advancing humanity’s quest for systemic sustainability, despite the necessary acceptance of geopolitical tensions as a reality.

What Colin then suggests is:

Middle Powers exist today and have agency and influence precisely because they are:

• Independently concerned with global threats and seek to play a role in addressing them rather than seeking a prominent role in international relations only as a projection of national strength and identity;

• Capable of self-interested contributions to global decision-making characterized by diversity of perspectives, competitive behaviors, and shifting coalitions of consensus rather than fixed allegiances based on normative values; and

• Basing their actions and behaviors in the international arena on national interests and pragmatic articulation rather than values which have resulted in ideological differences and confrontational tensions.”

And as he then concludes:

As these brief examples suggest, there could be a new global order based on secular interests, non-ideological formulations, and multiple sources of global leadership which interactively generate composite outcomes embodying contradictory but valid perspectives from different vantage points that move the world forward to addressing systemic global challenges in significant ways. This shift in the global political dynamic toward pluralism driven by middle power diplomacy does not inevitably lead to “a new global disorder”, but rather could become a more inclusive, integrated network of significant countries to drive global solutions, defining a new global order.

Middle power diplomacy is based on listening, learning, brokering, give and- get bargaining, inclusion, embracing diversity, being as comfortable with “difference” as with “like-mindedness,” understanding that “shifting coalitions of consensus” is better for global governance than fixed alliances and blocs, and adjusting pre-positioning by being open to enabling unexpected insights and different ways of seeing issues and opportunities to shift perceptions and change positions.

So Colin hones in on ‘pluralism’ and the impact of MIddle Power ‘coalitions of the willing’ in advancing global governance policies even in the face of geopolitical tensions. The diverse collective effort, it is presumed, can advance global governance policy.

This line of reasoning is underlined by Bob Carr and Gareth Evans, both former foreign ministers of Australia in an article titled, “Detente: Towards a balance of power between the USA and China”, identified by Colin and focused on Australian action in a competitive geopolitical environment. As these two former foreign ministers see it:

Lasting peace is always best achieved with others, not against them. Of course we have to prepare for worst-case scenarios, but it is in Australia’s interests to bring diplomacy back to centre stage, resist policies of containment and confrontation of China, and promote a political accord between the United States and China that could help ease tensions in the South China Sea and over Taiwan and the Korean peninsula.

Here then a further nuance of Middle Power action targeting Australia as an Indo-Pacific actor.  So it appears that there is a strong favoring of Middle Power action. It is a starting point but more needs to be fleshed out. While we can acknowledge pluralism and the construction of ‘coalitions of the willing’, where have we seen MPD in action especially in the face of great power interests that may not accord with the Middle Power goals. When does the dynamic of Middle Powers action draw together a coalition of the willing that ‘drives global solutions’? How does this dynamic gather and then advance policy? We need more on the mechanics of MPD.

More on that to come.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

 

Challenging Leadership and Stability in the Global Order

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There are some recent insights worth examining. These insights underscore the current difficulties of US leadership in the global order. There are at least three critical issues that challenge US foreign policy leadership today. These include: the ‘shadow of Trump’; the continuing primacy demand of US leadership; and the harm inflicted by current US economic policy making. All three and more undermine continuing US foreign policy leadership in a changing global order.

First there is the ‘shadow of a Trump return’ to the US presidency. As quixotic as the first Trump term was, it appears that this prior Trump term likely will be a pale shadow of how a second Trump presidency will conduct itself. There are strong indications that Trump will direct retribution on those such as the Justice Department that he believes undermined his first term as President. And there will be others. And his inconsistent nationalist-isolationist impulses will likely once again be on full display in his relations with NATO, Ukraine, Russia and China. Buckle up!  It could be very ugly. But meanwhile the shadow of his return has caused friend and foe alike to hedge their relations with the US allies, Global South and Middle Power players, and, of course, presumed foes.

So, that is one source of current harm to US leadership. Then there is the continuing determination by the Biden Administration to maintain the US sole superpower leadership role. This can also be read as the US hegemonic position in the global order. The dilemma of US leadership in a changing power order is all too evident. And it is likely to carry forward into the next administration whatever the political stripe it is.

We were alerted to this dilemma really some time ago and by none other than former National Security Advisor, H.R.McMaster. McMaster was appointed in 2017 by President Trump and after leaving office he wrote about his career in: “Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World”. There he raised the notion of ‘strategic narcissism”. While there is some contention over whether this concept was first voiced by the great international relations theorist, Hans Morgenthau, and McMaster raises that possibility, the point is the concept itself. Morgenthau did write an essay in 1978 called, “The Roots of Narcissism,” but McMaster in his book carried the concept forward in his description of ‘strategic narcissism’. For McMaster, ‘strategic narcissism’ was:

the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans.

I believe this concept and its elaboration helps us with a central concept in US foreign policy making. This framing aids us in understanding US approaches to leadership in international relations. That view was underlined in the recent piece by Ben Rhodes. It is well worth reviewing the insights provided by Rhodes in this very recent Foreign Affairs (FA) article. Rhodes has been directly involved in US foreign policy where from 2009 to 2017, he served as U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting in the Obama administration. He has been close to Democratic policymaking for a long time including being close with many in the current Biden Administration. As he wrote recently in the FA piece outlining what he sees as a needed reassessment of Democratic foreign policy making:

An updated conception of U.S. leadership—one tailored to a world that has moved on from American primacy and the eccentricities of American politics—is necessary to minimize enormous risks and pursue new opportunities. … Meeting the moment requires abandoning a mindset of American primacy and recognizing that the world will be a turbulent place for years to come. Above all, it requires building a bridge to the future—not the past.

In particular Rhodes points to the Trump ability in current presidential competition to build on the negative reaction to Democratic policy making in the period after the end of Cold War and the ‘triumph’ of US leadership:

Trump has also harnessed a populist backlash to globalization from both the right and the left. Particularly since the 2008 financial crisis,

large swaths of the public in democracies have simmered with discontent over widening inequality, deindustrialization, and a perceived loss of control and lack of meaning. It is no wonder that the exemplars of post–Cold War globalization—free trade agreements, the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and the instruments of international economic cooperation itself—have become ripe targets for Trump.

