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GrappIing with Explanations for US-China Relations

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I was intrigued by the recent efforts to understand and reveal the dynamic and direction of the US-China relations. In a global order where US-China tensions, or not, are likely the most consequential for either encouraging stability or instability in global affairs, new, and possibly some old insights, are key. It is why I was caught by a number of articles by colleague Ryan Hass of Brookings. Ryan is currently the Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at Brookings. He is also a senior fellow in the Center for Asia Policy Studies and is, as well, a nonresident affiliated fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. Importantly, Ryan served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff from from 2013 to 2017. In that role, he advised President Obama and senior White House officials on all aspects of U.S. policy toward China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and coordinated the implementation of U.S. policy toward this region among U.S. government departments and agencies. The point of this Post: it is very helpful to follow Ryan’s recent assessments of the US-China relationship.

I found quite helpful a number of relatively recent articles by Ryan where he tries to understand what drives the US-China relationship. The current views range from: individual great power assessments of their own power in relation to their competitors; to a range of interactive actions between and among the great powers; to domestic drivers and their impact on relations with other great powers. I was pleased to see him assess various conceptions of great power actions and their impact on current global relations with a focus on US-China  relations. So what drives US-China competition and explains in part stability in international affairs?

For Ryan it is the domestic factors that energize each country’s foreign policy actions as set out in his Brookings article from March titled, “How does national confidence inform US-China relations?”. As he writes in this piece:

Based on a review of the relationship over the past 75 years, this paper argues that when both countries feel secure and optimistic about their futures, the relationship generally functions most productively. When one country is confident in its national performance but the other is not, the relationship is capable of muddling through. And when both countries simultaneously feel pessimistic about their national condition, as is the case now, the relationship is most prone to sharp downturns. Domestic factors dictate the trajectory of relations. They do, however, play a larger role in influencing the relationship than otherwise has been observed in much recent public commentary.

 

This model for evaluating the relationship yields several policy-relevant conclusions. It suggests the relationship is dynamic and responsive to developments in both countries, as opposed to being captive to historical forces leading immutably toward conflict. It highlights that the relationship has navigated frequent zigs and zags over the past decades and rarely travels a straight line for long.” …  The current task for policymakers in Washington and Beijing is to navigate through the concurrent down cycles in both countries while keeping bilateral tensions below the threshold of conflict.

Clearly, while the interactions of the two are important aspects of the bilateral competitive relations,  it is domestic dynamics that are, according to Ryan, the significant drivers that promote cooperative relations or energize tensions:

At their core, both countries believe their governance and economic models are best equipped to meet the 21st century’s challenges. Both believe they are natural leaders in Asia and on the world stage. Both countries are contending with rapid societal transformations, which are being exacerbated by the impacts of the fourth industrial revolution. And both countries are determined to limit vulnerabilities to the other while seeking to gain an edge in emerging technologies.This is all occurring while the United States and China remain unsatisfyingly locked into a relationship that is at once both competitive and interdependent. The United States and China are competing to demonstrate which governance, economic, and social system can deliver the best results in the 21st century.

Thus in the present circumstances of US-China competition the following is the case, according to Ryan:

It [this article] argues that the United States and China presently find themselves in a simultaneous cycle of insecurity and dissatisfaction with their national conditions. Like when U.S.and PRC national down cycles have coincided in the past, this simultaneity is serving as a propellant in both countries for framing the national contest for power and influence in dramatic and, to some, existential terms.

 

Rather, by analyzing upturns and downturns in U.S.-China relations over the past 80 years, the U.S.-China relationship appears most prone to sharp volatility when both countries simultaneously are experiencing cycles of insecurity and pessimism about their futures.

 

That the U.S.-China rivalry has continued to intensify throughout the Trump and Biden administrations supports the argument that factors beyond the personalities and preferences of individual leaders inform the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. Trump and Biden are different in many respects. One through line of both of their presidencies, though, has been a sense of pessimism and loss of control among large portions of the American electorate about their country’s future.

Now the question is in the current political circumstance – with the end of Biden’s run for a second term and his replacement by Kamala Harris – what appears to be a far more optimistic leader, its seems to me,  whether this may open up a stronger prospect that the US-China relations could, assuming a Harris electoral win, stabilize and open up the prospect for more collaborative global governance efforts led by the two leading powers?

Whether Ryan’s domestic framing is an adequate explanation for US-China relations is unclear. Ryan himself allows that this described approach is not a detailed empirical analysis of great power relations but rather more of a thought experiment.

Now it is clear that this approach, just described, is but one of many contenders for understanding the state of great power relations and more particularly the US-China great power relations. In particular Ryan raises some classic IR approaches. One in particular I was interested in and Ryan examines this which he describes as: “immutable historic forces or a function of their leaders’ personalities and preferences.” As he concludes:

In other words, the United States and China are not predestined to conflict based on past patterns between rising and established powers. The nature of bilateral relations also is not simply an extension of two leaders’ preferences and personalities. There are other factors involved, specifically both countries’ internal dynamics and their levels of confidence in their national directions.

So Ryan appears unenthusiastic over ‘simple’ great power dynamics that are urged by some IR specialists.  He is not attracted to a view that focuses on the state of national power and a leader’s determination to act, or to not act, in the face of a leader’s assessment of immediate power advantage or not with rivals . Ryan mentions this in this Brookings piece but then tackles it more directly in a follow-on article where he describes in greater detail the framework, “peak power”. Ryan lays this out in an article titled, “Organizing American Policy Around “Peak China” is a Bad Bet” in China Leadership Monitor. The core argument in the ‘peak power’ thesis is that a great power, read that China, is more likely to act aggressively towards its competitors when leaders determine that that its national strength based on economic, political and military factors is waning:

China’s leaders explicitly reject suggestions that the country’s best daysare behind it. They believe China’s path to greater global influence is widening as America’s dominance in the international system wanes. It would be a mistake to organize American policy around “peak China” theory.

