The Trump Battering of the Order

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As much destruction, it seems, as this second Trump administration can engineer! And fast! One can’t avoid ‘reeling’ from the current Trump administration actions and plans. And yet we are only 30 days into the second Trump administration. It is truly amazing! 

The real dilemma for me – and for many others –  is the inability to determine whether there is method in Trump’s foreign policy actions; or, whether it is just madness that leads to few good outcomes. Read through  all the experts and you come away completely confused . Some do see method, maybe somewhat accidentally, perhaps, but nevertheless some positive direction – whether with respect to:  trade, Ukraine, Gaza, relations with the allies, especially Europe and Japan, or adversaries – be it Russia or China. But it is very hard to uncover any consistency of approach and any likelihood of valuable or even redeemable outcomes. 

Let’s take Tom Friedman. In a NYTimes piece entitled: “Why Trump’s Bullying Is Going to Backfire” he writes: 

And if all of this is just Trump bluffing to get other countries to give us the same access that we give them, I am OK with it. But Trump has never been clear: Some days he says his tariffs are to raise revenue, other days to force everyone to invest in America, other days to keep out fentanyl.

 

As the Beatles sang, I’d love to see the plan. As in: Here’s how we think the global economy operates today. Therefore, to strengthen America, here is where we think we need to cut spending, impose tariffs and invest — and that is why we are doing X, Y and Z.

 

That would be real leadership. Instead, Trump is threatening to impose tariffs on rivals and allies alike, without any satisfactory explanation of why one is being tariffed and the other not, and regardless of how such tariffs might hurt U.S. industry and consumers. It’s a total mess. As the Ford Motor chief executive Jim Farley courageously (compared to other chief executives) pointed out, “Let’s be real honest: Long term, a 25 percent tariff across the Mexico and Canada borders would blow a hole in the U.S. industry that we’ve never seen.”

 

So, either Trump wants to blow that hole, or he’s bluffing, or he is clueless. If it is the latter, Trump is going to get a crash course in the hard realities of the global economy as it really is — not how he imagines it.

And quite rightly Friedman points out that today’s global trade complex is nothing like the past where the conception was: one manufactured and exported  X while importing from another, Y. As Friedman describes what he nd others see as the world of global trade today: 

My favorite tutor in these matters is the Oxford University economist Eric Beinhocker, who got my attention when we were talking the other day with the following simple statement: “No country in the world alone can make an iPhone.”

 

Think about that sentence for a moment: There is no single country or company on earth that has all the knowledge or parts or manufacturing prowess or raw materials that go into that device in your pocket called an iPhone. Apple says it assembles its iPhone and computers and watches with the help of “thousands of businesses and millions of people in more than 50 countries and regions” who contribute “their skills, talents and efforts to help build, deliver, repair and recycle our products.

We are talking about a massive network ecosystem that is needed to make that phone so cool, so smart and so cheap.” 

The big difference between the era we are in now, as opposed to the one Trump thinks he’s living in, is that today it’s no longer “the economy, stupid.” That was the Bill Clinton era. Today, “it’s the ecosystems, stupid.”

Or turn to regional conflicts, Ukraine for instance. Here is the reaction to recent statements and Trump actions as described by Nicholas Kristof. In a piece titled, “With Trump’s Prostration to Putin, Expect a More Dangerous World”from the NYTimes on February 19th Kristof writes: 

I’m not sure most Americans appreciate the monumental damage President Trump is doing to the post-World War II order that is the wellspring of American global leadership and affluence.

 

He’s shattering it. He’s making the world more dangerous. He’s siding with an alleged war criminal, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, and poisoning relations with longtime U.S. allies. The trans-Atlantic alliance is unraveling. 

 

When I was a young reporter, we referred to countries like Poland and Romania as Soviet satellites; now Trump is doing Putin’s bidding and seems determined to put the United States in the Russian orbit. 

 

The Trump administration has lately sided with Moscow on one issue after another: Ukraine must cede territory, can’t join NATO and should hold new elections just as Russia insists. (Meanwhile, there’s no call for Russia to hold elections.) Trump even suggested that Russia should be readmitted to the Group of 7.

 

In a falsehood-filled rant on Truth Social on Wednesday, Trump went further. He denounced Ukraine’s elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, as a “dictator” who had squandered money and had “better move fast or he is not going to have a country left.” Trump’s post had the tone of statements from the Kremlin.

Now Dan Drezner in a piece from WPR suggests that Trump’s approach to allies in Europe may possibly incorporate a strategic logic: 

Even Trump’s second-term threats directed at longstanding allies can be seen as an example of what Ketian Zhang has labeled “coerce to deter”: In bullying smaller states, Trump is trying to signal what the U.S. could do to great powers if provoked. I have previously expressed deep skepticism about whether this will work during Trump’s second term—but the possibility cannot be ruled out.

This optimistic view, if you want to call it that, was employed by Trump in the first term. As Dan argues: 

Let’s start with the most optimistic scenario for the second Trump White House: that his application of the so-called madman theory works. According to this logic, which Rosanne McManus has critically examined, Trump’s norm-breaking and bullying tactics inject unpredictability into any kind of crisis-escalation calculus, ostensibly deterring other actors from challenging the United States.

However that is only one possible view as Dan suggests. Less optimistically Dan also suggests: 

The other scenarios paint a bleaker picture for the United States. The second possibility is that the Trump administration’s weakening of the U.S. national security state will be interpreted as an invitation for more aggressive Russian and Chinese expansionism. 

And there is even one further possibility as pointed to by Dan: 

There is one final possibility, and it is the most disconcerting outcome for the U.S.: that neither Russia nor China decide to take any provocative action while Trump is president. This is not because he represents a formidable deterrent, but rather the opposite. In this scenario, Trump so weakens the United States’ standing in the world and is so keen to appease autocrats like Putin and Xi that their best option is let him do whatever he wants.

The motivation and consequences of Trump’s actions leave us bewildered. It is at the moment not possible to draw firm conclusions on the Trump approach or the outcomes from administration actions. But most analysts are greatly worried. One other area of concern draws immediate attention. That is Trump’s attachment to, and US policy toward, international institutions and the current global order. My good colleague, Patrick Stewart from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) has raised some real concerns in a recent CEIP Commentary titled, “The Death of the World America Made: Donald Trump’s war on multilateralism is misguided and dangerous”. He writes: 

On February 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed a sweeping executive order with the potential to upend decades of American global engagement. The directive mandates a comprehensive review within 180 days of all current multilateral organizations of which the United States is a member and all international treaties to which it is party. The explicit purpose of this exercise is to determine whether such support should be withdrawn. … 

 

Of far greater import is the order’s decree that the secretary of state shall review “all international organizations” of which the United States is a member and “all conventions and treaties” to which it is party, to determine whether these “are contrary to the interests of the United States and whether [they] can be reformed.” The secretary will then recommend to the president “whether the United States should withdraw” from those commitments. In principle, the directive could lead to a U.S. abrogation of thousands of treaties and a departure from hundreds of multilateral organizations.

 

It is even plausible that the Trump administration will conclude that an “America First” foreign policy requires pulling the United States out of the UN—and kicking the UN out of the United States. Both are long-standing objectives of conservative nationalists who contend, speciously, that the UN threatens American sovereignty.

Now there seems to be a debate among experts as to whether the Trump administration can actually do so; nevertheless as Stewart suggests: 

As Trump’s first weeks in office have shown, this White House doesn’t do ambiguity—and there are many ways to wreck institutions without formally leaving them.

For my part I am equally worried about Trump’s actions with the Informals – the G7 and especially the G20. Particularly with regard to the latter, the hosting schedule for the G20 ends its first cycle with Brazil this year holding the Presidency and then the G20 returns to the beginning of the cycle with the United States scheduled to host in 2026. The G20 is critical in part because it draws together the significant advanced countries, like the US, Germany, France, Japan and now increasingly influential countries from the Global South such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and others. Already the Trump administration, because of its apparent dislike for South Africa’s ‘domestic policies and its theme focus for this year’s G20 Summit  – Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability – has led Secretary of State Marco Rubio cancelling his appearance at the first Foreign Ministers gathering in South Africa as apparently has Scott Bessent, the Treasury Secretary for the first Finance Ministers gathering. As Rubio suggested in his cancelling his attendance, as reported in the Hill: 

I will NOT attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg,” Rubio wrote in a Wednesday post on the social platform X. “South Africa is doing very bad things. Expropriating private property. Using G20 to promote ‘solidarity, equality, & sustainability.’ In other words: DEI and climate change.

 

Rubio added that his job is to “advance America’s national interests, not waste taxpayer money or coddle anti-Americanism.

Now the G20 has not operated very effectively as  a so-called Steering Committee but it has displayed value as a Crisis Committee. Without it, I don’t know but I worry.  

Who knows if Trump will show up to the G20 Leaders Summit. And who knows what he will do if in fact he does show up to the Leaders’ Summit on November 22-23rd. Moreover, will the United States take on the hosting for 2026, especially if it has failed to participate in most gatherings. There is much to worry about. But we will follow it closely. 

This Post first appeared asa Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter: https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/157647801/share-center

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The Many Possible Shapes for the Global Order: A Quick Look Back & Forward

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The Trump attack on interdependence – particularly economic – has felt foolish and destructive but without question – relentless. What appeared to be a stalling out with Biden’s ill-disguised protectionism, has now turned into repeated blows against an open trading system and a collaborative global order. 

MInouche Shafik, former president of Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and a member of the House of Lords referenced a well-known transformation in  a recent piece in PS: 

““The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.” This famous quote, often attributed to Antonio Gramsci, feels particularly pertinent today, as the international order that has defined the past century undergoes a profound shift.” 

What is passing away? And what is emerging? Joe Nye, the very well known International relations maven has examined exactly that in another  recent piece in PS.  As he describes Trump policy actions: 

“Globalization refers simply to interdependence at intercontinental distances. Trade among European countries reflects regional interdependence, whereas European trade with the US or China reflects globalization. By threatening China with tariffs, US President Donald Trump is trying to reduce the economic aspect of our global interdependence, which he blames for the loss of domestic industries and jobs.” 

Can globalization be reversed? Nye argues it certainly has in the past. As he describes: 

“But can economic globalization be reversed? It has happened before. The nineteenth century was marked by a rapid increase in both trade and migration, but it came to a screeching halt with the outbreak of World War I. Trade as a share of total world product did not recover to its 1914 levels until nearly 1970.” 