And these insights also alert us to yet another weakness in the international system – the fading of multilateralism, at least formal institutions. As Rhodes points out:

Second, the old rules-based international order doesn’t really exist anymore. Sure, the laws, structures, and summits remain in place.

But core institutions such as the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization are tied in knots by disagreements among their members. Russia is committed to disrupting U.S.-fortified norms. China is committed to building its own alternative order. On trade and industrial policy, even Washington is moving away from core tenets of post–Cold War globalization.

Even the high-water mark for multilateral action in the Biden years—support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia—remains a largely Western initiative. As the old order unravels, these overlapping blocs are competing over what will replace it.

Finally, and raised by Rhodes in his article is the Biden Administration’s turn away from free trade and access to the US market as others lower their barriers to freer trade. Protectionism has become rife under the Biden Administration guise of ‘industrial policy’ and such protectionism has been defended, I’d say promoted by Biden folks such as Jake Sullivan. As Sullivan argued early in the Administration, in fact before that in fact, he promoted quite loudly a policy for the middle class. As reported by Michigan State Representative Mari Manoogian, Sullivan urged:

In February 2021, national security advisor Jake Sullivan clearly defined the overarching theme of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy strategy as “foreign policy for the middle class.” The Chicago Council for Global Affairs contends that this Biden doctrine “recogniz[es] the linkages between American domestic strength and U.S. ability to maintain international competitiveness.” Under this new framework, foreign policy decisions, Sullivan indicated, would use the following simple rhetorical question as a basic metric for success: “Is it going to make life better, safer, and easier for working families?

But as FTs Martin Wolf has been loudly pointing out for some time in fact this is a strategy of trade protectionism cloaked within the frame of industrial policy all too frequently.  As Wolf recently wrote at his FT column:

Industrial policy works if it changes the structure of the economy in a beneficial direction. Unfortunately, there are well-known reasons why the attempt could fail. Lack of information is one. Capture by a range of special interests is another. Thus, governments may fail to pick winners, while losers may succeed in picking governments. The more money is on the table, the more the latter is likely to be true. … So, how should we assess this shift in US policy towards industrial policies, matched, on the Trumpian right, by a desire to return to the high tariffs of the late 19th and early 20th centuries?… The answer is that there are now at least three bipartisan positions: nostalgia for manufacturing; hostility to China; and indifference to the international rules that the US itself created. This, then, is a new world, one in which the international trading order could reach a breaking point quite quickly.

All of this is a dramatic threat to the stability and prosperity of the current global order.

Image Credit: E-International Relations

 

 

 

More than Just Sustaining the G7 – The G7 at 50

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The 50th annual G7 meeting was just held in Apulia Italy as leaders work, so they say, to coordinate economic policy in the context of rising geopolitical tensions. It  seems at this 50th G7 gathering, however, it is far more about geopolitics, and the shadow of Trump, than it is about global governance policy efforts.

The G7  leaders, the U.S., UK, Canada, Japan, Germany, Italy, and France have been tasked with host Italy to discuss in various sessions:  climate change, migration, and international development, as well as a discussion on AI led by Pope Francis. But that is not the ‘heart’ of summit discussions at this G7. It is rather discussions on Russia and the Ukraine War. Most pertinently, G7 leaders reached agreement to utilize Russia’s seized assets, most of which were frozen in the EU financial system, to provide a loan of up to $50 billion in support for Ukraine.

And there was a heavy emphasis, identified in the G7 Leaders’ Communique, of China. The Communique took on China for its continuing support for Russia. As noted by FT contributors Henry Foy and James Politi:

The joint statement at the end of their summit in Italy included a far tougher stance towards China than in the past, exposing the escalating frustration both in the US and Europe with Beijing’s critical support to Russia during the war in Ukraine.

 

We will continue taking measures against actors in China and third countries that materially support Russia’s war machine, including financial institutions, consistent with our legal systems, and other entities in China that facilitate Russia’s acquisition of items for its defense industrial base.  In this context, we reiterate that entities, including financial institutions, that facilitate Russia’s acquisition of items or equipment for its defense industrial base are supporting actions that undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine. Accordingly, we will impose restrictive measures consistent with our legal systems to prevent abuse and restrict access to our financial systems for targeted individuals and entities in third countries, including Chinese entities, that engage in this activity. We will take robust action against actors who aid Russia in circumventing our sanctions, including by imposing severe costs on all those who fail to immediately cease providing material support to Russia’s aggression and by strengthening domestic enforcement and stepping up our business engagement to promote corporate responsibility. We call on financial institutions to refrain from supporting and profiting from Russia’s war machine. We will take further steps to deter and disrupt this behavior.

Concluding on China, the FT suggested G7 leaders no longer underestimated China’s strategic actions toward Russia and economic ones toward all the G7 countries:

A second person familiar with the talks said: “The era of naivety towards Beijing is definitely gone now and China is to blame for that, honestly. … “China is everywhere in the G7, to be frank,” said a senior EU official. “The question we have is how to calibrate our actions to take in response.”

For analysts and officials the G7 Communique expressed much about taking on China and heightening the ‘new Cold War’ rhetoric. A good example,  David E Sanger of the NYT and author of New Cold War: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s  Struggle to Defend the West.

The point here is the noted diminishment,  if not outright absence of global governance policy expression and leadership. At the G7. Of course it is not that the leadership didn’t identify collective economic policy. How could it not in ever too long annual Statement – yes 36 pages – which started with a series of presumed priorities including a long list of notable global governance priorities:

Engaging with African countries, in a spirit of equitable and strategic partnership. As they work to deliver sustainable development and industrial growth for their people, we are advancing our respective efforts to invest in sustainable infrastructure, including through the PGII, and we launched the Energy for Growth in Africa initiative, together with several African partners.