There certainly has been broad analysis that China, unlike in past decades, is currently struggling economically, demographically, and suffering push back from regional and other powers internationally and more. Chinese dominance regionally or even beyond is increasingly questioned. The peak power view of China has been popularized in part by two colleagues, Michael Beckley from Tufts and Hal Brands, the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at SAIS. Ryan examines their analysis of China’s leadership. As Beckly and Brands warned in a 2021 in a Foreign Affairs piece titled: “The End of China’s Rise,”the growing limits to China’s economic and political power. As Ryan suggests these IR specialists focus on strategic imperatives of great powers and their need to maintain influence and authority in the international system:

Such is the work of grand strategists who seem unconcerned about understanding China’s own vision and its strategies for securing it. Proponents of “peak China theory” treat the country as an inanimate object that is being blown off course by immutable historic forces. They assume that Beijing’s national ambitions resemble those of past rising powers that ran up against forces opposing their goals. Such analyses overlook the fact that China has agency. China’s leaders also maintain their own internal narratives and metrics for measuring progress in pursuit of their national objectives.

Ryan’s review leads him to this conclusion about China’s actions:

If any forecast of China acting as a peaking power is to hold explanatory value, there must be evidence that China’s leaders accept the diagnosis of their current condition and feel an urgency to act before their moment at the apex of national power passes. In the case of China today, no such evidence is available, at least not in the public record.

Now, I was encouraged by Ryan’s analysis of China’s power and actions to go back to the Beckley and Brands piece. Now to be fair, I should note that the two did produce a jointly authored book after the article and there may be a more elaborate explication in the volume of peak power and its influence on great power politics though most comments on their approach generally refer to the article. Here they describe what they see as the state of China’s international position in the face of declining domestic power factors:

China is a risen power, not a rising one: it has acquired formidable geopolitical capabilities, but its best days are behind it. That distinction China’s leaders are determined to move fast because they are running out of time. It matters, because China has staked out vaulting ambitions and now may not be able to achieve them without drastic action. The CCP aims to reclaim Taiwan, dominate the western Pacific, and spread its influence around the globe.

And from the article by Beckley and Brands there is surprisingly just this one paragraph in the piece that points to the consequences for great powers and the global order from the impact of peak power:

When authoritarian leaders worry that geopolitical decline will destroy their political legitimacy, desperation often follows. For example, Germany waged World War I to prevent its hegemonic aspirations from being crushed by a British-Russian-French entente; Japan started World War II in Asia to prevent the United States from choking off its empire.

Now I don’t want to extend this Post – it is already too long, and I have not read their follow-up 2022 study but I am underwhelmed by their explanation in Foreign Affairs. I have not examined closely enough the complex details of the politics of Japan before the war in the Pacific but I have examined closely the lead up to World WarI. Their view of Germany and its actions leading to World War I is just dramatically underwhelming. In my reading the crisis was driven by a decades-long decline of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and not just German aspirations and threat posed by Russia. And the state of the entente at the time of the July crisis was far from united, especially in looking at British views of the powers prior to the war.

But let’s not ‘get into the weeds’ on this. I am for the moment content to examine closely the analysis of China’s leadership by Ryan. It appears to reveal much about the state of US-China competition and geopolitical tensions in the current global order.

Image Credit: South China Morning Post

This Blog Post was originally posted at my Substack Alan’s Newsletter. Comments and free subscriptions are welcome there. https://substack.com/@globalsummitryproject/p-148581811

US Tensions Over a Leading Role

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So, I was ruminating a bit on the question of US diplomacy coming off of the previous Substack Post and particularly the Jessica Matthews’s targeting of Biden foreign policy in the upcoming Foreign Affairs article “What Was the Biden Doctrine? Leadership Without Hegemony”. As a reminder, this is what she wrote and I quoted in last week’s Substack:

 

But he [Joe Biden] has carried out a crucial task: shifting the basis of American foreign policy from an unhealthy reliance on military intervention to the active pursuit of diplomacy backed by strength.

 

He has won back the trust of friends and allies, built and begun to institutionalize a deep American presence in Asia, restored the United States’ role in essential multilateral organizations and agreements, and ended the longest of the country’s “forever wars”—a step none of his three predecessors had the courage to take.

 

All of this happened in the face of grievous new threats from China and Russia, two great powers newly allied around the goal of ending American primacy. Biden’s response to the most pressing emergency of his term—Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022—has been both skillful and innovative, demonstrating a grasp of the traditional elements of statecraft along with a willingness to take a few unconventional steps. … But he has carried out a crucial task: shifting the basis of American foreign policy from an unhealthy reliance on military intervention to the active pursuit of diplomacy backed by strength.

Now I concluded that analysis with a Matthews’s quote with my concluding remark: “Now it seems to me there are questions over the effective use of diplomacy of this Administration but that is for another day.” Well this is another day and I want to focus a little on the current effectiveness of US diplomatic policy.

There appears to be a growing split over whether the US has had, or should I say, will choose to move forward with sharper diplomatic policies and initiatives rather than, if I can put it bluntly, ‘Reach for the Gun’. In fact, in the end, there are questions of whether the US will involve itself at all in serious but distant conflicts especially in the face of seriously weakened multilateral institutions. The foreign policy question is actually two questions then: will a Harris Administration respond to foreign policy crises with sharp diplomacy or resort to force and even more dramatically not only how the US may engage but whether it will engage at all.

Shortly after Harris and Waltz assumed the mantle of leadership of the Democratic Party that a strong positive view was identified. For instance Mark Hannah and Rachel Rizzo wrote the following in FP:

When applied to foreign policy, it could inform a pragmatic, forward-looking realism that’s all too rare in Washington. This sentiment aligns with a growing expert consensus.