It is striking how long it took for global economic interdependence to recover to levels that matched the late nineteenth century. But what is also interesting is how not long ago in fact there was much attention focused on an enhanced global order. Take a look at this piece published in 2001. This Introduction was written by one of the book’s principal contributors, and a close colleague, Arthur Stein. Arthur, today, is a Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at UCLA. Arthur has been a significant international relations force at UCLA for years now. He prepared the Introduction for the 2001 volume titled, “The New Great Power Coalition”. As an aside I played a minor role in the volume with a chapter on China’s entry into the WTO.  Now, back to Arthur’s examination. There is no missing the cautious but still optimistic tone that Arthur conveys for this era following the real tensions of the Cold War and the emergence of US leadership. As he writes: 

“In short, we believe that in this era following a global conflict, the prospects for global cooperation conflicts lie in the relations between the Great Powers. Constructing a Great Power concert would make possible the establishment of a cooperative world order and truly global international organizations.” …

 

“In more general terms, however, we conclude that the movement from unilateral to multilateral incentives, norms, and structures appears to be useful in enlisting members in an  encompassing coalition. The world is now in the process of creating new high-prestige and selective clubs in the fields of economics, politics, and even the military. Once enough of these clubs in the fields overlap (regionally and functionally), they will form a linked structure that could combine into an encompassing coalition, with the latter representing the sustaining cooperation developed in separate regions and issue areas.”

Returning to Minouche Shafik this is what she sees as the new global order, one that others, as well, have suggested is emerging: 

“The world today is very different. It is a multipolar world, with China, Russia, India, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, and the Gulf states challenging the old order, alongside other emerging powers demanding a greater voice in shaping the rules of the international system. Meanwhile, belief in “universal values” and the idea of an “international community” has waned, as many point to the hypocrisy of rich countries hoarding vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic and the response to the Ukraine war compared to the failures to act in response to humanitarian crises in Gaza, Sudan, and many other places.” 

 

“We may be heading to a zero-order world in which rules are replaced by power – a very difficult environment for smaller countries. Or it may be a world of large regional blocs, with the United States dominating its hemisphere, China prevailing over East Asia, and Russia reasserting control over the countries of the former Soviet Union. Ideally, we can find our way to a new rules-based order that more accurately reflects our multipolar world.”

Regional blocs may be in order. Or, possibly the reassertion of a form of geopolitical and ideological blocs. That seems to be what is described by colleague, G. John Ikenberry. In an article in International Affairs, penned at the beginning of last year, entitled, “Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order”, John writes this about the emerging global order:

“Today, among the many impacts of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the most consequential may be that it marks the moment—the tipping-point—when history reversed course, pushing the world back in the direction of geopolitical and ideological groupings.” 

 

“Today, we might call these three groupings the global West, the global East, and the global South. One is led by the United States and Europe, the second by China and Russia, and the third by an amorphous grouping of non-western developing states, led by India, Brazil and others. Each ‘world’ offers grand narratives of what is at stake in the Ukraine conflict and how it fits into the larger problems and prospects for twenty-first century world order.” 

 

“Each offers ideas and programmes for the reorganization and reform of global rules and institutions. Each has its own constructed history, its own list of grievances and accomplishments. Each has its leaders, projects and ideological visions.” 

 

“These Three Worlds are not blocs, nor even coherent negotiating groups. They might best be seen as informal, constructed and evolving global factions, and not as fixed or formal political entities.”

 

“The Three Worlds are not best defined as poles so much as loose coalitions seeking to shape global rules and institutions. States in these three ‘worlds’ occupy different locations in the global system, creating shared interests and affinities that, taken together, shape patterns of interstate behaviour. The Three Worlds are defined in important respects by diplomacy— that is, by speeches, summit meetings and UN gatherings in which leaders advance their visions of world order. Each grouping has a loose political identity and a range of more-or-less consistent convictions about what constitutes a desirable and legitimate international order.”

I think it is difficult to know where we are at this moment, and more so where we are going. It is evident, however, that the world we have experienced over the last decades is being hammered out of existence especially by Trump 2.0. As David Wallace-Wells describes it in a NYTimes Opinion article, written just the other day: 

“But each declaration of imperial desire is that mercurial kind of Trumpist speech act, in which a given utterance can be both meaningless and full of portent at the same time, self-disavowing even as it also demonstrates the president’s world-shaping power.” 

 

“And whatever comes of Trump’s retrograde dreams of manifest destiny, the implicit challenge to the legacy geopolitical order is just as striking: If we want these things and these places, who is going to stop us?” … 

 

“What comes next? New paradigms rarely arise fully formed. But if we spent the last four years watching Joe Biden’s ineffectual attempt to revive some rickety version of the moralistic postwar order, it is supremely clear what Donald Trump would like to replace that pretense with: the principle that global chaos opens up opportunity for great powers long hemmed in by convention and deference.” 

 

“The MAGA riposte is, Let’s not be naïve and let’s not be suckers: We are all wolves on the world stage, and the game begins when we show our teeth.”

It would be valuable if new rules, principles, and norms emerged but at the moment what we can see is the dramatic impact of power on interstate relations. For the moment we are less driven by the emergence of order but by its opposite.  But we will come back here at Alan’s Newsletter to examine  – likely repeatedly – the shape of the global order as I think there may be surprises, possibly many surprises we have not anticipated given the immediate and dramatic attention to Trump.

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All Purpose Tools – with Destruction in Mind

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It was hard to swallow the various initiatives and proposals that flooded from the White House and indeed Trump’s lips this week. Where does one start – with Gaza and the crazy Trump ‘wacko’ notion of the ‘Riviera of the  Mediterranean’? Or, do we look at a somewhat lower decibel view – the threats and or actions by Trump when it comes to tariffs. Tariffs, these things you remember up until Trump as a policy instrument that  used to be about trade policy. Well, not any more according to Trump. 

It was dismaying and equally disheartening to listen to the various efforts by his advisors past and present to normalize the actions along with Republicans in Congress while the loyal opposition, the  Democrats, seem ‘rooted in their seats’ with what appears to be only minor ‘huffing and puffing’ against the many mania actions by the President. 

What seems most startling is his recent flood of actions – Executive Orders and Memos – take us back to Trump 1.0 – but worse. The Trump Gaza proposal seems to be – without question – the winner of the week though. As Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman of the NYTimes, point out:

While his announcement looked formal and thought-out — he read the plan from a sheet of paper — his administration had not done even the most basic planning to examine the feasibility of the idea, according to four people with knowledge of the discussions, who were not authorized to speak publicly. 

 

Inside the U.S. government, there had been no meetings with the State Department or Pentagon, as would normally occur for any serious foreign policy proposal, let alone one of such magnitude. There had been no working groups. The Defense Department had produced no estimates of the troop numbers required, or cost estimates, or even an outline of how it might work.

 

There was little beyond an idea inside the president’s head.

And as David Leonhardt, also of the NYTimes, noted: 

For all the early energy of his presidency — the flurry of executive orders, confirmations and firings — Trump has looked less disciplined this week than he did in the initial days after returning to office. The last few days have instead conjured the chaos of his first term, when his grand pronouncements often failed to change government policy. 

Back to the Gaza proposal, for  a moment.  It is worth noting Aaron David Miller’s view as set out recently in his FP in a piece titled, “Trump Makes Population Transfer an American Policy”. Miller has had a long connection with  the region. He was a former U.S. State Department Middle East analyst and importantly a negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations there. As he wrote: 

From my 27 years of working in the official U.S. Arab-Israeli diplomacy business, I can say President Donald Trump’s Gaza gambit goes above and beyond the craziest and most destructive proposal any administration has ever made (and there have been some strange ones). In one fell swoop, standing next to an Israeli leader who looked like the cat that just swallowed a dozen canaries, the president let loose on a scheme that is not just impractical but dangerous.

 

Trump has now harnessed U.S. prestige and credibility to propose an idea that will be perceived as forced transfer or worse; validated the all-too-dangerous fantasies of the Israel right; undermined key U.S. partners Egypt and Jordan; made his own goal of Israeli-Saudi normalization that much harder; and for good measure sent an unmistakable signal to authoritarians everywhere that they have the right to assert control over other people’s territory. 

Clearly, it is ‘stomach churning’ to many that have been involved in the long unsuccessful effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and more recently to end the Gaza war. Arab partners have uniformly rejected the Trump proposal for Gaza and Israeli support at least to the extent of organizing the Israeli military to aid voluntary evacuation as pointed out by Alexandra Sharp at FP: 

Such suggestions have sparked a flurry of behind-the-scenes diplomacy to stop the joint Israel-U.S. proposal. Both Jordan and Egypt have refused to accept displaced Gaza residents, with Jordanian King Abdullah II rejecting any efforts to annex the territory and Cairo stating that the plan “constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law, and infringes on the most basic rights of the Palestinian people.” Egyptian officials told Time magazine that such a plan could undermine the country’s peace treaty with Israel and harm the region’s stability.

 

Saudi Arabia also strongly rejected the proposal and vowed not to sign a normalization deal with Israel—a foreign-policy priority for the Trump administration—without the creation of a Palestinian state that includes Gaza.

In the face of the Gaza proposal, Trump’s recent tariff actions against Canada, Mexico and China, seem positively tame. Still, though, it was rather crazy stuff threatening 25 percent across the board tariffs on Canada and Mexico only to hold off for 30 days after discussions with Mexican and Canadian leaders and then applying 10 percent across the board tariffs against China. The ultimate outcomes remain unknown though it is startling that Trump’s actions to delay action comes after accepting, at least in the Canadian case, proposals that had been offered significantly earlier. And not unlike the Gaza proposal, it is hard to discern either the methods or the ultimate goal of Trump’s proposals and demands. Is there a method or a clear goal?   The question that faces allies and foes alike is: is there a method to the madness? Not surprisingly experts and opinion writers have in the past, and in the early days of this  second Trump Administration are trying to assess what objectives and outcomes is Trump attempting to achieve? And what diplomatic means is Trump employing to achieve those objectives. 

On the latter Aaron Blake has suggested that there are four possible explanations for this current Trump 2.0 approach. In a piece in the Washington Post (Wapo)  titled, “4 explanations for Trump’s shocking Gaza proposal”, Blake gives us the following possible explanations for the outburst from Trump on Gaza at the press conference with Benjamin Netanyahu. He suggests:

  1. It is a distraction – “And there’s no question that Trump, more than ever, is “flooding the zone” with bold (and often legally dubious) actions that challenge everyone to keep up.” 

  2. It is a negotiating ploy “This could be Trump threatening the unthinkable to force Middle Eastern countries to pursue a more sustainable peace. It would basically be: If you guys can’t figure it out, we’re coming in.” 

  3. He’s leaning into the madman theory even more – ““The idea is basically to make other countries believe you’re completely unpredictable and capable of anything, to keep them in line.”

  4. His sudden imperialist streak is very real – ““It’s possible all of this imperialistic talk is bluster. But it’s also possible that Trump feels freed up in his second term, after years of leveraging “America First” for political gain, to change it up and make the expansion of the United States (in areas he actually cares about) a key plank of his legacy.”