 

Acting to enable countries to invest in their future and achieve the Sustainable DevelopmentGoals (SDGs), recognizing that reducing poverty and tackling global challenges go hand in hand.We are doing our part to achieve better, bigger and more effective Multilateral DevelopmentBanks, making it possible for the World Bank to boost its lending by USD 70 billion over the next ten years. We are calling for action from the international community to address debt burdens.

 

Reinforcing global food security and enhancing climate resilience, including by launching the Apulia Food Systems Initiative.  https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders- Communique.pdf 2

 

Reaffirming our commitment to gender equality. Together with International Financial Institutions, we will unlock at least USD 20 billion over three years in investments to boost women’s empowerment.

 

Taking concrete steps to address the triple crisis of climate change, pollution, and biodiversity loss, including by submitting ambitious 1.5°C aligned Nationally Determined Contributions. We will spearhead global efforts to preserve forests and oceans, and to end plastic pollution.

 

Affirming our collective commitment and enhanced cooperation to address migration, tackle the challenges and seize the opportunities that it presents, in partnership with countries of origin and transit. We will focus on the root causes of irregular migration, efforts to enhance border management and curb transnational organized crime, and safe and regular pathways for migration. We launched the G7 Coalition to prevent and counter the smuggling of migrants.

 

Deepening our cooperation to harness the benefits and manage the risks of Artificial Intelligence (AI). We will launch an action plan on the use of AI in the world of work and develop a brand to support the implementation of the International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems.

 

Fostering strong and inclusive global economic growth, maintaining financial stability and investing in our economies to promote jobs and accelerate digital and clean energy transitions. We also remain committed to strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system and to implementing a more stable and fairer international tax system fit for the 21st century.

 

Acting together to promote economic resilience, confront non-market policies and practices that undermine the level playing field and our economic security, and strengthen our coordination to address global overcapacity challenges.

But this was a gathering where Russia-Ukraine and then China’s support of Russia dominated, so we are told, leader discussions. As note by David Sanger in the NYT: 

But the change in views about China reached far beyond the questions swirling around an endgame in Ukraine. European countries that had worried a few years ago that the United States was being too confrontational with China, this year signed on to the communiqué, with its calls for more robust Western-based supply chains that were less reliant on Chinese companies.

A CSIS report led by John Homre and Victor Cha urged that the G7 expand its membership and “foster a more stable and predictable world order.”

This CSIS report speaks to the global need to elevate the Group of Seven (G7), a bloc of industrialized democracies—the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union—to foster a more stable and predictable world order.

The authors urge an enlargement of the Group – suggesting:

… Australia and South Korea. They bring significant capabilities to the nine priorities identified by G7 leaders, are like-minded partners, and display the trust and reliability required of G7 members.

 

The G7 should establish a formal leader-level outreach mechanism to the Global South and middle-power economies to demonstrate inclusivity and confer legitimacy on the body as a global governance institution. The outreach partners should include the African Union, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, the G20, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

But realistically that is not where the G7 is. It is about critical geopolitical matters to Europe and the United States. If anything, any long view of this Summit – 50 years on – and for a number of us one can cast back to 1975 and Rambouillet, this Informal is much shrunken and quite isolated.

It is worth noting Paul Poast’s assessment in WPR of the G7 at this 50th year:

While the group has evolved, its long-term survival is once again unclear. There are concerns that Trump’s disdain for international cooperation could return in 2025. Nations in Europe, notably Germany and France, are witnessing a far-right resurgence, which could also undermine the G7’s coherence as a gathering of the liberal democratic world’s leading nations. For that matter, this year’s host, Italy, is currently governed by the far-right Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose party has its origins in the country’s fascist movement.

 

Hence, there are once again questions about the summits’ future, let alone whether they will produce more iconic images and momentous outcomes. In short, it’s unclear if the G7 will make it through another five, let alone another 50, meetings.

The shadow of Trump – and his possible return – explains many pronouncements by the current G7 Leaders. Diminished and ‘in a crouch’ seems to best define today’s G7. But even so, it is fair to say that our gaze shifted long ago to the G20. Trump, no Trump, key Middle Powers represent a significant presence and influence in the G20. That’s where to turn our gaze and focus.

Image Credit: Organizer

Growing Closer to the Summit of the Future

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So, we are closing in on the consequential “UN Summit of the Future” (SoTF). This UN gathering will occur this coming fall on September 22-23rd during the UN General Assembly’s high-level week. This Summit, as was the case with the earlier SDG Summit, will be attended by many Heads of State and Government. 

Now this is not the first occasion that I found myself raising the SoTF. I did so back in March in a Substack Post, entitled: “The Impact of the UN Summit of the Future (SOTF)”. At that time I noted the hope from the UN and the Secretary General, Antonio Guterres for this second of two major UN gatherings: 

The Summit of the Future (SoTF) is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations Charter, and move towards a reinvigorated multilateral system that is better positioned to positively impact people’s lives. Building on the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States will consider ways to lay the foundations for more effective global cooperation that can deal with today’s challenges as well as new threats in the future.

If only to take the measure of this formal multilateral institution – the UN, it is useful that we closely examine the UN and the Secretary General’s effectiveness through the actions and conclusions of this second of the Two Summit. It has become evident to most, if not all commentators that this formal security institution and its many specialized agencies,  like the formal financial and trade institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO – have all become enfeebled with age, conflicting North-South objectives and rising geopolitical tensions between major powers including Russia, China, the US and Europe. In addition, the rules often require consensus that as pointed out recently by Frederic Menard and Jennifer Welsh and her colleagues, in a new volume on global governance,  Afterworlds: Long Covid and International Relations leads to the following conclusion: 

The second weakness of contemporary multilateralism—its reliance on particular representations of power and interests—means that it maintains a system whereby a consensus among sovereign governments is required to advance collective policy on global problems, even when that consensus effectively results in the lowest common denominator.

There is a strong sense that these institutions are no longer ‘fit for purpose’, yet there is little hope for renewal in the face of the ‘rising disorder and fragmentation in international relations’. 