 

A recent Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study concluded that the United States’ current approach to the world is “poorly adapted to the challenges of today and tomorrow.” It also noted a widespread demand among analysts for “a major strategic reorientation.” This reorientation could be from an everything-everywhere-all-at-once approach to a more judicious and strategic use of American might.

Let’s start with what appears to be the positive efforts of the current Biden policy efforts and conjure it  as a likely course of action for a new Harris Administration.  The immediate diplomatic approach is the recent Biden actions focused on its key geopolitical concern – that is its perceived strategic competitor and threat – its biggest rival – China. Notwithstanding the tough back and forth the two have undertaken recent discussions that appear to be designed to stabilize this most difficult bilateral relationship. The evidence for this is the recently concluded visit of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to China. This most recent meeting with Wang Yi who is the chief Chinese foreign affairs official for President Xi was not the first. For Sullivan and Wang this was one of a series of interactions as described by Demetri Sevastopulo in the FT:

It was the first of several secret rendezvous around the world, including Malta and Thailand, now called the “strategic channel”. Sullivan will arrive in Beijing on Tuesday [August 27th] for another round of talks with Wang in what will be his first visit to China as US national security adviser.

 

While the backchannel has not resolved the fundamental issues between the rival superpowers, says Rorry Daniels, a China expert at the Asia Society Policy Institute, it has aided each’s understanding of the other. “It’s been very successful in short-term stabilisation, communicating red lines and previewing actions that might be seen as damaging to the other side,” she says.

The two leading powers do not see ‘eye-to-eye’ on the role of diplomatic interactions.  China in particular does not accept the framework of stabilization in the context of competition – the US view. Still, there does appear to be a certain diplomatic stabilization as described by Sevastopulo leading up to this most recent series of meetings in Beijing:

Sullivan strived to get Wang to understand the new reality — that the nations were in a competition but one that should not preclude co-operation. “That was a really hard jump for the Chinese,” says the second US official. “They wanted to define the relationship neatly [as] we’re either partners or we’re competitors.”

 

The Chinese official said China did not accept the argument. “Wang Yi explained very clearly that you cannot have co-operation, dialogue and communication . . . and at the same time undercut China’s interests.

 

They discussed possible deals for a summit, including a compromise that would involve the US lifting sanctions on a Chinese government forensic science institute in return for China cracking down on the export of chemicals used to make fentanyl. They also talked about resurrecting the military-to-military communication channels China had shut after Pelosi visited Taiwan. And they discussed creating an artificial intelligence dialogue.

 

Rush Doshi, a former NSC official who attended the meetings with Wang, says it was important to explain to China what the US was doing — and not doing. “Diplomacy is how you clear up misperception and avoid escalation and manage competition. It’s actually not at odds with competition but part of any sustainable competitive strategy.

And in this most recent set of meetings in Beijing, Sullivan was able to meet not just President Xi, important in and of itself,  but critically a meeting with General Zhang Youxia:

Mr. Sullivan’s meeting with Gen. Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, was the first in years between a senior American official and a vice chair of the commission, which oversees China’s armed forces and is chaired by Mr. Xi.

The Biden Administration regarded the Beijing meetings, therefore, as important diplomatic effort in stabilizing great power relations:

Sullivan tells the FT that he was under no illusions that the channel would convince China to change its policies, but he stressed that it had played an instrumental role in helping to shift the dynamic in US-China relations.

All you can do is take their policy, our policy, and then try to manage it so that we can take the actions we need to take and maintain stability in the relationship,” Sullivan says. “We have been able to accomplish both of those things.”

If managing great power relations was the US diplomatic goal, that seems to be successfully achieved for the moment. But that positive framing is not replicated in wider global order relations and the US efforts or lack thereof. Thus, the assessment of wider US diplomatic efforts is not nearly as upbeat. This is the message of Alexander Clarkson,  a lecturer in European studies at King’s College London in his analysis of US foreign policy in his WPR article titled: “For Much of the World, the Post-American Order Is Already Here”:

This gradual waning of American influence outside of core areas of strategic focus rarely features in ferocious debates in Washington between those who believe that the U.S. should remain deeply involved in global affairs and the so-called Restrainers on the left and MAGA Republicans on the right who are skeptical of security commitments outside U.S. borders.

 

The limits of the United States’ ability to influence developments on the ground in destabilizing conflicts, or the responses of states engaged in them, have been particularly visible with civil wars in Myanmar and Sudan that barely feature in domestic American news cycles. In both cases, U.S. policymakers distracted by developments elsewhere failed to anticipate emerging escalation dynamics and then failed to develop the strategic leverage needed to rein in brutal armies and militias whose backing from other states rapidly widened devastating wars.

 

Washington’s flailing in the face of conflicts within Myanmar and Sudan that have now become wider geopolitical crises is a product of long-term shifts in the global balance of power. While Washington will continue to play a decisive role in managing conflicts that involve great power competition, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the tensions between Israel and Iran and China’s strategic assertiveness under Xi Jinping, in many other parts of the world the U.S. impact will be limited to diplomatic press releases expressing grave concern.

Clarkson sees US actions and inactions as a reshaping of the global balance of power. But I suspect it is an unwillingness to exercise direct diplomatic action to what is seen to be a distant conflict. It is also an evident result of the undermining, including by the United States, of effective diplomatic action by the UN. The weakening of the formal institutions – the WTO in trade policy and the UN in security and peace efforts – is now ‘coming home to roost’ at the US doorstep. US inaction is matched by the inability of these and other formal institutions to take on, stabilize and hopefully resolve difficult and potentially threatening conflicts.