All have some validity. It is evident that the approaches vary from slightly ‘off kilter’ – the madman theory, to a strategic gambit – a negotiating ploy.   I don’t think it is possible to draw strong conclusions at this early Trump 2.0 stage. What we do know however, that particularly with respect to the Gaza proposal, he is on his own untethered to his advisers and key cabinet members. And in the case of the ‘Gaza bomb’ it had one added dramatic effect – it left Netanyahu completely off the hook from any sharp questioning from global media over immediate Gaza actions on the ceasefire, and beyond, the role of the Palestinian Authority, and the future of a “two state solution”. It was a significant timely encounter completely avoided.

With respect to Trump’s goals, assuming there are such animals, it is hard to ignore the fact that his actions seem intended to dismantle the order that the US built; to see the United States as demanding fealty to a leading power and the shape of relations the US is striving to build under Trump 2.0. Decades of building integrated markets in North America, and likely  beyond, are now threatened by Trump’s bellicose actions. Yet according to Bob Davis in FP in a piece titled, “Trump Has the Whole Global Trade System in His Sights”, this is Trump’s goal: 

But he has a bigger goal in mind for his second term with plans he is still cooking up. Trump seeks to remake global trade based on what he calls “reciprocity”—treating other countries, supposedly, in the same fashion as they treat the United States. China is not the target this time—or at least not the only one. He has his sights set on any country with which the U.S. has a large, persistent trade deficit, which in his mind means it is treating the U.S. “terribly.” Success would mean sharply reducing the trade deficit, no matter which country he hits or what other geopolitical goals it impedes.

Maybe he does, maybe he doesn’t have this goal in mind. He is swinging tariffs as an ‘all purpose tool’ with destruction in mind. We will be watching. 

Image Credit: France 24

This Post first appeared at my Substack, Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/posts/detail/156695312/share-center

 

 

The Difficult Course of US-China Relations

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Many anticipated, and or feared, the flood of Executive Orders from the second Trump White House these past weeks. The barrage of Executive Orders follows a playbook conceived from a longtime Trump supporter Steve Bannon.  Bannon referred to it as ‘flood the zone’. Bannon served as the White House’s chief strategist for the first seven months of U.S. president Donald Trump’s first administration, before Trump discharged him. He remains a strong supporter of Trump actions. As Luke Braodwater of the NYTimes describes this Bannon approach:

… Bannon boasted of the ability to overwhelm Democrats and any media opposition through a determined effort to “flood the zone” with initiatives.

 

On Tuesday, just when Democrats thought they might come up for air, news broke that Mr. Trump had ordered a freeze on trillions of dollars in federal grants and loans, prompting a new round of outrage.

 

It is a little unclear how adept the Democrats are in parrying the ‘flood the zone’ approach but there does seem to be some awareness of the tactic: 

“It’s a little bit like drinking from a fire hose,” Representative Gerald E. Connolly of Virginia, the top Democrat on the Oversight Committee, said of the pace of Mr. Trump’s moves. But he said that speed is likely to cause sloppiness and mistakes.”

 

They’re going to stumble,” Mr. Connolly said. “They’re going to screw up, and we’re going to pounce when they do. In their haste to remake the federal government, they’re going to make big, big mistakes.”

 

And the evidence of at least Trump ‘screw ups’ emerged rapidly. The particular initiative that generated a significant amount of chaos was the issuance of the freeze on government spending. In fact the freeze memo was quickly withdrawn though not before a federal judge on Tuesday temporarily blocked a pause on federal funding while the Trump administration declared it would conduct an across-the-board review. Even more chaotically the new press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, a quite blustery press secretary it seems I might add, insisted, however, that the spending freeze in the Order wasn’t being rescinded despite the memo that appeared to rescinded the freeze. Dan Drezner at his Substack,  Drezner’s World, captured the craziness that has transpired recently with this flurry of executive orders, the freeze memo in particular: 

Here’s the thing, though: to paraphrase Mario Cuomo, you can campaign seriously but you have to govern literally. And the first week of Trump 2.0 highlights the problems when an entire administration fails to make this particular pivot. 

 

Needless to say, almost everything after “The American people elected Donald J. Trump to be President of the United States” is either factually or legally incorrect. Taken literally, it is a tsunami of bullshit.

 

Dan summed up this rather chaotic week for the Trump administration this  way: 

The White House and its co-partisans  tried to backfill and claim that everyone overreacted and should have understood what the president really, truly meant. But that dog won’t hunt. As the Manhattan Institute’s Brian Riedl — a pretty conservative dude — concluded, “the blame here lies entirely with the White House for releasing a terribly-written memo that did not include most of the guardrails they are now rushing to add as part of their next-day damage control. Perhaps the White House should try to get it right the first time.

 

If the Trump administration isn’t careful, they are going to blow their political inheritance and destroy the confidence of the American people. If they persist with “seriously but not literally” as a mode of governance, things will get real ugly real fast.

Now the chaos that broke out after the freeze memo kinda interfered with my effort to assess where Trump 2.0 was going with respect to US relations with China beginning with the Trump threat to impose 10 percent tariffs on China on account of fentanyl. Where is Trump 2.0 with respect to US-China relations? Well, interestingly Trump has not  played up the US-China relationship yet, though the imposition of tariffs on China might well signal a change. And while Trump has threatened tariffs we need to see if, and or when they happen, and the bluster against China that will accompany the tariff announcement. 

Meanwhile, Ryan Hass of Brookings has written a very interesting piece – “Can Trump seize the moment on China?” targeting the US-China relationship. He points to the very ‘heart’ of the competitiveness between the two leading powers:

This comprehensive approach [from China] to nurturing national economic competitiveness has generated eye-popping levels of industrial output. China is on pace to produce nearly 45% of global industrial output by 2030, according to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Outside of America’s industrial dominance in the wake of World War II, it is hard to find modern historical analogs to the levels of global concentration of output that are now occurring in China. 

Ryan identifies from this massive industrial output advantage for China three risks. First there is the national security risk:

China’s factories and shipyards are on track to have production capacity for military equipment at a scale the United States and its partners could struggle to match. Already, according to Michael Beckley, China is embarking on the largest peacetime military buildup since World War II, producing ships, planes, and missiles five to six times as fast as the United States

Then, there is the risk to US social cohesion:

If America’s economy becomes too dramatically overweighted toward finance, technology, and services, it will leave a large portion of the population behind, resulting in a hollowed-out middle class and a yawning gap between winners and losers in the 21st-century American economy. Such a scenario would fracture the polity and create the seeds of social disorder.

Third, and relatedly, the overconcentration of industrial output in China would undermine America’s allies in Europe and Asia:

America’s long-term strategic interests would be ill-served if vehicle factories shutter across Europe and if Japan’s and South Korea’s industrial sectors are decimated by Chinese competitors. A core challenge for the Trump administration will be rebalancing global economic activity to ensure sustainable opportunities for growth in industrial output outside China.

Rebalancing is the key. But there also is the rub. It is very hard to see how with the current leadership of China, namely Xi Jinping, such a rebalancing is possible. The difficulties are underscored in an article by Zongyuan Zoe Liu in FA. This is an article published back in August entitled: “China’s Real Economic Crisis: Why Beijing Won’t Give Up on a Failing Model”. Zongyuan Zoe is currently the Maurice R. Greenberg Fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In the piece he wrote:

Despite vehement denials by Beijing, Chinese industrial policy has for decades led to recurring cycles of overcapacity.

 

Partly, this stems from a long tradition of economic planning that has given enormous emphasis to industrial production and infrastructure development while virtually ignoring household consumption. This oversight does not stem from ignorance or miscalculation; rather, it reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing economic vision.

 

As the party sees it, consumption is an individualistic distraction that threatens to divert resources away from China’s core economic strength: its industrial base.” According to party orthodoxy, China’s economic advantage derives from its low consumption and high savings rates, which generate capital that the state-controlled banking system can funnel into industrial enterprises.

And he then concludes: 

For the West, China’s overcapacity problem presents a long-term challenge that can’t be solved simply by erecting new trade barriers. For one thing, even if the United States and Europe were able to significantly limit the amount of Chinese goods reaching Western markets, it would not unravel the structural inefficiencies that have accumulated in China over decades of privileging industrial investment and production goals.

Overlay this industrial focus by China with an intense competitive urges by members of the Trump team, starting with Marco Rubio, if not Donald Trump himself. Here is Rubio in his confirmation opening remarks speaking about China: 

We welcomed the Chinese Communist Party into this global order. And they took advantage of all its benefits. But they ignored all its obligations and responsibilities. Instead, they have lied, cheated, hacked, and stolen their way to global superpower status, at our expense.

Hardly an attitude likely to generate serious considered negotiations between the US and China. And, then finally, add the necessary US approach to negotiations as seen and set out by Ryan Hass: 

Trump’s team holds a variety of viewpoints on how to maximize America’s leverage, or even on what objectives America should pursue in its competition with China. Left unaddressed, this variance in views risks leading to policy incoherence. To overcome this risk, Trump will need to set a firm direction, identify specific objectives, and put his advisors on notice that they will pay a cost for actions that undermine his goals. 

Look Trump’s transactional urges may surprise us all with movement on the US-China negotiating front but there is little, no, no way that Trump will undertake a more than reasonable approach as urged by Ryan. In fact Ryan describes what is likely to be the more telling direction and its consequences: 

Absent firm and decisive policy direction from the top, there is a risk of policy chaos, with different factions canceling each other out and little progress being achieved to address American concerns about Chinese behavior. In such a circumstance, the U.S.-China relationship likely would grow more fractious. If Beijing abandons the hope of resolving U.S.-China differences through diplomacy, it likely will double down on efforts to hedge risk, including by deepening its relationships with countries who share antagonisms against the United States. 

Based on what we have seen to date, I think we should ‘hunker down’ and anticipate a ‘risk of policy chaos’. More to come.

Image Credit: AP

The Trump Weakening of America and Multilateralism

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Well, I guess we shouldn’t have been surprised. But  since I’ve never spent time listening to Trump speeches – I thought I would listen to Trump’s Second Inaugural . As David Bernstein et al. at the Substack, “Good Politics/Bad Politics” called it: “An Ugly Speech”. And it was. On reflection, and notwithstanding his early invocation of, ““The golden age of America begins right now,” in fact it was really a version two of “American Carnage”. As David Bernstein and colleagues declared: 

“Normal inaugural addresses are inclusive. Trump? There was little or nothing in this speech for anyone but his strongest supporters. The framing of it was, as is always the case with Trump, outright insulting to everyone else: The nation has been absolutely horrible for the last four years, in his telling, with not even a hint that its leaders have been trying to do their best even if they differ on what to do.” 

 

“This ugly speech will be forgotten rapidly. But if there was anything there to even give him a bit of a honeymoon approval bump, I sure didn’t see it.”

 

“Trump’s inauguration speech was very much directed toward such supporters. Despite claims that unity would be a major theme, the speech was a typical Trump litany of gripes about the left, praises for his unique ability to fix things, and recitation of plans that can at best be called controversial.”

In the NYTimes, “Morning Briefing” Emmett Lidner declared just after the speech: 

“The golden age of America begins right now,” Trump declared in his Inaugural Address delivered at the Capitol, shortly after he took the oath of office. Much as he did eight years ago, Trump painted a grim portrait of a country on its knees that only he could revive.” 