But back to the UN and this critical Summit. The UN describes the path to the SoTF as follows: 

The 75th Anniversary of the United Nations was marked in June 2020 with a declaration by Member States that included 12 overarching commitments along with a request to the Secretary-General for recommendations to address both current and future challenges. In September 2021, the Secretary-General responded with his report, Our Common Agenda, a wake-up call to speed up the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and propel the commitments contained in the UN75 Declaration. In some cases, the proposals addressed gaps that emerged since 2015, requiring new intergovernmental agreements. The report, therefore, called for a Summit of the Future to forge a new global consensus on readying ourselves for a future that is rife with risks but also opportunities. The General Assembly welcomed the submission of the “rich and substantive” report and agreed to hold the Summit on 22-23 September 2024, preceded by a ministerial meeting in 2023. An action-oriented Pact for the Future is expected to be agreed by Member States through intergovernmental negotiations on issues they decide to take forward. 

This self-described pathway by the UN and its Secretary General highlights the key measure of success and renewal – the “Pact for the Future” (Pact).  Richard Ponzio, Director and Senior Fellow, Global Governance, Justice & Security at The Stimson Center, and a close watcher of the UN, raised that very same question with his opinion piece on the Pact with its title – “Summit of the Future: A Historical Pivot or Mere Footnote?” But after a reading of his opinion piece and then a review of both the zero draft and now what is called the compilation draft it leaves the answer difficult to discern. As Richard pointed out, however, this compilation draft is not yet an end point. As he describes: 

Time is running short, with the first revision of the Pact for the Future not expected until shortly after the UN Civil Society Conference, from May 9-10 in Nairobi, which is focusing on the Summit of the Future.

Now  the zero draft covered 20 pages. Additions and emendations and significant paragraph rewrites by member states left the compilation draft at 255 pages leaving much to accomplish for those about to hold the pen after Nairobi. Moreover, as Richard points out, there is a movement ‘afoot’ to leave final results – the final document, to sometime in the future: 

A more recent argument to gather steam that could further kick the can down the road and result in underwhelming outcomes by September is the notion that as a consensus-based world leaders document, the Pact for the Future is already pitched at an appropriate length, tone and level of ambition. Hence, the logic follows that the technical details could be fleshed out by diplomats and others after the summit.

But  the current document as I pointed out earlier remains fixed more on the ‘what’ but hardly anything on the ‘how. There is little in the current document on how can the UN, the Secretary-General, and others actually advance and implement reforms and changes agreed to by the Member States. Unfortunately, the ‘what’ is decidedly more easy to lay out than the ‘how’. Thus, for example, there is a call for UN Security Council reform – an issue that has dogged the UN system for years but the compilation draft, just as the earlier zero draft, still fails to actually provide suggested reforms in membership,how many countries will be permanent, how large will the the Security Council be, which countries will hold a veto, if any at all, etc., etc.

Now Richard does suggest there there are four major initiatives that appear to be coming together:

A biennial summit on the global economy to bring the G20 and the UN closer to expand development financing for the 2030 Agenda (Sustainable Development Goals) and improve global economic governance. 

 

An emergency platform for better addressing complex global shocks, such as pandemics or large-scale environmental disasters (although influential countries, such as Pakistan and Cuba, question its purpose and cost). 

 

A Global Digital Compact with human rights-based principles to lay the foundations for broader governance of cybertech, including AI. 

 

A Declaration on Future Generations, which, if backed by an authoritative intergovernmental body, a special envoy and monitoring tool, could achieve the status and impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

If Richard is correct, and these are the most likely changes and reforms to be adopted by the UN and also likely to be adopted as a legacy for the current Secretary General as he comes to the end, and likely retirement in 2026 after his second term, well, I am concerned.  A biennial summit with the G20 is possible but then what is likely to be accomplished – I’m not sure. But an emergency platform – that seems to me to be a stretch and as for the other two other initiatives, they suggest a presence but likely in form but without substance. 

Look, reform of these formal institutions created decades ago is a struggle at the best of times. And, I’m afraid, the state of global governance reform is far from being at the best of times in this growing era of disorder in international relations.

But stay tuned.

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter’.

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Stumbling Over ‘Strategic Narcissism’

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“Advancing global governance and human security for a better future”: A Symposium hosted by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), America-China Public Affairs Institute (ACPAI) and the China-West Dialogue (CWD) 

I had the good fortune to attend a ‘closed’ symposium in Washington this past midweek hosted by the organizations identified above. The Symposium identified the attainment of human security and the advancement of global governance as the key subjects of discussion and debate for the two roundtable sessions. The advance notes for the symposium suggested focusing on: 

How, might 2024 turn out to be a year of opportunity for advancing global governance in addressing human security challenges? What role can the Middle Powers play in moving the global relations forward to address humanity’s quest for security and systemic sustainability?

And as the notes further suggested: 

This half-day event aims for a broad engagement of perspectives from China, the United States, and the Global South on the feasibility of revamping global governance in the current context. We seek to convene leading global policy researchers, practitioners, and advocates to debate and recommend specific global institutional, legal, normative, and operational mechanisms that could inform governments’ participation in the major multilateral events of this year. 

 

The first roundtable session on the attainment of human security was led by Henry Huiyao Wang the President of CCG. And as the notes suggested: 

This session seeks to explore the scope of the concept of human security as a useful tool of generating alternative narratives and dynamics of US-China relations that yield more productive relations in global governance policy.

 

Framing questions:

 

  1. How can the idea of human security [to] be articulated in a way to mediate differences between the United States and China, given the prospects of bilateral cooperation on climate change, health, and AI governance?

  2. Multilaterally, how can the scope of the notion be extended to include norms and principles, such as international humanitarian law, human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and other dimensions in global governance?

  3. Are there specific institutional, legal, normative, and operational mechanisms that can be reformed to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 agenda? What are alternative coalitions that need to, should or can drive global governance leadership?