The Harris Administration, if it wins, needs to address the manner of engagement but in too many instances the likely failure of foreign policy engagement at all. Much is currently wanting in US foreign policy. It is unclear if a Harris Administration is likely to tackle, and if so, how, these difficult foreign policy questions.

Image Credit: YouTube

This Post was originally posted at Alan’s Newsletter. Your comments are welcome as well as free subscriptions to Alan’s Newsletter

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The Intensity of the US Presidency – and the Race

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So many eventful happenings again this past week. As a consequence this Post will be a quick ‘dip and serve’ of several consequential matters. First from my international law colleague, Ooa Hathaway from Yale Law School and the Department of Political Science at Yale. She is one of the best. She and her colleague, Scott Shapiro wrote a terrific book in 2017, The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World. And it was interesting to see this past week that her piece on the Presidential Immunity case, Trump v the United States, appeared in Foreign Affairs, the journal not particularly notable for publishing international law issues. Nevertheless, the piece is quite interesting by pointing out that this examination of Presidential Immunity domestically has long been examined internationally – and the consequences have not been good. As Oona writes: 

What most analysts have failed to note, however, is that this lack of legal accountability for decisions by the U.S. president, including decisions to direct the military to use lethal force, is nothing new. It has long been the reality for most of the world outside the United States.

As Oona points out there has been a long effort to reign in such ‘extra-legal’ Presidential behavior:

What most analysts have failed to note, however, is that this lack of legal accountability for decisions by the U.S. president, including decisions to direct the military to use lethal force, is nothing new. It has long been the reality for most of the world outside the United States.

 

For years, attempts have been made to hold the United States accountable for its unsanctioned violence. Lawyers in the United States and overseas have filed case after case challenging U.S. military and CIA operations abroad, but few have made it past procedural and jurisdictional hurdles. As a result, the U.S. president has long been a “king above the law” when it comes to actions outside the United States.

As Oona, perhaps, vainly concludes: 

The problem of presidential immunity—and the capacity of the president to act outside the law—was not created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. United States. It was simply exposed and expanded by it. Outside the United States, American presidents have long been able to violate the law with impunity, inflicting death and property destruction on civilians in the process. Now that this is also true in the United States, perhaps there will be the will to do something about it.

The acknowledgement of some immunity for ‘official acts’ – still to be determined of course, is just one aspect of presidential intensity that I recognized in the past week. The obvious other matter is the gathering US presidential race. It has been a whirlwind of change for the Democrats of course, but it seems for the Republicans and the Trump campaign as well. 

First was the incredibly speedy replacement of President Biden with his Vice-President, Kamala Harris. The ultra speedy consolidation of her position as the presumptive nominee for the Democrats was startling and indeed head spinning.  As Shane Goldmacher described in his recent NYT piece, titled, “How Kamala Harris Took Command of the De​​mocratic Party in 48 Hours”:

Time was of the essence. A sprawling call list of the most important Democrats to reach had been prepared in advance, according to two people with knowledge of the situation. The vice president, in sneakers and a sweatshirt, began methodically dialing Democratic power brokers.

 

I wasn’t going to let this day go by without you hearing from me,” Ms. Harris had said over and over, as day turned to night, according to five people who received her calls or were briefed on them.

 

The blitz demonstrated exactly the kind of vigor and energy that Mr. Biden had lacked in recent weeks. Mr. Biden had reportedly made 20 calls to congressional Democrats in the first 10 or so days after the debate, while his candidacy hung in the balance. Ms. Harris made 100 calls in 10 hours.

 

Within 48 hours, Ms. Harris had functionally cleared the Democratic field of every serious rival, clinched the support of more delegates than needed to secure the party nomination, raised more than $100 million and delivered a crisper message against former President Donald J. Trump than Mr. Biden had mustered in months.

The speed and impact on the Democratic Party of Harris assuming leadership, and the invidious comparison with Biden and his now ended campaign appears quite stark. As described by Goldmacher:

Even some at the White House and the newly transformed Harris campaign in Wilmington, Del., privately confided that the vice president’s energetic early appearances were a refreshing change from those of the 81-year-old president, whose verbal stumbles were constant fodder on the right.

The heaviness and distress of the prior campaign was only underlined by the President’s ‘stepping aside’ Oval Office appearance and statement this last Wednesday. It was quite the downer and it certainly lacked insight and explanation. Susan B. Glasser of TheNewYorker did a good job of describing the very short Biden speech: 

The short, awkward speech—a mere eleven minutes, though it felt longer than that, listening to Biden’s painful communion with the ghosts of Presidents past as he justified his decision to step aside a few months before the election—served as yet another reminder of why Democratic officials had felt such an urgency to act. … Lyndon B. Johnson was the only other modern President to choose not to run again for a second term, and, in the address he gave to the nation making his surprise announcement, in March of 1968, the trauma of Vietnam that prompted his decision did not seem at all comparable to Biden’s quieter tragedy of an octogenarian in decline and denial.

 

Years from now, I suspect it will not be Biden’s speech that I’ll remember so much as the few heady days of pure political joy among Democrats that preceded it: the race against Trump, practically given up for lost, suddenly looked winnable again.

That sudden energy and excitement that appeared to surge through the Democratic Party seemed very evident if not palatable. Now, let’s be clear, it is far too early to tell if the Harris ascension has in fact altered the trajectory of the race. And it will take some time to get some electoral evidence impact. Any numbers at the current moment can only be received with restraint if not outright skepticism. Still, here is just an early dip into the electoral waters at this very early stage by folks at the NYT under the heading: “Harris Narrows Gap Against Trump, Times/Siena Poll Finds” : 

Overall, Mr. Trump leads Ms. Harris 48 percent to 47 percent among likely voters in a head-to-head match. That is a marked improvement for Democrats when compared to the Times/Siena poll in early July that showed Mr. Biden behind by six percentage points, in the aftermath of the poor debate performance that eventually drove him from the race.” … Because the survey was of voters nationwide, the impact of Ms. Harris’s candidacy in particular battleground states was not immediately clear.