And Paolo Magri of the Italian think tank ISPI put it this way: 

“Eight years after his first inaugural address, the one about “American carnage,” Trump returned with the promise of a new “golden age” for the United States. But much of that vengeful rhetoric was still there, in tones steeped in rancor and an almost messianic inspiration for his extraordinary political comeback. “I was saved by God to make America great again,” the tycoon said in reference to the attempted assassination he was the victim of last summer. In a speech full of imperialistic overtones, Trump then announced that he would restore America’s highest peak, Mount Denali, to its former name, Mount McKinley, in honor of the Republican president assassinated in 1901. He also reiterated his intention to “pursue our manifest destiny to the stars,” promising to plant the American flag on Mars, rename the Gulf of Mexico the “Gulf of America,” and reclaim the Panama Canal.” 

Finally, David French, among a number of other opinion writers, commenting on the Inauguration’s best and worst moments in the NYT said this about the Trump speech: 

 “The title of Trump’s speech should have been “American Carnage 2: Ultimate Carnage.” If possible, Trump’s second inaugural speech was darker than his first. Rather than seek to unite Americans, he painted the darkest possible picture of the state of the nation and the character of his opponents. And he set himself up as a kind of messiah figure, the man saved by God for the sake of national greatness. If you want to lay the groundwork for authoritarianism, that’s exactly how to do it.”

It was disheartening. Now I didn’t expect a wholesale conversion for the returning President but one could have hoped for some greater perspective with Trump 2.0. But no, I don’t think so. So, we are likely to see all his grievances and resentments dominating this President’s domestic and foreign policy. 

Now I was interested in various reactions to Trump’s reactions to American foreign policy both his ongoing remarks through the election campaign and then with his full-throated approach to US foreign policy on Inauguration Day. One person of interest to me was Ben Rhodes and his views. Rhodes is a political commentator, and a former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting under President Barack Obama. With Jake Sullivan, he is the co-chair of National Security Action, a political NGO. In FA Rhodes at the end of 2024, in a piece entitled, “Democrats Need a Foreign Policy That Can Work—and Win: How to Harness Populist Energy and Build a Better International Order” displayed a strong critique of Trump :

“While Trump casts himself as a radical disrupter, he is a familiar figure in today’s world: a far-right nationalist at a time when that brand of politics is ascendant, a strongman in a world full of them.” 

 

“Since his ascent in 2016, Trump has successfully tapped into a populist fatigue with American national security policies. He has consistently railed against forever wars, free trade, free-riding allies,an unaccountable “deep state,” and the harm that globalization has done to the working class. The irony is that, for a long time, the policies that produced these outcomes were more popular among Republicans than Democrats.”

 

“By fully embracing the mantle of hawkish defenders of the status quo, Democrats allowed themselves to be held responsible for the failures of the post-9/11 era.”

 

“At the same time, however, many Americans have come to see U.S. national security policy writ large as an instrument of a broader system that has not served their interests and is unresponsive to their concerns.”

I think it is fair to say that Trump has tapped in to that distaste for current US foreign policy and many Americans have glommed on to Trump’s strongman approach.  Now having said that Rhodes sharply critiques Trump policy directions making clear the hollowness of Trump’s strongman approaches: 

To be clear, the remedies that Trump is preparing to impose are not correctives to the grievances he has identified. An overuse of tariffs—combined with more sanctions and further decoupling of supply chains—would only exacerbate inflation while amplifying the geopolitical influence of China. A shift of that kind would also reduce the cost to China of a potential blockade or invasion of Taiwan. Mass deportations will tear at the social cohesion of American communities, drive up prices, and undermine the strength and vitality that the U.S. has traditionally drawn from immigrants. Tax cuts, deregulation, and a federal embrace of cryptocurrencies will fuel inequality and encourage oligarchy. The abandonment of action on climate change could have catastrophic consequences as the planet careens past a tipping point. U.S. alignment with the Israeli far right could lead to the annexation of parts of Gaza and the West Bank, with devastating consequences for Palestinians and perhaps the stability of neighboring states. The abandonment of Ukraine would lead to an end to that war on terms favorable to Russia while eroding U.S. influence in Europe. The dismantling of American national security agencies through unqualified appointments and purges of the civil and foreign service will concentrate power in the White House while undermining the long-term capacity of the government to protect the safety and interests of the American people. And these are just the things Trump has said he will do: if his COVID-19 pandemic response is any indication, there is little reason to trust that he will competently manage the inevitable crises to come. This is a harrowing thought in a world of great-power conflict.

But it is interesting to contemplate the consequences of Trump foreign policy. And of course there is no consensus here, I suppose not surprisingly. For instance, there was the recent FA piece by Richard Fontaine titled: “The Trump-Biden-Trump Foreign Policy: American Strategy’s Strange Continuity”. Fontaine, interestingly, is currently CEO of the Center for a New American Security but earlier in his career, he was a foreign policy adviser to U.S. Senator John McCain. Now interestingly Fontaine suggests a rather muted policy by Trump with continuity between the two administrations – Biden-Trump: 

“The two administrations [Trump, Biden] could hardly have been more different in style and rhetoric. In the underlying substance of their policies, however, there was more continuity than the casual observer might have appreciated.”

 

“Many such areas of constancy will almost certainly remain in the next Trump presidency. The incoming administration’s approach to Israel, for instance, will likely be broadly similar, combining military support with protection both from Iranian missiles and diplomatic attacks at the United Nations and elsewhere. Policy toward Saudi Arabia will be comparable now that Biden has embraced the government in Riyadh and seeks regional normalization. Under Trump, Washington is poised to continue to see China as its foremost global challenger and endeavor to build domestic sources of strength. Even as the new administration rails against U.S. allies on issues such as defense spending and trade, it is likely to seek tighter partnerships abroad, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, to better compete with Beijing.” 

 

“Trump will usher in departures, sometimes dramatic ones, in American foreign policy. But those changes will compose just a fraction of the total. The stability of U.S. interests and values, the role of Congress, and the realities of today’s world will demand a significant measure of constancy. Although it is bent on reversing Biden’s approach, the incoming team may itself be surprised to find out how much the two administrations share.” 

Now you’ll not be surprised that this view of similarity between the two administrations is not universally held. I was intrigued by my colleague Dan Drezner’s piece in WPR, where, apparently, Dan is now providing a monthly opinion piece. I was alerted to it by Dan at his Substack, Drezner’s World, rather chillingly titled, “A Great Power War is Coming: The implicit assumption behind a lot of recent rhetoric.” Dan was particularly sparked by Trump’s territorial threats – to the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada. He reacted in the article this way:

“I have a very depressing answer: “Fear of a Great Power War Could Be Making One More Likely.” 

As he says the following is his thesis paragraph: 

“What is going on? There are some disturbing parallels between how great powers are behaving today and how they started behaving in the late 1930s. In both eras, the proliferation of economic sanctions and embargoes caused great powers to fear that they would be cut off from critical resources. Their reaction to that threat, in turn, helped to escalate great power conflict. The question today is whether history will repeat itself, or only rhyme.” 

He then provides the following conclusion: 

“For decades, the principal sources of great power peace have been clear: U.S. hegemony, commercial interdependence and nuclear deterrence. But really, there was a fourth pillar as well: whether elites in these countries were seriously contemplating the mechanics of a sustained great power war. For much of the post-Cold War era, that was inconceivable.”

 

“In 2025, U.S. hegemony looks wobbly, and great powers are falling all over themselves to reject interdependence unless it favors them asymmetrically. Increasingly, elites in the U.S. and China seem to be conceiving of how a war between the two countries would play out. Which means we may be about to test whether the last pillar of great power peace—the logic of mutually assured destruction—remains compelling or not.” 

Now I must say my initial reaction was – really! It is possible of course,  but I suspect not all that likely. My reaction to the proposition offered by Dan is in part driven by my caution when being offered historical analogies. They are superficially attractive, and frequently employed but such comparisons should be treated with strong caution. If you’re going to use an historical analogy you examine the similarities, of course, but you need to also look at the dissimilarities before declaring it an appropriate lesson. Few authors ever do; it takes a fair bit of work and rather deep historical knowledge. And I’m afraid it was done in this case, though practically few authors or experts do. Still in the end mark me skeptical. 

So we enter the age of ‘Trump 2.0’. Fasten your safety belts. It is going to be a bumpy ride, for sure.

Image Credit: NY Times

Struggling with Global Leadership

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So, with the last several Posts here at Alan’s Newsletter, I have been transitioning – altering my mindset, and bidding farewell to the Biden administration and contemplating the reality of the return of Donald Trump as US President with a new administration. There are certainly strong signs that this time around, as opposed to 2017, that the Trump administration is intent on ‘hitting the ground running’. As The Economist noted, for Trump there is nothing more critical than immigration and the removal of illegals:

Mr Trump has long been exercised about immigration. He made building a wall along America’s border with Mexico a central theme of his election campaign in 2016. He duly issued a flurry of executive orders on immigration within weeks of taking office in 2017, including a ban on visas for applicants from various largely Muslim countries and instructions to federal agencies to expedite the construction of the border wall and to detain more illegal immigrants. … Stephen Miller, his deputy chief of staff, is an America First, anti-immigration hawk who has been fighting against bipartisan immigration reform in Congress since 2013. “As God is my witness,” he declared last year, “you are going to see millions of people rapidly removed from this country who have no right to be here.

The question is where does Trump and his team take the US? On immigration? On US-China relations? On relations with allies and the multilateral relations and organizations that the US has built over the past several decades? What approach is Trump going to take in rolling out ‘America First’? Now, there is lots of speculation but with so much being described really knowing is nearly impossible. But that being said, one clear direction is described by Fareed Zakaria. Like many, Fareed has to absorb the recent inducements and/or threats by Trump with respect to Greenland and Canada and the Panama Canal. As a result Fareed suggests:

Having campaigned on a policy of ending wars, making peace, putting America first and disentangling the country from the world, President-elect Donald Trump this week decided to revive 19th-century imperialism. In a single news conference, he pondered making Canada a state and acquiring Greenland and the Panama Canal by economic coercion — and declined to rule out using military force in the latter two cases.

Fareed, in his weekly Washington Post opinion piece titled, “Trump revives 19th-century imperialism. Make Russia great again!”, suggests these territorial aggrandizement initiatives simply put the US today in the same league as Russia and China:

In the news conference, Trump proposed getting rid of the “artificially drawn line” between Canada and the United States. Of course, that is precisely what President Vladimir Putin says about the line between Russia and Ukraine. Or President Xi Jinping about the division between China and Taiwan. This is a world that makes Russia and China great again.