The second roundtable was led by Colin Bradford, the Lead Co-Chair of CWD and non-resident Senior Fellow, Brookings. The session was designed to explore advancing global governance “in a new global dynamic of pluralism where middle power diplomacy, it was suggested, might play a key role in lowering the ‘temperature’ in great power relations and promoting greater global governance policymaking. As the notes identified: 

Middle Powers exist today with agency and influence to play a role in addressing global threats. Understanding Middle Power Diplomacy and its implications for the global order can generate transformative forces in fostering multilateral consensus on global governance. The Brazilian and South African G20 presidencies during 2024 and 2025, with the US to follow in 2026, could become pivotal focal points for transition to a new era in global relations in which MPD demonstrates the feasibility of advancing humanity’s quest for peace, security, equality, and sustainable development. This session aims for a broad engagement of diverse perspectives, cutting across disciplines, sectors and regions.

 

Framing questions:

 

  1. What is Middle Power Diplomacy and how [can] the concept factor in independent and cross-national policy space to address global governance challenges?
  2. Following the Bali Declaration in November 2022 and the pause in US-China tensions after the Biden-Xi summit in November 2023 in San Francisco, what are the prospects for MPD to play an active role in global governance leadership?
  3. What are specific issues on which greater potential for convergence and cooperation exist in a global governance dimension, not a geopolitical context for MPD to bridge divides and invigorate coordinated efforts between countries?”

There was a lively discussion throughout the two roundtables that revealed, as one participant put it, that there appears to be two trends in our thinking on the current geopolitics. One trend underscored how critical greater cooperation was called for to deal with the growing transnational problems and the second, and a countervailing trend – greater great power rivalry  and competition. With respect to the first trend, it was hoped that various Middle Powers – seen as countries that can and do punch above their weight – say a Sweden, or Singapore, or Braziland more – work to tackle global governance problems such as extreme poverty or climate change ‘green transition’ policy and financing.

While there was a strong sentiment expressed underscoring the agency of Middle Powers in the midst of great power rivalry, especially in the context of Middle Power leadership of the G20 – Indonesia, India, currently Brazil, and to be followed next year by South Africa, there was an equally strong sense of caution and a view that great power rivalry – Russia, China and the United States – appeared to cripple collective action and to undermine Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD). 

Much of our discussion in MIddle Powers and MPD – what was possible in the face of great power competition – was shadowed by what has been labelled in the recent past as ‘Strategic Narcissism’ and I recalled to the group. The term ‘Strategic Narcissism’ was used, if not created by H.R. McMaster in his book,  Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World published in 2020 at the end of the Trump years. McMaster In February 2017 succeeded Michael Flynn as President Donald Trump‘s National Security Advisor.  For McMaster the term was applied to the US role in shaping global order relations. He defined the term as: “the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans.” As he wrote (2020, 18): 

Across multiple administrations, U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy has suffered from what we might derive from Morgenthau’s essay “Strategic Narcissism”: the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans. The two mind-sets that result from strategic narcissism, overconfidence and resignation, share the conceit of attributing outcomes almost exclusively to U.S. decisions and undervaluing the degree to which others influence the future.

McMaster appears to have drawn the concept  from earlier work by the great international relations thinker, Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau identifies the concept in his 1978 essay: “The Roots of Narcissism” with Ethel Person (The Partisan Review. 1978 vol 45(3): 337-347). McMaster, however, creates what is a new phrase and concept by adding “strategic.” How closely McMaster’s interpretation of narcissism represents Morgenthau’s position is debatable. The language of “alienation” and “aspirations exceeding the limits of ability” is drawn verbatim from Morgenthau, but Morgenthau presents them as human problems. The leap by McMaster to apply this analysis to a national level foreign policy is somewhat questionable. In Battlegrounds, however, McMaster writes that in “The Roots of Narcissism” Morgenthau lamented preoccupation with self in foreign policy because it led to alienation from other nations and aspirations that exceed the limits of ability.  America’s stature as the only superpower encouraged narcissism, according to McMaster with a preoccupation with self, and an associated neglect of the influence that others have over the future course of events. Americans began to define the world only in relation to their own aspirations and desires and there are many that continue to do so in current global order analysis.

While there was much caution, even pessimism expressed over the ability of MPD to successfully temper great power dominance and action, general support was expressed for a view acknowledged at the end of the symposium by one participant that it was necessary to try and ‘move the needle’ – to push back against blocs and their rigidity and to support and advance collective global governance policy and action.   

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter

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‘The Black and the White of it’ – The Rules-based Order(RBO) – at an Intriguing Roundtable

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I was fortunate enough last week to join colleagues at the annual ISA in San Francisco in a Roundtable with the above title, or close to it. Enjoy the weekend and this Post at Alan’s Newsletter

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It was a good gathering, actually, a very good gathering! I had the good fortune of joining with many thousands of my colleagues at the International Studies Association (ISA) annual conference, this year in San Francisco. The ISA runs for some 4 days and the attendees joined the conference from across the globe. One thing that was noticeable at this annual gathering was that there seemed to be more international relations (IR) sessions than in the past. And this year I was fortunate enough to chair the following Roundtable: ‘The Black and White’ of the Rules-based Order (RBO): Does it exist? If it does, how to constrain breaches; if not what is to be done?

The session’s origin was in back and forth with my colleagues G. John Ikenberry and Arthur Stein. Though John in the end failed to attend, Arthur, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at UCLA did join us at the Roundtable. And truth be told Arthur and I snuck away from the Conference on Friday to enjoy – the opening game of the San Francisco Giants. So cool!

So, back to the Conference and the Rountable. The other members of the Roundtable included: Pascale Massot, Assistant Professor, soon to be Associate Professor, in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, Harukata Takenaka, Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) at Tokyo, Andrew Cooper, Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, Yves Tiberghien, Professor of Political Science and Konwakai Chair in Japanese Research at the University of British Columbia and Amitav Acharya the UNESCO Chair in Transitional Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University. The group joined Arthur and I on Thursday morning of the Conference.