And my colleague Dan Drezner from Drezner’s World,  a noted Substack provider not to mention a Distinguished Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School  of Tufts University set out ‘Ten Things I Think I Think About the 2024 Presidential Race After Joe Biden’s Exit’. Here just one point:

Until then, [the Convention] I have ten thoughts — some of which are pretty banal but nonetheless worthy of mention:

 

2. Despite all the shocks, the race remains mostly unchanged. In the past ten days there has been an assassination attempt, multiple court rulings favorable to Trump, his choice of J.D. Vance to be his vice president candidate, and the pageantry of the Republican National Convention. Despite all that, Trump has not received much of a bump. To be sure, he’s in the lead, which is something. Still, despite a month’s worth of good news, it’s still a pretty tight race. That is mostly because Trump is a historically unpopular politician. Never forget that although Trump has a high floor of support, he also has an incredibly low ceiling.

 It is clearly, at this moment, a real contest again. Phew! And, enjoy the Olympics!

Image Credit: CNBC 

Violence and Political Disorder in the United States

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It’s rather foolish to believe that even a ‘bullet wound’ would alter Donald Trump. His speech accepting the nomination for the Republican Party on Thursday night – over 90 minutes – proved that.  What you see is what you get. But let me reflect for a moment on the consequences for Trump, and the political system, of this attempt on his life.  Its impact it seems on American politics, and more particularly on the Trump third presidential run – well, at least for the moment, appears rather negligible. As Susan B. Glasser of The NewYorker wrote:

Trump’s supposed pivot to the center was silly spin, and yet all week long I marvelled at the collective susceptibility to this narrative, so seductive, so absurd. … Soon enough on Thursday night, the audience was back to its comfort zone, booing as Trump criticized “crazy Nancy Pelosi” and warned that the hated Democrats were “destroying our country,” cheering him on as he demanded the firing of union leaders and rambled about the “China virus” and the “plunder” of our nation by rapacious foreigners. The second coming of George Herbert Walker Bush this was not.

He may have had a brush with death but he has not been reborn. He is the same Trump, only four years older, angrier, and far, far more incoherent than anyone who has any business being President of the United States. If Biden can’t beat him, then surely someone else can—and must.

Okay, so it was, I suspect, a rather a vain hope. But it is worth reflecting here on the incident and what it says about American political violence. It certainly appears that many view the shooting – public and commentators alike – as being strongly linked to political violence in the United States. Numerous commentators reprised repeated views and analysis that first reflected on heightened political polarization in the US body politic and then suggesting the tie to instances of political violence. Foreign Affairs reflected on this causal chain with an interview with Robert Lieberman, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins,  who with his colleague from Cornell, Suzanne Mettler in 2020 had written an FA piece titled, “The Fragile Republic: American Democracy Has Never Faced So Many Threats All at Once”. In that piece the two argued:

Polarization is not a static state but a process that feeds on itself and creates a cascade of worsening outcomes. Over time, those who exploit it may find it difficult to control, as members of the party base become less and less trustful of elites and believe that none is sufficiently devoted to their core values.

The culmination of polarization can endanger democracy itself. If members of one political group come to view their opponents as an existential threat to their core values, they may seek to defeat them at all costs, even if it undermines normal democratic procedures. They may cease to view the opposition as legitimate and seek permanent ways to prevent it from gaining power, such as by stacking the deck in their own favor. They may become convinced that it is justifiable to circumvent the rule of law and defy checks and balances or to scale back voting rights, civil liberties, or civil rights for the sake of preserving or protecting the country as they see fit.

And then as Lieberman reflects in his very recent interview on the current political landscape that we face in the aftermath of the shooting:

There are four features that help cause democratic crises. The first is political polarization, the second is conflict over who belongs in the political community, the third is high and growing economic inequality, and the fourth is excessive executive power. At least one of these forces has been present at every moment of democratic turmoil in U.S. history.

What makes the last four years different is that all of them are present. They helped fuel Trump’s rise and were part of why the country was vulnerable to an incident like the storming of the Capitol on January 6. And unfortunately, every such event only further weakens the country’s democracy. It makes the Trump shooting even more dangerous and provocative than it otherwise would be.

So I really worry that if Trump and his people start talking about this in an inflammatory way, you could see not just sporadic attacks—which is what this shooting seems to have been—but more collective and organized forms of violence.

What is interesting is that  a number of current commentators draw the link between the current instability and then tie it back to the origins of the political community. Here is Nick Bryant, the former reporter for the BBC in New York reflecting in FP:

Now, though, I would amend my advice. I would urge young reporters to reach back even further into history. The roots of modern-day polarization, and even the origins of former President Donald Trump, can be located in the country’s troubled birth. Division has always been the default setting.

So many contemporary problems can be traced back to those founding days. U.S. democracy has become so diseased because for most of the country’s history, it has not been that healthy. “We the People,” the rousing words that opened the preamble to the Constitution, was not conceived of as an inclusive statement or catchall for mass democracy. Rather, this ill-defined term referred to what in modern terminology might be called the body politic.

So there are multiple explanations for this instance of political violence, some anchored to the founding of the nation, but most tethered to deep political polarization and dire concerns of immediate political consequences. But there is a particular difficulty, in my mind, in understanding the current circumstances and its political consequences. And to me this understanding the motivation for the shooting by Thomas Crooks. Though much scrutiny has occurred, and I am sure there is likely more to come, there does not appear to be a political motivation involved. In the most recent inquiry by a number of NYT reporters concluding 60 interviews with classmates, teachers, neighbors and officials in Bethel Park, Pa., and reviewed law enforcement bulletins and extensive school records for the article, there is no evidence to date of a political motive:

Experts who study the histories of gunmen said the emerging picture of Mr. Crooks looked more like a 21st-century school shooter than a John Wilkes Booth.