It is tough to really understand the future US foreign policy with Trump at the helm. Now I may be reaching way too far but I was intrigued by the republishing, recently by Foreign Affairs, of a piece by Richard Haass now President emeritus of CFR and Charles Kupchan a Senior Fellow and Director of European Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Charlie is also Professor of International Affairs at the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University. The article is entitled, “The New Concert of Powers: How to Prevent Catastrophe and Promote Stability in a Multipolar World”. The piece was originally published in 2021.

For Haass and Kupchan the future of the global order is multipolarity as they describe it in the FA article. As they suggest:

Moreover, even if Western democracies overcome polarization, beat back illiberalism, and pull off an economic rebound, they will not forestall the arrival of a world that is both multipolar and ideologically diverse.

And as they argue the best means, maybe the only structure for the global order to achieve some stability in such a coming multipolar environment is a gathering of major powers:

The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers. As the history of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe demonstrated—its members were the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—a steering group of leading countries can curb the geopolitical and ideological competition that usually accompanies multipolarity.

 

This recent uptake in concert operation and interest in the same includes a major piece by my colleague, Andrew Fenton Cooper, from Waterloo University. You might want to take a look at his recent publication from Oxford Press titled: The Concertation Impulse in World Politics”. But turning back to Haass and Kupchan this is their description and understanding of such a concert:

 

Concerts have two characteristics that make them well suited to the emerging global landscape: political inclusivity and procedural informality. A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there, regardless of their regime type. In so doing, it largely separates ideological differences over domestic governance from matters of international cooperation.

Concerts have two characteristics that make them well suited to the emerging global landscape: political inclusivity and procedural informality. A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there, regardless of their regime type. In so doing, it largely separates ideological differences over domestic governance from matters of international cooperation.

A global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body. It would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions.

 

This steering group would help fashion new rules of the road and build support for collective initiatives but leave operational matters, such as deploying peacekeeping missions, delivering pandemic relief, and concluding new climate deals, to the UN and other existing bodies. The concert would thus tee up decisions that could then be taken and implemented elsewhere. It would sit atop and backstop, not supplant, the current international architecture by maintaining a dialogue that does not now exist.

This new global concert proposal, according to Haass and Kupchan, would have the following membership:

A global concert would have six members: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States.

The concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending.

The analysis seems to be moving full speed forward until:

This proposal presumes that none of the concert’s members would be a revisionist power bent on aggression and conquest.

Ah, and there is the dilemma – the ‘fly in the ointment’. The reality is that two great powers are evidently revisionist – that is Russia and China, and now under Trump the same may well be said for the upcoming Trump administration.

But as Nathan Gardels, the editor-in-chief of Noema Magazine and also the co-founder of, and a senior adviser to the Berggruen Institute, just recently wrote in Noema:

A revisionist state seeks to change the rules and norms of the extant world order. In recent years, we have become used to castigating China and Russia as the chief renegades in this endeavor. Now, as Princeton political scientist John Ikenberry pithily notes, another “revisionist state has arrived on the scene to contest the liberal international order … it is the United States. It’s Trump in the Oval Office, the beating heart of the free world.”

So, are we at a brick wall when it comes to promoting stability and dampening geopolitical tensions? Well, like many of my international relations colleagues I have spent time examining the contours and the operation of the classic global concert – the Concert of Europe. For Haass and Kupchan this is the model for a contemporary concert designed to diminish tensions and mitigate conflict. But the Concert is 200 years ago and it is not at all clear that a modern day instrument could operate in any way similar to this much earlier European instrument. And I would think we have already a ready-made instrument of concert-like characteristics – the G20. This involves a membership wider than that suggested by these authors. The G20 today includes: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, United Kingdom and United States and two regional bodies today: the European Union and the African Union. It seems to me this Informal has a much better representation from the Global South and the collective could turn its attention to critical global security issues as well as global economic issues if the motivation were there.

But concerts may not be, or may not be the only mechanism to generate potentially greater stability in a world of increasing disorder. Rather, plurilateral structures – smaller groupings that include major and Middle Powers, especially from the Global South targeting growing challenges to global stability – plurilateral collaborations that could target climate change and the green transition, debt distress and relief, regional conflicts and more. Let’s tackle real threatening problems starting with these plurilateral collaboratives and build our way to a global concert in time. Let’s start here with this smaller step, and who knows, in time it might also provide for a larger grouping, even a ‘global concert’ with possibly better leadership than we seem to have right now.

This first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter – https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/publish/post/155031165

All comments and subscriptions for the Substack are welcome

 

“What Can We Expect?”: A Second Look At America’s Political Transition

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Well, hello, we’re back! I do hope the holidays proved to be a warm time and filled with family and friends. Now, I was ‘chomping at the bit’ to return to Alan’s Newsletter before the end of the Biden administration and the return of Donald J Trump. We are looking at the transition of administrations – focusing on foreign policy.

So where we left Alan’s Newsletter at this first Post of ‘What Can We Expect’ – the last Post of the year 2024, was me actually looking at the end of the Biden administration – and, as I said: “… trying to focus on the end of the Biden administration: what folks conclude about the Biden initiatives and where that then leads, possibly,  for the upcoming Trump administration”, especially targeting US-China policy. 

In this earlier Post I looked primarily at trade and technology policies – and there seemed to be much to be desired – though it was interesting to get Biden’s last words on his own assessment of his administration’s efforts. But now I want to extend the analysis by turning to national security. Interestingly, and as I noted in the earlier Post I was keen to review, none other than Senator McConnell, a dominant Republican figure over several decades in Congress and the Republican majority leader from 2015 to 2021, making him the longest-serving Senate party leader in U.S. history. And for the moment he remains in the Senate and an influence on some at least. But to get there – to McConnell that is,  I thought it worthwhile to first look at Fareed Zakaria’s early 2024 FA article, “The Self-Doubting Superpower: America Shouldn’t Give Up on the World It Made” Fareed has a large public role in assessing US international politics as the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and he also writes a weekly column for The Washington Post. Fareed starts out acknowledging the Biden administration’s turn – and not for the better – in international economic policy making: 

“And yet, much of his governing strategy has been predicated on the notion that the country has been following the wrong course, even under Democratic presidents, even during the Obama-Biden administration. In an April 2023 speech, Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, criticized “much of the international economic policy of the last few decades,” blaming globalization and liberalization for hollowing out the country’s industrial base, exporting American jobs, and weakening some core industries.”

Now, I remain rather sceptical of the consequences these folks assign to trade policy but it continues to be a ‘warm blanket’ for many analysts and politicians. Fareed acknowledges it, it but then situates the US in the global order as still a dominant presence: 

“On measure after measure, the United States remains in a commanding position compared with its major competitors and rivals. Yet it does confront a very different international landscape. Many powers across the globe have risen in strength and confidence. They will not meekly assent to American directives. Some of them actively seek to challenge the United States’ dominant position and the order that has been built around it. … The challenge for Washington is to run fast but not run scared. Today, however, it remains gripped by panic and self doubt.” 

Fareed raises the real prospect that the US will quail from continued leadership in the global economy but in fact even beyond that to global order and national security relations as well: 

“The most worrying challenge to the rules-based international order does not come from China, Russia, or Iran. It comes from the United States. If America, consumed by exaggerated fears of its own decline, retreats from its leading role in world affairs, it will open up power vacuums across the globe and encourage a variety of powers and players to try to step into the disarray.” 

 

“Since 1945, America has debated the nature of its engagement with the world, but not whether it should be engaged to begin with. Were the country to truly turn inward, it would mark a retreat for the forces of order and progress. Washington can still set the agenda, build alliances, help solve global problems, and deter aggression while using limited resources—well below the levels that it spent during the Cold War. It would have to pay a far higher price if order collapsed, rogue powers rose, and the open world economy fractured or closed.”

Now the actions by the departing Biden administration may have already done some real damage to relations with allies – this the determination by Biden to kill the Nippon-US Steel deal. As Alan Beattie described it in his FT ‘Trade Secrets’ column:

“Still, some of us were also moderately hopeful that Biden’s long history as an alliance-builder in international relations might weigh reasonably heavily in the balance. That’s where we were largely wrong. When it came down to it, steelmakers were prioritised above all. As a unionised industry located in electoral swing states (Pennsylvania and Wisconsin) with tariff protection inherited from Donald Trump and national security and environmental rationales, however specious, they ticked too many boxes to ignore.” 

 

“All politics is local, including trade politics, but the politics here is quite weird. It’s surreal that the geopolitically important practice of friendshoring is being sabotaged by a USTR with no specialism in national security and a union leader both acting in defiance of colleagues who are closer to the issues at hand. Tai’s obsession with the steel industry has extended to sending groups of USTR officials on tourist trips to do photo-ops with steelworkers. This is vibes-based trade policy backed up by show-and-tell.” 

So, the focus on allies and partners in firming trade relations and building resilient supply chains with them is, in this instance, revealed as hollow: 

“When it came to it, it wasn’t the substance but the vibe of protecting the steel industry that prevented the Biden administration giving friendshoring a fair go. It’s a sad end for a respectable but ultimately unloved idea.” 

And, it suggests that the US under Biden is not ‘walking the walk’ when it comes to friendshoring but also undermining trust with, in this case, one of its closest allies in the Indo-Pacific, Japan.

All right then, focusing more directly on national security, let me turn to Rush Doshi who is a colleague – an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is also senior fellow for China and director of the Initiative on China Strategy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and importantly he served the Biden White House at the National Security Council (NSC) as the Director and later Deputy Senior Director for China and Taiwan from 2021 to March 2024. So involved with Biden national security. Having just emerged from the Biden administration, how does he now view the requirements of US national security policy today? Well, Rush assists us in a FA article produced in late November. There he wrote: 

“Without corrective action, the United States faced a growing risk of being surpassed by China technologically, dependent on it economically, and defeated militarily in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait.” 

 

“The Biden administration focused on rebuilding American strength by focusing on its foundations at home and its relationships with partners abroad, an approach summed up in its “invest, align, compete” tagline.

 

“That formula can also serve as a way to fulfill the Trump administration’s vision of “peace through strength.” But rebuilding American power will require the Trump administration to undertake new efforts, too, that depend on bipartisan congressional support and the buy in of the American public.”

 

“But the foundations of that strength have atrophied, especially since the end of the Cold War. The administration will need to undertake significant structural reforms to remedy these weaknesses.”

 

“The United States needs to fix its defense industrial base to rapidly deter China and, if necessary, defeat it in a potential conflict. At present, the United States would expend all its munitions within a week of sustained fighting and would struggle to rebuild surface vessels after they were sunk, with a national shipbuilding capacity less than that of one of China’s larger shipyards.”

 

“Washington also needs to protect its critical infrastructure from cyberattack. China has compromised U.S. critical infrastructure upon which millions of Americans rely, including water and gas, transportation, and telecommunications systems, with the aim of inciting chaos, sowing panic, and reducing U.S. will in a conflict scenario.” 