So what was the premise of this Roundtable? The intro posed the contrasting views of the RBOs existence.  There are clear statements from the Biden Administration,  NATO partners and other European countries of Russia’s violation of the RBO with its war on Ukraine. We then zeroed in on the Russian view, expressed by among others, Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Foreign Minister who described the state of the global order as seen from Moscow: “Now the UN-centric system is undergoing a deep crisis, the root cause of which was brought on by the decision of certain UN members to replace international law and the UN Charter with some rules-based international order”. A similar view was expressed by Chen Wenqing, a chief security official from China who declared: “Individual states are trying to use the pretext of protesting  [for] democracy to substitute the existing world order based on international law with an artificial rules-based order…”. On the one side an evident and declared rules-based order and on the other something very different. This view declares that international order and international law are something very distinct from this apparent Western construct – The Rules-based Order. And it led us, at this Roundtable to raise the evident question: “… do we even have an RBO? If an RBO does not exist are we condemned to growing rivalry and conflict? If an RBO does exist, then what are the limits on conflict?”

The participants brought a variety of views to this Roundtable and the folks that joined us for the session. They expressed  perspectives and viewpoints from the major powers but not only and took a bird’s eye view of the evolving order and its relationship to the RBO. In the end the participants described the construction and the current state of the house that states, and now others, have built.

Let me try and capture just some of the participant perspectives. Let’s start with two valuable points, among many, that Amitav expressed at the Roundtable. First, according to Amitav, such RBO rules have been developed, shaped and reshaped by states over many centuries. He described a variety of RBOs: rules of diplomacy that go back to the 13 century; the Geneva Convention that goes back to the Code of Manon from 200 BC; the freedom of the seas from the 1th century but before that from small Asian states in Mombasa, Calicut, Malacca and more. Not a single order but a variety of orders. Secondly, the contemporary RBO is the product of a shared effort at San Francisco and not just a US creation. For some time the rules, and in many instances norms, have been refined, and in many cases came together in the 19th century and the West had much to do with it, but so did others.

As described by a number of participants, power shifts can and often do challenge the rules and norms but as pointed out by Pascale institutions can survive power shifts if the legitimacy of purpose can be maintained by some. Different futures are fashioned by states  for each RBO ecosystem – and we witness different evolutions for humanitarian law, from trade, from freedom of the seas and other orders. But the powerful may, and often do, ignore the norms time and time again for convenience. When the powerful are tired, or inconvenienced, they go around the rules and norms. There is a huge amount of arbitrariness in the order,  as described by Andrew. And further, as noted by Arthur all rules have exceptions and cheaters. Rules are created for violating the rules and, as identified for example in trade agreements, such agreements have escape clauses. States at one time or another are willing to enforce rules and on other occasions are all too ready to cheat on the same rules. And it is the case, and it should be noted that when a country complains about others being hypocrites, that state is in fact complaining about the actor being hypocrite, not the rule itself. For Harukata the RBO can be maintained but requires the commitment of leading states to expressly maintain such norms and rules.

Finally, our colleague, Yves described 7 flaws as he saw them  in the contemporary RBO. Among the 7 it is evident that the RBO is weak and needs commitment especially from the more powerful to sustain the order or orders. As he pointed out, in a Westphalian world, any global order is a weak superstructure that requires agreement of major states at creation, and indeed to survive. Like several others Yves suggested hypocrisy, especially, among the leading powers can undermine the RBO but as he notes the power of habits and socialization, even if the order is organized hypocrisy can grow on the members of the order. Norms get integrated. The ideal standards of the RBIO can bestow legitimacy even where hypocrisy lives. Institutional gravity and stickiness as well as the entrepreneurial role of staffers in the IOs can keep the RBO alive, note recent agreements: the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the High Seas Treaty 2023. For Yves, if we really want to promote cooperation and collective commitment toward meeting common challenges and common rules, we have to focus more on the pragmatic as opposed to the high pitched rhetoric demanding adherence to an ideal RBO that does exist.

The session with my colleagues was both revealing and satisfying. They undertook a wide and deep examination of the RBO and realistically examined the contemporary order that as all pointed out is under stress, hindered by hypocrisy but still capable of maintaining constraint and order in the face of a complex interstate environment but also today an engaged substate and non-state set of actors.

 

Image Credit: ISA 2024

 

Continuing the Middle Power Narrative

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In early February CWD highlighted, and I described in the Post at Alan’s Newsletter, “Are They All Middle Powers? Or, Are There None!” this emerging Middle Power narrative:

We hoped this session would be an opportunity to examine and critique “Asia’s Future at a crossroads: A Japanese strategy for peace and sustainable prosperity.” This very valuable Report was the outcome of years of work by the ‘Asia Future’ Research Group (Research Group)  co-convened by Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus of Keio University and Mike Mochizuki of the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University. … The Research Group urged that Japanese policy not be reshaped by the rise in US-China rivalry and the growing geopolitical tensions in the international system generally and in the Indo-Pacific specifically. Alas, that may prove to be quite difficult.

The story of emerging Middle Powers is about to continue with a new Report, this by the Körber Foundation. As noted by Colin Bradford our lead co-chair at CWD in his invitation to CWD participants to join a coming session on March 28th:

Driven by demographic and economic factors and an increasingly self-confident presence on the world stage, emerging middle powers (such as Brazil, India and South Africa) are gaining international influence.

  • ​What foreign policy challenges do emerging middle powers face?  How do they position themselves vis-à-vis China and the war in Ukraine?    And, where do they find common ground with the West, particularly on reforming the international system?

The Report is, “Listening Beyond the Echo Chamber: Emerging Middle Powers Report 2024”. This Report, front and centre in our coming CWD session, presents an intriguing survey and various findings from the following:

The first Emerging Middle Powers Survey polled nearly 1,000 politicians, diplomats, journalists, researchers and private-sector representatives from

India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) as well as from Germany.