“When somebody attacks a president, our gut instinct is to say, ‘That must be politically motivated,’” said James Densley, a founder of the Violence Project, which has compiled a comprehensive database of mass shootings. “What we might be seeing here is: This was somebody intent on perpetrating mass violence, and they happened to pick a political rally.”

From the near outside – which is where I am situated, it is perplexing that so few commentators reflect on the obvious – the dramatic presence in the United States of too many guns in the country. Not ignoring this, however – and what appears to me to be the obvious as well, is the reflection by Opinion Writer for NYT, David Wallace-Wells. And he writes:

But many others were not so obviously motivated by ideology or a sense of political crusade, including the country’s deadliest attack, in Las Vegas. In Connecticut, Adam Lanza left no manifesto before marching into Sandy Hook Elementary School, and though Virginia Tech’s Seung-Hui Cho left an epic paper trail, it primarily documented deep social resentment and incel-style sexual frustration like that which pushed Elliot Rodger toward violence in the 2014 Isla Vista killings. Other rampages — including in Uvalde, Lewiston and Aurora — have been rendered in national memory not just as horrifying acts of spectacular violence but enigmatic ones, too, with inscrutable motivations.

In the aftermath of the shooting at Trump’s rally, it seems everyone had a story to tell or an argument to make about it. But conspicuously absent was the subject that often takes center stage in the wake of a shooting: guns.

Everyone knows this country is an unusually violent place, but few appreciate just how unusually so. Our gun homicide rate is 22 times as high as it is in the European Union; this means that, on a per-capita basis, for every European who is killed by a gun every year, 22 Americans are. One conservative estimate put the number of guns in America at almost 378 million, increasingly concentrated in a smaller number of households. Perhaps 44 million are AR-15-style rifles.

And while American murder rates are in long-term decline, mass shootings, though only a tiny fraction of the total, are becoming only more common. About a decade ago, it was sometimes pointed out that, contrary to the public narrative, mass shootings hadn’t meaningfully increased in America; instead, they had simply become more salient in an age of, first, cable news and, then, social media. But if you define “mass shooting” as an attack with four or more victims, killed or injured, the number more than doubled between 2014 and 2023.

Experts, analysts and opinion writers need to face these very striking figures. And, if necessary, ignore the politics.

Image Credit: The New York Times

Challenging Leadership and Stability in the Global Order

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There are some recent insights worth examining. These insights underscore the current difficulties of US leadership in the global order. There are at least three critical issues that challenge US foreign policy leadership today. These include: the ‘shadow of Trump’; the continuing primacy demand of US leadership; and the harm inflicted by current US economic policy making. All three and more undermine continuing US foreign policy leadership in a changing global order.

First there is the ‘shadow of a Trump return’ to the US presidency. As quixotic as the first Trump term was, it appears that this prior Trump term likely will be a pale shadow of how a second Trump presidency will conduct itself. There are strong indications that Trump will direct retribution on those such as the Justice Department that he believes undermined his first term as President. And there will be others. And his inconsistent nationalist-isolationist impulses will likely once again be on full display in his relations with NATO, Ukraine, Russia and China. Buckle up!  It could be very ugly. But meanwhile the shadow of his return has caused friend and foe alike to hedge their relations with the US allies, Global South and Middle Power players, and, of course, presumed foes.

So, that is one source of current harm to US leadership. Then there is the continuing determination by the Biden Administration to maintain the US sole superpower leadership role. This can also be read as the US hegemonic position in the global order. The dilemma of US leadership in a changing power order is all too evident. And it is likely to carry forward into the next administration whatever the political stripe it is.

We were alerted to this dilemma really some time ago and by none other than former National Security Advisor, H.R.McMaster. McMaster was appointed in 2017 by President Trump and after leaving office he wrote about his career in: “Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World”. There he raised the notion of ‘strategic narcissism”. While there is some contention over whether this concept was first voiced by the great international relations theorist, Hans Morgenthau, and McMaster raises that possibility, the point is the concept itself. Morgenthau did write an essay in 1978 called, “The Roots of Narcissism,” but McMaster in his book carried the concept forward in his description of ‘strategic narcissism’. For McMaster, ‘strategic narcissism’ was:

the tendency to view the world only in relation to the United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily on U.S. decisions or plans.

I believe this concept and its elaboration helps us with a central concept in US foreign policy making. This framing aids us in understanding US approaches to leadership in international relations. That view was underlined in the recent piece by Ben Rhodes. It is well worth reviewing the insights provided by Rhodes in this very recent Foreign Affairs (FA) article. Rhodes has been directly involved in US foreign policy where from 2009 to 2017, he served as U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting in the Obama administration. He has been close to Democratic policymaking for a long time including being close with many in the current Biden Administration. As he wrote recently in the FA piece outlining what he sees as a needed reassessment of Democratic foreign policy making:

An updated conception of U.S. leadership—one tailored to a world that has moved on from American primacy and the eccentricities of American politics—is necessary to minimize enormous risks and pursue new opportunities. … Meeting the moment requires abandoning a mindset of American primacy and recognizing that the world will be a turbulent place for years to come. Above all, it requires building a bridge to the future—not the past.

In particular Rhodes points to the Trump ability in current presidential competition to build on the negative reaction to Democratic policy making in the period after the end of Cold War and the ‘triumph’ of US leadership:

Trump has also harnessed a populist backlash to globalization from both the right and the left. Particularly since the 2008 financial crisis,

large swaths of the public in democracies have simmered with discontent over widening inequality, deindustrialization, and a perceived loss of control and lack of meaning. It is no wonder that the exemplars of post–Cold War globalization—free trade agreements, the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and the instruments of international economic cooperation itself—have become ripe targets for Trump.