 

“Finally, the United States needs to invest in reindustrialization and technological leadership. China already accounts for more than 30 percent of global manufacturing, can innovate successfully, increasingly leads in the sectors of tomorrow, and is redirecting massive amounts of capital into manufacturing as its housing market stagnates. The result, a second “China shock” akin to the one that flooded U.S. markets with cheap Chinese goods at the beginning of this century, will threaten the United States’ future as an industrial power and leave it more dependent on China than China is on the United States. 

 

“National security is not just about foreign policy. Trump’s team should remember that the key to this decisive decade is not just what the United States does abroad. What it does at home to improve its competitive position may be even more important.” 

What is more than interesting is that Rush urges these major efforts after just emerging from several years at the Biden administration. Now what does that say about the Biden years. 

So, finally, let’s turn to what I promised you above Mitch McConnell. Now McConnell is more than willing to attack the Biden administration for what he describes as a weak national security effort. But it also urges Trump to avoid just focusing on China and in doing so ignore the real threat to Europe – and to the US obviously, from Russia’s Ukraine efforts. As McConnell describes:

“Trump would be wise to build his foreign policy on the enduring cornerstone of U.S. leadership: hard power.” 

 

“To pretend that the United States can focus on just one threat at a time, that its credibility is divisible, or that it can afford to shrug off faraway chaos as irrelevant is to ignore its global interests and its adversaries’ global designs.”

 

“China poses the gravest long-term challenge to U.S. interests. But although successive presidents have acknowledged this reality, their actual policies have been inconsistent.”

 

“In so doing, it [Trump] must not repeat the mistakes of President Barack Obama’s so-called pivot to Asia. The Obama administration failed to back up its policy with sufficient investments in U.S. military power.” 

Against the grain I suspect of many of the MAGA Republicans including, possibly Donald Trump, McConnell urges: 

“The United States needs a military that can handle multiple increasingly coordinated threats at once. Without one, a president will likely hesitate to expend limited resources on one threat at the expense of others, thereby ceding initiative or victory to an adversary.The United States must get back to budgets that are informed by strategy and a force-planning construct that imagines fighting more than one war at once.”

 

“The United States’ security and prosperity are rooted in military primacy. Preserving that decisive superiority is costly, but neglecting it comes with far steeper costs.”

For McConnell, then, there is a real need to underpin current US economic strength with policy initiatives: 

“I am not naive about the downsides of international trade, but there is no question that free markets and free trade have been responsible for much of the United States’ prosperity.”

 

“That’s why the United States and like-minded free-market economies must work together to reform the international trading system to protect U.S. interests from predatory trade practices—not abandon the system entirely.  Without U.S. leadership in this area, there is little question that Beijing will be able to rewrite the rules of trade on its own terms.”

Finally, there is a real abiding requirement, from this side of the Republican Congressional majority – directed to the MAGA Republicans and urging  this critical need for the incoming Trump administration:

“Trump will no doubt hear from some that he should prioritize a single theater and downgrade U.S. interests and commitments elsewhere. Most of these voices will argue for focusing on Asia at the expense of interests in Europe or the Middle East.  Such thinking is commonplace among both isolationist conservatives who indulge the fantasy of “Fortress America” and progressive liberals who mistake internationalism for an end in itself.”

 

“Neither camp has committed to maintaining the military superiority or sustaining the alliances needed to contest revisionist powers.” 

So, there you are. McConnell is urging ‘a full court press’ to maintain a dominant US military position and global leadership. Will Trump and his MAGA Republicans in Congress follow through. I have my doubts. 

Image Credit: Getty Images

This Post first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter –

https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/what-can-we-expect-a-second-look?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true

“What Can We Expect?”: In the First Instance

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Now you might think, with that title, that I’d be delving into Trump 2.0. Well, not exactly in the first instance. Instead, I am trying to focus on the end of the Biden administration: what folks conclude about the Biden initiatives and where that then leads, possibly, for the upcoming Trump administration. Now, to be clear, I’m not trying to guess where the Trump administration is likely to take us. Not with the inconsistent Trump at the helm again; but it would be good if the incoming administration might choose to take a hard look at what the Biden administration hoped to achieve with its policy initiatives and where, in fact, it found itself in the increasing disorder in the international system. We are particularly interested, not surprisingly, in the state of US-China relations in the face of four years of Biden strategy and policy. What has China done in reaction to Biden strategic competition? And what does the United States do now in the face of today’s US-China competition?

Just the other day, Tom Friedman from the NYT gave us a peek of what he saw in a recent visit to Beijing and Shanghai. Where is China today in the face of the challenging US relations: the end of US engagement, the rise in tensions with Trump 1.0 and the Biden strategic competitive policy. Friedman in an opinion article titled, “How Elon Musk and Taylor Swift Can Resolve U.S.-China Relations” makes “no bones about it” and early in the opinion piece he writes:

I just spent a week in Beijing and Shanghai, meeting with Chinese officials, economists and entrepreneurs, and let me get right to the point: While we were sleeping China took a great leap forward in high-tech manufacturing of everything.

And he starts with Trump 1.0:

If no one has told Donald Trump, then I will: His nickname on Chinese social media today is “Chuan Jianguo” — meaning “Trump the (Chinese) Nation Builder” — because of how his relentless China bashing and tariffs during his first term as president lit a fire under Beijing to double down on its efforts to gain global supremacy in electric cars, robots and rare materials, and to become as independent of America’s markets and tools as possible.

What Trump 2.0 now faces in today’s China that he helped to create is, according to Tom:

The China that Trump will encounter is a much more formidable export engine. Its advanced manufacturing muscles have exploded in size, sophistication and quantity in the last eight years, even while consumption by its people remains puny.

 

China’s export machine is so strong now that only very high tariffs might really slow it down, and China’s response to very high tariffs could be to start cutting off American industries from crucial supplies that are now available almost nowhere else. That kind of supply-chain warfare is not what anyone, anywhere needs.

Further, Tom signals what a Trump administration must now do in the face of much more evident competitor:

But if we don’t use this time to respond to China the way we did to the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, with our own comprehensive scientific, innovative and industrial push, we will be toast.

So for Tom what it requires is a ‘full court press’ – ‘A Sputnik Moment’ by the US under a second Trump administration. Hmm, if really required one has to wonder if given today’s US politics there is anything even somewhat similar to that much earlier, “all hands on deck” type US strategy.

Tom Friedman, however, is not the only one calling for a concerted US national effort to deal with a charging China that the US helped to create. More focused on the technology/science/innovation front is the examination by my good colleague Scott Kennedy from CSIS. Scott is senior adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at CSIS and recently he examined the US-China technology competition in Foreign Affairs, in an article titled, “How America’s War on Chinese Tech Backfired And Why Trump’s Plans Would Make Things Even Worse.

But just before going there I thought it was worth setting up that examination by focusing on probably one of Joe Biden’s last public talks as President, this at Brookings in Washington, just a few days ago on December 10th. The remarks were titled by the White House as, “His Middle-Out, Bottom-Up Economic Playbook”. There was a fair bit of coughing and missing words in the transcript but the message was clear enough:

Today, here at Brookings Institution, I would like to talk about pivotal actions we’ve taken to rebuild the economy for the long haul, you know, and how we’re — how we’re at a critical, in my view, moment in the direction the economy is going to take.

 

After decades of trickle-down economics that primarily benefited those at the very top, we — we’ve written a new book that’s growing the economy — the middle-out and the bottom-up — that benefits, thus far, everyone. And that’s going to be the test with go- — going forward.

 

I was determined to restore U.S. leadership in industries of the future.

 

We understood we needed long-term investments for the future. Investing in America agenda, which includes my Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act — together, they mark the most significant investment in America since the New Deal. And that’s a fact. I mean, whether it’s good or bad, that’s the fact.

 

We not only — we not only beat the pandemic; we broke from the economic orthodoxy that has failed this nation, in my view, for a long time — a theory that led to fewer jobs, less economic growth, and bigger deficits.

 

And the best way to build that in America was to invest in America, invest in American products and invest in the American people — not by handing out tax breaks to those at the top.

But the tools employed by the Biden administration, as described by the President, barely touched the protections initiated by Trump 1.0 and advanced further in some cases by the Biden administration. But Scott targets exactly those initiatives by the Biden administration, particularly in the technology innovation sectors. As he describes:

Washington’s array of tools is highly expansive: export controls, tariffs, product bans, inbound and outbound investment screening, constraints on data flows, incentives to shift supply chains, limits on scholarly exchange and research collaboration, industrial policy expenditures, and buy-America incentives.

 

The goals of these measures are equally diverse: slow China’s progress in the most advanced technologies that have dual-use potential, reduce overdependence on China as a source of inputs and as a market for Western goods, deny China access to sensitive data, protect critical infrastructure, push back against economic coercion, protect the United States’ industrial competitiveness, and boost its manufacturing employment.

And he concludes by arguing:

Beijing’s shift toward a more expansive and assertive form of mercantilist techno-nationalism poses genuine risks to the prosperity and economic security of the United States and others. Something must be done, to be sure, but Washington’s increasingly restrictive policies have yielded highly mixed results.

So it’s not that China doesn’t pose a challenge but the solutions chosen by the Biden administration, in part built on the earlier Trump years, raise serious concerns and pose real questions in the face of Trump 2.0:

As President-elect Donald Trump returns to power, his administration would be wise to reflect on the fact that existing restrictions on Chinese technology have yielded decidedly mixed results. The Biden administration has described its strategy as a “small yard, high fence,” or placing high restrictions on a small number of critical technologies. That yard is already growing, with negative unintended consequences for the United States.

What then can be done, according to Scott. It seems to be in several parts. First, according to him:

Washington needs to set clear priorities, identifying the most urgent threats that deserve a response. Otherwise, the United States will be dragged into a game of whack-a-mole or, more worryingly, try to block all commercial ties with China. To the extent that the United States attempts to deny technologies to China, the only sustainable approach involves working with allies and other countries so that the United States will not be outflanked by China and lose technology leadership in the rest of the world. If the Trump administration pursues extensive decoupling from China, the result will most likely be an isolated, poorer, and weaker United States.

And additionally Scott targets international organizations and multilateral initiatives:

The Trump administration would also be unwise to ignore global institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, as doing so would dramatically raise the likelihood of unbounded conflict. Instead, Washington should intensify multilateral cooperation to set new rules for global economic activity in order to avoid a race to the bottom.

 

The United States may in some instances need to take unilateral steps to maintain its relative technology superiority, but excessive economic security measures will mean less innovation, slower economic growth, reduced profits, and fewer jobs. With a combination of wise domestic policies, collaboration with allies, and investment in international institutions, the United States can achieve both prosperity and security.

This latter focus is welcome, it seems to me. As bad as some of the Biden tariff and sanction approaches have been, certainly the dismantling of the WTO trade and investment policies stand out, in particular, because earlier administrations were vital to the creation of the multilateral trade framework. While it was, and is imperfect, as any multilateral instrument is, it is a ‘damn sight better’ than where we are today. Geneva at the moment is dead.