The CWD gathering has the good fortune of welcoming Julia Ganter, Programme Director Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative to introduce the Report to CWD. In addition we have remarks from:

  • Steven Gruzd, Head, African Governance and Diplomacy Programme, South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg,
  • Manjeet Kripalani, Executive Director, Gateway House Indian Council on Global Relations, Mumbai, and
  • Paulo Esteves, Researcher & fmr. Director, BRICS Policy Center, Rio de Janeiro

The Report identifies the purpose of this research initiative on the part of the Korber:

The aim of our Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative (KEMP) is to promote dialogue between Germany and emerging middle powers, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. With their growing political, economic and demographic weight they are key players for global problem solving and also form the G20 troika in 2024. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown that in Germany, among other places, geopolitical perspectives, foreign policy traditions, and national interests of emerging middle powers

are often not assessed in a realistic manner. To address this, the Körber initiative conducts an annual expert survey and facilitates various dialogue formats in cooperation with Gateway House India, the Brazilian BRICS Policy Centre and the South African Institute of International Affairs.

The initiative is valuable in part because it targets three quite important Middle Powers – India, Brazil and South Africa – all large democratic emerging market powers –  that formed IBSA with the Brasilia Declaration in 2003. While overshadowed by the BRICS and now BRICS+, IBSA remains a useful gathering of key EM powers. Moreover, India, last year, Brazil this year, and South Africa in 2025 will each host the G20 Summit. With the troika mechanism these three countries will be influencing the organization and policy initiatives of the G20.

Back to the current Körber Report. The Report opens with a rather surprising conclusion in its Executive Summary:

despite differences among the four countries, there is a common basis for more meaningful engagement and joint approaches for international reform.

The survey findings are varied and interesting.The broad conclusions:

respondents in India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) identify a different foreign policy challenge as most important for each country – climate change for Brazil, relations with China for India, the war in Ukraine and the Middle East for South Africa – as well as international trade for all three. These are global concerns and respondents in Germany share them.

The Report is particularly interesting in highlighting differences of view between IBSA experts and German ones.

These aspects divide [Germany] them from the IBSA respondents, who perceive international trade as a foreign policy challenge, prefer to mediate between Russia and Ukraine instead of supporting either, view the dollar’s dominance unfavourably and are optimistic about BRICS+. But even in IBSA, some are critical of the group’s expansion to include the likes of Iran.

Finally, the Report brings into focus  what Western interests, I suspect, need to understand and to advance more collaborative action:

Understanding the challenges of the West’s partners must begin with an examination of their specific concerns. Brazilian respondents most often cite climate change and the environment as the most challenging foreign policy issue for their country. Indian respondents see China, which their country has a ‘hot’ border with, as the biggest challenge. In South Africa, the most frequently cited issue is maintaining an autonomous foreign policy between the demands and pressures of different major powers, followed by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. … Taking their ideas seriously would show that the West is ready to include them as equals at the new global high table. Ultimately, this shift in thinking will transform the Western echo chamber into a symphony of voices.

The Report is very revealing and I suspect the CWD session will be lively and likely to advance our Middle Power thinking between and among the participants at the CWD.

More on that later I anticipate.

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter. Comments are welcome and feel free to subscribe to receive new posts and support my work.

Calming US-China Tensions

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My colleague, Michael Swaine, now a Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, has produced two very insightful pieces on US-China relations. The longer piece can be found as a Quincy Brief and well worth reading. But if that is not possible, then a shorter examination is set out by Michael at  WPR. The ‘heart’ of both pieces is that stability arising from the Biden-Xi Summit at the margin of the APEC meeting in  San Francisco late in 2023 is far less than meets the eye. As Michael narrates in the WPR piece:

All this means that, far from developing the incentives and the means to avert a crisis or conflict, efforts on both sides to reassure each other on their vital interests are ringing increasingly hollow, with the result that both continue to view each other as engaging in evasive or, worse yet, hypocritical and duplicitous behavior.

And with respect to Taiwan, set out in the Quincy Brief, Michael paints a rather bleak picture:

The reality, however, is that the features and trends pushing both countries toward a confrontation over Taiwan persist, fueling a dangerous, interactive dynamic that could quickly overcome any diplomatic thaw between the world’s foremost powers.

Why have the two leading powers come to such a serious pass in the face of what appeared to be a solid effort to stabilize the relationship at the margins of APEC? Here Michael is clear:

Achieving this requires each nation to match its formal statements clearly and reliably with its actual behavior—in other words, to avoid hypocrisy—with regard to what each side regards as its vital interests, and to do so consistently over time. This in turn requires both sides reaching a mutual understanding of what their vital interests are, the meaningful assurances regarding them that each desires, and what would constitute violations of those assurances and, hence, threats to the concerned party’s vital interests. …

Unfortunately, despite some initial efforts, neither Washington nor Beijing has thus far met these requirements. Perhaps the most prominent example of this failure involves what began as the “Four Noes and One No Intention,” but which Beijing now calls the “Five Noes.” These reportedly affirm that the United States: does not seek a new Cold War with China; does not aim to change China’s political system; is not revitalizing its alliances to counter China; does not support Taiwan’s independence; and does not seek a conflict with China. [WPR]

From Michael’s perspective the United States has failed to reassure China that indeed it is committed to the “Five Noes”. Then, added to this is the failure to provide the reassurances necessary over Taiwan. As Michael describes the Taiwan situation:

  • The increasingly high (and arguably growing) stakes the Taiwan issue presents for both Beijing and Washington;
  • Deepening levels of domestic threat inflation on each side;
  • The growing tendency on both sides to worst case the motives and intentions of others (fed by a persistent lack of trust) while failing to recognize the interactive nature of the rivalry;
  • A resulting steady erosion of confidence in the original, stabilizing bilateral understanding regarding Taiwan reached between Beijing and Washington during the 1970s normalization process, and a related stress on deterrence over assurance;
  • The absence of effective bilateral crisis prevention and management Mechanisms”. [Brief]

While the two articles focus on somewhat different aspects of the US-China relationship, the big conclusion I draw from these two very insightful pieces by Michael is that both leading powers are providing insufficient assurances to the other of the desire of each to maintain the status quo and peaceful relations.