And these insights also alert us to yet another weakness in the international system – the fading of multilateralism, at least formal institutions. As Rhodes points out:

Second, the old rules-based international order doesn’t really exist anymore. Sure, the laws, structures, and summits remain in place.

But core institutions such as the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization are tied in knots by disagreements among their members. Russia is committed to disrupting U.S.-fortified norms. China is committed to building its own alternative order. On trade and industrial policy, even Washington is moving away from core tenets of post–Cold War globalization.

Even the high-water mark for multilateral action in the Biden years—support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia—remains a largely Western initiative. As the old order unravels, these overlapping blocs are competing over what will replace it.

Finally, and raised by Rhodes in his article is the Biden Administration’s turn away from free trade and access to the US market as others lower their barriers to freer trade. Protectionism has become rife under the Biden Administration guise of ‘industrial policy’ and such protectionism has been defended, I’d say promoted by Biden folks such as Jake Sullivan. As Sullivan argued early in the Administration, in fact before that in fact, he promoted quite loudly a policy for the middle class. As reported by Michigan State Representative Mari Manoogian, Sullivan urged:

In February 2021, national security advisor Jake Sullivan clearly defined the overarching theme of President Joe Biden’s foreign policy strategy as “foreign policy for the middle class.” The Chicago Council for Global Affairs contends that this Biden doctrine “recogniz[es] the linkages between American domestic strength and U.S. ability to maintain international competitiveness.” Under this new framework, foreign policy decisions, Sullivan indicated, would use the following simple rhetorical question as a basic metric for success: “Is it going to make life better, safer, and easier for working families?

But as FTs Martin Wolf has been loudly pointing out for some time in fact this is a strategy of trade protectionism cloaked within the frame of industrial policy all too frequently.  As Wolf recently wrote at his FT column:

Industrial policy works if it changes the structure of the economy in a beneficial direction. Unfortunately, there are well-known reasons why the attempt could fail. Lack of information is one. Capture by a range of special interests is another. Thus, governments may fail to pick winners, while losers may succeed in picking governments. The more money is on the table, the more the latter is likely to be true. … So, how should we assess this shift in US policy towards industrial policies, matched, on the Trumpian right, by a desire to return to the high tariffs of the late 19th and early 20th centuries?… The answer is that there are now at least three bipartisan positions: nostalgia for manufacturing; hostility to China; and indifference to the international rules that the US itself created. This, then, is a new world, one in which the international trading order could reach a breaking point quite quickly.

All of this is a dramatic threat to the stability and prosperity of the current global order.

Image Credit: E-International Relations

 

 

 

Biden Trade Protectionism

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There is a continuing interest in capturing the state of the current global political economy and the global economic policymaking of the major states – the US, China, India, Brazil, Europe, Japan, Korea, and others. Not surprisingly the debate is most active in the US. Experts and officials alike are intent in describing current Biden Administration policy. Most recently some experts have been labeling the global economic framework as ‘post- neoliberalism’, defining it, apparently, in contradistinction to the previous dominant policy framework – ‘neoliberalism’.  The dilemma of course is a definitional one as much as anything else  – the terms are well known, their meaning not so much. 

Recently, colleagues of mine have kicked off a discussion. One, Dan Drezner, from the Fletcher School and the Substack ‘Drezner’s World’ has waded into the policy mix, actually in an article from Reason titled, “The Post-Neoliberalism Moment”. As Dan early in the piece thought to frame first neoliberalism he suggested the following: 

The term neoliberal has been stigmatized far more successfully than it has been defined. For our purposes, it refers to a set of policy ideas that became strongly associated with the so-called Washington Consensus: a mix of deregulation, trade liberalization, and macroeconomic prudence that the United States encouraged countries across the globe to embrace. These policies contributed to the hyperglobalization that defined the post–Cold War era from the fall of the Berlin Wall to Brexit.

Dan made it clear, however, that this economic model no longer dominates: 

In the 16 years since the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberalism has taken a rhetorical beating; New Yorker essayist Louis Menand characterized it as “a political swear word.” Until recently, no coherent alternative set of ideas had been put forward in mainstream circles—but that has been changing. 

And what has been the replacement, well Dan suggests that its the politicians and officials that have been most active in leaving neoliberalism behind:

These ideas are being shaped by powerful officials. The primary difference between Biden and Trump in this area is that Trump’s opposition to globalization was based on gut instincts and implemented as such. The Biden administration has been more sophisticated. Policy principals ranging from U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai to National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan have been explicit in criticizing “oversimplified market efficiency” and proposing an alternative centered far more on resilience.

For elements of this policy transformation one need only look to recent Biden Administration policies including the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. As Dan concludes, the totality of these policy initiatives is: “all represent a pivot to industrial policy—a focus on domestic production.” 

In constructing this post-neoliberalism model, folks argue that there is a necessary trade-off between resilience and efficiency. As Dan suggests: “A key assumption behind post-neoliberalism is that policy makers can implement the right policies in the right way to nudge markets in the right direction.” 

Now another colleague of mine, Henry Farrell from Johns Hopkins, tries his hand at a definition in a recent Substack Post at his ‘Programmable Mutter’, titled, “If Post-Neoliberalism is in Trouble, We’re all in Trouble”. The Post partly responds to Dan, and further articulates Henry’s view of post-neoliberalism. As he describes it: 

A key assumption behind post-neoliberalism is that policy makers can implement the right policies in the right way to nudge markets in the right direction. … I see post-neoliberalism less as a coherent alternative body of thought, than as the claim, variously articulated by a very loosely associated cluster of intellectuals and policy makers, that markets should not be the default solution. … More generally, post-neoliberalism isn’t and shouldn’t be a simple reverse image of the system that it has to remake. It can’t be, not least because it has to build in part on what is already there.