But it is not just the economy/technology front that demands apparently a concerted Trump administration effort. There is also national security. The message, it seems, is being delivered by one of the key figures over decades, that is none other than Senator Mitch McConnell.

I plan to return to Senator McConnell, and a number of others on national security, after the holiday break. But it is holiday time and I plan to put down my pen for the holidays. Look for me back here at Alan’s Newsletter in the week of January 6th – 2025, if not earlier. Have a great Holiday time!

This Post first appeared as a Substack Post at Alan’s Newsletter.

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/what-can-we-expect-in-the-first-instance

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A Start on Middle Powers and Their Diplomacy

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It is kinda like wading into a well-developed cornfield; no, maybe it’s more like a cornfield with some incendiary devices strewn throughout. Anyway, this fall the China-West Dialogue (CWD) has waded into a rather concentrated discussion with colleagues and experts around the globe on an examination of Middle Powers (MPs) and their behaviors and policies – Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD).

So, where did we look? We in fact used the fall to showcase a number of possible MPs and to examine the policies and political behaviors of them. At CWD we held the following Zoom sessions:

At CWD we held the following Zoom sessions: 

  • Our lead off was on Japan with Mike Mochizuki (GWU) as the Lead Organizer;
  • then Active Non-Alignment with Latin America, led by Jorge Heine (BU) and former Ambassador for Chile as the Lead Organizer;
  • South Korea with Yul Sohn (Yonsei University) as the the Lead Organizer;
  • Australia and New Zealand with Shiro Armstrong (ANU/EAF) as Lead Organizer assisted by our own Richard Carey (OECD Alumnus); and 
  • INDONESIA and ASEAN with Maria Monica Wihardja (ISEAS) as the Lead Organizer.

These were all really terrific sessions with ‘super’ efforts to bring speakers to the sessions who could speak to MP characteristics and describe MPD. Now, these sessions were all held under Chatham House Rules but I have received remarks from some of our speakers and permission to quote these remarks here at this Post.  

 So, why was the CWD looking at questions of MPD? Certainly, for one, we were examining first which states seemed to qualify as MPs  in today’s global order/disorder?  Then we were interested in what influence, or potential influence these MPs expressed in the growing global order/disorder – growing tensions between the United States and China and the unremitting regional conflicts in the Middle East and Europe.  Where, if anywhere, were MPs influencing international relations and enhancing, perhaps, international stability and advancing global governance actions especially in such critical areas as climate transition, climate finance, debt management, global financial regulation and more? These efforts, we anticipated, could stabilize global relations in the face of current damaging international actions and the sour relations held by the leading powers, China and the US of each other. We were determined to look at MPs especially with the return of a US Trump administration and the possible significant impact of Trump 2.0 on global order stability.

Let me turn in this Post to the remarks of some of our speakers in the Australia and New Zealand session.  All the sessions were great but interestingly, two of our speakers in this session described diametrically opposing views of the impact of MPs on the current international order. One was Gareth Evans, a strong proponent for MPs and their influence in international relations. Gareth is rather well known of course. He was an Australian politician, representing the Labor Party in the Senate and House of Representatives from 1978 to 1999. He is probably best known as the  Minister for Foreign Affairs, a position he held from 1988 to 1996. Like most inquiries, Gareth starts by trying to define what a MP is. It is not an easy task. As he writes: 

For me, there are three things that matter in characterizing  middle powers: what we  are not, what we are, and the mindset we bring to our international role.

As he then describes it: 

‘Middle powers’ are those states which are not economically or militarily big or strong enough to really impose their policy preferences on anyone else, either globally or (for the most part) regionally.  We are nonetheless states which are sufficiently capable in terms of our diplomatic resources, sufficiently credible in terms of our record of principled behaviour, and sufficiently motivated to be able to make, individually, a significant impact on international relations in a way that is beyond the reach of small states.

 

And we are states, I would argue, which generally (although this can wax and wane with changes of domestic government) bring a particular mindset to the conduct of our international relations, viz. one attracted to the use of middle power diplomacy. I would describe ‘middle power diplomacy’, in turn, as having both a characteristic motivation and a characteristic method:

 

  • the characteristic motivation is belief in the utility, and necessity, of acting cooperatively with others in addressing international challenges, particularly those global public goods problems which by their nature cannot be solved by any country acting alone, however big and powerful; and
  • the characteristic diplomatic method is coalition building with ‘like-minded’ – those who, whatever their prevailing value systems, share specific interests and are prepared to work together to do something about them.

Gareth reviews policy initiatives he sees advanced by MPs over the years and described by him as: 

Our [MP] impact I think is more likely to be on individual issues, involving what might be called ‘niche diplomacy’, than across the board.  But that said, some of those niche roles, as I have just listed. can be of much greater than merely niche importance.

Finally, Gareth sets out what he believes are likely to be possible future initiatives, by at least Australia acting as a MP:

Looking to the future, there are a number of areas in which Australian middle power diplomacy can potentially make a real difference, whether by way of agenda-setting, North-South bridge-building (an aspiration of the MIKTA group within the G20), or simply building critical masses of support for global or regional public goods delivery. These areas include:

 

–   working to make the East Asian Summit become in practice the preeminent regional security and economic dialogue and policy-making body it was designed to be;

 

–   maintaining a leading advocacy role in support of free and open trade, including globally through the WTO and regionally through RCEP and the CPTPP, and vigorously resisting likely protectionist assaults by the Trump administration;

 

–   working to harness, without over-relying on an increasingly erratic US, the collective middle-power energy and capacity of a number of regional states of real regional substance – including India, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Vietnam –  to visibly push back (through mechanisms like a Quad+, optically useful though not purporting to be a formal military alliance)  against potential Chinese overreach in the region;

 

–   at the same time, actively arguing for the US as well as China to step back from the strategic competition brink, and embrace and sustain over time the spirit of détente which, which dramatically thawed relations between the US and Soviet Union: this would involve both sides living cooperatively together, both regionally and globally, respecting each other as equals and neither claiming to be the undisputed top dog;

 

–   building on our longstanding nuclear risk reduction credentials, bridging the gap between those who, on the one hand, will settle only for the kind of absolutism embodied in the Nuclear Ban Treaty, and on the other hand, the nuclear armed states and those sheltering under their protection who want essentially no movement at all on disarmament;

 

–   becoming an acknowledged global leader, not just bit player, in the campaign against global warming, putting our green energy transition money where our mouth is.” 

 

It is a MPD projected to counter at least some of the likely erratic behavior of Trump 2.0 international actions. 

It is evident that Gareth Evans accepts, in fact promotes, the current and continuing reality of MPs and their capacity to act positively even in a turbulent international setting. This positive MP and MPD view is, as it turns out, in dramatic contrast to another of our Australia speakers, Andrew Carr. Andrew Carr is an Associate Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. His remarks contrast vividly with those of Gareth Evans. While, as I pointed earlier, Chatham House Rules prevail at CWD, fortunately Andrew and a colleague Jeffrey Robinson of Yonsei University published a recent piece in International Theory, “Is anyone a Middle Power? The case for Historicization”. There Andrew and his colleague lay out their view of MPs and MPD. 

We find that while there is some variation, middle power theory can no longer help us distinguish or interpret these states. As such, we conclude the middle power concept should be historicized.

 

In blunt terms, the middle power concept does not capture anything substantive about the behaviour of mid-sized states. It should therefore not be used by scholars any further.

Andrew sees the concept as historically grounded and no longer sustains relevance and in his view must be assigned to a historical period of international relations. The two experts make it clear that using MP and MPD has outlasted its usefulness.

This is a rather clear statement and probably needs some further explanation. Now, interestingly the two researchers examine six MPs – the traditional MPs, Australia and Canada but as well newly emerging MPs – Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and Mexico. Now Carr and his colleague suggest that there are 30 MPs but their analysis relies on the six just identified. They come away, however, suggesting this:

Argument 1: the middle power concept is unable to shed its 20th century historical legacy 

 

Argument 2: contemporary states no longer reflect the core theoretical propositions of the middle power concept 

There is much insight from the analysis of these two experts. Yet the bottom line is clear: 

The evidence from our six case studies is not universal, but clear trend lines and patterns can be observed. As the 21st century has worn on, these states have all been less internationally focused, less supportive and active in multilateral forums, and shown sparse evidence of being ‘good citizens’.

Put another way the changing international structure is reshaping the behavior of MPs:

As international structures change so too will the power, status, and actions of non-great power states. The changes occurring today are removing the foundations upon which the middle power concept was explicitly created, as supporters and legitimizers of the US-led liberal international order.

So, where does that leave us in understanding which states are the MPs and what can we expect from MPs? Is there a MPD? Does such MPD correspond to what Gareth Evans describes; or are we in a global  order today where such MPD can only be seen ‘in  the rear view’ as Andrew Carr explains with his colleague Jeffrey Robertson?

Well, this is only the beginning of an answer but it is useful to look to a recent piece by Dr. Dino Patti Djalal. Now, Dr. Djalal is the founder and chair of the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) and chair of the Middle Power Studies Network (MPSN). In November Dr. Djalal published Middle Power Insights: 1st Edition. What is immediately evident is the membership of MPs in this Report was somewhat distinct from previous authors, at least from Gareth Evans. 

Like others, of course Djalal attempts to identify the current universe of MPs and what policies they promote. As Djalal describes: 

In this article, I refer to middle powers as countries that, by virtue of their considerable size (population and geography), weight (economic, diplomatic, and military strength), and ambition, are placed between the small power and great power categories.

While the objective measures, size and weight are fairly well described, ‘ambition’ is not so easily determined. With these features Djalal suggests: 

Of the 193 countries in the world today, around two dozen qualify as middle powers – some are in the Global North but the majority are in the Global South.

Here, then, is an emerging shift in today’s MPs. We are looking at MPs many of whom today are in the Global South and their behavior is also shifting: 

While all of the middle powers of the North are committed to military pacts, most middle powers in the Global South are non-aligned and tend to pursue strategic hedging. In fact, while the middle powers of the North have developed a fixed view against China, those in the Global South (except India and South Korea) tend to have an open mind and are keen to explore closer relations with China.

 

Unlike those in the North, middle powers of the South are also generally more averse in using sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. 

 

It also matters that the Middle Powers of the Global South, relative to those of the Global North, are generally strong proponents of “non-interference” and are more sensitive about the principle of “equality”.

So their policy behavior is less intrusive and by implication less committed to global policy. It would seem to suggest that many of today’s MPs target their actions at the region. As Djalal describes: 

More and more, middle powers are positioning themselves to be a driving force in shaping regional architecture, thus compelling them to step up their response to the challenges inherent in their neighborhood. They are also spearheading various minilateral initiatives that can potentially supplement the provision of global public goods and also enhance the space for meaningful dialogue.

 

By constantly resorting to strategic hedging and diversifying their strategic relationships, middle powers can render multipolarity less volatile and more stable.