The rising gyre of action and response between the two is underlined by Michael:

In China, U.S. assertions that the One China Policy has not changed, or that its relations with Taiwan remain unofficial, thus fall on deaf ears. And the apparent hypocrisy of U.S. behavior is then used to justify more provocative Chinese actions, which lead many Americans to conclude that Beijing is jettisoning its commitment to peaceful unification.

This worsening situation is made even more dangerous by the absence of substantive crisis prevention and management mechanisms and procedures between the two nations. It is true that Washington and Beijing have recently agreed to resume a nascent military–to–military crisis communication working group that remained suspended since 2019 and appear to be working to revive a few other more established agreements designed to avoid incidents in the air and at sea. [Brief]

For Michael the heavy reliance on military deterrence, as opposed to material bilateral reassurance is at the heart of the shaky relations between the two. What is needed is clear, according to him:

There are, however, concrete steps that the U.S. government, Congress, and civil society can take to reduce the mounting tension around the Taiwan issue and remove it as a major factor driving the growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Most importantly, both sides must reverse the tendency to regard the island as a surrogate for the overall U.S.–China strategic competition.

This requires, as a first step, efforts to reduce the overall intensity of the bilateral rivalry, by eliminating the heretofore divisive, often politically–induced, zero–sum rhetoric that has dominated much of the dialogue in Washington and Beijing, and ending, to the extent possible, the mismatch between the words spoken and actions taken on both sides.” “… Such overblown rhetoric and hypocrisy deepen distrust and signal that there is no potential common ground on critical issues such as Taiwan’s future. They reinforce worst–case assumptions about motives and therefore increase the likelihood that manageable crises will become severe conflicts.[Brief]

Michael then sets out a rather lengthy list of reassuring statements that the US might express to undermine any trajectory toward confrontation and conflict. As he says:

These statements would represent a clear shift from the current drift toward confrontation and abandonment of the “One China” normalization understandings with China over Taiwan. They would not constitute a new U.S. policy so much as an attempt to restore policy understandings that have maintained peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades.”[Brief]

In an ideal world such efforts backed by equally reassuring statements and actions from China could well represent an optimal path for US-China relations in the immediate circumstances. Unfortunately, in a Presidential election year and with the heavy cloud of a possible Trump re-election and his growing wild rhetoric of an 8-month campaign, it seems to me Michael’s solutions in these circumstances may well unfortunately be overreach. What therefore can be done in this difficult period.

It would be nice if a Leaders Summit was planned relatively soon but unfortunately the Brazil G20 Summit is scheduled to  take place after the US election. Thus a bilateral meeting at the margins of a summit is not going to be possible. Bad timing I’m afraid. In the face of a poor calendar the best that might be hoped for are confidence building gatherings of senior officials. Here too the G20 can be useful. There are a large number of ministerial sessions that provide the setting for side meetings by US-China senior officials. These bilateral side gatherings provide opportunities where expressions of reassurance could be had and public statements made that underline the US-China effort to maintain stability and express specific collaborative policy initiatives. It might provide just the kind of opportunities that Michael believes might help stabilize US-China relations.

Image Credit: France24

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/calming-us-china-tensions?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&triedRedirect=true

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A Notable Passing

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A passing of significant note. Our mentor – Richard Rosecrance – passed away in his 93rd year. He was our mentor but also one to many others, indeed to generations of graduate students – at UC Berkeley, Cornell, UCLA, and the Kennedy School at Harvard. While the last few years left him less able to exercise his academic wit and mastery, he was a guiding light in international relations for years.

Dick was an unmatched researcher. Just some of his books underscore how prolific and varied his work: 

  • Action and Reaction in World Politics  (1963)
  • Defence of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (1967)
  • The Future of the International Strategic System (editor, 1972)
  • The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (1986)
  • America’s Economic Resurgence: A Bold New Strategy (1990)
  • The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (co-editor, 1993)
  • The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena (co-editor, 1999); 
  • The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century (1999)
  • The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations (editor, 2001).
  • No More States?: Globalization, National Self-Determination, and Terrorism (co-editor, 2006)
  • Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the US-China Relationship (co-editor, 2009)
  • History and Neorealism (co-editor, 2010)
  • The Resurgence of the West: How a Transatlantic Union Can Prevent War and Restore the United States and Europe (2013)
  • The Next Great War?: The Roots of World War I and the Risk of U.S.-China Conflict (co-editor, 2015)
  • International Politics: How History Modifies Theory (co-author, 2018)

This partial list embodies seminal contributions to the fields of security, foreign policy, and international political economy. These works emphasize the roles of both domestic and international forces, reflect an interest in history and the forces for change in world politics. They also reveal an interest in applying social science to develop strategies for dealing with these challenges.  Understanding the implications of modernization and the potential to produce greater prosperity and avoid war and chaos was a major focus of his career.  He was a student of world affairs who thought about the implications of current events and what puzzles they posed to our conventional understanding.

The above list also encapsulates a productive career that extended for more than five decades into his mid-80s and includes two books and four edited volumes produced following his retirement from full-time teaching.

The wide-ranging set of his writings constitutes only part of his impact on the field.  Dick encouraged and empowered his students.  He would point out lacunae and understudied portions of the field, but he was equally interested in his students’ views of the burning questions that animated them.  He relished hearing and discussing contrasting views and supported students working on approaches that differed from his own.  Among his students are prominent realists, liberal internationalists, and constructivists.  In his support of his students and his interest in the work of younger scholars, Dick was one to send the elevator back down.

His interest in and his examination of international relations extended over his long life. We were honored to be his students and colleagues and to be with him in the classroom. 

We mourn his passing. We miss his wit, wisdom, intellectual prodding, and encouragement.

Image Credit: Belfer Center  

This Joint Post with Arthur A Stein originally appeared at the Substack, Alan’s Newsletter

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/a-notable-passing?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true