The dilemma, as I see it, for understanding any of these  post-neoliberalism models, and also, though less intensely – neoliberalism, is pretty much all definitional. The base of the problem is not really understanding what ‘resilience’ and ‘efficiency’ really mean. And that in turn causes confusion over trying to then understand ‘globalization’.  And that unfortunately builds vagueness into our understanding of these economic models especially over what we are to understand to be – post-neoliberalism. 

But what isn’t so difficult to understand is the problem that has been created in this post-neoliberal period by current trade policy especially as seen in the United States. Layer it as much as you can but the Biden Administration policy is ‘protectionist’ and the Trump Administration, was, and will in all likelihood be, even more protectionist if Trump is returned to office in late 2024. As Inu Manak has written in a recent piece for the Hinrich Foundation in Australia – a foundation focused on global trade: 

Trade has become toxic, not just on the campaign trail, but in the way that it is discussed by both Democrats and Republicans. “Traditional” US trade policy, which began to form its nearly century-old roots under the leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, has been described by US Trade Representative Katherine Tai as “trickle-down economics,” where “maximum tariff liberalization…contributed to the hollowing out of our industrial heartland. … The current US approach to trade, if it can be called an approach at all, risks weakening US influence abroad and economically disadvantaging Americans at home. It rests on the false belief that retrenchment of “traditional” US trade policy—by putting America First or catering to a select group of US workers and branding such efforts as “worker-centric trade policy”—will somehow restore the United States to a position of hegemonic dominance with no peer competitor. 

The Biden Administration’s allergy to new trade policy initiatives can be seen in its Indo-Pacific economic strategy – the IPEF – the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. This framework is intended to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness for the fourteen countries negotiating the IPEF. The countries included are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam with the United States. The IPEF partners represent 40 percent of global GDP and 28 percent of global goods and services trade. Negotiations have proceeded well for three of the four pillars including supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy pillars but the Biden Administration has decided not to proceed in negotiating for fair and resilient trade. As William Reinsch at CSIS described the situation: 

The commentariat is busy these days debating the future of the Biden administration’s trade policy in the wake of its effective abandonment of the trade pillar in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) negotiations. (The administration says the talks will continue, and I imagine they will, but I don’t see a conclusion, at least before the election.) The policy is clearly a failure at this point, …

As colleague Ryan Haas of the Brookings Institution, and a former US official – from 2013 to 2017, Hass served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council (NSC) staff – underscored in his examination of trade policy in the Indo-Pacific: 

These constraints will be most visible on trade. The absence of a credible trade and economic agenda for Asia has been the Biden administration’s greatest weakness. Political and national security imperatives will continue to drive the United States’ approach to trade. Do not expect any outbreak of creativity or boldness on trade by the Biden administration in 2024.

The Biden Administration failed to roll back the tariffs imposed by the Trump trade folk. It is a major failure of US trade policy and an expression of the Biden SAdministration’s trade protectionism. It bodes ill for growing the global economy and achieving productivity gains for the United States and others.

Image Credit: E-International Relations

This Post originally appeared at my Substack Post Alan’s Newsletter – https://open.substack.com/pub/globalsummitryproject/p/biden-trade-protectionism?r=bj&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcome=true

 

China-West Relations: Reading the Dynamics and Getting the Mix Right

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China-US relations are at a critical juncture in fashioning global order relations in the 2020s.  As Joe Biden approaches inauguration day, there is increasing speculation on what approach he will take toward China.  Theories abound.  There are those in foreign policy circles who are seen as “restorationists” (see Thomas Wright at TheAtlantic for these terms) who tend to have a greater focus on the cooperation component of the relationship.  There are “reformists” who have come to the conclusion that competition and rivalry must define the path for US-China relations.  There are those who see China as the culprit in job loss, technology theft, trade imbalances, the pandemic, climate change and other hits on American pre-eminence.  And there are many with cultural, societal and business ties to China who hope for a period of predictability, and hopefully opportunity.

Clear-eyed self-interest and deep understanding of the new political dynamics need to guide Biden foreign policy. For Biden and his team, it is not just a question how to reframe US international relations after Trump, but how to shape them in response to changed circumstances, domestic constraints, and new defining elements in the global landscape. 

For starters, Asia is more pressing than Europe, the Indo-Pacific region more demanding than the trans-Atlantic, China is more important than Russia, social and environmental issues are more compelling than trade and financial policies, and domestic pressures everywhere mean that international policies are now constrained by and tethered to internal conditions affecting ordinary people.  Global inter-connectivity may be vividly evident, but domestic politics are dominant in defining strategic thrusts.

Biden and his team seem to “get” most of these circumstances, constraints and defining elements.  But, it is not clear that the incoming Administration has yet stared down the underlying political dynamics that will define geopolitical relations among leading powers, especially how to approach China in ways that makes sense to the other significant global players, that will be effective with China and with domestic political constraints. For this, the various “schools of thought” contending with each other to define the overall narrative for US relations with China, each by themselves are less helpful than combining them to address the complexity and importance of this most crucial relationship.

The starting point has to be a clear understanding that China does indeed have strategic interests in meeting US dominance in the Pacific. Additionally, China does use the state and public resources to advance its economic dynamism, does use techniques for internal control which violate international norms on human rights, and does have the scale, scope and dynamism to be a challenger to US predominance, a rival in the Pacific and a competitor in the global economy.  There is no doubt that this is the reality of China today.  The hardening of Xi Jinping’s authoritarian rule in the last four years is real and worrisome. 

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