At a minimum, then, according to Djalal, the new Global South MPs exercise their MPD at the regional level and possibly in small groups, minilaterally, at the international level. More clearly needs to be examined here. 

So, today was a start but just a start. Much more will need to be examined. We will return to today’s Middle Powers and their Middle Power Diplomacy, especially as the Trump administration unveils its foreign policy actions. 

Image Credit: geopoliticalcompass.com

Focusing on the Future – Where are we on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and some other things?

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Now I’m not in New York City; at least not at the moment. And I am not particularly plugged in to UN sources or other related IOs. However, it seems to me as though the SDGs – following two very publicized UN Summits, the SDG Summit in September 2023 and the Summit of the Future (SoTF) in September 2024 – have both ‘dropped like rocks’ into the international deep. Silence now seems to dominate both their efforts.

Now, before I look a little more closely at the evidence, it is worth noting, rather gloomily I must admit, the recent raft of summit gatherings including: COP29 on climate from Baku Azerbaijan, COP16 the Biodiversity Conference from Cali, Colombia and the Plastics Conference in Busan, South Korea.

At the annual climate change conference, this year COP29 in Baku Azerbaijan, a petrostate even, there was unsatisfactory progress as the global average temperature continues to rise. As noted in the NYTimes:

Negotiators at this year’s United Nations climate summit struck an agreement early on Sunday in Baku, Azerbaijan, to triple the flow of money to help developing countries adopt cleaner energy and cope with the effects of climate change. Under the deal, wealthy nations pledged to reach $300 billion per year in support by 2035, up from a current target of $100 billion.

 

Independent experts, however, have placed the needs of developing countries much higher, at $1.3 trillion per year. That is the amount they say must be invested in the energy transitions of lower-income countries, in addition to what those countries already spend, to keep the planet’s average temperature rise under 1.5 degrees Celsius. Beyond that threshold, scientists say, global warming will become more dangerous and harder to reverse.

And with respect to the urgency to move away from fossil fuels, well:

The agreement on finance ultimately affirmed a commitment to last year’s consensus on transitioning away from fossil fuels. But delegates rejected a separate document that, in theory, focused on the transition away from fossil fuels, but that after many rounds of editing ended up not even mentioning them.

And with respect to the Biodiversity Conference COP 16, held this year in Colombia:

The COP16 biodiversity summit came to an abrupt halt after countries failed to reach consensus on the creation of a new fund during a mammoth 10-hour final plenary session.

Countries debated through the night on Friday in Cali, Colombia, in an attempt to get through the many items on COP16’s agenda.

 

But, as the talks dragged on into Saturday morning, a large number of developing-country delegates were forced to catch flights home, leaving parties without the “quorum” needed to reach consensus on key issues.

Finally, with respect to the Busan, Korea meeting on plastics, here reporting from the Washington Post:

Negotiations in Busan, South Korea, to finalize a global treaty on plastic pollution collapsed earlier today, as oil-rich nations pushed back on a plan by more than 100 countries to include measures that would reduce plastic production, arguing the treaty should focus only on pollution. The talks were the last of a scheduled five, but negotiators are pushing to add another round and adopt a ‘Chair’s Text’ as the basis for 2025 negotiations.

The breakdown came after a week of late-night negotiations involving hundreds of diplomats as plastic industry officials and environmentalists watched from the sidelines in the hallways of the Busan Exhibition and Convention Center. The outcome underscores the difficulties in dialing back the use of a material that is ubiquitous and underpins a global multibillion dollar industry.

Now let’s return to the SDGs. I wrote in September 2024, in an Alan’s Newsletter Substack Post, just before the SoTF:

There will be serious efforts at the UN meetings to urge all to focus on the SDGs and accelerate efforts to achieve these goals. But there is a huge problem – a serious disconnect. And it spells continuing problems for collective global governance efforts. There is an unfortunate glaring disconnect here. The urging is [coming from] the multilateral level but the implementation is at the national level. And efforts at the national level are either underwhelming or, sadly, non-existent. Multilateralism is built and moves forward at the national level and as I have pointed out before, key member states, read that the United States – are disengaged from any national effort. US executive and congressional budgeting processes and finance and development policy implementation are simply void of any SDG policy efforts. And the US is not the only member state in this situation. The rhetoric may be there at the international level but today it does not link to national policy action.

At that time in that Post I said I’d return to the SDGs and so here we are.

In looking back, it seems that coming out of the pandemic there appeared to be some signs of encouragement that the SDGs were ‘on the move’. My good colleague, Homi Kharas from Brookings who has played a valuable role in focusing on the SDG efforts including helping to launch the SDGs by advising the U.N. Secretary General on the post-2015 development agenda (2012-2013) and leading the Report that was presented on May 30, 2013, “A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development” wrote in early 2022:

Entering 2022, then, the prospects for improved financial, scientific, and institutional backing for public health—while not sufficient—are grounds for optimism.

Homi further suggested that there was, as he described, an “under the radar story about wider awareness of the SDGs:

… but the upswell in awareness of the SDGs is palpable and significant. Awareness builds change, and change builds greater awareness and learning. A positive cycle is established.

One consequence of this growing awareness, according to Homi was the following:

It is early days, but sustainable and green finance are entering the mainstream with the prospects of more growth, standardization, and attention to avoiding greenwashing in 2022.

Even more pointedly, Homi suggested that a vein of optimism was called for. The reason: technology could provide the necessary fillip to efforts to achieve the SDGs. Under the header, “ Technology is finally delivering on its promise to make major economic production and consumption structures more sustainable”, Homi provided this example of the significant role of technology in achieving the SDGs :

There is now evidence to support the idea that when technology and economics provide the right conditions, countries can overperform on their climate pledges by a large margin. As one example, India pledged, in 2015, to generate 40 percent of its electricity in 2030 using nonfossil fuels. It reached that target last year, nine years ahead of schedule.

The technology initiatives that Homi pointed to have no doubt been helpful for economic growth but it seems to me that technology has not provided the widespread impact that at least was hinted at by Homi and described in the book that he and John McArthur and Izumi Ohno published at Brookings in 2022: The Promise of Frontier Technologies for Sustainable Development.

Nor have other optimistic signs that Homi and his colleagues pointed to in 2022. Besides greater awareness of the SDGs, and the impact of technology and better global public health there is also a more favorable outlook for world population. Still, the more recent assessment by Homi and his colleague John McArthur in a Brookings piece titled, “How is the world really doing on the SDGs?”, published this November, fairly assesses, sadly, I think, the global ‘state of play’:

Even if the pace of progress is not sufficient to achieve what 193 countries committed to delivering, this does not mean everything is getting worse. Our study examined 24 SDG-relevant, country-level indicators and started with a basic question: Have things improved since 2015? We found humanity-wide improvements for 18—ranging from the enlargement of marine protected areas to expanded access to water and sanitation. Such gains do not minimize the pain of backsliding on the six remaining measures, especially those linked to hunger and food security, not to mention the horrendous health and educational consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. But they do show why we need to differentiate progress toward the SDGs more systematically.

 

When we investigate which trends have changed since the SDG agreement in 2015, the results are more muted. The clearest accelerations in progress are in HIV incidence, antiretroviral coverage to treat AIDS, and access to electricity.

 

For eight indicators, however, we found no change in the long-term rate of progress, and spotted signs of a slowdown in nine others. (For four indicators, we did not have sufficient pre-2015 data to assess long-term changes.) The takeaway is that there is no single overall story to tell about the SDGs. Most countries are doing better on some issues and worse on others, suggesting that the world needs a more balanced scorecard for cataloging successes and failures.

If folks were hoping for a broad and systemic effort to achieve the goals set for global development under the SDGs, well that is not where we are though there has been progress on at least a number of goals.

I couldn’t quite leave it there so I decided to ring up my colleague, Homi, to get his most recent view of the world’s advancement through the lens of the SDGs. Homi did note of course that on several goals, those mentioned in his recent Brookings pieces, the efforts of states have bent the curve on those goals. But he also admitted that the case that has been made for a comprehensive approach with speed and urgency, that has been called for by the UN and particularly by the Secretary General of the UN, António Guterres, that case isn’t being heard globally. Given the rising geopolitical tensions and the series of regional conflicts, the collaborative underpinnings identified, and in fact needed by the SDGs and the collective efforts targeted by Agenda 2030, do not match up well with today’s global political interactions. Nevertheless, Homi defended the ‘plan’ as set out by Agenda 2030 suggesting that Agenda 2030 was the only plan, the sole common language framing global development today. He even suggested that come a future crisis, whether in nature, climate change, debt distress, climate finance, whatever, the SDG framework will be there and available to be taken up at that moment to meet that crisis.

Looking to the near future Homi suggested that renewal or reshaping of the SDGs are likely to be taken up in 2027 and shift into high gear likely will begin by 2028. Is renewal a realistic possibility, yes? But the shadow of President Trump and his second term cannot be ignored either. Such Trump concern could extend to the UN, itself, with the real prospect of a growing unwillingness on the part of a Trump administration to work with the UN, possibly even withdraw, or Trump 2.0 might be unwilling to pay its UN dues or arrears. And that would be a crisis.

But that’s for a separate examination. Meanwhile, there is advancement towards selected goals but overall, the current bottom line is described by Homi and another colleague, Zia Khan, the Chief Innovation Officer for Innovation at The Rockefeller Foundation in an August piece at Brookings titled: “Rebooting the Sustainable Development Goals” :

With six years remaining until the 2030 deadline, the world is far from achieving most of these goals. Despite significant improvements in some areas – such as a million more children reaching their fifth birthday each year – progress has been too slow in many others.

 

While financing gaps are rightly often cited as a key factor, the biggest obstacle to achieving the SDGs is the lack of systematic approaches to creating scalable solutions. Slow and steady gains can lead to significant advances over time, but if progress becomes too slow, the sense of achievement and hope for the future can dissipate.

 

In 2015, the SDGs were launched with a call for transformation. But calling for transformative solutions is easier than developing them. Although markets are powerful drivers of innovation, we need solutions capable of tackling broader public interests. Progress often requires new forms of collaboration between public, private, scientific, and civil-society institutions, or even the creation of new ones. But many organizations have difficulties updating their goals or building partnership strategies.

 

Siloed professional communities are difficult to unite, leaving vested interests and the forces of inertia to crowd out innovation. Consequently, partnership remains more an aspirational value than a skills-based discipline, and policy debates often prioritize ideology over practical solutions.

So individual goal progress but no overall advancement at achieving the SDGs. The world is, of course, worse for it. Besides a renaissance in US thinking on the SDGs are there alternative pathways? Maybe. The China-West Dialogue (CWD) has been exploring the possible role of Middle Powers in the near future and their capacity to move global order issues forward without the leading or even the major powers. Devising collective actions among groups of the Middle Powers might advance collective efforts and move towards the goals of the SDGs.

But more on that later.

This Post first appeared as a Substack Post from Alan’s Newsletter.

https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/focusing-on-the-future-where-are

Image Credit: Jane Goodall